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At least 127 records · Page 7

Testing of Crystalline Silicotitanate to Support Tank-Side Cesium Removal System Operations - 20458

The direct feed of waste from the Hanford tank farms to the Low-Activity Waste Facility at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant requires an intermediate treatment step that prepares the waste for vitrification. Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) selected a near-tank treatment system known as the Tank-Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) system to perform the required intermediate treatment functions. The approach in the TSCR system is to filter waste supernatant with a sintered metal dead-end filter and then use a series of ion exchange columns to remove cesium; this system has several similarities to the Tank Closure Cesium Removal system that has been deployed on the Savannah River Site. The ion exchange media proposed for use is crystalline silicotitanate (CST), which is a non-elutable media with a high affinity for cesium. Because the media is non-elutable, loaded columns will be blown down with compressed air, moved into interim storage, and replaced with new columns when cesium capacity is reached. The assumed extent and rate of drying that could be achieved in the TSCR column geometry lacked confirmation by experimental data. In addition, once the columns are loaded with cesium, they generate flammable gases (primarily hydrogen) via radiolysis acting on any resident liquids, i.e., moisture, remaining in the media bed. An assessment of available information on CST concluded that gas generation data that bounds expected operational conditions were needed to support the TSCR system safety basis and planned operations. Working with WRPS, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) designed and conducted testing with CST media to address the need for (a) representative in-column drying data, and (b) bounding flammable gas generation data. Drying testing was performed using a full-height column with a diameter of approximately 2 inches with injected air at temperatures of 18 deg. C and 30 deg. C. Gas generation testing was conducted in an engineered bunker that allowed simultaneous irradiation of up to eight samples at a time. These two experimental approaches used at PNNL for the CST testing are summarized and the major outcomes are presented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Final Technical Report on Quantifying Dependability Attributes of Software Based Safety Critical Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants

With the current transition from analog to digital instrumentation and control systems in nuclear power plants, the number and variety of software-based systems have significantly increased. The sophisticated nature and increasing complexity of software raises trust in these systems as a significant challenge. The trust placed in a software system is typically termed software dependability. Software dependability analysis faces uncommon challenges since software systems’ characteristics differ from those of hardware systems. The lack of systematic science-based methods for quantifying the dependability attributes in software-based instrumentation as well as control systems in safety critical applications has proved itself to be a significant inhibitor to the expanded use of modern digital technology in the nuclear industry. Dependability refers to the ability of a system to deliver a service that can be trusted. Dependability is commonly considered as a general concept that encompasses different attributes, e.g., reliability, safety, security, availability and maintainability. Dependability research has progressed significantly over the last few decades. For example, various assessment models and/or design approaches have been proposed for software reliability, software availability and software maintainability. Advances have also been made to integrate multiple dependability attributes, e.g., integrating security with other dependability attributes, measuring availability and maintainability, modeling reliability and availability, quantifying reliability and security, exploring the dependencies between security and safety and developing integrated analysis models. However, there is still a lack of understanding of the dependencies between various dependability attributes as a whole and of how such dependencies are formed. To address the need for quantification and give a more objective basis to the review process -- therefore reducing regulatory uncertainty -- measures and methods are needed to assess dependability attributes early on, as well as throughout the life-cycle process of software development. In this research, extensive expert opinion elicitation is used to identify the measures and methods for assessing software dependability. Semi-structured questionnaires were designed to elicit expert knowledge. A new notation system, Causal Mechanism Graphing, was developed to extract and represent such knowledge. The Causal Mechanism Graphs were merged, thus, obtaining the consensus knowledge shared by the domain experts. In this report, we focus on how software contributes to dependability. However, software dependability is not discussed separately from the context of systems or socio-technical systems. Specifically, this report focuses on software dependability, reliability, safety, security, availability, and maintainability. Our research was conducted in the sequence of stages found below. Each stage is further examined in its corresponding chapter. Stage 1 (Chapter 2): Elicitation of causal maps describing the dependencies between dependability attributes. These causal maps were constructed using expert opinion elicitation. This chapter describes the expert opinion elicitation process, the questionnaire design, the causal map construction method and the causal maps obtained. Stage 2 (Chapter 3): Elicitation of the causal map describing the occurrence of the event of interest for each dependability attribute. The causal mechanisms for the “event of interest” were extracted for each of the software dependability attributes. The “event of interest” for a dependability attribute is generally considered to be the “attribute failure”, e.g. security failure. The extraction was based on the analysis of expert elicitation results obtained in Stage 1. Stage 3 (Chapter 4): Identification of relevant measurements. Measures for the “events of interest” and their causal mechanisms were obtained from expert opinion elicitation for each of the software dependability attributes. The measures extracted are presented in this chapter. Stage 4 (Chapter 5): Assessment of the coverage of the causal maps via measures. Coverage was assessed to determine whether the measures obtained were sufficient to quantify software dependability, and what measures are further required. Stage 5 (Chapter 6): Identification of “missing” measures and measurement approaches for concepts not covered. New measures, for concepts that had not been covered sufficiently as determined in Stage 4, were identified using supplementary expert opinion elicitation as well as literature reviews. Stage 6 (Chapter 7): Building of a detailed quantification model based on the causal maps and measurements obtained. Ability to derive such a quantification model shows that the causal models and measurements derived from the previous stages (Stage 1 to Stage 5) can form the technical basis for developing dependability quantification models. Scope restrictions have led us to prioritize this demonstration effort. The demonstration was focused on a critical system, i.e. the reactor protection system. For this system, a ranking of the software dependability attributes by nuclear stakeholders was developed. As expected for this application, the stakeholder ranking identified safety as the most critical attribute to be quantified. A safety quantification model limited to the requirements phase of development was built. Two case studies were conducted for verification. A preliminary control gate for software safety for the requirements stage was proposed and applied to the first case study. The control gate allows a cost effective selection of the duration of the requirements phase.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Development and testing of a solar flux heating freeze recovery system for molten salt parabolic troughs

