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NASA NTRS2003

Certification Processes for Safety-Critical and Mission-Critical Aerospace Software

This document is a quick reference guide with an overview of the processes required to certify safety-critical and mission-critical flight software at selected NASA centers and the FAA. Researchers and software developers can use this guide to jumpstart their understanding of how to get new or enhanced software onboard an aircraft or spacecraft. The introduction contains aerospace industry definitions of safety and safety-critical software, as well as, the current rationale for certification of safety-critical software. The Standards for Safety-Critical Aerospace Software section lists and describes current standards including NASA standards and RTCA DO-178B. The Mission-Critical versus Safety-Critical software section explains the difference between two important classes of software: safety-critical software involving the potential for loss of life due to software failure and mission-critical software involving the potential for aborting a mission due to software failure. The DO-178B Safety-critical Certification Requirements section describes special processes and methods required to obtain a safety-critical certification for aerospace software flying on vehicles under auspices of the FAA. The final two sections give an overview of the certification process used at Dryden Flight Research Center and the approval process at the Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL).

Nelson, Stacy↗
NASA NTRS2003

Certification Processes for Safety-Critical and Mission-Critical Aerospace Software

This document is a quick reference guide with an overview of the processes required to certify safety-critical and mission-critical flight software at selected NASA centers and the FAA. Researchers and software developers can use this guide to jumpstart their understanding of how to get new or enhanced software onboard an aircraft or spacecraft. The introduction contains aerospace industry definitions of safety and safety-critical software, as well as, the current rationale for certification of safety-critical software. The Standards for Safety-Critical Aerospace Software section lists and describes current standards including NASA standards and RTCA DO-178B. The Mission-Critical versus Safety-Critical software section explains the difference between two important classes of software: safety-critical software involving the potential for loss of life due to software failure and mission-critical software involving the potential for aborting a mission due to software failure. The DO-178B Safety-critical Certification Requirements section describes special processes and methods required to obtain a safety-critical certification for aerospace software flying on vehicles under auspices of the FAA. The final two sections give an overview of the certification process used at Dryden Flight Research Center and the approval process at the Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL).

Nelson, Stacy↗
NASA NTRS2023

CST: A Tool for Optimizing the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Static-Code Analysis Tools

Static Code Analysis (SCA) is a vital component of NASA IV&V’s mission assurance for safety-critical software as it reduces the likelihood of software-induced hazards impacting mission success. Static Code Analysis achieves this by identifying hazards that may not have been otherwise detectable by typical code reviews or other testing. Using SCA tools, however, can be intimidating due to steep learning curves, especially considering tool performance and defect coverage varies greatly. Because of this variation amongst SCA tools, understanding which tools support certain defects and which do not, as well as understanding how to run an analysis based on steps that are unique to each tool, can be difficult to both new and experienced analysts alike. To mitigate this, the SCAWG or the IV&V Static Code Analysis Working Group, created the SCA Checker Taxonomy and Starting Point Profiles. The Checker Selection Tool (CST) incorporates these two SCAWG products into an interactive tool which allows the user to: select organized categories of defects they would like the SCA tools to discover, select default checkers depending on their mission type (e.g. flight), and configure multiple SCA tools at once. C/C++, Java, and Python defect checkers from four common SCA tools were utilized in this iteration of the CST. This iteration also includes the addition of training, SCA tool specific help, and taxonomy guide links, into its design to help users new to Static Code Analysis learn how to perform SCA more efficiently. The CST has been subject to beta testing by experienced static code analysts from the SCAWG to ensure a usable and accurate final product. The implications of the CST in the mission assurance of NASA safety-critical software are profound, as the CST can help identify and reduce false positives and false negatives, fundamentally improving overall SCA efficiency and accuracy.

static code analysis↗
NASA NTRS2023

Utilizing Code Generation from Models for Electric Aircraft Motor Controller Flight Software

The processes followed to develop and test safety-critical flight software significantly increase development effort and overhead in comparison to both non-safety-critical and non-flight software. Generating code from models can be used to reduce development effort; however, the processes for using code generation to develop flight software are relatively immature. This work presents an approach for developing safety-critical flight software utilizing code generation from models to reduce development time and effort. The presented use-case is of electric aircraft motor control software developed for NASA's X-57 Maxwell aircraft.

