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At least 127 records · Page 7

External Tank (ET) Bipod Fitting Bolted Attachment Locking Insert Performance

Following STS-107, the External Tank (ET) Project implemented corrective actions and configuration changes at the ET bipod fitting. Among the corrective actions, the existing bolt lock wire which provided resistance to potential bolt rotation was removed. The lock wire removal was because of concerns with creating voids during foam application and potential for lock wire to become debris. The bolts had been previously lubricated to facilitate assembly but, because of elimination of the lock wire, the ET Project wanted to enable the locking feature of the insert. Thus, the lubrication was removed from bolt threads and instead applied to the washer under the bolt head. Lubrication is necessary to maximize joint pre-load while remaining within the bolt torque specification. The locking feature is implemented by thread crimping in at four places in the insert. As the bolt is torqued into the insert the bolt threads its way past the crimped parts of the insert. This provides the locking of the bolt, as torque is required to loosen the joint after clamping.

Larsen, Curtis E.↗

Estimation of the Unsteady Aerodynamic Load on Space Shuttle External Tank Protuberances from a Component Wind Tunnel Test

At the wake of the Columbia (STS-107) accident it was decided to remove the Protuberance Aerodynamic Load (PAL) Ramp that was originally intended to protect various protuberances outside of the Space Shuttle External Tank from high buffet load induced by cross-flows at transonic speed. In order to establish the buffet load without the PAL ramp, a wind tunnel test was conducted where segments of the protuberances were instrumented with dynamic pressure transducers; and power-spectra of sectional lift and drag forces at various span-wise locations between two adjacent support brackets were measured under different cross flow angles, Mach number and other conditions. Additionally, frequency-dependent spatial correlations between the sectional forces were also established. The sectional forces were then adjusted by the correlation length to establish span-averaged spectra of normal and lateral forces that can be suitably "added" to various other unsteady forces encountered by the protuberance. This paper describes the methodology used for calculating the correlation-adjusted power spectrum of the buffet load. A second part of the paper describes wind-tunnel results on the difference in the buffet load on the protuberances with and without the PAL ramp. In general when the ramp height is the same as that of the protuberance height, such as that found on the liquid Oxygen part of the tank, the ramp is found to cause significant reduction of the unsteady aerodynamic load. However, on the liquid Hydrogen part of the tank, where the Oxygen feed-line is far larger in diameter than the height of the PAL ramp, little protection is found to be available to all but the Cable Tray.

Panda, J.↗

Estimation of the Unsteady Aerodynamic Load on Space Shuttle External Tank Protuberances from a Component Wind Tunnel Test

At the wake of the Columbia (STS-107) accident it was decided to remove the Protuberance Aerodynamic Load (PAL) Ramp that was originally intended to protect various protuberances outside of the Space Shuttle External Tank from high buffet load induced by cross-flows at transonic speed. In order to establish the buffet load without the PAL ramp, a wind tunnel test was conducted where segments of the protuberances were instrumented with dynamic pressure transducers; and power-spectra of sectional lift and drag forces at various span-wise locations between two adjacent support brackets were measured under different cross flow angles, Mach number and other conditions. Additionally, frequency-dependent spatial correlations between the sectional forces were also established. The sectional forces were then adjusted by the correlation length to establish span-averaged spectra of normal and lateral forces that can be suitably "added" to various other unsteady forces encountered by the protuberance. This paper describes the methodology used for calculating the correlation-adjusted power spectrum of the buffet load. A second part of the paper describes wind-tunnel results on the difference in the buffet load on the protuberances with and without the PAL ramp. In general when the ramp height is the same as that of the protuberance height, such as that found on the liquid Oxygen part of the tank, the ramp is found to cause significant reduction of the unsteady aerodynamic load. However, on the liquid Hydrogen part of the tank, where the Oxygen feed-line is far larger in diameter than the height of the PAL ramp, little protection is found to be available to all but the Cable Tray.

