Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Safety Design Approach”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 127 records · Page 7

Operation and Development Status of the Spacecraft Fire Experiments (Saffire)

Since 2012, a series of Spacecraft Fire Experiments (Saffire) have been under development by the Spacecraft Fire Safety Demonstration (SFS Demo) project, funded by NASA's Advanced Exploration Systems Division. The overall objective of this project is to reduce the uncertainty and risk associated with the design of spacecraft fire safety systems for NASA's exploration missions. The approach to achieving this goal has been to define, develop, and conduct experiments that address gaps in spacecraft fire safety knowledge and capabilities identified by NASA's Fire Safety System Maturation Team. The Spacecraft Fire Experiments (Saffire-I, -II, and -III) are material flammability tests at length scales that are realistic for a spacecraft fire in low-gravity. The specific objectives of these three experiments are to (1) determine how rapidly a large scale fire grows in low-gravity and (2) investigate the low-g flammability limits compared to those obtained in NASA's normal gravity material flammability screening test. The experiments will be conducted in Orbital ATK's Cygnus vehicle after it has unberthed from the International Space Station. The tests will be fully automated with the data downlinked at the conclusion of the test before the Cygnus vehicle reenters the atmosphere. This paper discusses the status of the Saffire-I, II, and III experiments followed by a review of the fire safety technology gaps that are driving the development of objectives for the next series of experiments, Saffire-IV, V, and VI.

Fire Safety↗

From BERTopic to SysML: Informing Model-Based Failure Analysis With Natural Language Processing for Complex Aerospace Systems

The development of emerging complex aerospace systems will require new approaches for capturing safety incident scenarios as early as possible in the design phase. However, for novel systems, relevant data available is limited. In this work, we propose a framework informing model-based mission assurance activities with historical incident reports, lessons learned, or other relevant engineering documents using natural language processing. In doing so, we investigate whether there is useful information in data sets that are relevant, if not identical, to the system under design and whether, through rigorous systems engineering practice, this information can be effectively leveraged through model-based failure analysis. In a worked case study, we apply state-of-the-art topic modeling techniques to two data sets, a mission relevant data set and a system relevant data set. The sets of topics are merged and interpreted to form a preliminary list of failure topics that can be used to inform the identification of off-nominal modes in the model-based failure modes and effects analysis development. Once data from the system in operation is available, it can be used to update the topics identified. By extracting information about likely failures from relevant historical data sets and utilizing model-based mission assurance to ensure relevance and rigor, unanticipated failures can be reduced, and projects can more effectively learn from past missions.

Failure Analysis↗

From BERTopic to SysML: Informing Model-Based Failure Analysis With Natural Language Processing for Complex Aerospace Systems

The development of emerging complex aerospace systems will require new approaches for capturing safety incident scenarios as early as possible in the design phase. However, for novel systems, relevant data available is limited. In this work, we propose a framework informing model-based mission assurance activities with historical incident reports, lessons learned, or other relevant engineering documents using natural language processing. In doing so, we investigate whether there is useful information in data sets that are relevant, if not identical, to the system under design and whether, through rigorous systems engineering practice, this information can be effectively leveraged through model-based failure analysis. In a worked case study, we apply state-of-the-art topic modeling techniques to two data sets, a mission relevant data set and a system relevant data set. The sets of topics are merged and interpreted to form a preliminary list of failure topics that can be used to inform the identification of off-nominal modes in the model-based failure modes and effects analysis development. Once data from the system in operation is available, it can be used to update the topics identified. By extracting information about likely failures from relevant historical data sets and utilizing model-based mission assurance to ensure relevance and rigor, unanticipated failures can be reduced, and projects can more effectively learn from past missions.