flight software↗
NASA NTRS1997

Automated Reuse of Scientific Subroutine Libraries through Deductive Synthesis

Systematic software construction offers the potential of elevating software engineering from an art-form to an engineering discipline. The desired result is more predictable software development leading to better quality and more maintainable software. However, the overhead costs associated with the formalisms, mathematics, and methods of systematic software construction have largely precluded their adoption in real-world software development. In fact, many mainstream software development organizations, such as Microsoft, still maintain a predominantly oral culture for software development projects; which is far removed from a formalism-based culture for software development. An exception is the limited domain of safety-critical software, where the high-assuiance inherent in systematic software construction justifies the additional cost. We believe that systematic software construction will only be adopted by mainstream software development organization when the overhead costs have been greatly reduced. Two approaches to cost mitigation are reuse (amortizing costs over many applications) and automation. For the last four years, NASA Ames has funded the Amphion project, whose objective is to automate software reuse through techniques from systematic software construction. In particular, deductive program synthesis (i.e., program extraction from proofs) is used to derive a composition of software components (e.g., subroutines) that correctly implements a specification. The construction of reuse libraries of software components is the standard software engineering solution for improving software development productivity and quality.

Lowry, Michael R.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Safety Characteristics in System Application of Software for Human Rated Exploration Missions for the 8th IAASS Conference

NASA and its industry and international partners are embarking on a bold and inspiring development effort to design and build an exploration class space system. The space system is made up of the Orion system, the Space Launch System (SLS) and the Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) system. All are highly coupled together and dependent on each other for the combined safety of the space system. A key area of system safety focus needs to be in the ground and flight application software system (GFAS). In the development, certification and operations of GFAS, there are a series of safety characteristics that define the approach to ensure mission success. This paper will explore and examine the safety characteristics of the GFAS development. The GFAS system integrates the flight software packages of the Orion and SLS with the ground systems and launch countdown sequencers through the 'agile' software development process. A unique approach is needed to develop the GFAS project capabilities within this agile process. NASA has defined the software development process through a set of standards. The standards were written during the infancy of the so-called industry 'agile development' movement and must be tailored to adapt to the highly integrated environment of human exploration systems. Safety of the space systems and the eventual crew on board is paramount during the preparation of the exploration flight systems. A series of software safety characteristics have been incorporated into the development and certification efforts to ensure readiness for use and compatibility with the space systems. Three underlining factors in the exploration architecture require the GFAS system to be unique in its approach to ensure safety for the space systems, both the flight as well as the ground systems. The first are the missions themselves, which are exploration in nature, and go far beyond the comfort of low Earth orbit operations. The second is the current exploration system will launch only one mission per year even less during its developmental phases. Finally, the third is the partnered approach through the use of many different prime contractors, including commercial and international partners, to design and build the exploration systems. These three factors make the challenges to meet the mission preparations and the safety expectations extremely difficult to implement. As NASA leads a team of partners in the exploration beyond earth's influence, it is a safety imperative that the application software used to test, checkout, prepare and launch the exploration systems put safety of the hardware and mission first. Software safety characteristics are built into the design and development process to enable the human rated systems to begin their missions safely and successfully. Exploration missions beyond Earth are inherently risky, however, with solid safety approaches in both hardware and software, the boldness of these missions can be realized for all on the home planet.

capability↗
NASA NTRS1985

A view of software development environment issues

The unique and challenging nature of the Space Station Program requires that software standards be effectively used to control costs, facilitate enhancements and ensure safety. The Software Standards Panel identified and developed recommendations in four areas to help the Space Station Program achieve these objectives. The areas in which recommendations are offered are policy, organization, process and candidate software standards for the Space Station Program. The concensus process employed by the panel is given and recommendations are made.