Panda, Jayatana↗

Aeromedical Lessons from the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation

This paper presents the aeromedical lessons learned from the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation. The contents include: 1) Introduction and Mission Response Team (MRT); 2) Primary Disaster Field Office (DFO); 3) Mishap Investigation Team (MIT); 4) Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Mishap Response Plan; 5) Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP); and 6) STS-107 Crew Surgeon.

Pool, Sam L.↗

Primary Disaster Field Office (DFO), Lufkin, Texas

On February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia broke apart during atmospheric re-entry on mission STS-107; the complexity of such an event cannot be underestimated. The Lufkin Disaster Field Office (DFO) served as the primary DFO for all operations, including staging assets and deploying field teams for search, recovery and security. There were many organizations that had operational experience with disaster recovery. Offers to help came from many groups including the White House Liaison Office, the Department of Defense (DOD), branches of local, state and federal government, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), state police, fire departments, the Texas Forestry Service, the Texas Army National Guard, medical groups, various rescue forces, contractor companies, the Salvation Army, local businesses, and citizens of our country and especially East Texas. The challenge was to know how much help to accept and how to efficiently incorporate their valuable assistance into a comprehensive and cohesive operational plan. There were more than 2,000 people involved with search and recovery.

Wetherbee, James D.↗

Magnetic Separator Enhances Treatment Possibilities

Since the earliest missions in space, NASA specialists have performed experiments in low gravity. Protein crystal growth, cell and tissue cultures, and separation technologies such as electrophoresis and magnetophoresis have been studied on Apollo 14, Apollo 16, STS-107, and many other missions. Electrophoresis and magnetophoresis, respectively, are processes that separate substances based on the electrical charge and magnetic field of a molecule or particle. Electrophoresis has been studied on over a dozen space shuttle flights, leading to developments in electrokinetics, which analyzes the effects of electric fields on mass transport (atoms, molecules, and particles) in fluids. Further studies in microgravity will continue to improve these techniques, which researchers use to extract cells for various medical treatments and research.

Source record↗

Southern Impact Testing Alliance (SITA)

Efforts to form this Alliance began in 2008 to showcase the impact testing capabilities within the southern United States. Impact testing customers can utilize SITA partner capabilities to provide supporting data during all program phases-materials/component/ flight hardware design, development, and qualification. This approach would allow programs to reduce risk by providing low cost testing during early development to flush out possible problems before moving on to larger scale1 higher cost testing. Various SITA partners would participate in impact testing depending on program phase-materials characterization, component/subsystem characterization, full-scale system testing for qualification. SITA partners would collaborate with the customer to develop an integrated test approach during early program phases. Modeling and analysis validation can start with small-scale testing to ensure a level of confidence for the next step large or full-scale conclusive test shots. Impact Testing Facility (ITF) was established and began its research in spacecraft debris shielding in the early 1960's and played a malor role in the International Space Station debris shield development. As a result of return to flight testing after the loss of STS-107 (Columbia) MSFC ITF realized the need to expand their capabilities beyond meteoroid and space debris impact testing. MSFC partnered with the Department of Defense and academic institutions as collaborative efforts to gain and share knowledge that would benefit the Space Agency as well as the DoD. MSFC ITF current capabilities include: Hypervelocity impact testing, ballistic impact testing, and environmental impact testing.