A major obstacle preventing commercialization of molten salt parabolic trough plants is freeze protection and recovery of the solar field. One of the most common nitrate salt compositions under consideration allows for solar field outlet temperatures up to 565°C and begins solidifying above 240°C. Using molten salt directly in the solar field can significantly reduce thermal energy storage costs and the higher temperature compared to oil heat transfer fluids can power a more efficient power cycle, but the very high freezing point is cause for concern. This work builds on a previous modeling effort investigating different methods for melting Solar Salt frozen in the solar field, which suggested the viability of a novel solar heating method to lower costs of the freeze protection system. In this work higher fidelity models are developed to better investigate the melting process with a more detailed 3D geometry which includes the insulated bellows. The thermal-fluid model of the melting process is updated to include temperature dependent density and data for solid phase properties. In addition, a finite element model is developed to resolve thermal stresses at the point with highest thermal gradients. Results with the new model confirm the viability of using controllable solar flux heating to thaw salt frozen in the solar field without damaging the receiver; however, the presence of non-illuminated sections significantly slows down the melting process. Solar heating simulations with pauses off-sun of 120 and 60 s require 18.5 and 11.9 h to melt salt from a night-time temperature of 10°C with 1000 W m2 DNI, which results in maximum thermal stresses of 48.2 and 53.5 MPa, respectively. Adding 150 W m−1 to the solar heating simulation with a 60 s pause off-sun decreases both the melt time and thermal stresses due to the more uniform heating, suggesting a combined heating method may be the best option.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Decommissioning, Decontamination, and Disposal of LLW-LL, and ILW-LL at a Former Rare Earths Processing Facility in Malaysia - 19087

