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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 127 records · Page 7
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

FY21 Status Report: Probabilistic SCC Model for SNF Dry Storage Canisters

Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) is an important failure degradation mechanism for storage of spent nuclear fuel. Since 2014, Sandia National Laboratories has been developing a probabilistic methodology for predicting SCC. The model is intended to provide qualitative assessment of data needs, model sensitivities, and future model development. In fiscal year 2021, improvement of the SCC model focused on the salt deposition, maximum pit size, and crack growth rate models.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
NASA NTRS2018

A Prognostic Launch Vehicle Probability of Failure Assessment Methodology for Conceptual Systems Predicated on Human Causal Factors

Lessons learned from past failures of launch vehicle developments and operations were used to create a new method to predict the probability of failure of conceptual systems. Existing methods such as Probabilistic Risk Assessments and Human Risk Assessments were considered but found to be too cumbersome for this type of system-wide application for yet-to-be-flown vehicles. The basis for this methodology were historic databases of past failures, where it was determined that various faulty human-interactions were the predominant root causes of failure rather than deficient component reliabilities evaluated through statistical analysis. This methodology contains an expert scoring part which can be used in either a qualitative or a quantitative mode. The method produces two products: a numerical score of the probability of failure and guidance to program management on critical areas in need of increased focus to improve the probability of success. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of this new method, data from a concluded vehicle program (USAF's Titan IV with the Centaur G-Prime upper stage) was used as a test case. The theoretical vs. actual probability of failure was found to be 4.46% vs. 6.67% respectively. Recommendations are made for future applications of this method to ongoing launch vehicle development programs.

Launch Vehicle↗
NASA NTRS2019

Prognostic Launch Vehicle Probability of Failure Assessment Methodology for Conceptual Systems Predicated on Human Causal Factors

Lessons learned from past failures of launch vehicle developments and operations were used to create a new method to predict the probability of failure of conceptual systems. Existing methods such as Probabilistic Risk Assessments and Human Risk Assessments were considered but found to be too cumbersome for this type of system-wide application for yet-to-be-flown vehicles. The basis for this methodology were historic databases of past failures, where it was determined that various faulty human-interactions were the predominant root causes of failure rather than deficient component reliabilities evaluated through statistical analysis. This methodology contains an expert scoring part which can be used in either a qualitative or a quantitative mode. The method produces two products: a numerical score of the probability of failure or guidance to program management on critical areas in need of increased focus to improve the probability of success. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of this new method, data from a concluded vehicle program (USAF's Titan IV with the Centaur G-Prime upper stage) was used as a test case. Although the theoretical vs. actual probability of failure was found to be in reasonable agreement (4.46% vs. 6.67% respectively) the underlying sub-root cause scoring had significant disparities attributable to significant organizational changes and acquisitions. Recommendations are made for future applications of this method to ongoing launch vehicle development programs.

Craig H Williams↗
NASA NTRS1991

Developing acceptance limits for measured bearing wear of the Space Shuttle Main Engine high pressure oxidizer turbopump

The probabilistic design approach currently receiving attention for structural failure modes has been adapted for obtaining measured bearing wear limits in the Space Shuttle Main Engine high-pressure oxidizer turbopump. With the development of the shaft microtravel measurements to determine bearing health, an acceptance limit was neeed that protects against all known faiure modes yet is not overly conservative. This acceptance criteria limit has been successfully determined using probabilistic descriptions of preflight hardware geometry, empirical bearing wear data, mission requirements, and measurement tool precision as an input for a Monte Carlo simulation. The result of the simulation is a frequency distribution of failures as a function of preflight acceptance limits. When the distribution is converted into a reliability curve, a conscious risk management decision is made concerning the acceptance limit.