Hubbs, Whitney↗

Impact Testing on Reinforced Carbon-Carbon Flat Panels with Ice Projectiles for the Space Shuttle Return to Flight Program

Following the tragedy of the Orbiter Columbia (STS-107) on February 1, 2003, a major effort commenced to develop a better understanding of debris impacts and their effect on the space shuttle subsystems. An initiative to develop and validate physics-based computer models to predict damage from such impacts was a fundamental component of this effort. To develop the models it was necessary to physically characterize reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) along with ice and foam debris materials, which could shed on ascent and impact the orbiter RCC leading edges. The validated models enabled the launch system community to use the impact analysis software LS-DYNA (Livermore Software Technology Corp.) to predict damage by potential and actual impact events on the orbiter leading edge and nose cap thermal protection systems. Validation of the material models was done through a three-level approach: Level 1--fundamental tests to obtain independent static and dynamic constitutive model properties of materials of interest, Level 2--subcomponent impact tests to provide highly controlled impact test data for the correlation and validation of the models, and Level 3--full-scale orbiter leading-edge impact tests to establish the final level of confidence for the analysis methodology. This report discusses the Level 2 test program conducted in the NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) Ballistic Impact Laboratory with ice projectile impact tests on flat RCC panels, and presents the data observed. The Level 2 testing consisted of 54 impact tests in the NASA GRC Ballistic Impact Laboratory on 6- by 6-in. and 6- by 12-in. flat plates of RCC and evaluated three types of debris projectiles: Single-crystal, polycrystal, and "soft" ice. These impact tests helped determine the level of damage generated in the RCC flat plates by each projectile and validated the use of the ice and RCC models for use in LS-DYNA.

Melis, Matthew E.↗

Turbulent Wing-Leading-Edge Correlation Assessment for the Shuttle Orbiter

This study was conducted in support of the Orbiter damage assessment activity that takes place for each Shuttle mission since STS-107 (STS - Space Transportation System). As part of the damage assessment activity, the state of boundary layer (laminar or turbulent) during reentry needs to be estimated in order to define the aerothermal environment on the Orbiter. Premature turbulence on the wing leading edge (WLE) is possible if a surface irregularity promotes early transition and the resulting turbulent wedge flow contaminates the WLE flow. The objective of this analysis is to develop a criterion to determine if and when the flow along the WLE experiences turbulent heating given an incoming turbulent boundary layer that contaminates the attachment line. The data to be analyzed were all obtained as part of the MH-13 Space Shuttle Orbiter Aerothermodynamic Test conducted on a 1.8%-scale Orbiter model at Calspan/University of Buffalo Research Center in the Large Energy National Shock Tunnels facility. A rational framework was used to develop a means to assess the state of the WLE flow on the Orbiter during reentry given a contaminated attachment-line flow. Evidence of turbulent flow on the WLE has been recently documented for a few STS missions during the Orbiter s flight history, albeit late in the reentry trajectory. The criterion developed herein will be compared to these flight results.

King, Rudolph A.↗

Experimental Space Shuttle Orbiter Studies to Acquire Data for Code and Flight Heating Model Validation

