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At least 127 records · Page 7

Precursor Analysis Report: Blackmatter Ransomware Attack on New Cooperative 2021

The BlackMatter Ransomware Attack on New Cooperative 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the New Cooperative cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The BlackMatter ransomware was first identified in July 2021 and is reported to have infected more than 50 corporations around the world. , The Iowa-based grain cooperative, New Cooperative, was impacted by the BlackMatter ransomware on or before 18 September 2021. The adversary likely resided on New Cooperative’s networks for 15 days prior to encrypting its network and demanding New Cooperative pay $5.9 million in ransom by 25 September to unlock systems and prevent 1 terabyte (TB) of sensitive data from being publicly released. It is not clear if New Cooperative paid the ransom. The full impact of the ransomware attack is not known; however, according to New Cooperative’s general manager, the attack caused the company’s automated processes to revert back to processes used in the 1970s. , As of 6 October, only 50 percent of New Cooperative’s operations were utilizing automated processes. The company took eight weeks to rebuild the entire network and information technology (IT) systems from the ground up, which puts the date of fully recovery around 13 November. Researchers and analysts identified 20 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 404 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Seventeen of the identified techniques used during the New Cooperative cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 360 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 284 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 15 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Rapid Monitoring and Defense Approach for Resilience Improvement of Grid Cyber Security

Cyber-physical systems and electric utilities significantly depend on the reliability and efficiency of information and operational technology. However, false data injection attacks based on synchrophasor measurement data pose a serious threat to the safe and reliable operation of modern power systems. Here, to mitigate this problem, a rapid monitoring and defense approach is proposed to defend against cyber attacks. Initially, the Time and Frequency based Convolutional neural Network (TFCN) is proposed to detect different types of attacks. Within the TFCN, the advances are that both time and frequency domain information can be fused without extra spectrum analysis methods, and can save detection time to speed the calculation efficiency using the developed time-frequency block. Next, a comprehensive defense strategy is developed for multiple cyber attacks to ensure the stability and resilience of the power system according to the feedback detection results. The advances of this strategy are that different control strategies can be automatically selected to recover the stability to the greatest extent according to the detected attacks. To verify the effectiveness of the proposed approach, the high-speed frequency measurements collected from the wide-area monitoring system are used. The results demonstrate that the cyber attack detection performance can reach 95.57% accuracy, outperforming both traditional and some advanced neural networks. Importantly, the defense strategy is conducted and verified in a modified IEEE 39 bus system as well, which illustrates profound performance in faster stability restoration.

Comprehensive defense strategy↗

Accelerating technology development to monitor and minimize effects from land‐based wind energy on birds and bats

While wind energy is a key sector of domestic energy production for the United States, operation of wind turbines directly and indirectly adversely affects certain species of birds and bats. The cumulative effect of wind turbine strikes can have both biological and regulatory consequences, and, in some cases, delay permitting and construction or affect ongoing operations. Technology can help quantify and minimize these effects, but the pace of development, acceptance, and adoption of technological solutions is slow. Although adopting cost‐effective technologies may reduce negative effects on wildlife and help achieve both energy production and conservation goals, consensus is lacking among developers, regulators, and the conservation community regarding how to define technology effectiveness and acceptance and how to develop a standardized process for doing so. Removing barriers to technology advancement requires deviating from the status quo. Changes include 1) creating incentives to mitigate impacts, 2) establishing options for research as mitigation, 3) rethinking how research is funded, 4) increasing stakeholder coordination, and 5) increasing the efficiency of research and development. We recommend the creation of a national framework to establish clear criteria and protocols for technology evaluation and adoption.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Materials and devices for fundamental quantum science and quantum technologies

Technologies operating on the basis of quantum mechanical laws and resources such as phase coherence and entanglement are expected to revolutionize our future. Quantum technologies are often divided into four main pillars: computing, simulation, communication, and sensing & metrology. Moreover, a great deal of interest is currently also nucleating around energy-related quantum technologies. In this Perspective, we focus on advanced superconducting materials, van der Waals materials, and moiré quantum matter, summarizing recent exciting developments and highlighting a wealth of potential applications, ranging from high-energy experimental and theoretical physics to quantum materials science and energy storage.

