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This paper presents, in viewgraph form, a general overview of space shuttle projects. Some of the topics include: 1) Space Shuttle Projects; 2) Marshall Space Flight Center Space Shuttle Projects Office; 3) Space Shuttle Propulsion systems; 4) Space Shuttle Program Major Sites; 5) NASA Office of Space flight (OSF) Center Roles in Space Shuttle Program; 6) Space Shuttle Hardware Flow; and 7) Shuttle Flights To Date.
Space industrialization (or commercialization) has the potential to be a major player in America's space program. If this potential is to be realized, however, industrialization efforts must be considered within the context of the other major portions of the space program: shuttle, space station, and civil remote sensing. Further, development efforts must be based upon a sound scientific and technical understanding of the products and processes, and there must be a trained cadre of dedicated individuals willing to devote time and effort to this effort. There remain considerable risks and uncertainties. Given all this, the best path to follow would seem to be a long term, balanced commitment, emphasizing government, industry, and academia partnerships. Several points are addressed: (1) the place of space industrialization in the overall national space program; (2) the meaning of space industrialization with respect to the historic, national aims of space; and (3) specifically what is being industrialized.
NASA’s mission-operations paradigm, established during Project Mercury and minimally evolving through the Apollo Program, Space Shuttle Program, and ISS missions, has primarily depended on real-time support from a ground team of experts. This ground team has served as the safety net for crewed spaceflight missions over the past 60 years, managing the combined state of the mission, vehicle, and crew. However, this operational paradigm, which has seen little change in its Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA), will face challenges during long-duration exploration missions beyond low Earth orbit. Lunar missions may experience one-way communication latencies ranging from 3 to 14 seconds, while Mars missions will encounter up to a 44-minute round-trip latency at a maximum distance from Earth. Communication delays negatively impact the behavioral health and performance of individuals and crews operating across the multi-team space-to-ground system. Previous research indicates that increased isolation and the challenges posed by delayed communication lead to heightened stress, frustration, adverse behavioral symptoms, and reduced individual performance. NASA has investigated the nature and effectiveness of managing this shift in complex operations since early 2000, but additional research is necessary to assess the issues associated with communication latencies and identify effective countermeasures. This work aimed to examine the evidence from 20 years of research on comm delays. We systematically reviewed the past 20 years of communication delay literature, focusing on how this research aligns with relevant, high-priority needs in the HSIA, Team, and BMed Risks. This type of panoramic review has not been done since 2013; a current, aggregated picture of what has been studied and how is needed to inform additional studies and mitigation development. Additional perspectives were gained from interviews with the research participants, operations experts, and communication delay researchers. Results from this effort will help characterize the risk posed by communication latency for upcoming Artemis missions and point toward potential mitigations. The final results will be presented. For the literature review, we formed a search term seed set drawing from languages used in two papers representative of the previous state of knowledge and supplemented it with additional search terms. We conducted literature searches on Google Scholar, PubMed, and Web of Science and searched NASA project archives for output from NASA-sponsored research. This search yielded 150 papers, of which 48 were relevant. SME interviews provided perspective on key communication delay issues and concerns and what is being worked on to mitigate those issues. Preliminary results of the literature review have been presented. Final results to be presented include the results of the literature review and findings from the interviews.
A summary of the technical results and conclusions is presented of the hazards analyses of earth orbital operations in conjunction with the space shuttle program. The space shuttle orbiter and a variety of manned and unmanned payloads delivered to orbit by the shuttle are considered. The specific safety areas examined are hazardous payloads, docking, on-orbit survivability, tumbling spacecraft, and escape and rescue.
With the development of the space shuttle program, space flight for the first time is available to individuals who have not been specially selected and trained to be astronauts. In addition, women are being actively recruited into the space program, both as mission specialists and as career astronauts. One purpose of this project was to examine some of the physiological responses of women to a simulated weightlessness program (12 day horizontal bedrest), to compare their responses to those reported in men during similar programs, and to test whether menstrual function might alter some of the physiological changes which occur during bedrest, specifically changes in the plasma volume, exercise tolerance, and venous compliance before and after bedrest.