In an experimental study to obtain detailed heating data over the Space Shuttle Orbiter, CUBRC has completed an extensive matrix of experiments using three distinct models and two unique hypervelocity wind tunnel facilities. This detailed data will be employed to assess heating augmentation due to boundary layer transition on the Orbiter wing leading edge and wind side acreage with comparisons to computational methods and flight data obtained during the Orbiter Entry Boundary Layer Flight Experiment and HYTHIRM during STS-119 reentry. These comparisons will facilitate critical updates to be made to the engineering tools employed to make assessments about natural and tripped boundary layer transition during Orbiter reentry. To achieve the goals of this study data was obtained over a range of Mach numbers from 10 to 18, with flight scaled Reynolds numbers and model attitudes representing key points on the Orbiter reentry trajectory. The first of these studies were performed as an integral part of Return to Flight activities following the accident that occurred during the reentry of the Space Shuttle Columbia (STS-107) in February of 2003. This accident was caused by debris, which originated from the foam covering the external tank bipod fitting ramps, striking and damaging critical wing leading edge heating tiles that reside in the Orbiter bow shock/wing interaction region. During investigation of the accident aeroheating team members discovered that only a limited amount of experimental wing leading edge data existed in this critical peak heating area and a need arose to acquire a detailed dataset of heating in this region. This new dataset was acquired in three phases consisting of a risk mitigation phase employing a 1.8% scale Orbiter model with special temperature sensitive paint covering the wing leading edge, a 0.9% scale Orbiter model with high resolution thin-film instrumentation in the span direction, and the primary 1.8% scale Orbiter model with detailed thin-film resolution in both the span and chord direction in the area of peak heating. Additional objectives of this first study included: obtaining natural or tripped turbulent wing leading edge heating levels, assessing the effectiveness of protuberances and cavities placed at specified locations on the orbiter over a range of Mach numbers and Reynolds numbers to evaluate and compare to existing engineering and computational tools, obtaining cavity floor heating to aid in the verification of cavity heating correlations, acquiring control surface deflection heating data on both the main body flap and elevons, and obtain high speed schlieren videos of the interaction of the orbiter nose bow shock with the wing leading edge. To support these objectives, the stainless steel 1.8% scale orbiter model in addition to the sensors on the wing leading edge was instrumented down the windward centerline, over the wing acreage on the port side, and painted with temperature sensitive paint on the starboard side wing acreage. In all, the stainless steel 1.8% scale Orbiter model was instrumented with over three-hundred highly sensitive thin-film heating sensors, two-hundred of which were located in the wing leading edge shock interaction region. Further experimental studies will also be performed following the successful acquisition of flight data during the Orbiter Entry Boundary Layer Flight Experiment and HYTHIRM on STS-119 at specific data points simulating flight conditions and geometries. Additional instrumentation and a protuberance matching the layout present during the STS-119 boundary layer transition flight experiment were added with testing performed at Mach number and Reynolds number conditions simulating conditions experienced in flight. In addition to the experimental studies, CUBRC also performed a large amount of CFD analysis to confirm and validate not only the tunnel freestream conditions, but also 3D flows over the orbiter acreage, wing leading edge, and controlurfaces to assess data quality, shock interaction locations, and control surface separation regions. This analysis is a standard part of any experimental program at CUBRC, and this information was of key importance for post-test data quality analysis and understanding particular phenomena seen in the data. All work during this effort was sponsored and paid for by the NASA Space Shuttle Program Office at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas.

Wadhams, T. P.↗

Impact Testing on Reinforced Carbon-Carbon Flat Panels With BX-265 and PDL-1034 External Tank Foam for the Space Shuttle Return to Flight Program

Following the tragedy of the Orbiter Columbia (STS-107) on February 1, 2003, a major effort commenced to develop a better understanding of debris impacts and their effect on the space shuttle subsystems. An initiative to develop and validate physics-based computer models to predict damage from such impacts was a fundamental component of this effort. To develop the models it was necessary to physically characterize reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) along with ice and foam debris materials, which could shed on ascent and impact the orbiter RCC leading edges. The validated models enabled the launch system community to use the impact analysis software LS-DYNA (Livermore Software Technology Corp.) to predict damage by potential and actual impact events on the orbiter leading edge and nose cap thermal protection systems. Validation of the material models was done through a three-level approach: Level 1-fundamental tests to obtain independent static and dynamic constitutive model properties of materials of interest, Level 2-subcomponent impact tests to provide highly controlled impact test data for the correlation and validation of the models, and Level 3-full-scale orbiter leading-edge impact tests to establish the final level of confidence for the analysis methodology. This report discusses the Level 2 test program conducted in the NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) Ballistic Impact Laboratory with external tank foam impact tests on flat RCC panels, and presents the data observed. The Level 2 testing consisted of 54 impact tests in the NASA GRC Ballistic Impact Laboratory on 6- by 6-in. and 6- by 12-in. flat plates of RCC and evaluated two types of debris projectiles: BX-265 and PDL-1034 external tank foam. These impact tests helped determine the level of damage generated in the RCC flat plates by each projectile and validated the use of the foam and RCC models for use in LS-DYNA.