Polini, Marco↗

Cyber-CHAMP White Paper

Cyber-CHAMP white paper intern school assignment. Worldwide there is a tremendous shortfall in the cybersecurity workforce. By 2021, researchers have forecasted a deficit of 3.5 million cyber professionals. As workforce capabilities diminished, the world's cybersecurity threats have continued to multiply. Industrial control systems (ICSs) and their operational technology (OT) components became more vulnerable to attack and compromise. When an ICS is compromised, attackers can cause widespread impacts on national security, public health, and safety. This capacity makes ICSs attractive targets, with 90% of surveyed OT organizations reporting a damaging cyberattack in the last two years. To address the risk to ICSs, personnel must be competent in operational best practices and the latest threats. While frameworks for information technology (IT) cybersecurity education have been developed, educational standards for OT cybersecurity are nonexistent.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cybersecurity Workforce Training for SMR Integration into Distribution Grids: A Competency Framework and Containerized Hands-On Lab for the SMR/DER/Microgrid Boundary

Small modular reactors (SMRs) and microreactors are entering the U.S. distribution grid as synchronous generation on feeders designed for loads and inverter-based distributed energy resources (DERs). No existing cybersecurity training program addresses this intersection of nuclear operations, DER management, and operational technology security. As subcontractor to Iowa State University on the CyDERMS Center, Argonne analyzed the relevant standards and training landscape, translated the resulting gaps into a twelve-objective competency framework across distribution-operator and graduate-analyst role tracks, and built a containerized training lab using a ∼400-bus composite grid model behind a realistically simulated Modbus TCP SCADA stack. The analysis isolates the balance-of-plant / energy-management-system (BOP/EMS) boundary as the critical jurisdictional seam where, as of March 2026, neither NRC nor NERC CIP cleanly claims cybersecurity responsibility for distribution-connected SMRs. The framework maps each objective across NIST CSF 2.0, ISA/IEC 62443, NIST NICE Task–Knowledge–Skill statements, and NRC RG 5.71 awareness-and-training controls. The training lab implements operator-recognition assessment scenarios spanning grid-side disturbances and telemetry-layer anomalies.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Design Considerations for Distributed Energy Resource Honeypots and Canaries

There are now over 2.5 million Distributed Energy Resource (DER) installations connected to the U.S. power system. These installations represent a major portion of American electricity critical infrastructure and a cyberattack on these assets in aggregate would significantly affect grid operations. Virtualized Operational Technology (OT) equipment has been shown to provide practitioners with situational awareness and better understanding of adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Deploying synthetic DER devices as honeypots and canaries would open new avenues of operational defense, threat intelligence gathering, and empower DER owners and operators with new cyber-defense mechanisms against the growing intensity and sophistication of cyberattacks on OT systems. Well-designed DER canary field deployments would deceive adversaries and provide early-warning notifications of adversary presence and malicious activities on OT networks. In this report, we present progress to design a high-fidelity DER honeypot/canary prototype in a late-start Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Advanced Reactor Control Systems Authentication Methods and Recommendations

In the dynamic landscape of Operational Technology (OT), and specifically the emerging landscape for Advanced Reactors, the establishment of trust between digital assets emerges as a challenge for cybersecurity modernization. This report reviews existing approaches to authentication in Enterprise environments, and proposed methods for authentication in OT, and analyzes each for its applicability to future Advanced Reactor digital networks. Principles of authentication ranging from underlying cryptographic mechanisms to trust authorities are evaluated through the lens of OT. These facets emphasize the importance of mutual authentication in real-time environments, enabling a paradigm shift from the current approach of strong boundaries to a more malleable network that allows for flexible operation. This work finds that there is a need for evaluation and decision making by industry stakeholders, but current technologies and approaches can be adapted to fit needs and risk tolerances.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Equipment Testing Environment (ETE) Specification

Cyber security has been difficult to quantify from the perspective of defenders. The effort to develop a cyber-attack with some ability, function, or consequence has not been rigorously investigated in Operational Technologies. This specification defines a testing structure that allows conformal and repeatable cyber testing on equipment. The purpose of the ETE is to provide data necessary to analyze and reconstruct cyber-attack timelines, effects, and observables for training and development of Cyber Security Operation Centers. Standardizing the manner in which cyber security on equipment is investigated will allow a greater understanding of the progression of cyber attacks and potential mitigation and detection strategies in a scientifically rigorous fashion.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Security of DERs and Grid Edge Technologies [Slides]

Distributed energy resources (DERs) offer significant value for incorporating diverse generation technologies and improving reliability. They also present a new set of cybersecurity challenges. The move of generation to the grid edge can also mean more distributed control systems and expanded communication networks, resulting in an increase in attack surface. This presentation will discuss definitions and essential terms related to DERs; developments and deployment trends for DERs; recent cyber attacks on operational technology and industrial systems; cyber risk arising from distributed grid resources; and ways in which standards may help mitigate some of these risks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Automation of Vulnerability and Patch Management: Information Extraction, Association, and Optimization