Genge, Gary G.↗
NASA NTRS1997

A Comprehensive Reliability Methodology for Assessing Risk of Reusing Failed Hardware Without Corrective Actions with and Without Redundancy

This paper deals with the development of a reliability methodology to assess the consequences of using hardware, without failure analysis or corrective action, that has previously demonstrated that it did not perform per specification. The subject of this paper arose from the need to provide a detailed probabilistic analysis to calculate the change in probability of failures with respect to the base or non-failed hardware. The methodology used for the analysis is primarily based on principles of Monte Carlo simulation. The random variables in the analysis are: Maximum Time of Operation (MTO) and operation Time of each Unit (OTU) The failure of a unit is considered to happen if (OTU) is less than MTO for the Normal Operational Period (NOP) in which this unit is used. NOP as a whole uses a total of 4 units. Two cases are considered. in the first specialized scenario, the failure of any operation or system failure is considered to happen if any of the units used during the NOP fail. in the second specialized scenario, the failure of any operation or system failure is considered to happen only if any two of the units used during the MOP fail together. The probability of failure of the units and the system as a whole is determined for 3 kinds of systems - Perfect System, Imperfect System 1 and Imperfect System 2. in a Perfect System, the operation time of the failed unit is the same as that of the MTO. In an Imperfect System 1, the operation time of the failed unit is assumed as 1 percent of the MTO. In an Imperfect System 2, the operation time of the failed unit is assumed as zero. in addition, simulated operation time of failed units is assumed as 10 percent of the corresponding units before zero value. Monte Carlo simulation analysis is used for this study. Necessary software has been developed as part of this study to perform the reliability calculations. The results of the analysis showed that the predicted change in failure probability (P(sub F)) for the previously failed units is as high as 49 percent above the baseline (perfect system) for the worst case. The predicted change in system P(sub F) for the previously failed units is as high as 36% for single unit failure without any redundancy. For redundant systems, with dual unit failure, the predicted change in P(sub F) for the previously failed units is as high as 16%. These results will help management to make decisions regarding the consequences of using previously failed units without adequate failure analysis or corrective action.

Putcha, Chandra S.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Experiences with Probabilistic Analysis Applied to Controlled Systems

This paper presents a semi-analytic method for computing frequency dependent means, variances, and failure probabilities for arbitrarily large-order closed-loop dynamical systems possessing a single uncertain parameter or with multiple highly correlated uncertain parameters. The approach will be shown to not suffer from the same computational challenges associated with computing failure probabilities using conventional FORM/SORM techniques. The approach is demonstrated by computing the probabilistic frequency domain performance of an optimal feed-forward disturbance rejection scheme.

Kenny, Sean P.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Coupled Multi-Disciplinary Optimization for Structural Reliability and Affordability

A computational simulation method is presented for Non-Deterministic Multidisciplinary Optimization of engine composite materials and structures. A hypothetical engine duct made with ceramic matrix composites (CMC) is evaluated probabilistically in the presence of combined thermo-mechanical loading. The structure is tailored by quantifying the uncertainties in all relevant design variables such as fabrication, material, and loading parameters. The probabilistic sensitivities are used to select critical design variables for optimization. In this paper, two approaches for non-deterministic optimization are presented. The non-deterministic minimization of combined failure stress criterion is carried out by: (1) performing probabilistic evaluation first and then optimization and (2) performing optimization first and then probabilistic evaluation. The first approach shows that the optimization feasible region can be bounded by a set of prescribed probability limits and that the optimization follows the cumulative distribution function between those limits. The second approach shows that the optimization feasible region is bounded by 0.50 and 0.999 probabilities.

Abumeri, Galib H.↗
NASA NTRS1989

Probabilistic structural analysis: Introductory remarks

The development of probabilistic structural analysis methodology consists of the following program elements: (1) composite load spectra models, (2) computational probabilistic structural analysis methods, and (3) probabilistic constitutive relationships. The development of the probabilistic structural analysis methodology is a joint program of NASA Lewis in-house and sponsored research. The objective of this session is to illustrate recent progress on the application of this methodology to determine the reliability of structural components for rocket propulsion systems. The session contains descriptions of and progress reports on the following specific activities: (1) The NESSUS computer code, (2) approximate methods, (3) advanced methods, (4) composite load spectra applications, (5) probabilistic fracture mechanisms, and (6) probability of failure and risk analysis. Collectively, the progress to date demonstrates that the structural durability of hot engine structural components can be effectively evaluated in a formal probabilistic/reliability framework.