Melis, Matthew E.↗

NASA Contingency Shuttle Crew Support (CSCS) Medical Operations

The genesis of the space shuttle began in the 1930's when Eugene Sanger came up with the idea of a recyclable rocket plane that could carry a crew of people. The very first Shuttle to enter space was the Shuttle "Columbia" which launched on April 12 of 1981. Not only was "Columbia" the first Shuttle to be launched, but was also the first to utilize solid fuel rockets for U.S. manned flight. The primary objectives given to "Columbia" were to check out the overall Shuttle system, accomplish a safe ascent into orbit, and to return back to earth for a safe landing. Subsequent to its first flight Columbia flew 27 more missions but on February 1st, 2003 after a highly successful 16 day mission, the Columbia, STS-107 mission, ended in tragedy. With all Shuttle flight successes come failures such as the fatal in-flight accident of STS 107. As a result of the STS 107 accident, and other close-calls, the NASA Space Shuttle Program developed contingency procedures for a rescue mission by another Shuttle if an on-orbit repair was not possible. A rescue mission would be considered for a situation where a Shuttle and the crew were not in immediate danger, but, was unable to return to Earth or land safely. For Shuttle missions to the International Space Station (ISS), plans were developed so the Shuttle crew would remain on board ISS for an extended period of time until rescued by a "rescue" Shuttle. The damaged Shuttle would subsequently be de-orbited unmanned. During the period when the ISS Crew and Shuttle crew are on board simultaneously multiple issues would need to be worked including, but not limited to: crew diet, exercise, psychological support, workload, and ground contingency support

Adams, Adrien↗

The Reconstruction and Failure Analysis of The Space Shuttle Columbia

This viewgraph presentation describes a very detailed reconstruction plan and failure analysis of The Space Shuttle Columbia accident. The contents include: 1) STS-107 Timeline; 2) Foam Impact; 3) Recovery; 4) Reconstruction; 5) Reconstruction Plan; 6) Reconstruction Hanger; 7) Pathfinders; 8) Aluminum Pathfinder; 9) Early Analysis - Left MLG Door Area; 10) Emphasis Switched to Left Hand Wing Leading Edge; 11) Wing Leading Edge Subsystem (LESS); 12) 3D Reconstruction of Left WLE; 13) Left Wing Tile Table; 14) LESS Observations; 15) Left Hand Wing Debris Points to RCC 8/9 - Slumped Tile; 16) Reconstructed View of LC/P 9 tile with I/B Tile; 17) Reconstructed View of Lower C/P 9 Tile; 18) Carrier Panel 8 - Upper; 19) Left Hand Wing Debris Points to RCC 8/9 - Erosion and RCC with attach hole intact; 20) Erosion on Panel 8 Upper Outboard Rib; 21) RCC Panels 8 & 9 Erosion Features; 22) Slumping Source for Carrier Panel 9 Tile was Revealed; 23) Debris Indicated Highest Probability Initiation Site; 24) Left Hand Wing Debris Points to RCC 8/9- Metallic Deposits; 25) Relative Metallic Deposition on L/H Wing Materials; 26) Metallic Deposit Example, LH RCC 8; 27) High Level Questions; 28) Analysis Plan Challenges; 29) Analysis Techniques; 30) Analysis Approach; 31) RCC Panel 8 Erosion Features; 32) Radiographic Features; 33) Radiography WLE LH Panel 8; 34) LH RCC 8 Upper Apex; 35) LH RCC 8 - Deposit Feature: Thick Tear Shaped; 36) LH RCC 8 - Deposit Feature: Thick Globules; 37) LH RCC 8 - Deposit Feature: Spheroids; 38) LH RCC 8 - Deposit Feature: Uniform Deposit; 39) Significant Findings - Sampling All Other panels; 40) Proposed Breach Location and Plasma Flow; 41) Corroborating Information - RCC Panel Debris Locations; 42) Corroborating Information - LH OMS Pod Analysis; 43) Corroborating Information - Impact Testing; and 44) Overall Forensic Conclusions.

