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At least 127 records · Page 7

Cybersecurity Framework Profile for Electric Vehicle Extreme Fast Charging Infrastructure

This document is the Cybersecurity Framework Profile (Profile) developed for the Electric Vehicle Extreme Fast Charging (EV/XFC) ecosystem, including the four domains that relies on the ecosystem (i) Electric Vehicles (EV); (ii) Extreme Fast Charging (XFC); (iii) XFC Cloud or Third-Party Operations; and (iv) Utility and Building Networks. This Profile utilizes the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Version 1.1 and provides voluntary guidance to help relevant parties develop Profiles specific to their organization to understand, assess, and communicate their cybersecurity posture as a part of their risk management process. The Profile is intended to supplement, not replace, an existing risk management program or cybersecurity standards, regulations, and industry guidelines that are in current use by the EV/XFC industry.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Cybersecurity Risk Profiles for Distributed Energy Resource Management Systems

Managing the digitalization of increasingly diversity energy resources is a complex challenge for energy systems planners and managers. As the penetration of solar photovoltaics (PV) and other distributed renewable energy resources (DERs) expands, distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS) will play an increasingly important role in managing, monitoring, and controlling DERs as electric systems before more distributed, interconnected, and networked. However, the cybersecurity implications of DERMS deployments are not well understood today. A lack of understanding around the cybersecurity implications of DERMS deployments and variability in the security posture of DERMS vendors, owners, and operators could introduce new security risks to evolving electric power systems. This paper describes cybersecurity attack scenarios on DERMS, identifies related cybersecurity standards and guidelines, reviews the security features of state-of-the-art DERMS solutions, and offers cybersecurity guidance for DERMS vendors, owners, and operators to protect DERMS' unique capabilities. Standardizing cybersecurity requirements for DERMS could help improve the security of DERMS integrations and improve innovations that are more secure by design. The cybersecurity guidance found in this paper is intended to offer a unified approach and lay the foundation for future standardization of DERMS cybersecurity to reduce risk to the solar industry and other renewable energy stakeholders when integrating these technologies with electric power systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Recommended Functionalities for Improving Cybersecurity of Distributed Energy Resources: Preprint

The legacy electric grid is transitioning into a 'present' modern grid due to increasing penetration of intermittent renewable generation at the distribution side, also known as distributed energy resources (DERs). Monitoring and control of such DERs requires extensive data-exchange and bidirectional communication networks. This bidirectional communication paves the way to cyber vulnerabilities and risks for new kinds of cyber-attacks that may have destructive impacts on power system operations. Since IEEE Std. 1547-2018 does not discuss cybersecurity measures for DERs, cybersecurity controls should be developed for securing DER systems at all three levels: device level, communications level, and applications level. This paper discusses the current industry's best practices related to DER cybersecurity and proposes recommended functionalities for improving the cybersecurity posture of DERs. These practical recommended functionalities have been discussed and verified with the industry through a DER cybersecurity working group and are meant to improve the device level security of DERs.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

The Nuclear Digital I&C System Supply Chain Cyber-Attack Surface

The nuclear supply chain attack surface is a large, complex network of interconnected stakeholders and activities. The global economy has widened and deepened the supply chain, resulting in larger numbers of geographically dispersed locations and increased difficulty ensuring the authenticity and security of digital assets. Although the nuclear industry has made significant strides in securing facilities from cyber-attacks, the supply chain remains vulnerable. This paper outlines supply chain threats and vulnerabilities and provides a Digital I&C System Supply Chain Cyber-Attack Surface diagram to illustrate the complexity of securing hardware, firmware, software, and system information throughout the entire supply chain lifecycle. The knowledge presented in this paper provides a foundation to use in cybersecurity supply chain risk analysis and to guide future supply chain research and development efforts leading to enhancement of a nuclear facility’s overall security posture.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Integration of Data Analytics with Plant System Health Program