NASA’s current mission-operations paradigm originated with Project Mercury and endured with minimum evolution through the Apollo Program, Space Shuttle Program, and ISS missions. At its foundation is a near-complete real-time dependence on a ground team to manage the combined state of the mission, vehicle, and crew. Utilizing many engineers and operators with broad and deep expertise; large, distributed datasets including extensive telemetry; and expansive analytical and computing power, this ground team has served as the safety net for crewed spaceflight missions over the past 60 years. This approach must change to address challenges associated with missions beyond low Earth orbit (BLEO), including infrequent resupply, reduced ability to evacuate, and delayed communications that prohibit real-time operational support. We anticipate that a necessary part of this change will be increased independence for the crew, as roles and responsibilities traditionally performed by ground teams move on board the vehicle. While many risks are associated with Earth-independent operations, one particular concern is ensuring that the crew will have adequate onboard support to perform urgent problem solving when communication with the ground is delayed or intermittent. A key resource that enables the ground team to respond to anomalies quickly and effectively is the extraordinary expertise and experience it possesses. It is comprised of 80+ experts on at any given time, with a combined 600+ years of system-specific experience across 22 unique console disciplines. A small crew will face the unprecedented challenge of independently responding to anomalies that have historically been handled by a team 20 times their size. Another important resource upon which the ground heavily relies to support procedure execution and anomaly response is data. The amount of telemetry data that each flight controller monitors is extensive. In addition, as the ground team works to further assess impacts, trouble shoot, identify workarounds, and oversee procedure execution, it accesses and synthesizes engineering and procedure information, as well as system build, test, and configuration documentation. It is not feasible nor useful to put all these data onboard as crews become more Earth independent. Each member of a small Mars mission small crew will have multiple roles beyond monitoring telemetry and data gathering, and multiple roles within anomaly resolution processes, thereby limiting their capacity for copious amounts of information. Moreover, while access is necessary, it alone is insufficient. Information will need to be compiled, refined, and represented appropriately to support the crew’s reduced attention and expertise. This work seeks to understand the content and representation of information needed to support time-constrained problem solving and decision making by the crew without real-time ground support. To build this understanding, we first surveyed the literature, focusing on how expert problem solvers construct and manipulate their mental models. Next, we interviewed expert problem solvers in spaceflight and analogous domains and surveyed industry solutions for data presentation. Finally, we analyzed current spaceflight operations by investigating flight controller anomaly resolution processes during ISS training simulations and real operational events. These methods led to creating a problem-solving framework that details common themes and features of attending to, assessing, analyzing, and acting on problems in complex, time-constrained domains. Using this framework and the results of our analysis, we identified conceptual data representations needed for crew-led problem-solving. Preliminary onboard user interface concepts to meet identified needs will be presented.
Rocket engine testing is important throughout a program s life and is essential to the overall success of the program. Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) testing can be divided into three phases: development, certification, and operational. Development tests are conducted on the basic design and are used to develop safe start and shutdown transients and to demonstrate mainstage operation. This phase helps form the foundation of the program, demands navigation of a very steep learning curve, and yields results that shape the final engine design. Certification testing involves multiple engine samples and more aggressive test profiles that explore the boundaries of the engine to vehicle interface requirements. The hardware being tested may have evolved slightly from that in the development phase. Operational testing is conducted with mature hardware and includes acceptance testing of flight assets, resolving anomalies that occur in flight, continuing to expand the performance envelope, and implementing design upgrades. This paper will examine these phases of testing and their importance to the SSME program. Examples of tests conducted in each phase will also be presented.
Aerospace engineering and computer programming manual for space shuttle synthesis program to simulate spacecraft trajectories and weight analysis for performance prediction
For over 30 years the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) has processed the Space Shuttle; handling all hands-on aspects from receiving the Orbiter, External Tanks, Solid Rocket Booster Segments, and Payloads, through certification, check-out, and assembly, and ending with fueling, count-down, and launch. A team of thousands have worked this highly complicated, yet supremely organized, process and have, as a consequence, generated an exceptional amount of technology to solve a host of problems. This paper describes the contributions of one team that formed with the express purpose to help solve some of these diverse Shuttle ground processing problems.