Russell, Richard W.↗

Fault Management Technology Maturation for NASA's Constellation Program

This slide presentation reviews the maturation of fault management technology in preparation for the Constellation Program. There is a review of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) and a discussion of a couple of incidents with the shuttle main engine and tanking that indicated the necessity for predictive maintenance. Included is a review of the planned Ares I-X Ground Diagnostic Prototype (GDP) and further information about detection and isolation of faults using Testability Engineering and Maintenance System (TEAMS). Another system that being readied for use that detects anomalies, the Inductive Monitoring System (IMS). The IMS automatically learns how the system behaves and alerts operations it the current behavior is anomalous. The comparison of STS-83 and STS-107 (i.e., the Columbia accident) is shown as an example of the anomaly detection capabilities.

Waterman, Robert D.↗

Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV): Flight Rationale for the Space Shuttle Program

Each Orbiter Vehicle (Space Shuttle Program) contains up to 24 Kevlar49/Epoxy Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV) for storage of pressurized gases. In the wake of the Columbia accident and the ensuing Return To Flight (RTF) activities, Orbiter engineers reexamined COPV flight certification. The original COPV design calculations were updated to include recently declassified Kevlar COPV test data from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and to incorporate changes in how the Space Shuttle was operated as opposed to orinigially envisioned. 2005 estimates for the probability of a catastrophic failure over the life of the program (from STS-1 through STS-107) were one-in-five. To address this unacceptable risk, the Orbiter Project Office (OPO) initiated a comprehensive investigation to understand and mitigate this risk. First, the team considered and eventually deemed unfeasible procuring and replacing all existing flight COPVs. OPO replaced the two vessels with the highest risk with existing flight spare units. Second, OPO instituted operational improvements in ground procedures to signficiantly reduce risk, without adversely affecting Shuttle capability. Third, OPO developed a comprehensive model to quantify the likelihood of occurrance. A fully-instrumented burst test (recording a lower burst pressure than expected) on a flight-certified vessel provided critical understanding of the behavior of Orbiter COPVs. A more accurate model was based on a newly-compiled comprehensive database of Kevlar data from LLNL and elsewhere. Considering hardware changes, operational improvements and reliability model refinements, the mean reliability was determined to be 0.998 for the remainder of the Shuttle Program (from 2007, for STS- 118 thru STS-135). Since limited hardware resources precluded full model validation through multiple tests, additional model confidence was sought through the first-ever Accelerated Stress Rupture Test (ASRT) of a flown flight article. A Bayesian statistical approach was developed to interpret possible test results. Since the lifetime observed in the ASRT exceeded initial estimates by one to two orders of magnitude, the Space Shuttle Program deemed there was significant conservatism in the model and accepted continued operation with existing flight hardware. Given the variability in tank-to-tank original prooftest response, a non-destructive evaluation (NDE) technique utilizing Raman Spectroscopy was developed to directly measure COPV residual stress state. Preliminary results showed that patterns of low fiber elastic strains over the outside vessel surface, together with measured permanent volume growth during proof, could be directly correlated to increased fiber stress ratios on the inside fibers adjacent to the liner, and thus reduced reliability.