Boehm, B.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Improving Software Engineering on NASA Projects

Software Engineering Initiative: Reduces risk of software failure -Increases mission safety. More predictable software cost estimates and delivery schedules. Smarter buyer of contracted out software. More defects found and removed earlier. Reduces duplication of efforts between projects. Increases ability to meet the challenges of evolving software technology.

Crumbley, Tim↗
NASA NTRS2011

Integrated Software Health Management for Aircraft GN and C

Modern aircraft rely heavily on dependable operation of many safety-critical software components. Despite careful design, verification and validation (V&V), on-board software can fail with disastrous consequences if it encounters problematic software/hardware interaction or must operate in an unexpected environment. We are using a Bayesian approach to monitor the software and its behavior during operation and provide up-to-date information about the health of the software and its components. The powerful reasoning mechanism provided by our model-based Bayesian approach makes reliable diagnosis of the root causes possible and minimizes the number of false alarms. Compilation of the Bayesian model into compact arithmetic circuits makes SWHM feasible even on platforms with limited CPU power. We show initial results of SWHM on a small simulator of an embedded aircraft software system, where software and sensor faults can be injected.

Schumann, Johann↗
NASA NTRS1997

Verification and Validation in a Rapid Software Development Process

The high cost of software production is driving development organizations to adopt more automated design and analysis methods such as rapid prototyping, computer-aided software engineering (CASE) tools, and high-level code generators. Even developers of safety-critical software system have adopted many of these new methods while striving to achieve high levels Of quality and reliability. While these new methods may enhance productivity and quality in many cases, we examine some of the risks involved in the use of new methods in safety-critical contexts. We examine a case study involving the use of a CASE tool that automatically generates code from high-level system designs. We show that while high-level testing on the system structure is highly desirable, significant risks exist in the automatically generated code and in re-validating releases of the generated code after subsequent design changes. We identify these risks and suggest process improvements that retain the advantages of rapid, automated development methods within the quality and reliability contexts of safety-critical projects.

Callahan, John R.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Safety Characteristics in System Application Software for Human Rated Exploration

NASA and its industry and international partners are embarking on a bold and inspiring development effort to design and build an exploration class space system. The space system is made up of the Orion system, the Space Launch System (SLS) and the Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) system. All are highly coupled together and dependent on each other for the combined safety of the space system. A key area of system safety focus needs to be in the ground and flight application software system (GFAS). In the development, certification and operations of GFAS, there are a series of safety characteristics that define the approach to ensure mission success. This paper will explore and examine the safety characteristics of the GFAS development.

exploration↗
NASA NTRS2004

A Tool for Verification and Validation of Neural Network Based Adaptive Controllers for High Assurance Systems

High reliability of mission- and safety-critical software systems has been identified by NASA as a high-priority technology challenge. We present an approach for the performance analysis of a neural network (NN) in an advanced adaptive control system. This problem is important in the context of safety-critical applications that require certification, such as flight software in aircraft. We have developed a tool to measure the performance of the NN during operation by calculating a confidence interval (error bar) around the NN's output. Our tool can be used during pre-deployment verification as well as monitoring the network performance during operation. The tool has been implemented in Simulink and simulation results on a F-15 aircraft are presented.

Gupta, Pramod↗
NASA NTRS2014

Range Safety Flight Elevation Limit Calculation Software

This program was developed to fill a need within the Wallops Flight Facility workflow for automation of the development of vertical plan limit lines used by flight safety officers during the conduct of expendable launch vehicle missions. Vertical plane present-position-based destruct lines have been used by range safety organizations at numerous launch ranges to mitigate launch vehicle risks during the early phase of flight. Various ranges have implemented data submittal and processing workflows to develop these destruct lines. As such, there is significant prior art in this field. The ElLimits program was developed at NASA's Wallops Flight Facility to automate the process for developing vertical plane limit lines using current computing technologies. The ElLimits program is used to configure launch-phase range safety flight control lines for guided missiles. The name of the program derives itself from the fundamental quantity that is computed - flight elevation limits. The user specifies the extent and resolution of a grid in the vertical plane oriented along the launch azimuth. At each grid point, the program computes the maximum velocity vector flight elevation that can be permitted without endangering a specified back-range location. Vertical plane x-y limit lines that can be utilized on a present position display are derived from the flight elevation limit data by numerically propagating 'streamlines' through the grid. The failure turn and debris propagation simulation technique used by the application is common to all of its analysis options. A simulation is initialized at a vertical plane grid point chosen by the program. A powered flight failure turn is then propagated in the plane for the duration of the so-called RSO reaction time. At the end of the turn, a delta-velocity is imparted, and a ballistic trajectory is propagated to impact. While the program possesses capability for powered flight failure turn modeling, it does not require extensive user inputs of vehicle characteristics (e.g., thrust and aerodynamic data), nor does it require reams of turn data after the traditional fashion of the Air Force ranges. The program requires a nominal trajectory table (time, altitude, range, velocity, and flight elevation) and makes heavy use of it to initialize and model a failure turn.