Failure Analysis↗

A Data-Driven Approach to Recognizing and Understanding Human Contributions to Aviation Safety

Data-driven decisions about safety management and design of safety-critical systems are limited by the available data, which influence, and are influenced by, how decision makers characterize problems and identify solutions. In the commercial aviation domain, large volumes of data are collected and analyzed on the failures and errors that result in infrequent incidents and accidents, but in the absence of data on safety-producing behaviors, safety management and system design decisions are based on a small sample of non-representative safety data. Analysis of aviation accident data suggests that human error is implicated in up to 80% of accidents, which has been used to justify future visions for aviation in which the roles of human operators are greatly diminished or eliminated in the interest of creating a safer aviation system. However, failure to fully consider the human contributions to aviation safety represents a significant and largely unrecognized risk when making policy decisions about safety management and system design. Opportunities exist to leverage the vast amount of data that have already been collected, or could be easily obtained, to increase our understanding of human contributions to safety in commercial aviation. This presentation will focus on those opportunities as well as the challenges associated with collecting and analyzing data on operators’ safety-producing behaviors.

Safety↗

An Ontological Approach to Integrate Commercial Space Operations with an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS)

The emergence of commercial space operations (CSO) is one of many Advanced Air Mobility domains that pose major challenges to in-time safety assurance because of the different architectures used by the operators and other agents. The National Academies recognized the need to improve integration of disparate architectures and recommended that an In-time Aviation Safety Management System(IASMS) be developed to provide seamless connectivity across interacting architectures and enable in-time safety assurance. An ontological approach to integrating CSO with IASMS involves in-time Services, Functions, and Capabilities design to manage operational risks and inform changes to design. The resulting integrated architecture provides a common basis for risk management and in-time safety assurance.

K Ellis↗

MLAS and LAS: Project Comparison of Lessons Learned

The development of new and safer manned space vehicles is a top priority at NASA. Recently two different approaches of how to accomplish this mission of keeping astronauts safe was successfully demonstrated. With work already underway on an Apollo-like launch abort system for the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), an alternative design concept named the Max Launch Abort System, or MLAS, was developed as a parallel effort. The Orion system, managed by the Constellation office, is based on the design of a single solid launch abort motor in a tower positioned above the capsule. The MLAS design takes a different approach placing the solid launch abort motor underneath the capsule. This effort was led by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). Both escape systems were designed with the Ares I Rocket as the launch vehicle and had the same primary requirement to safely propel a crew module away from any emergency event either on the launch pad or during accent. Beyond these two parameters, there was little else in common between the two projects, except that they both concluded in successful launches that will further promote the development of crew launch abort systems. This presentation will compare both projects from the standpoint of technical requirements; program management and flight test objectives and highlight the synergistic lessons learned by two engineers who worked on each program.

Dittemore, Gary↗

Comparison of Two Recent Launch Abort Platforms

The development of new and safer manned space vehicles is a top priority at NASA. Recently two different approaches of how to accomplish this mission of keeping astronauts safe was successfully demonstrated. With work already underway on an Apollo-like launch abort system for the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), an alternative design concept named the Max Launch Abort System, or MLAS, was developed as a parallel effort. The Orion system, managed by the Constellation office, is based on the design of a single solid launch abort motor in a tower positioned above the capsule. The MLAS design takes a different approach placing the solid launch abort motor underneath the capsule. This effort was led by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). Both escape systems were designed with the Ares I Rocket as the launch vehicle and had the same primary requirement to safely propel a crew module away from any emergency event either on the launch pad or during accent. Beyond these two parameters, there was little else in common between the two projects, except that they both concluded in successful launches that will further promote the development of crew launch abort systems. A comparison of these projects from the standpoint of technical requirements; program management and flight test objectives will be done to highlight the synergistic lessons learned by two engineers who worked on each program. This comparison will demonstrate how the scope of the project architecture and management involvement in innovation should be tailored to meet the specific needs of the system under development.