This report summarizes the R&D activities of the Plant Health Management (PHM) project during fiscal year 2020 (FY20). This project focuses on the development of methods that integrate component health data and propagate such information at the system level to evaluate system sources of risk. This project development lives in cooperation with the Risk Informed Asset Management (RIAM) project. The RIAM project, in fact, uses the reliability models and data generated by the PHM project to optimize plant operations (e.g., maintenance/replacement schedule, optimal maintenance posture). This year’s activities for the PHM project focused mainly on the development of two classes of models. The first one includes a series of component reliability models which include aging, testing and maintenance. The second class includes a series of system reliability models which focus on the secondary side of exiting U.S. reactors. These models are based on fault tree logic structures such that they can be used by existing plant PRA software. We also started to focus on the management of health data and we tackled this issue in two directions. The first one focuses on the integration of monitor data with simulation models to assess component health. This approach is moving from a classical data based to a model+data based approach with the goal of improving higher component health information. The second direction focuses on linking equipment reliability data (e.g., maintenance/failure reports, component monitoring data) directly to system reliability models using a safety margin based language rather than a probability based language. The main advantage of a safety margin based language is that it can provide to system engineers more tangible information on system/component health and how it propagates to the system level.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Are You Resilient? Site Energy and Water Resilience Indicators

There is growing interest among operators of individual or co-located facilities to plan for utility disruptions caused by natural hazards and threats. Energy and water resilience at the site level can be characterized as the ability to withstand, adapt, and recover from an energy and/or water supply disruption. But how can a site’s energy and water resilience posture be measured? An evaluation framework with clear performance measures or indicators can help organizations establish what it means to be energy and water resilient and assess progress towards meeting resilience goals across sites and over time. Tracking a consistent set of indicators can help organizations identify problem areas that should be addressed and ascertain if energy and water resilience has improved as a result of investments or operational or policy changes. Resilience indicators also provide a means for organizations with geographically distributed sites to identify common problem areas that may require higher-level attention. This paper outlines an approach that organizations can use to measure site energy and water resilience. This approach was developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory for the U.S. Department of Energy’s Federal Energy Management Program as part of an effort to help federal agencies plan for energy and water resilience in a more systematic and rigorous way. The paper defines a general structure for defining energy and water resilience indicators, and provides example indicators and potential rating methods.

resilience, metrics for resilience, site resilienc↗

Cybersecurity Assessment Tools for Distributed Energy Resources

This growing number of smart devices that support DERs can increase the number of access points outside a utility’s administrative domain, which can increase the potential for cyberattack. With the integration of DERs at federal sites, the cybersecurity vulnerabilities of DER systems must be understood and addressed. This presentation covers two NREL tools available. The Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework (DER-CF) is a web-based holistic tool for evaluating cybersecurity posture including governance, physical security and technical management. The Distributed Energy Resource Risk Manager (DER-RM) extends the DER-CF by applying it to the NIST risk management framework process. It will be downloadable application that runs locally and documents all the major requirements for achieving Authority to Operate the DER.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Smart Semi-Supervised Accumulation of Large Repositories for Industrial Control Systems Device Information

Industrial Control Systems device manufacturers frequently add new features to improve their product performance. Oftentimes, these changes are mainly vendor-driven initiatives, and customers may not be aware of the full impact of these new capabilities on their cybersecurity posture. In the energy sector, this can lead to considerable dissonance between vendor-provided cybersecurity claims and a customer’s responsibility for Operation Technology cybersecurity compliance. Thus, the resulting dynamic verification burden is shifted towards the customer and may pose a significant cybersecurity risk to the energy sector landscape. We found that there is very limited research into cybersecurity auditing for Operational Technology. However, a solution is needed for vetting the vendor-supplied feature claims and their adherence to cybersecurity requirements and standards. We are presently engaged in an effort to develop such a system. This paper demonstrates one vital aspect of this effort in proposing an end-to-end framework to accumulate a large repository of ICS device information for this vetting system, curate the dataset, and conduct extensive processing. This framework is designed to use web scraping, data analytics and Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques to identify vendor websites, automate the collection of website-accessible documents and automatically derive metadata from them for identification of product documents relevant to the repository. We have found that this automated approach to vendor identification, document extraction into a product repository, and NLP pre-processing is unique and has not been previously presented in the literature. The preliminary work shows that this is feasible and can produce reliable results with minimum supervision. Future work will be built upon this foundation in order to achieve semi-supervised vetting of device technical information – a vital capability for ensuring that vendor-claimed device cybersecurity capabilities match industry requirements.