Lanzi, Raymond J↗
NASA NTRS2011

Bayesian Software Health Management for Aircraft Guidance, Navigation, and Control

Modern aircraft, both piloted fly-by-wire commercial aircraft as well as UAVs, more and more depend on highly complex safety critical software systems with many sensors and computer-controlled actuators. Despite careful design and V&V of the software, severe incidents have happened due to malfunctioning software. In this paper, we discuss the use of Bayesian networks (BNs) to monitor the health of the on-board software and sensor system, and to perform advanced on-board diagnostic reasoning. We will focus on the approach to develop reliable and robust health models for the combined software and sensor systems.

Schumann, Johann↗
NASA NTRS2005

Integrated Systems Health Management for Space Exploration

Integrated Systems Health Management (ISHM) is a system engineering discipline that addresses the design, development, operation, and lifecycle management of components, subsystems, vehicles, and other operational systems with the purpose of maintaining nominal system behavior and function and assuring mission safety and effectiveness under off-nominal conditions. NASA missions are often conducted in extreme, unfamiliar environments of space, using unique experimental spacecraft. In these environments, off-nominal conditions can develop with the potential to rapidly escalate into mission- or life-threatening situations. Further, the high visibility of NASA missions means they are always characterized by extraordinary attention to safety. ISHM is a critical element of risk mitigation, mission safety, and mission assurance for exploration. ISHM enables: In-space maintenance and repair; a) Autonomous (and automated) launch abort and crew escape capability; b) Efficient testing and checkout of ground and flight systems; c) Monitoring and trending of ground and flight system operations and performance; d) Enhanced situational awareness and control for ground personnel and crew; e) Vehicle autonomy (self-sufficiency) in responding to off-nominal conditions during long-duration and distant exploration missions; f) In-space maintenance and repair; and g) Efficient ground processing of reusable systems. ISHM concepts and technologies may be applied to any complex engineered system such as transportation systems, orbital or planetary habitats, observatories, command and control systems, life support systems, safety-critical software, and even the health of flight crews. As an overarching design and operational principle implemented at the system-of-systems level, ISHM holds substantial promise in terms of affordability, safety, reliability, and effectiveness of space exploration missions.

Uckun, Serdar↗
NASA NTRS2021

Machine Learning Based Path Planning for Improved Rover Navigation

Enhanced AutoNav (ENav), the baseline surface navigation software for NASA’s Perseverance rover, sorts a list of candidate paths for the rover to traverse, then uses the Approximate Clearance Evaluation (ACE) algorithm to evaluate whether the most highly ranked paths are safe. ACE is crucial for maintaining the safety of the rover, but is computationally expensive. If the most promising candidates in the list of paths are all found to be infeasible, ENav must continue to search the list and run time-consuming ACE evaluations until a feasible path is found. In this paper, we present two heuristics that, given a terrain heightmap around the rover, produce cost estimates that more effectively rank the candidate paths before ACE evaluation. The first heuristic uses Sobel operators and convolution to incorporate the cost of traversing high-gradient terrain. The second heuristic uses a machine learning (ML) model to predict areas that will be deemed untraversable by ACE. We used physics simulations to collect training data for the ML model and to run Monte Carlo trials to quantify navigation performance across a variety of terrains with various slopes and rock distributions. Compared to ENav's baseline performance, integrating the heuristics can lead to a significant reduction in ACE evaluations and average computation time per planning cycle, increase path efficiency, and maintain or improve the rate of successful traverses. This strategy of targeting specific bottlenecks with ML while maintaining the original ACE safety checks provides an example of how ML can be infused into planetary science missions and other safety-critical software.