Dittemore, Gary D.↗

Conceptual design and simulator implementation of an automatic terminal approach system

The pilot-machine interface with aircraft automation to increase the safety and utility of single-pilot IFR (instrument flight rules) operations is addressed. An automatic terminal approach system (ATAS), that uses stored instrument approach data to automatically tune aircraft radios and control the aircraft autopilot, was conceived as a means of improving this critical interface. The ATAS automatically flies instrument approach procedures, including the missed approach, and provides for easy pilot interaction to accommodate air traffic control radar vectors and altitude assignments. A research prototype of an ATAS was developed to the extent necessary for a simulation implementation and piloted evaluation. The development of the ATAS concept and the software algorithms is described.

Hinton, D. A.↗

Structures and materials technology for hypersonic aerospacecraft

Major considerations in structural design of a transatmospheric aerospacecraft are discussed. The general direction of progress in structures and materials technology is indicated, and technical areas in structures and materials where further research and development is necessary are indicated. Various structural concepts under study and materials which appear to be most applicable are discussed. Structural design criteria are discussed with particular attention to the factor-of-safety approach and the probabilistic approach. Structural certification requirements for the aerospacecraft are discussed. The kinds of analyses and tests which would be required to certify the structural integrity, safety, and durability of the aerospacecraft are discussed, and the type of test facility needed to perform structural certification tests is identified.

Mccomb, Harvey G., Jr.↗

Creep-Fatigue Interaction Testing

Fatigue fives in metals are nominally time independent below 0.5 T(sub Melt). At higher temperatures, fatigue lives are altered due to time-dependent, thermally activated creep. Conversely, creep rates are altered by super. imposed fatigue loading. Creep and fatigue generally interact synergistically to reduce material lifetime. Their interaction, therefore, is of importance to structural durability of high-temperature structures such as nuclear reactors, reusable rocket engines, gas turbine engines, terrestrial steam turbines, pressure vessel and piping components, casting dies, molds for plastics, and pollution control devices. Safety and lifecycle costs force designers to quantify these interactions. Analytical and experimental approaches to creep-fatigue began in the era following World War II. In this article experimental and life prediction approaches are reviewed for assessing creep-fatigue interactions of metallic materials. Mechanistic models are also discussed briefly.

Halford, Gary R.↗

The Role of Alerting System Failures in Loss of Control Accidents CAST SE-210 Output 2

This report is part of a series of reports that address flight deck design and evaluation, written as a response to loss of control accidents. In particular, this activity is directed at failures in airplane state awareness in which the pilot loses awareness of the airplane's energy state or attitude and enters an upset condition. In a report by the Commercial Aviation Safety Team, an analysis of accidents and incidents related to loss of airplane state awareness determined that hazard alerting was not effective in producing the appropriate pilot response to a hazard (CAST, 2014). In the current report, we take a detailed look at 28 airplane state awareness accidents and incidents to determine how well the hazard alerting worked. We describe a five-step integrated alerting-to-recovery sequence that prescribes how hazard alerting should lead to effective flight crew actions for managing the hazard. Then, for each hazard in each of the 28 events, we determine if that sequence failed and, if so, how it failed. The results show that there was an alerting failure in every one of the 28 safety events, and that the most frequent failure (20/28) was tied to the flight crew not orienting to (not being aware of) the hazard. The discussion section summarizes findings and identifies alerting issues that are being addressed and issues that are not currently being addressed. We identify a few recent upgrades that have addressed certain alerting failures. Two of these upgrades address alerting design, but one response to the safety events is to upgrade training for approach to stall and stall recovery. We also describe issues that are not being addressed adequately: better alert integration for flight path management types of hazards, airplanes in the fleet that do not meet the current alerting regulations, a lack of innovation for addressing cases of channelized attention, and existing vulnerabilities in managing data validity.

aviation safety↗

Integrated Handling Qualities Safety Analysis For Conceptual Design of Urban Air Mobility Vehicles

The recent emergence of distributed electric propulsion Vertical Takeoff and Landing (VTOL) aircraft has created a rapid introduction of new design concepts with unique stability and control characteristics. A challenge to realizing the full potential of these vehicles for urban transportation is to gain public acceptance which is largely driven by flight safety. This paper describes ongoing research to address the feasibility of integrating flying qualities safety metrics into conceptual design of VTOL Urban Air Mobility (UAM) vehicles. The discussion is composed of the approach and progress toward a toolbox that integrates with existing NASA rotorcraft design software and processes. Several key challenges are highlighted including modeling requirements for failures, identification of critical failures, and capturing critical failures, with robustness to model uncertainty. A discussion of requirements for safety metrics, specific to UAM vehicles, as well as the effects of the control system design is also included. Results to date have demonstrated the degradation in flying qualities metrics due to propulsion failures.