Ameri, Kimia↗

Distributed Energy Resources Cybersecurity Framework & Risk Manager

Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework (DER-CF) provides a holistic assessment for evaluating the cybersecurity posture of DER systems - filling an important gap that expands upon existing cybersecurity frameworks for more modern energy systems. The DER-CF is available as a written framework and an interactive Web tool. Distributed Energy Resource Risk Manager (DER-RM) process adheres closely to NIST's seven risk management steps: prepare, categorize, select, implement, assess, monitor, and authorize. This added feature is independent of the DER-CF's existing self-assessment and allows managers to focus on the RMF process.

cybersecurity↗

Cybersecurity Governance

Cybersecurity governance helps an organization detect, prevent, and respond to cyber incidents by establishing cybersecurity policies and procedures for use across the enterprise. As modern energy systems become increasingly reliant on smaller and decentralized generation sources-equipped with complex, data-driven communications-governance will be of growing importance for the continued protection of the electric grid. This presentation sheds light on the important aspects of cybersecurity governance, best practices to ensure a culture of cybersecurity, and approaches to frequent monitoring and assessment of an organization's cybersecurity posture.

business requirements↗

Module-OT: A Turnkey Solution for Securing Energy Systems

The Modular Security Apparatus for Managing Distributed Cryptography for Command-and-Control Messages on Operational Technology Networks (Module-OT) is a flexible and lightweight solution for grid-edge devices focusing on end-to-end security. It is a bump- in- the-wire solution acting as a secure conduit for data between devices or systems across a network. It improves the cybersecurity posture of DER systems by providing authentication, authorization, and data integrity to secure DER communications. Additionally, it performs key management, provides data security through whitelisting Internet Protocol addresses and ports, blocks unauthorized connections, controls user access, and allows serial or Ethernet connections for added flexibility. The core software is portable to various Linux-based operating systems and is developed to be customized by the developer and researcher communities. Module-OT has been validated in the lab, has been demonstrated at a 500-KW PV-plus-storage site, and has been proven ready to secure operational technology devices. Its core functionality meets current standards, including validation procedures of the NIST Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) and the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS 140-2). Because of its capability to provide an accessible and affordable option for stepping up security across modern energy systems, Module-OT can serve as an effective technological option to standardize cybersecurity moving forward.

cryptography↗

Cybersecurity Certification Standard for Distributed Energy Resources

Cybersecurity Certification Standard for Inverter Based Resources led by UL, and contributed to by NREL, is a certification standard for devices and their cyber security practices. The standard, which is being developed and led by UL, contains certification and testing processes for the devices to be certified before they are deployed in the field. The importance of the standard is to ensure that all DER devices have all the five pillars of cybersecurity, in which the baseline cybersecurity posture of the DER industry will be elevated.

certification standard↗

DER Cybersecurity R&D

The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) conducted more than 30 assessments for utilities across the United States with a cybersecurity assessment tool based on the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) and focused on business process. With funding from the DOE Office of Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Federal Energy Management Program, NREL modified the current cyber governance assessment tool to include an assessment process specifically for distributed energy resources (DERs). The Distributed Energy Resources Cybersecurity Framework (DER-CF) was developed to help federal agencies mitigate gaps in their cybersecurity posture for distributed energy systems.

cybersecurity valuation↗

Development of Analysis Methods that Integrate Numeric and Textual Equipment Reliability Data