Current Human Space Flight Programs: a) Space Shuttle Program (SSP); b) International Space Station (ISS) Program; c) Constellation Program (CxP).
A means for developing a space shuttle maintenance program which will be acceptable to the development centers, the operators (KSC and AF), and the manufacturer is presented. The general organization and decision processes for determining the essential scheduled maintenance requirements for the space shuttle orbiter are outlined. The development of initial scheduled maintenance programs is discussed. The remaining maintenance, that is non-scheduled or non-routine maintenance, is directed by the findings of the scheduled maintenance program and the normal operation of the shuttle. The remaining maintenance consists of maintenance actions to correct discrepancies noted during scheduled maintenance tasks, nonscheduled maintenance, normal operation, or condition monitoring.
The STS-61 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report summarizes the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) servicing mission as well as the Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), and the Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) systems performance during the fifty-ninth flight of the Space Shuttle Program and fifth flight of the Orbiter vehicle Endeavour (OV-105). In addition to the Orbiter, the flight vehicle consisted of an ET designated as ET-60; three SSME's which were designated as serial numbers 2019, 2033, and 2017 in positions 1, 2, and 3, respectively; and two SRB's which were designated BI-063. The RSRM's that were installed in each SRB were designated as 360L023A (lightweight) for the left SRB, and 360L023B (lightweight) for the right SRB. This STS-61 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report fulfills the Space Shuttle Program requirement as documented in NSTS 07700, Volume 8, Appendix E. That document requires that each major organizational element supporting the Program report the results of its hardware evaluation and mission performance plus identify all related in-flight anomalies. The primary objective of the STS-61 mission was to perform the first on-orbit servicing of the Hubble Space Telescope. The servicing tasks included the installation of new solar arrays, replacement of the Wide Field/Planetary Camera I (WF/PC I) with WF/PC II, replacement of the High Speed Photometer (HSP) with the Corrective Optics Space Telescope Axial Replacement (COSTAR), replacement of rate sensing units (RSU's) and electronic control units (ECU's), installation of new magnetic sensing systems and fuse plugs, and the repair of the Goddard High Resolution Spectrometer (GHRS). Secondary objectives were to perform the requirements of the IMAX Cargo Bay Camera (ICBC), the IMAX Camera, and the Air Force Maui Optical Site (AMOS) Calibration Test.
The Space Shuttle vehicle consists of the orbiter, external tank, and two solid rocket boosters. In dealing with security two major protective categories are considered, taking into account resource protection and information protection. A review is provided of four basic programs which have to be satisfied. Aspects of science and technology transfer are discussed. The restrictions for the transfer of science and technology information are covered under various NASA Management Instructions (NMI's). There were two major events which influenced the protection of sensitive and private information on the Space Shuttle program. The first event was a manned space flight accident, while the second was the enactment of a congressional bill to establish the rights of privacy. Attention is also given to national resource protection and national defense classified operations.
The Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC) has been a critical element of the United State's human space flight program for over 50 years. It is the home to NASA s Mission Control Center, the astronaut corps, and many major programs and projects including the Space Shuttle Program, International Space Station Program, and the Orion Project. As part of JSC's Engineering Directorate, the Applied Aeroscience and Computational Fluid Dynamics Branch is charted to provide aerosciences support to all human spacecraft designs and missions for all phases of flight, including ascent, exo-atmospheric, and entry. The presentation will review past and current aeroscience applications and how NASA works to apply a balanced philosophy that leverages ground testing, computational modeling and simulation, and flight testing, to develop and validate related products. The speaker will address associated aspects of aerodynamics, aerothermodynamics, rarefied gas dynamics, and decelerator systems, involving both spacecraft vehicle design and analysis, and operational mission support. From these examples some of NASA leading aerosciences challenges will be identified. These challenges will be used to provide foundational motivation for the development of specific advanced modeling and simulation capabilities, and will also be used to highlight how development activities are increasing becoming more aligned with flight projects. NASA s efforts to apply principles of innovation and inclusion towards improving its ability to support the myriad of vehicle design and operational challenges will also be briefly reviewed.