Geosyntec Consultants, Inc. (Geosyntec) was the design-build Contractor for a project involving the remediation and disposal of low level (LLW-LL and ILW-LL) NORM and TENORM wastes at a former rare earth processing facility in Malaysia. These sites were associated with a plant that extracted rare earth elements from local tin ores. Because of the naturally occurring radioactivity contained in the raw materials, these productions resulted in by-products and residues containing LLW-LL and ILW-LL thorium hydroxide and uranium hydroxide. The total mass of uranium (∼120 tons) and thorium (∼1,200 tons) managed in a single repository required the project design incorporate requirements related to inventory, security and safeguards around nuclear precursor materials. The requirement to consider a performance over a period of more than 10,000 years led to significant challenges in design and modeling of the disposal facility as this disposal facility was purposely designed and permitted as a final disposal for the LLW-LL and ILW-LL. The first phase of the project was the decommissioning, decontamination, and demolition of the 14- acre former rare earth processing plant and excavation of contaminated soils, construction of an engineered cell at the repository for waste disposal, and transportation and disposal of the waste materials into the cell. Final status surveys were carried out to allow the site to be successfully released by the Malaysian regulatory authorities as a clean site for re-development as common industrial use. Over 11,000 loads of material, including approximately 75,000 cubic meters of excavated soils and plant debris, were transported in specially designed steel transport boxes on public roads for disposal in the engineered cell. The second phase of the project included the design and construction of a second engineered cell, enhanced with protective barrier systems and a final cover system constructed of natural materials. Ancillary facilities such as substations, offices, processing buildings, and wastewater treatment plants were constructed to support retrieval and processing of the materials from more than 87,000 individual drums using a semi-automated process. The drums, waste packages, and other materials in the storage facility were systematically extracted, sorted, inventoried, solidified using Portland cement, transported, and disposed in the cell. All temporary facilities were decontaminated, demolished, and disposed in the cell. Radiological inventory and radiation safety programs were implemented to quantify the waste activity and to control exposure to workers and the public during the project. The total mass of radioactive contaminated waste disposed in the two projects is nearly 200,000 tons. The projects were carried out under a high level of scrutiny from Malaysian and international regulatory bodies. Between 2014 and 2017, performance monitoring and modeling activities were carried out to demonstrate that the disposal facility was performing in accordance with design requirements established by regulatory agencies. (authors)

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Impact of Active Control on Passive Safety Response Characteristics of Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactors: II-Model Implementation and Simulations

Advanced reactors are often claimed to be passively safe against unprotected upset events. In common practice, these events are not considered in the context of the plant control system, i.e., the reactor is subjected to classes of unprotected upset events while the normally programmed response of the control system is assumed not to be present. However, this approach constitutes an oversimplification since, depending on the upset involving the control system, an actuator does not necessarily go in the same direction as needed for safety. In this work, dynamic simulations are performed to assess the degree to which the inherent self-regulating plant response is safe from active control system override. The simulations are meant to characterize the resilience of the plant to unprotected initiators. The initiators were represented and modeled as an actuator going to a hard limit. Consideration of failure is further limited to individual controllers as there is no cross-connect of signals between these controllers. The potential for passive safety override by the control system is then relegated to the single-input single-output controllers. Here, the results show that when the plant control system is designed by taking into account and quantifying the impact of the plant control system on accidental scenarios there is very limited opportunity for the preprogrammed response of the control system to override passive safety protection in the event of an unprotected initiator.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

System Study: High-Pressure Safety Injection 1998-2014

This report presents an unreliability evaluation of the high-pressure safety injection system (HPSI) at 69 U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. Demand, run hours, and failure data from fiscal year 1998 through 2014 for selected components were obtained from the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Consolidated Events Database (ICES). The unreliability results are trended for the most recent 10 year period, while yearly estimates for system unreliability are provided for the entire active period. No statistically significant increasing or decreasing trends were identified in the HPSI results.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Hazard analysis for identifying common cause failures of digital safety systems using a redundancy-guided systems-theoretic approach