Yue, Yisong↗
NASA NTRS2015

A Vehicle Management End-to-End Testing and Analysis Platform for Validation of Mission and Fault Management Algorithms to Reduce Risk for NASA's Space Launch System

The engineering development of the new Space Launch System (SLS) launch vehicle requires cross discipline teams with extensive knowledge of launch vehicle subsystems, information theory, and autonomous algorithms dealing with all operations from pre-launch through on orbit operations. The characteristics of these spacecraft systems must be matched with the autonomous algorithm monitoring and mitigation capabilities for accurate control and response to abnormal conditions throughout all vehicle mission flight phases, including precipitating safing actions and crew aborts. This presents a large and complex system engineering challenge, which is being addressed in part by focusing on the specific subsystems involved in the handling of off-nominal mission and fault tolerance with response management. Using traditional model based system and software engineering design principles from the Unified Modeling Language (UML) and Systems Modeling Language (SysML), the Mission and Fault Management (M&FM) algorithms for the vehicle are crafted and vetted in specialized Integrated Development Teams (IDTs) composed of multiple development disciplines such as Systems Engineering (SE), Flight Software (FSW), Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) and the major subsystems and vehicle elements such as Main Propulsion Systems (MPS), boosters, avionics, Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC), Thrust Vector Control (TVC), and liquid engines. These model based algorithms and their development lifecycle from inception through Flight Software certification are an important focus of this development effort to further insure reliable detection and response to off-nominal vehicle states during all phases of vehicle operation from pre-launch through end of flight. NASA formed a dedicated M&FM team for addressing fault management early in the development lifecycle for the SLS initiative. As part of the development of the M&FM capabilities, this team has developed a dedicated testbed that integrates specific M&FM algorithms, specialized nominal and off-nominal test cases, and vendor-supplied physics-based launch vehicle subsystem models. Additionally, the team has developed processes for implementing and validating these algorithms for concept validation and risk reduction for the SLS program. The flexibility of the Vehicle Management End-to-end Testbed (VMET) enables thorough testing of the M&FM algorithms by providing configurable suites of both nominal and off-nominal test cases to validate the developed algorithms utilizing actual subsystem models such as MPS. The intent of VMET is to validate the M&FM algorithms and substantiate them with performance baselines for each of the target vehicle subsystems in an independent platform exterior to the flight software development infrastructure and its related testing entities. In any software development process there is inherent risk in the interpretation and implementation of concepts into software through requirements and test cases into flight software compounded with potential human errors throughout the development lifecycle. Risk reduction is addressed by the M&FM analysis group working with other organizations such as S&MA, Structures and Environments, GNC, Orion, the Crew Office, Flight Operations, and Ground Operations by assessing performance of the M&FM algorithms in terms of their ability to reduce Loss of Mission and Loss of Crew probabilities. In addition, through state machine and diagnostic modeling, analysis efforts investigate a broader suite of failure effects and associated detection and responses that can be tested in VMET to ensure that failures can be detected, and confirm that responses do not create additional risks or cause undesired states through interactive dynamic effects with other algorithms and systems. VMET further contributes to risk reduction by prototyping and exercising the M&FM algorithms early in their implementation and without any inherent hindrances such as meeting FSW processor scheduling constraints due to their target platform - ARINC 653 partitioned OS, resource limitations, and other factors related to integration with other subsystems not directly involved with M&FM such as telemetry packing and processing. The baseline plan for use of VMET encompasses testing the original M&FM algorithms coded in the same C++ language and state machine architectural concepts as that used by Flight Software. This enables the development of performance standards and test cases to characterize the M&FM algorithms and sets a benchmark from which to measure the effectiveness of M&FM algorithms performance in the FSW development and test processes.

Trevino, Luis↗