Kezirian, Michael T.↗

External Tank - The Structure Backbone

The External Tank forms the structural backbone of the Space Shuttle in the launch configuration. Because the tank flies to orbital velocity with the Space Shuttle Orbiter, minimization of weight is mandatory, to maximize payload performance. Choice of lightweight materials both for structure and thermal conditioning was necessary. The tank is large, and unique manufacturing facilities, tooling, handling, and transportation operations were required. Weld processes and tooling evolved with the design as it matured through several block changes, to reduce weight. Non Destructive Evaluation methods were used to assure integrity of welds and thermal protection system materials. The aluminum-lithium alloy was used near the end of the program and weld processes and weld repair techniques had to be refined. Development and implementation of friction stir welding was a substantial technology development incorporated during the Program. Automated thermal protection system application processes were developed for the majority of the tank surface. Material obsolescence was an issue throughout the 40 year program. The final configuration and tank weight enabled international space station assembly in a high inclination orbit allowing international cooperation with the Russian Federal Space Agency. Numerous process controls were implemented to assure product quality, and innovative proof testing was accomplished prior to delivery. Process controls were implemented to assure cleanliness in the production environment, to control contaminants, and to preclude corrosion. Each tank was accepted via rigorous inspections, including non-destructive evaluation techniques, proof testing, and all systems testing. In the post STS-107 era, the project focused on ascent debris risk reduction. This was accomplished via stringent process controls, post flight assessment using substantially improved imagery, and selective redesigns. These efforts were supported with a number of test programs to simulate combined environments. Processing improvements included development and use of low spray guns for foam application, additional human factors considerations for production, use of high fidelity mockups during hardware processing with video review, improved tank access, extensive use of non destructive evaluation, and producibility enhancements. Design improvements included redesigned bipod fittings, a bellows heater, a feedline camera active during ascent flight, removal of the protuberance airload ramps, redesigned ice frost ramps, and titanium brackets replaced aluminum brackets on the liquid oxygen feedline. Post flight assessment improved due to significant addition of imagery assets, greatly improving situational awareness. The debris risk was reduced by two orders of magnitude. During this time a major natural disaster was overcome when Katrina damaged the manufacturing facility. Numerous lessons from these efforts are documented within the paper.

Welzyn, Kenneth↗

NASA Talks: Space Shuttle Columbia - Lessons Learned: Columbia Launch and Recovery

On February 25, 2026, this NASA Talk was held regarding the Space Shuttle Columbia (Columbia Launch & Recovery). Crew & Thermal System Division (EC) partnered with Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Engineering Directorate (EA) to bring this talk to Johnson Space Center (JSC) centering on what led up to and transpired after the Space Shuttle Columbia accident. Some recovered debris was on exhibit during the talk. Retired NASA Columbia Vehicle Manager Scott Thurston presented this talk. Mr. Thurston brings a wealth of knowledge from his mission experience. This talk was timely and a solemn reminder of the critical importance of diligence, safety, and excellence in our work. EA Director Julie Kramer White welcomed the 400+ center-wide in-person audience, and EC Division Chief Rubik Sheth introduced the speakers. This event was held in the JSC Teague Auditorium, recorded, and executed by the EC in-house STAR Productions team. This record includes an mp4 video presentation with a run time of 36 min. 20 sec.; in color; with sound.

NASA Talks↗

NASA Talks: Space Shuttle Columbia - Lessons Learned

On February 25, 2026, two NASA Talks were held regarding the Space Shuttle Columbia (Columbia Launch & Recovery, Columbia Reconstruction, Investigation, Causes & Key Takeaways). Crew & Thermal System Division (EC) partnered with Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Engineering Directorate (EA) to bring these talks to Johnson Space Center (JSC) centering on what led up to and transpired after the Space Shuttle Columbia accident. Some recovered debris was on exhibit during the talks. NASA Mishap Program Specialist David Erickson and retired NASA Columbia Vehicle Manager Scott Thurston presented these talks. Mr. Erickson supports NASA mishap investigations and assists with the development of NASA's new Columbia Learning Center at KSC. Mr. Thurston brought a wealth of knowledge from his mission experience. These talks were timely and a solemn reminder of the critical importance of diligence, safety, and excellence in our work. EA Director Julie Kramer White welcomed the 400+ center-wide in-person audience, and EC Division Chief Rubik Sheth introduced the speakers. This event was held in the JSC Teague Auditorium, recorded, and executed by the EC in-house STAR Productions team.

Space Shuttle Columbia↗