Replacing the existing aging analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems with modern safety control and protection, digital technology offers one of the foremost means of performance improvements and cost reductions for the existing nuclear power plants (NPPs). However, the qualification of digital I&C systems remains a challenge, especially considering the issue of software common-cause failures (CCFs), which are difficult to address. With the application and upgrades of advanced digital I&C systems, software CCFs have become a potential threat to plant safety because most redundant designs use similar digital platforms or software in the operating and application systems. With complex designs of multilayer redundancy to meet the single-failure criterion, digital I&C safety systems (e.g., engineered safety-features actuation system [ESFAS]) are of a particular concern in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing procedures. Here, this paper applies a modularized approach to conduct redundancy-guided systems-theoretic hazard analysis for an advanced digital ESFAS with multilevel redundancy designs. Systematic methods and risk-informed tools are incorporated to address both hardware and software CCFs, which provide guidance to eliminate the causal factors of potential single points of failure in the design of digital safety systems in advanced plant designs.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Chemical System Decontamination at PWR Power Stations Biblis A and B by Advanced System Decontamination by Oxidizing Chemistry (ASDOC-D) Process Technology - 13081

For chemical decontamination of PWR primary systems the so called ASDOC-D process has been developed and qualified at the German PWR power station Biblis. In comparison to other chemical decontamination processes ASDOC-D offers a number of advantages: - ASDOC-D does not require separate process equipment but is completely operated and controlled by the nuclear site installations. Feeding of chemical concentrates into the primary system is done by means of the site's dosing systems. Process control is performed by standard site instrumentation and analytics. - ASDOC-D safely prevents any formation and precipitation of insoluble constituents - Since ASDOC-D is operated without external equipment there is no need for installation of such equipment in high radioactive radiation surrounding. The radioactive exposure rate during process implementation and process performance may therefore be neglected in comparison to other chemical decontamination processes. - ASDOC-D does not require auxiliary hose connections which usually bear high leakage risk. The above mentioned technical advantages of ASDOC-D together with its cost-effectiveness gave rise to Biblis Power station to agree on testing ASDOC-D at the volume control system of PWR Biblis unit A. By involving the licensing authorities as well as expert examiners into this test ASDOC-D received the official qualification for primary system decontamination in German PWR. As a main outcome of the achieved results NIS received contracts for full primary system decontamination of both units Biblis A and B (each 1.200 MW) by end of 2012. (authors)

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Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: Overview and Policy Context of UF6 Cylinder Tracking Program

Thousands of cylinders containing uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) move around the world from conversion plants to enrichment plants to fuel fabrication plants, and their contents could be very useful to a country intent on diverting uranium for clandestine use. Each of these large cylinders can contain close to a significant quantity of natural uranium (48Y cylinder) or low-enriched uranium (LEU) (30B cylinder) defined as 75 kg {sup 235}U which can be further clandestinely enriched to produce 1.5 to 2 significant quantities of high enriched uranium (HEU) within weeks or months depending on the scale of the clandestine facility. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) kicked off a 5-year plan in April 2011 to investigate the concept of a unique identification system for UF{sub 6} cylinders and potentially to develop a cylinder tracking system that could be used by facility operators and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The goal is to design an integrated solution beneficial to both industry and inspectorates that would improve cylinder operations at the facilities and provide enhanced capabilities to deter and detect both diversion of low-enriched uranium and undeclared enriched uranium production. The 5-year plan consists of six separate incremental tasks: (1) define the problem and establish the requirements for a unique identification (UID) and monitoring system; (2) develop a concept of operations for the identification and monitoring system; (3) determine cylinder monitoring devices and technology; (4) develop a registry database to support proof-of-concept demonstration; (5) integrate that system for the demonstration; and (6) demonstrate proof-of-concept. Throughout NNSA's performance of the tasks outlined in this program, the multi-laboratory team emphasizes that extensive engagement with industry stakeholders, regulatory authorities and inspectorates is essential to its success.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Construction of a cyber attack model for nuclear power plants - 115