Vulnerability and patch management is an integral part of a robust cybersecurity program, yet it grows increasingly complex due to the sheer amount of data that must be analyzed. Particularly in Operational Technology (OT) environments, analysis must be done manually because of the lack of automated solutions. Additionally, there are many steps in this process, from the initial discovery of the vulnerability to the implementation of its remediation, and each step in the process requires different data in order to be performed effectively. In this work, we provide approaches and strategies to assist operators in industrial or OT environments throughout the vulnerability management cycle. Security advisories provide key information about mitigation strategies, or actions that can be taken when a patch is unavailable or cannot be installed. Details of these strategies are not shared in public vulnerability databases and must be found manually. We approach this problem by designing a solution to automatically identify that information within vendor security advisories and retrieve it for operator use. We start with an approach that requires domain-specific knowledge of certain frequently-seen reference websites. Next, an approach that can work on an arbitrary website but relies on certain keywords. Finally, an approach that uses Natural Language Processing (NLP) methods and does not require specific knowledge or keywords. Each of these approaches is more general than its predecessor; we demonstrate high accuracy for all approaches Advisories also often contain details of affected products in non-standard or natural language formats. While this information can be easily understood when read by an operator, the non-standard format acts as a barrier to effective automation. We provide an approach for the first step in this process: identifying vendors in security advisories and mapping them to a standard framework for representing digital assets and software products. We evaluate five established string similarity algorithms, plus one of our own design that combines string similarity and information theory, on the task of mapping vendors to their corresponding entries in the Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) repository. Our results show that our proposed metric outperforms all others. Due to the constraints on time, finances, and personnel for organizations, Large Language Models (LLMs) may seem like attractive opportunities for security operators to speed up information gathering; however, it is still not clear whether LLMs can handle vulnerability management tasks well. To answer this question, we perform an empirical study of LLMs’ ability to provide consistent, accurate information about vulnerabilities in order to guide organizations in their adoption of LLMs. We observe poor performance for all models tested, suggesting that these models are not well-suited to the consistent retrieval of accurate vulnerability information. Finally, once vulnerabilities have been identified and any additional information has been obtained, operators must decide which remediation actions to implement based on their available resources. This already-complex problem becomes even more so when we consider that a vulnerability may have multiple avenues for remediation. We formulate this scenario as two knapsack problems and provide solutions, which we then compare against several existing strategies for vulnerability prioritization seen in real operational environments.

McClanahan, Kylie↗

Using the CYBER-Champ Model to Determine Cyber Competencies and Role Alignment

Cybersecurity roles, tasks, and skills are seen by many organizations as nonessential, abstract, or complicated. Although standards are in place, such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800-181 document titled “Workforce Framework for Cybersecurity (NICE Framework)” available since September 2012, companies are still showing security vulnerabilities in their cyber networks (Hatzes, 2020). Barriers towards creating a cyber-ready workforce are not always due to a lack of resources, but often caused by organizational structure. The need for cyber-cognizant job postings, improved communication between Operational Technology (OT) and Information Technology (IT) employees, increases in staffing and funding for cyber teams, and better communication of standards and training can all contribute to increasing an organization’s cyber resilience. Cybersecurity Competency Health and Maturity Progression model (CYBER-CHAMP) is a model aimed at evaluating an organization’s structure and individual employee’s cyber knowledge and helps develop a plan to reach competency. This model was used to engage with organizations to promote proper cyber protocols and policies. The aim of this paper is to answer if it is possible for an organization to build a cyber-ready workforce by providing education and training options for current employees and prepare the future workforce to be ready on day one of employment. Both open source and firsthand interviews with organizations were used to conduct the research contained in this document. Further research may include additional development to the CYBER-CHAMP model and its delivery platform.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Recommendations for Distributed Energy Resource Patching

While computer systems, software applications, and operational technology (OT)/Industrial Control System (ICS) devices are regularly updated through automated and manual processes, there are several unique challenges associated with distributed energy resource (DER) patching. Millions of DER devices from dozens of vendors have been deployed in home, corporate, and utility network environments that may or may not be internet-connected. These devices make up a growing portion of the electric power critical infrastructure system and are expected to operate for decades. During that operational period, it is anticipated that critical and noncritical firmware patches will be regularly created to improve DER functional capabilities or repair security deficiencies in the equipment. The SunSpec/Sandia DER Cybersecurity Workgroup created a Patching Subgroup to investigate appropriate recommendations for the DER patching, holding fortnightly meetings for more than nine months. The group focused on DER equipment, but the observations and recommendations contained in this report also apply to DERMS tools and other OT equipment used in the end-to-end DER communication environment. The group found there were many standards and guides that discuss firmware lifecycles, patch and asset management, and code-signing implementations, but did not singularly cover the needs of the DER industry. This report collates best practices from these standards organizations and establishes a set of best practices that may be used as a basis for future national or international patching guides or standards.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Evolving Architectures and Considerations to address Distributed Energy Resources and Non-Wired Alternatives

