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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 127 records · Page 7
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2016

Physical cryptographic verification of nuclear warheads

Significance We provide a method for potentially solving one of the central problems in arms control: proving the authenticity of a nuclear warhead without revealing information about its construction. The proposal is the first, to our knowledge, to be proof-theoretically sound (i.e., unspoofable) and information-theoretically secure. The method uses a tomography technique which can resolve the spatial distribution of mass with isotopic specificity. The soundness and security emerge from an integral-geometric transform that is able to uniquely map 3D geometries from zero-dimensional point measurements.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Results of an In-Field Validation Exercise in Support of Wide-Area Environmental Sampling

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NA-24) is evaluating Wide-Area Environmental Sampling (WAES) as an additional safeguards verification tool for the International Atomic Energy Agency to detect undeclared nuclear activities. The NNSA is evaluating strategies for conducting a generic WAES campaign, the cost of a WAES campaign, and the effect of technological advancements that have occurred since the last major WAES review in 1999. Until now, the NNSA effort has focused on tabletop exercises (TTXs) in which high-performance computing allows for advanced modeling and simulation efforts to be applied to the WAES question. Although the modeling and simulations used in the TTXs are extremely valuable, field campaigns are still needed to validate the assumptions that underpin the models and the modeling process itself. During a 7 week period beginning in May 2023 and ending in June 2023, which included 4 weeks of active field collections, a multilaboratory team conducted its first in-field validation exercise. Prior to the in-field exercise, abbreviated TTXs were conducted to estimate the performance of all collection systems to be used during the field test. These TTXs guided the selection of materials to be released and the placement of the collection system. Based on these determinations, materials were procured to use in the field test, and an injection/release system was designed, built, and installed at the test facility. Background samples were collected during weeks one and four, and environmental collections against active releases were conducted during weeks two and three. The goals of this validation exercise included a demonstration of (1) the ability to provide controlled releases of particulates of surrogate materials, (2) the fielding and operation of collection systems (including deposition and active air collectors), and (3) the flexibility to revise equipment and campaign plans in the field. This paper presents the results and preliminary conclusions for this initial validation test. Based on these results, subsequent field campaigns are anticipated and will include the addition of other released materials.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Prototype for Unclassified Algorithm

Continuing previous efforts to investigate and develop the Unclassified Radioisotope Algorithm, the goal of the FY19-FY20 effort was to develop a prototype detector system which uses the algorithm to confirm warhead attributes related to the presence of either weapons grade plutonium (WGPu) or highly enriched uranium (HEU). The final deliverable is a prototype attribute measurement system built with common, commercially available gamma radiation detector components, capable of confirming the presence of specific, complex radioactive sources of interest, without the collection and storage of gamma energy spectra. This is accomplished by processing each gamma pulse as it is received, applying weight values based on the energy and incrementing or decrementing scalar counters which can be compared with expected values to determine if the measured source is consistent with WGPu or HEU. This report documents the design of the prototype system as well as the development of the algorithm and performance testing results. While the previously conceptualized, simple algorithm resulted in a prohibitive amount of false positives, the goal for a simple attribute measurement system capable of verifying Ba-133 and Ra-226 (weapons grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium surrogate testing sources) at over 95% accuracy with sub 5% false positive rate was demonstrated.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2015

Fiber Optic Tamper Indicating Enclosure (TIE); A Case Study in Authentication

A robust fiber optic-based tamper-indicating enclosure (TIE) has been developed by PNNL through funding by the National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nuclear Verification over the past few years. The objective of this work is to allow monitors to have confidence in both the authenticity and integrity of the TIE and the monitoring equipment inside, throughout the time it may be located at a host facility. Incorporating authentication features into the design were the focus of fiscal year 2014 development efforts. Throughout the development process, modifications have been made to the physical TIE design based on lessons learned via exercises and expert elicitation. The end result is a robust and passive TIE which can be utilized to protect monitoring party equipment left in a host facility.

Arms Control↗
DOE OSTI2020

Verifying Deep Reductions in the Nuclear Arsenals: Development and Demonstration of a Motion-detection Subsystem for a “Buddy Tag” Using Non-export Controlled Accelerometers

Future nuclear arms-control agreements may place numerical limits on items that are difficult to monitor with national technical means, even when complemented with onsite inspections. Such items could include small objects and mobile assets, such as non-deployed nuclear warheads and mobile missile launchers. Typically, this verification task can be addressed with unique identifiers, but standard tagging techniques may be unacceptable in this case due to host concerns about safety and intrusiveness. First proposed in the late 1980s and partially developed by Sandia National Laboratories in the early 1990s, the “Proximity Tag” or “Buddy Tag” concept seeks to overcome these concerns by separating the tag from the treaty accountable item itself. A buddy tag has two key elements: a tamper-indicating enclosure and a motion-detection system designed to detect illicit movements in a stand-down period. As part of this project, we have built a buddy-tag prototype for demonstration and evaluation purposes. This paper reviews the design choices and functionalities of the tag’s motion-detection subsystem.We pursue a modular approach for the tag’s hardware, built around an Arduino-class microcontroller and a non-export-controlled low-noise accelerometer, and use open-source algorithms for the motion-detection software. Finally, we discuss the results of an extensive experimental campaign involving both indoor and outdoor measurements assessing the performance of the tag under real-world environmental conditions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