The consideration of how a compromised digital component can impact neighboring components is critical to understanding the progression of cyber attacks. The degree of influence that one component may have on another depends on a variety of factors, including the sharing of resources such as network bandwidth or processing power, the level of trust between components, and the inclusion of segmentation devices such as firewalls. The interactions among components via mechanisms that are unique to the digital world are not usually considered in traditional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). This means potential sequences of events that may occur during an attack may be missed if one were to only look at conventional accident sequences. This paper presents a method where, starting from the initial attack vector, the progression of a cyber attack can be modeled. The propagation of the attack is modeled by considering certain attributes of the digital components in the system. These attributes determine the potential vulnerability of a component to different classes of attack and the capability gained by the attackers once they are in control of the equipment. The use of attributes allows similar components (components with the same set of attributes) to be modeled in the same way, thereby reducing the computing resources required for analyzing large systems. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Reliability and availability requirements analysis for DEMO: fuel cycle system

The Demonstration Power Plant (DEMO) will be a fusion reactor prototype designed to demonstrate the capability to produce electrical power in a commercially acceptable way. Two of the key elements of the engineering development of the DEMO reactor are the definitions of reliability and availability requirements (or targets). The availability target for a hypothesized Fuel Cycle has been analysed as a test case. The analysis has been done on the basis of the experience gained in operating existing tokamak fusion reactors and developing the ITER design. Plant Breakdown Structure (PBS) and Functional Breakdown Structure (FBS) related to the DEMO Fuel Cycle and correlations between PBS and FBS have been identified. At first, a set of availability targets has been allocated to the various systems on the basis of their operating, protection and safety functions. 75% and 85% of availability has been allocated to the operating functions of fuelling system and tritium plant respectively. 99% of availability has been allocated to the overall systems in executing their safety functions. The chances of the systems to achieve the allocated targets have then been investigated through a Failure Mode and Effect Analysis and Reliability Block Diagram analysis. The following results have been obtained: 1) the target of 75% for the operations of the fuelling system looks reasonable, while the target of 85% for the operations of the whole tritium plant should be reduced to 80%, even though all the tritium plant systems can individually reach quite high availability targets, over 90% - 95%; 2) all the DEMO Fuel Cycle systems can reach the target of 99% in accomplishing their safety functions. (authors)

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

HTGR Resilient Control System Strategy

A preeminent objective for corporate and government organizations is the protection of major investments, which is attained by achieving state awareness, a comprehensive understanding of security and safety, for critical infrastructures. Given the dependence of critical infrastructure on control systems for automation, the integrity of these systems and their ability to provide owner/operators a high degree of state awareness is essential in attaining a high degree of investment protection and public acceptance. Operators as well as government are therefore burdened to ensure they have a timely understanding of the status of their plant or all plants, respectively, to ensure efficient operations and investment and public protection. “This characterization is a significant objective that must consider many aspects of instrumentation, control, and intelligent systems in order to achieve the required result. These aspects include sensory, communication, analysis, decision, and human system interfaces necessary to achieve fusion of data and presentation of results that will provide an understanding of what issues are important and why.

42 ENGINEERING↗

H-Canyon Ventilation System Exhaust Tunnel Inspection at the Savannah River Site - 18052

The Department of Energy (DOE) H-Canyon Facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS) is operated by Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). The Facility Structural Integrity Program (SIP) performs periodic visual inspections to confirm the component is capable of performing its safety function. This Program provides the process to document the conditions of safety related structural systems and components, their damage mechanisms, and recommend repairs if required before there is impact on the safety envelope. The H-Canyon Exhaust Tunnel is part of the H-Canyon Exhaust Ventilation System and is periodically inspected under the Structural Integrity Program. The Tunnel performs a Safety Class passive design feature function that is available 100% of the time. The Tunnel directs Canyon process air from the Canyon to the Sand Filter System. The radiological and chemical airborne activity coupled with the physical configuration of the tunnel precludes a manned entry into the tunnel. Tunnel inspections have been performed using cameras on a stick, referred to as pole cameras prior to CY2003. Since CY2003, five camera equipped crawlers have been used with varying levels of inspection success. With each successive crawler inspection, expectations have increased to perform tasks beyond visual examinations. The 2017 crawler performed the visual inspection but also included improvements on crawler performance, such as testing the use of wireless capability and remediation of crawler travel route, to the addition of stationary cameras and lighting at key locations. The latest 2017 crawler successfully traveled the entire length of the tunnel between the Canyon and Sand Filter System for the second time since development, thus providing key visual data for the integrity program [2]. In addition, several access ports were installed in 2017 following the removal of concrete core samples that allow for new visual inspection of the Canyon Crossover tunnel, thus providing information for an area that was generally inaccessible for monitoring. Planning for the 2019 crawler inspection is underway with the expectations to improve upon inspection cameras and also introduce mapping technologies such as LIDAR. The challenge to obtain meaningful data from the remote inspections of a 60+ year operating Canyon Exhaust tunnel continues to be a complex endeavor requiring close coordination of multiple organizations, adherence to Conduct of Operations, Radiological Safety, Worker Safety, etc. principles as well as alignment with Facility Safety Basis requirements. This paper discusses the continuing improvements in inspection techniques and the challenges associated these inspections. (authors)