Dean Acosta, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Public Affairs hosted this post launch press conference. Present were Mike Griffin, NASA Administrator; William Ready, Associate Administrator for Space Operations; Bill Parsons, Space Shuttle Program Manager; Mike Leinbach, NASA Launch Director; and Wayne Hill, Deputy Program Manager for Space Shuttle Program. Each expressed thanks to all of NASA Officials and employees, contractors, vendors and the crew for their hard work the past two and a half years that resulted the successful and pristine launch of Space Shuttle Discovery. The Panel emphasized that through extensive technical analysis, thorough planning and tremendous amount of public support brought them full circle again to return to flight. Flight safety, debris during rocket separation, sensors, observations from the mission control, launch conditions were some of the topics discussed with the News media.
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) presents its annual report covering February through December 1995. Findings and recommendations include the areas of the Space Shuttle Program, the International Space Station, Aeronautics, and Other. Information to support these findings is included in this report. NASA's response to last year's annual report is included as an appendix. With regards to the Space Shuttle Program, the panel addresses the potential for safety problems due to organizational changes by increasing its scrutiny of Space Shuttle operations and planning.
NASA leads the world in space research and provides other government agencies, educational institutions, and companies opportunities to explore, launch, and conduct research in and around space. NASA has 11 formal locations based around the United States, and each has different goals and objectives to help NASA meet its overall mission. 2004, President George Bush announced a new vision for the Space Exploration program. During his grand announcement, he discussed that the Space Shuttles would retire due to the 2003 Space Shuttle Columbia accident, where the crew and the space vehicle were lost. The Kennedy Space Center (KSC) would no longer manage the day-to-day operations of maintaining the US Space Shuttle fleet. Our NASA teams would continue working to finish the Space Shuttle program's mission to build the International Space Station. Afterward, NASA would transition to develop and test a new spacecraft, the Crew Exploration Vehicle. The third goal was to return to the moon by 2020 as the launching point for missions beyond, to get humans from lower Earth orbit to the moon and Mars. (Secretary, 2004) The KSC engineering workforce had to prepare to transition from Operational support of the Space Shuttle program to the design and development of over 50 subsystems for the future SLS and Orion Launch Systems at the Kennedy Space Center. These subsystems developed at the Kennedy Space Center Engineering Directorate followed a comprehensive design process that required several different product deliverables during various phases for each subsystem. (Schafer et al., 2013) What allowed these systems to be successful? What enabled NASA KSC to complete over 130 Artemis 1 Design Certification and System Acceptance Reviews, closing over 21,656 Requirements to deem the Artemis 1 rocket ready for launch? Little is known about the NASA engineering workforce agility characteristics that enabled the organization to transition from the Space Shuttle program that ended in 2011 and launch the Artemis Program's SLS rocket on November 16, 2022.
The Phase B Extension of the Space Shuttle System Program Definition study was redirected to apply primary effort to consideration of space shuttle systems utilizing either recoverable pressure fed liquids or expendable solid rocket motor boosters. Two orbiter configurations were to be considered, one with a 15x60 foot payload bay with a 65,000 lb, due East, up-payload capability and the other with a 14x45 payload bay with 45,000 lb, of due East, up-payload. Both were to use three SSME engines with 472,000 lb of vacuum thrust each. Parallel and series burn ascent modes were to be considered for the launch configurations of primary interest. A recoverable pump-fed booster is included in the study in a series burn configuration with the 15x60 orbiter. To explore the potential of the swing engine orbiter configuration in the pad abort case, it is included in the study matrix in two launch configurations, a series burn pressure fed BRB and a parallel burn SRM. The resulting matrix of configuration options is shown. The principle objectives of this study are to evaluate the cost and technical differences between the liquid and solid propellant booster systems and to assess the development and operational cost savings available with a smaller orbiter.