Passive high explosive neutron inspection (PHENIX): a new method to confirm the presence or absence of high explosives for nuclear treaty verification

Advanced instruments and methods need to be developed now to create a technical basis to support the negotiation of future nuclear arms control treaties. One new capability that is anticipated is the ability to confirm either the declared presence or declared absence of high explosive (HE) material in the presence of special nuclear material (SNM). Towards this goal, Passive HE Neutron Inspection (PHENIX) has been developed and demonstrated as a method for confirming the presence or absence of HE in the presence of plutonium. The method exploits the inherent presence of neutrons associated with the decay of plutonium as an internal probe source for performing prompt gamma-ray neutron activation analysis (PGNAA), searching for the presence of HE as revealed by the emission of characteristic gamma rays following neutron absorption in hydrogen and nitrogen which are building blocks of present-day, military-grade HE. Tests using stoichiometrically-correct hemishells of mock HE with plutonium show that a system can be expected to positively confirm the presence or absence of these signatures, supporting determination of HE presence or absence with Pu, in a few hours. To protect other potentially sensitive gamma-ray signatures from a treaty accountable item, an analog information barrier has been conceptualized and tested which physically prevents the collection of gamma-ray spectral data outside of user selected energy windows strategically chosen to view only narrow spectral regions corresponding to the hydrogen (2223.2 keV) and nitrogen (9807.2 keV, 10,318.2 keV, and 10,829.2 keV) PGNAA signatures.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
NASA NTRS1990

Development of a multipurpose hand controller for JEMRMS

A prototype multipurpose hand controller for the JEMRMS (Japanese Experiment Module Remote Manipulator System) was developed. The hand controller (H/C) is an orthogonal type, with 6 degrees of freedom (DOF) and small size. The orthogonal type H/C is very simple for coordinate transformations and can easily control any type of manipulators. In fact, the JEMRMS is planned to have two manipulators controlled by a common H/C at this stage. The H/C was able to be used as a rate control joystick and a force reflection master arm, using an experimental 6 DOF manipulator. Good maneuverability was confirmed in the verification test. The orthogonal type H/C is suitable for use as a common H/C for the two manipulators of the JEMRMS.

Matsuhira, Nobuto↗
DOE OSTI2016

A physical zero-knowledge object-comparison system for nuclear warhead verification

Zero-knowledge proofs are mathematical cryptographic methods to demonstrate the validity of a claim while providing no further information beyond the claim itself. The possibility of using such proofs to process classified and other sensitive physical data has attracted attention, especially in the field of nuclear arms control. Here we demonstrate a non-electronic fast neutron differential radiography technique using superheated emulsion detectors that can confirm that two objects are identical without revealing their geometry or composition. Such a technique could form the basis of a verification system that could confirm the authenticity of nuclear weapons without sharing any secret design information. More broadly, by demonstrating a physical zero-knowledge proof that can compare physical properties of objects, this experiment opens the door to developing other such secure proof-systems for other applications.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2012

Simultaneous Authentication and Certification of Arms-Control Measurement Systems

Most arms-control-treaty-monitoring scenarios involve a host party that makes a declaration regarding its nuclear material or items and a monitoring party that verifies that declaration. A verification system developed for such a use needs to be trusted by both parties. The first concern, primarily from the host party's point of view, is that any sensitive information that is collected must be protected without interfering in the efficient operation of the facility being monitored. This concern is addressed in what can be termed a 'certification' process. The second concern, of particular interest to the monitoring party, is that it must be possible to confirm the veracity of both the measurement system and the data produced by this measurement system. The monitoring party addresses these issues during an 'authentication' process. Addressing either one of these concerns independently is relatively straightforward. However, it is more difficult to simultaneously satisfy host party certification concerns and monitoring party authentication concerns. Typically, both parties will want the final access to the measurement system. We will describe an alternative approach that allows both parties to gain confidence simultaneously. This approach starts with (1) joint development of the measurement system followed by (2) host certification of several copies of the system and (3) random selection by the inspecting party of one copy to be use during the monitoring visit and one (or more) copy(s) to be returned to the inspecting party's facilities for (4) further hardware authentication; any remaining copies are stored under joint seal for use as spares. Following this process, the parties will jointly (5) perform functional testing on the selected measurement system and then (6) use this system during the monitoring visit. Steps (1) and (2) assure the host party as to the certification of whichever system is eventually used in the monitoring visit. Steps (1), (3), (4), and (5) increase the monitoring party's confidence in the authentication of the measurement system.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
NASA NTRS1980