The electric grid is in the beginning stage of a transformation, driven by a combination of shutdowns of coal-fired plants, commissioning of new natural-gas plants, and tremendous growth in energy supply from renewables such as wind, and solar. As utilities navigate this transformation, their progress is supported by advances in Operational Technologies (OT), and Informational Technologies (IT), such as automation, smart inverters, cloud computing, mobile computing, machine learning, big data analytics, which have the potential to enable advanced capabilities more efficiently and at a lower cost. This white paper focuses on the architectural considerations that will allow the industry to transition in a planned manner. It introduces and formalizes two architectural constructs –the data bus and the control bus. The data bus is responsible for carrying all non-operational models and information necessary to drive utility decisions. In contrast, the control bus is responsible for carrying all operational data and control actions taken at the local level, centralized level, or other levels in-between. The paper reviews those architectural considerations, their requirements and how they will evolve. This paper intends to provide a context for vendors, utilities, and their service providers to review and understand the changes that are coming and get ready for them.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Integrity Enhancing Protocols: Performance and Recommendations for Nuclear Systems

In today’s communication landscape there are multiple technologies and protocols used for communication between end devices. Within security paradigms for these protocols, integrity management is a common goal of system designers. Communication protocols focused on maintaining message integrity can provide assurance that some received data has not been altered or tampered with. While integrity is often coupled with confidentiality in protocol design, this analysis focuses on an evaluation of only integrity protocols. This report outlines various ways message integrity may be preserved with respect to high performance operational technology (OT) systems. It describes a series of experiments and an evaluation framework used to evaluate the performance of the identified integrity approaches regarding common system design goals. Finally, it addresses the testing environment utilized and closes the report with a summary of experimental results.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

INS–Support for Formal Cyber Security Education in Brazil–After Action Report

The adoption of digital technology into Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems in nuclear facilities fundamentally changes the nature of these systems. Greater interconnectivity of reprogrammable, and functionally interdependent control systems has given rise to the need for computer security consideration in digital I&C Systems. The cyber security of I&C systems presents a growing risk to nuclear facilities and requires the development of educational and research tools to ensure the safety of these facilities. Currently there is a major gap in formal educational offerings on cyber security for these Operational Technology (OT) systems. To provide formal cyber security education resources, DOE’s office of International Nuclear Security (INS) partnered with the University of São Paulo (USP) to develop a training course on the cyber security of nuclear facility I&C systems using the hypothetical Nuclear Power Plant, Asherah.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

A Cybersecurity Testbed for Smart Buildings

Smart buildings are equipped with a plethora of cyber-physical systems, such as Internet of Things (IoT) devices and building automation systems. These devices, especially in commercial buildings, use legacy communications and hardware that were not designed with cybersecurity in mind. With increasing cyber threats in recent years, smart buildings have become an increasing target for attacks, but not enough published data are available from these incidents to study or replicate the scenarios to defend buildings. As part of the U.S. Department of Energy-funded project focusing on developing the Building Intelligence with Layered Defense Using Security-Constrained Optimization and Security Risk Detection (BUILD-SOS) platform, we developed a cybersecurity test bed for smart buildings. This test bed includes a building simulation tool, virtual devices, emulated operational technology networks, and remote hardware-in-the-loop. Using this test bed, we performed different cyberattacks on the smart building model and collected both physical building data, to understand the impacts on the building, and network data, to aid in separating mechanical faults from cyberattacks during the detection. This test bed is a significant tool in protecting smart buildings from cyberattacks because they can aid in both cybersecurity analysis and the evaluation of cyberattack detection tools by testing the tools in a secure environment without impacting the building operations.

alfalfa↗

A Cybersecurity Testbed for Smart Buildings

Smart buildings are equipped with a plethora of cyber-physical systems, such as Internet of Things (IoT) devices and building automation systems. These devices, especially in commercial buildings, use legacy communications and hardware that were not designed with cybersecurity in mind. With increasing cyber threats in recent years, smart buildings have become an increasing target for attacks, but not enough published data are available from these incidents to study or replicate the scenarios to defend buildings. As part of the U.S. Department of Energy-funded project focusing on developing the Building Intelligence with Layered Defense Using Security-Constrained Optimization and Security Risk Detection (BUILD-SOS) platform, we developed a cybersecurity test bed for smart buildings. This test bed includes a building simulation tool, virtual devices, emulated operational technology networks, and remote hardware-in-the-loop. Using this test bed, we performed different cyberattacks on the smart building model and collected both physical building data, to understand the impacts on the building, and network data, to aid in separating mechanical faults from cyberattacks during the detection. This test bed is a significant tool in protecting smart buildings from cyberattacks because it can aid in both cybersecurity analysis and the evaluation of other cyberattack detection tools by testing the tools in a secure environment without impacting the building operations.

cyber-physical systems↗