Chamis, Christos C.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Synthesizing a New Launch Vehicle Failure Probability Based on Historical Flight Data

New launch vehicles have historically had significantly higher failure rates in early flights than what has been predicted using Probabilistic Risk Assessment - PRA. This is because PRAs typically model a mature vehicle where a significant portion of the early failure probability contributors have been eliminated due to testing and improvements after actual field operation. To capture a more accurate early flight failure probability estimate, this paper develops a method that estimates ascent failure probability starting with the first flight based on historical launch vehicle records. With new launch vehicles being developed, such as the Space Launch System - SLS, a PRA model must be extended to cover early flight failure probability contributions that are either not covered in the mature-vehicle PRA or are underestimated. These failure probability contributions include design errors, quality control deficiencies, installation errors, and environmental impacts. There are also failure dependencies due to systemic errors that still exist due to limited entire-system testing.

Cross, Robert B.↗
NASA NTRS2020

Continued Discussion of Failure Mode Modeling and Overall Component Reliability: Are the Data Missing or Censored?

This paper is the continuation of a paper presented at the 13th Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference, in which a methodology of modeling failure modes of complex components was presented; see Paulos and Smith (2016). This methodology is not particularly helpful in the space industry where there is a lack of failure data, but is more helpful in industries that see a lot of component repairs and improvements, such as in the aircraft or automotive industries. The previous paper demonstrated how the typical approach of treating failure modes as being exponential in nature may yield optimistic predictions when estimating how improvements to components will perform in the future. It is more accurate to model the failure modes as a race in time; unfortunately, this does not give a closed-form solution. This paper uses simulation to solve for the model of the world, and the results compared to the standard methodology of treating the failure modes as being exponential random failures. The standard method is shown to have optimistic predictions, which will lead to prediction errors when failure modes are removed or “fixed.” The failure mode methodology presented in the first paper treated the data as being censored when the test stopped. In this paper, we will compare the results from treating the data as both censored and missing.

Smith, Curtis↗
DOE OSTI2020

Continued Discussion of Failure Mode Modeling and Overall Component Reliability: Is the Data Missing or Censored?

This paper is a continuation of a paper presented at the 13th Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference, in which a discussion of modeling failure modes of complex components was presented; see Paulos and Smith (2016). The paper demonstrated how the typical method of treating failure modes as being exponential in nature may yield optimistic predictions when estimating how improvements to components will perform in the real world. Instead of relying on textbook methods, it is more accurate to model the failure modes as a race in time; unfortunately, this does not give a closed-form solution. This work uses a simulation to solve for the model of the world, and is compared to the standard methodology of treating the failure modes as exponential random failures. The standard method is shown to have optimistic predictions, which will lead to prediction errors when failure modes were removed or “fixed.” The failure mode methodology presented in the first paper treated the data as being censored when the test stopped. In this paper, we will compare the results from treating the data as both censored and missing, and comparisons will be shown showing which method is more accurate and under what conditions.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
NASA NTRS1992

A new response surface approach for structural reliability analysis

This paper describes a new approach for computing structural reliability by post-processing previously computed probabilistic results for stress and strength. The objective is to provide an accurate method whereby independent probabilistic analyses for stress and strength functions can be performed independently and combined at a later time to compute probability of failure. The method provides a capability for testing different strength measures without the need for re-computing the probabilistic stress response. The proposed approach takes full account of the basic random variables effecting both stress and strength, and the failure region in the variable space identified during separate stress/strength probabilistic analyses. A simple closed-form example and a more complex analysis of a turbine blade subject to creep rupture is used to illustrate the method.

Thacker, B. H.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Reliability and Failure in NASA Missions: Blunders, Normal Accidents, High Reliability, Bad Luck

NASA emphasizes crew safety and system reliability but several unfortunate failures have occurred. The Apollo 1 fire was mistakenly unanticipated. After that tragedy, the Apollo program gave much more attention to safety. The Challenger accident revealed that NASA had neglected safety and that management underestimated the high risk of shuttle. Probabilistic Risk Assessment was adopted to provide more accurate failure probabilities for shuttle and other missions. NASA's "faster, better, cheaper" initiative and government procurement reform led to deliberately dismantling traditional reliability engineering. The Columbia tragedy and Mars mission failures followed. Failures can be attributed to blunders, normal accidents, or bad luck. Achieving high reliability is difficult but possible.

accidents↗
NASA NTRS2018

The Growth of Mass and Reliability Source Database and Me

Mass and Reliability Source (MaRS) is a database which draws together information from multiple other sources and databases (MADS, VMDB, ISS PART, Bayesian PowerPoint, etc.). Information such as mass, operating hours, and failure data are compiled to create a tool for the building of probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models. MaRS also has great potential for deep space mission planning. Understanding the lowest point of failure within an ORU helps to inform the efficient selection of spare parts necessary for a journey where mass and volume are at a premium and resupply is not possible.