George Altamirano↗

An Approach for Identifying IASMS Services, Functions, and Capabilities From Data Sources

Assuring safety in the NAS with the inclusion of new entrants that are part of Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) will require overcoming unique safety challenges that result from combining innovative technologies with novel airspace concepts for moving people and cargo using semi-autonomous/autonomous vehicles. Overcoming these AAM safety assurance challenges is the focus of the In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS). The IASMS Concept of Operations (ConOps) describes an interconnected set of services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs)designed to manage operational risks, identify unknown risks, and inform system design to mitigate risk. This paper describes a broad approach for identifying SFCs involving technology trends in research, assessment of known and unknown risks in safety reports, and causal and contributing factors in aviation accidents and incidents. This approach leverages these sources to identify potential SFCs that enable the Monitor, Assess, and Mitigate (M-A-M)functionality that represents the enabling framework of the IASMS.

Kyle Ellis↗

Achieving the Proper Balance Between Crew and Public Safety

A paramount objective of all human-rated launch and reentry vehicle developers is to ensure that the risks to both the crew onboard and the public are minimized within reasonable cost, schedule, and technical constraints. Past experience has shown that proper attention to range safety requirements necessary to ensure public safety must be given early in the design phase to avoid additional operational complexities or threats to the safety of people onboard. This paper will outline the policy considerations, technical issues, and operational impacts regarding launch and reentry vehicle failure scenarios where crew and public safety are intertwined and thus addressed optimally in an integrated manner. Historical examples and lessons learned from both the Space Shuttle and Constellation Programs will be presented. Using these examples as context, the paper will discuss some operational, design, and analysis approaches to mitigate and balance the risks to people onboard and in the public. Manned vehicle perspectives from the FAA and Air Force organizations that oversee public safety will also be summarized. Finally, the paper will emphasize the need to factor policy, operational, and analysis considerations into the early design trades of new vehicles to help ensure that both crew and public safety are maximized to the greatest extent possible.

Gowan, John↗

Addressing Unison and Uniqueness of Reliability and Safety for Better Integration

For a long time, both in theory and in practice, safety and reliability have not been clearly differentiated, which leads to confusion, inefficiency, and sometime counter-productive practices in executing each of these two disciplines. It is imperative to address the uniqueness and the unison of these two disciplines to help both disciplines become more effective and to promote a better integration of the two for enhancing safety and reliability in our products as an overall objective. There are two purposes of this paper. First, it will investigate the uniqueness and unison of each discipline and discuss the interrelationship between the two for awareness and clarification. Second, after clearly understanding the unique roles and interrelationship between the two in a product design and development life cycle, we offer suggestions to enhance the disciplines with distinguished and focused roles, to better integrate the two, and to improve unique sets of skills and tools of reliability and safety processes. From the uniqueness aspect, the paper identifies and discusses the respective uniqueness of reliability and safety from their roles, accountability, nature of requirements, technical scopes, detailed technical approaches, and analysis boundaries. It is misleading to equate unreliable to unsafe, since a safety hazard may or may not be related to the component, sub-system, or system functions, which are primarily what reliability addresses. Similarly, failing-to-function may or may not lead to hazard events. Examples will be given in the paper from aerospace, defense, and consumer products to illustrate the uniqueness and differences between reliability and safety. From the unison aspect, the paper discusses what the commonalities between reliability and safety are, and how these two disciplines are linked, integrated, and supplemented with each other to accomplish the customer requirements and product goals. In addition to understanding the uniqueness in reliability and safety, a better understanding of unison and commonalities will further help in understanding the interaction between reliability and safety. This paper discusses the unison and uniqueness of reliability and safety. It presents some suggestions for better integration of the two disciplines in terms of technical approaches, tools, techniques, and skills to enhance the role of reliability and safety in supporting a product design and development life cycle. The paper also discusses eliminating the redundant effort and minimizing the overlap of reliability and safety analyses for an efficient implementation of the two disciplines.