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West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) (Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER), Calendar Year 2022)

The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2022. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2022 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2023

The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2023. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2023 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

Record of Decision↗

Radiation Protection for the First Korea Heavy-ion Medical Accelerator (KHIMA) Facility - Paper 7

The number of particle therapy facilities is increasing worldwide due to the encouraging results obtained at research facilities such as the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (USA), the Helmholtz Center for Heavy Ion Research GSI (Germany), and the Heavy Ion Medical Accelerator (HIMAC) in Chiba (Japan). The first hospital-based heavy-ion therapy facility is under construction in Busan, Korea, at the Korea Institute of Radiological and Medical Sciences [KIRAMS]. The project was originally designed to develop a compact superconducting cyclotron for hadron therapy able to deliver forefront beams of heavier ions, essentially carbon ions of energy, 430 MeV/u. Radiation protection issues play an important role in every stage of the project such as civil construction planning, control system design, and special technological plants. Monte Carlo transport codes are the best tools to solve these issues and the FLUKA2011 and MCNPX2.7.0 codes are used in this work. Beam loss distributions of cyclotron installations in combination with passive or active beam shaping methods have a particularly high implication on the protection layout of the facility. Methods for shielding and activation calculations are described with an emphasis on carbon ion beams. All the tools and databases require verification. Benchmarking is an instrumental process for verification. An overview of benchmarking efforts will also be given and the need for further benchmarks is discussed. (authors)

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

COOLING WATER ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES AT U.S. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

This report has been prepared for the Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), for the purpose of providing a status report on the challenges and opportunities facing the U.S. commercial nuclear energy industry in the area of plant cooling water supply. The report was prompted in part by recent Second Circuit and Supreme Court decisions regarding cooling water system designs at existing thermo-electric power generating facilities in the U.S. (primarily fossil and nuclear plants). At issue in the courts have been Environmental Protection Agency regulations that define what constitutes “Best Technology Available” for intake structures that withdraw cooling water that is used to transfer and reject heat from the plant’s steam turbine via cooling water systems, while minimizing environmental impacts on aquatic life in nearby water bodies used to supply that cooling water. The report was also prompted by a growing recognition that cooling water availability and societal use conflicts are emerging as strategic energy and environmental issues, and that research and development (R&D) solutions to emerging water shortage issues are needed. In particular, cooling water availability is an important consideration in siting decisions for new nuclear power plants, and is an under-acknowledged issue in evaluating the pros and cons of retrofitting cooling towers at existing nuclear plants. Because of the significant ongoing research on water issues already being performed by industry, the national laboratories and other entities, this report relies heavily on ongoing work. In particular, this report has relied on collaboration with the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), including its recent work in the area of EPA regulations governing intake structures in thermoelectric cooling water systems.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Emergency Heat Removal System for the Secondary Loop of a Fast Sodium Reactor and its Efficiency Evaluation

An emergency heat removal system (SAOT) that removes heat from the secondary loop of a fast sodium reactor by air cooling the surfaces of the piping and equipment of the heat-sink loops of the secondary loop is described and ways to optimize it are indicated. A method of evaluating the efficiency of such an SAOT is described, and the results of an evaluation for a fast sodium reactor are presented as an example showing that the system can be used in fast sodium reactors of any power capacity.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