George, Cory A.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Common Cause Failure Modeling

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFS are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused by: system environments; manufacturing; transportation; storage; maintenance; and assembly, as examples. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, the effects can be reduced, but they are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and CCF (dependent) failure and data is limited, especially for launch vehicles. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate at Marshall Space Flight Center (MFSC) is using generic data from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's database of common cause failures at nuclear power plants to estimate CCF due to the lack of a more appropriate data source. There remains uncertainty in the actual magnitude of the common cause risk estimates for different systems at this stage of the design. Given the limited data about launch vehicle CCF and that launch vehicles are a highly redundant system by design, it is important to make design decisions to account for a range of values for independent and CCFs. When investigating the design of the one-out-of-two component redundant system for launch vehicles, a response surface was constructed to represent the impact of the independent failure rate versus a common cause beta factor effect on a system's failure probability. This presentation will define a CCF and review estimation calculations. It gives a summary of reduction methodologies and a review of examples of historical CCFs. Finally, it presents the response surface and discusses the results of the different CCFs on the reliability of a one-out-of-two system.

Hark, Frank↗
NASA NTRS2016

Common Cause Failure Modeling

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFS are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused by: system environments; manufacturing; transportation; storage; maintenance; and assembly, as examples. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, the effects can be reduced, but they are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and CCF (dependent) failure and data is limited, especially for launch vehicles. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate at Marshal Space Flight Center (MFSC) is using generic data from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's database of common cause failures at nuclear power plants to estimate CCF due to the lack of a more appropriate data source. There remains uncertainty in the actual magnitude of the common cause risk estimates for different systems at this stage of the design. Given the limited data about launch vehicle CCF and that launch vehicles are a highly redundant system by design, it is important to make design decisions to account for a range of values for independent and CCFs. When investigating the design of the one-out-of-two component redundant system for launch vehicles, a response surface was constructed to represent the impact of the independent failure rate versus a common cause beta factor effect on a system's failure probability. This presentation will define a CCF and review estimation calculations. It gives a summary of reduction methodologies and a review of examples of historical CCFs. Finally, it presents the response surface and discusses the results of the different CCFs on the reliability of a one-out-of-two system.

Hark, Frank↗
NASA NTRS1991

Probabilistic simulation of the human factor in structural reliability

Many structural failures have occasionally been attributed to human factors in engineering design, analyses maintenance, and fabrication processes. Every facet of the engineering process is heavily governed by human factors and the degree of uncertainty associated with them. Factors such as societal, physical, professional, psychological, and many others introduce uncertainties that significantly influence the reliability of human performance. Quantifying human factors and associated uncertainties in structural reliability require: (1) identification of the fundamental factors that influence human performance, and (2) models to describe the interaction of these factors. An approach is being developed to quantify the uncertainties associated with the human performance. This approach consists of a multi factor model in conjunction with direct Monte-Carlo simulation.

Shah, Ashwin R.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Predictive Modeling to Assess and Address Challenges and Limitations Associated with Clinical Care and Decision Support in Deep Space

Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is a method for assessing and integrating the risk of failure in a multivariate system. While it is often applied by engineers designing complex machines, it could also be applied to humans to assess the probability of a health “failure” treating diseases as the multiple “variables” and the human as the “complex machine.” The Medical Extensible Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Tool (MEDPRAT) was developed to apply PRA to assess medical risk for exploration spaceflight and inform the design of medical systems for space flight. The NASA engineering community utilizes event-driven and fault tree probabilistic techniques to classify risk in the space flight environment by leveraging the inherent knowledge of complex space flight system design and testing to quantify risk. However, in harmonizing the risk of human space flight, answering the question of “How do we balance astronaut health, performance and resource risks with other engineering risks on exploration space missions?” remains a profoundly challenging and largely qualitative practice. The Medical Extensible Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Tool (MEDPRAT) is one aspect of the Human Research Program’s efforts to represent space fight human health and performance risks quantitatively.

L Mcintyre↗