Within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program, the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway is performing collaborative research on the development and deployment of technologies designed to assist operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) to reduce operating costs improve plant reliability and availability. One of the RISA research areas is focusing on the development of methods and tools designed to optimize plant operations (e.g., maintenance/replacement schedules, optimal maintenance postures for plant structures, systems, and components [SSCs]) in a manner that is more cost effective than current approaches and makes better use of available SSC health data. The Risk-Informed Asset Management (RIAM) project targets this research area by creating a direct bridge between component equipment reliability (ER) data and system engineer decision making regarding maintenance activity scheduling and component aging management. In this respect, one challenge that NPP system engineers are facing is that the amount of ER data being continuously generated is not only extremely large in size, but it comes in different forms: textual (e.g., condition or maintenance reports) and numeric (e.g., generated by monitoring systems). All these data elements provide them with valuable insights and information regarding: 1) the discovery of anomalous behaviors or degradation trends, 2) the identification of the possible causes behind such behaviors/trends, and 3) the prediction of their direct consequences. However, several challenges have proved to be roadblocks to this process. While some of these challenges are technical in nature (i.e., data are often distributed over several physical servers/databases), others are conceptual in nature: data elements come in different formats (e.g., numeric or textual), and measured values have different scales (e.g., vibration spectra and oil temperature). The activities performed by the RIAM project during FY23 directly tackles the need to simultaneously integrate the analysis of ER data in all its forms, numeric and textual. Note that such task has never been performed before due to the complexity of the systems under consideration but, most importantly, because of the technical challenges behind the harmonization of ER data formats and the lack of adequate computational methods to analyze them. Our approach borrows ideas and concepts from the medical field where integration of several data sources is vital to assist medical practitioners to perform correct diagnosis and indicate optimal treatments. In our view a NPP asset is equivalent to a patient in a medical context. The main difference is the complexity of a human body is a magnitude more complex when compared to typical assets commonly present in NPPs (e.g., centrifugal pumps, or motor operated valves). This simplifies our first requirement when analyzing heterogenous ER data formats: to put data into “context”. Context is here intended as the additional piece of information that is needed by ER data analysis tools to understand what these data elements are referring to, i.e., which king of knowledge they are generating. In our context, this knowledge can be translated into models that capture the form and functional architecture of assets/systems, their dependencies, and how they interact. These models actually emulate the knowledge that that NPP system engineers possess about assets and systems; this is their key of success when analyzing ER data, their challenge is ability to handle large amount of data. Here, we employ model-based system engineering (MBSE) models of systems and assets to represent and capture their architecture and functional, i.e. cause-effect, relations. Then, ER data elements are processed by identifying first of all which elements of the developed MBSE elements they are referring to. For numeric ER data this task is fairly easy since it is possible to precisely pinpoint what MBSE elements the corresponding sensor are observing (e.g., bearing temperature of a centrifugal pump). Task is much harder for textual data since the information contained in issue or maintenance reports needs to “be understood” by a computational tool. Here we called this process as “knowledge extraction”. Once again, we borrow the experience in the medical field where methods to extract knowledge from textual data have been developed in the past decade. The missing element for us is the availability of a complete dictionary of NPP related concepts (in addition to the MBSE models presented earlier) that can put “text into context”. In FY23, such dictionary has been developed along with all the computational elements required for knowledge extraction. Lastly, once numeric and textual ER data elements have been processed and “understood”, then the last step is the discovery of possible cause-effect relations among them. This is performed by observing if a logical connection through the MBSE models exists, and if the

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Securing Future Energy Supplies: From Renewables to Microreactors