Huang, Zhaofeng↗

Evaluating the Performance of the NASA LaRC CMF Motion Base Safety Devices

This paper describes the initial measured performance results of the previously documented NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) Cockpit Motion Facility (CMF) motion base hardware safety devices. These safety systems are required to prevent excessive accelerations that could injure personnel and damage simulator cockpits or the motion base structure. Excessive accelerations may be caused by erroneous commands or hardware failures driving an actuator to the end of its travel at high velocity, stepping a servo valve, or instantly reversing servo direction. Such commands may result from single order failures of electrical or hydraulic components within the control system itself, or from aggressive or improper cueing commands from the host simulation computer. The safety systems must mitigate these high acceleration events while minimizing the negative performance impacts. The system accomplishes this by controlling the rate of change of valve signals to limit excessive commanded accelerations. It also aids hydraulic cushion performance by limiting valve command authority as the actuator approaches its end of travel. The design takes advantage of inherent motion base hydraulic characteristics to implement all safety features using hardware only solutions.

Gupton, Lawrence E.↗

Assessment and Control of Spacecraft Charging Risks on the International Space Station

The International Space Station (ISS) operates in the F2 region of Earth's ionosphere, orbiting at altitudes ranging from 350 to 450 km at an inclination of 51.6 degrees. The relatively dense, cool F2 ionospheric plasma suppresses surface charging processes much of the time, and the flux of relativistic electrons is low enough to preclude deep dielectric charging processes. The most important spacecraft charging processes in the ISS orbital environment are: 1) ISS electrical power system interactions with the F2 plasma, 2) magnetic induction processes resulting from flight through the geomagnetic field and, 3) charging processes that result from interaction with auroral electrons at high latitude. Recently, the continuing review and evaluation of putative ISS charging hazards required by the ISS Program Office revealed that ISS charging could produce an electrical shock hazard to the ISS crew during extravehicular activity (EVA). ISS charging risks are being evaluated in an ongoing measurement and analysis campaign. The results of ISS charging measurements are combined with a recently developed model of ISS charging (the Plasma Interaction Model) and an exhaustive analysis of historical ionospheric variability data (ISS Ionospheric Specification) to evaluate ISS charging risks using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methods. The PRA combines estimates of the frequency of occurrence and severity of the charging hazards with estimates of the reliability of various hazard controls systems, as required by NASA s safety and risk management programs, to enable design and selection of a hazard control approach that minimizes overall programmatic and personnel risk. The PRA provides a quantitative methodology for incorporating the results of the ISS charging measurement and analysis campaigns into the necessary hazard reports, EVA procedures, and ISS flight rules required for operating ISS in a safe and productive manner.

Koontz, Steve↗

Probabilistic Risk-Based Approach to Aeropropulsion System Assessment Developed

In an era of shrinking development budgets and resources, where there is also an emphasis on reducing the product development cycle, the role of system assessment, performed in the early stages of an engine development program, becomes very critical to the successful development of new aeropropulsion systems. A reliable system assessment not only helps to identify the best propulsion system concept among several candidates, it can also identify which technologies are worth pursuing. This is particularly important for advanced aeropropulsion technology development programs, which require an enormous amount of resources. In the current practice of deterministic, or point-design, approaches, the uncertainties of design variables are either unaccounted for or accounted for by safety factors. This could often result in an assessment with unknown and unquantifiable reliability. Consequently, it would fail to provide additional insight into the risks associated with the new technologies, which are often needed by decisionmakers to determine the feasibility and return-on-investment of a new aircraft engine.

Tong, Michael T.↗