This session will provide insight into how future energy deployments, critical to national-level programs focused on reducing carbon emissions, can be secured-by-design using lessons learned from current energy infrastructure. It will begin with an overview of current threats and risks associated with renewable energy assets and systems, primarily wind and solar, focusing on their control architecture and key system functions for both efficient and safe operations. This talk will then translate the key takeaways from current renewable infrastructure into applications for securing future energy systems, including microreactors and small modular reactors (SMRs), based on planned concepts of operations and control. Microreactors and SMRs are intended to be factory-assembled with commercially available components and deployed in more remote or distributed environments, necessitating centralized control centers, remote monitoring, and offsite maintenance and technical support. All of these factors lead these assets to a security posture and controls more similar to today's renewable energy assets than today's nuclear reactors, which represents a significant shift in mindset for the nuclear industry. This talk will provide justification for this shift as well as a path forward to motivate securing these groundbreaking technologies from the outset of their design and deployment.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance: DistribuTECH Workshop

Idaho National Laboratory, the Department of Energy’s Grid Deployment Office, and other national laboratories are collaborating to ensure the U.S. energy infrastructure is reliable, resilient, and secure. This involves strategically leveraging digital technologies to modernize the grid, enhance its resilience against all hazards and disruptions, and fortify national energy security across a diverse energy portfolio. In this workshop you will learn about Idaho National Lab’s Technical Assistance programs, where organizations will be matched with a national laboratory subject matter expert to focus on their key topical area. The technical assistance offered through this track is designed to be responsive to a rapidly changing regulatory landscape and cutting-edge technologies that enhance grid reliability and efficiency. Users will be guided through a tailored analysis and mitigation program to determine their current security posture and given assistance in evaluating supply chain and protection choices against potential consequences.

Digital assurance↗

1. Physical Security Engineering by Design for Nuclear Facilities; 2. Nuclear Power Plant Site Security Management – A Security Strategy; 3. The UAE Women in Nuclear Energy Security

1. Security by design, or SeBD, is a comprehensive approach that integrates the physical protection system of a nuclear plant into every stage of its existence. This includes planning, designing, constructing, commissioning, and operating the facility, using a combination of analytical, physical, technological, and procedural measures. Essentially, SeBD involves intentionally applying and incorporating security into all aspects of design and operation throughout the entire lifecycle of a facility. By implementing this methodology throughout various phases such as program development, process implementation, staff training and procedures management in conjunction with plant equipment, facilities can be optimized to minimize security risks without compromising functional design requirements. This ultimately improves the overall security posture of the site and reduces the need for costly modifications or additional security resources post-design. 2. A site security strategy is a living document that is revised on a periodic or event-driven basis, ensuring that site security operations and corresponding procedures provide long-term, effective protection for the entire nuclear power plant (NPP) site. A site security strategy aims to mitigate threats across the entire NPP site via in-depth defense approaches and mutual support; therefore, if a layer is omitted or altered, then the effect across all layers must be re-evaluated. Therefore, the aim of the site security strategy is to provide an appropriate, scalable security regime that deters, denies, delays, and detects incidents and, equally importantly, reassures legitimate users and the regulator that due diligence and regulatory compliance have been achieved, ensuring that the site is safe and secure. Robust access control for vehicles and pedestrians is at the heart of the strategy. Vehicle and pedestrian searching and screening are seen as the strongest mitigation methods against vehicle- and pedestrian-borne attacks. The security strategy must also be supported through comprehensive staff training and the development of robust processes, procedures, and planning. If all these measures are to be effective, then training must be implemented during each phase of construction, partial operation/commissioning, and full operation. No single element of site security is completely isolated from the influence of other elements. Ideally, consideration of all key elements will result in a security strategy that is integrated and proportional to the threat and that does not over specify individual security solutions through the application of isolated measures but rather applies a holistic, all-encompassing approach. 3. When women enter the labor force, numerous positive outcomes emerge, including increased GDP, educational gains, and decreased maternal mortality. Despite these benefits, women's employment rates and equality vary significantly worldwide as does support for women in the workforce. This paper will explore the multifaceted benefits of women's employment, the factors influencing labor force participation rates, and the urgency to achieve gender equality as outlined in the 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It will then examine the emerging presence of women in the traditionally male-dominated nuclear field, specifically within the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a testament to their resilience and determination to break social norms and advance gender equality.

Zineddin, Dr. Z.↗