The role of the real-time simulation facility, SIMFAC, in the design, development and performance verification of the Shuttle Remote Manipulator System (SRMS) with man-in-the-loop

The SIMFAC has played a vital role in the design, development, and performance verification of the shuttle remote manipulator system (SRMS) to be installed in the space shuttle orbiter. The facility provides for realistic man-in-the-loop operation of the SRMS by an operator in the operator complex, a flightlike crew station patterned after the orbiter aft flight deck with all necessary man machine interface elements, including SRMS displays and controls and simulated out-of-the-window and CCTV scenes. The characteristics of the manipulator system, including arm and joint servo dynamics and control algorithms, are simulated by a comprehensive mathematical model within the simulation subsystem of the facility. Major studies carried out using SIMFAC include: SRMS parameter sensitivity evaluations; the development, evaluation, and verification of operating procedures; and malfunction simulation and analysis of malfunction performance. Among the most important and comprehensive man-in-the-loop simulations carried out to date on SIMFAC are those which support SRMS performance verification and certification when the SRMS is part of the integrated orbiter-manipulator system.

Mccllough, J. R.↗
DOE OSTI2021

Radiation Detection Technologies

When governing bodies seek to reduce the spread and development of nuclear material and weapons, arms control and safeguards technologies play an important role in preventing proliferation within a state that has already developed a nuclear weapon. Arms control treaties work to control the development, production, stockpiling, proliferation, distribution, or the usage of a certain weapon type or delivery system. Treaty guidelines are met using combinations of monitoring, detection, and verification technologies. 1 To verify compliance, a country must determine if the activities of another country are within the limits and obligations established by the treaty. A verifiable treaty contains an interlocking web of constraints and provisions designed to deter cheating, to make cheating more complicated and more expensive, or to make its detection timelier. In the past, the U.S. has deemed treaties to be effectively verifiable if there is confidence that significant violations can be detected in time to respond and offset any threat that the violation may create for the U.S.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
NASA NTRS2014

Advanced Inspection System: Integrating Robotic Configurations & Controls

The Advanced Inspection System (AIS) promotes the ability to perform field inspections and repairs remotely by operator command. The robotic system is required to be a fully autonomous operation, managed by computer execution of scripts with limited user control. AIS is a complex yet intriguing challenge in which various goals must be reached to achieve complete autonomy. The first steps to building such a system require human computer interactions and computer simulations for testing and verification. Such applications include the use of a wireless video game controller via Bluetooth Technology and the use of Leap Motion, a gesture based motion controller which can be used to manipulate robotic arm movements. Utilizing the Robotic Operating System (ROS) environment, these applications, in accordance to developing a 3D simulation of the system, will provide a foundational test bed for AIS development.

Wlodarczyk, Stephan J.↗
DOE OSTI2014

Novel Authentication of Monitoring Data Through the use of Secret and Public Cryptographic Keys

The Office of Nuclear Verification (ONV) is supporting the development of a piece of equipment to provide data authentication and protection for a suite of monitoring sensors as part of a larger effort to create an arms control technology toolkit. This device, currently called the Red Box, leverages the strengths of both secret and public cryptographic keys to authenticate, digitally sign, and pass along monitoring data to allow for host review, and redaction if necessary, without the loss of confidence in the authenticity of the data by the monitoring party. The design of the Red Box will allow for the addition and removal of monitoring equipment and can also verify that the data was collected by authentic monitoring equipment prior to signing the data and sending it to the host and for review. The host will then forward the data to the monitor for review and inspection. This paper will highlight the progress to date of the Red Box development, and will explain the novel method of leveraging both symmetric and asymmetric (secret and public key) cryptography to authenticate data within a warhead monitoring regime.

Benz, Jacob M.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Integrated Simulation Design Challenges to Support TPS Repair Operations

During the Orbiter Repair Maneuver (ORM) operations planned for Return to Flight (RTF), the Shuttle Remote Manipulator System (SRMS) must grapple the International Space Station (ISS), undock the Orbiter, maneuver it through a long duration trajectory, and orient it to an EVA crewman poised at the end of the Space Station Remote Manipulator System (SSRMS) to facilitate the repair of the Thermal Protection System (TPS). Once repair has been completed and confirmed, then the SRMS proceeds back through the trajectory to dock the Orbiter to the Orbiter Docking System. In order to support analysis of the complex dynamic interactions of the integrated system formed by the Orbiter, ISS, SRMS, and SSMS during the ORM, simulation tools used for previous ‘nominal’ mission support required substantial enhancements. These upgrades were necessary to provide analysts with the capabilities needed to study integrated system performance. Prevalent throughout this ORM operation is a dynamically varying topology. In other words, the ORM starts with the SRMS grappled to the mated Shuttle/ISS stack (closed loop topology), moves to an open loop chain topology consisting of the Shuttle, SRMS, and ISS, and then, at the repair configuration, extends the chain topology to one consisting of the Shuttle, SMS, ISS, and SSRMS/EVA crewman. The resulting long dynamic chain of vehicles and manipulators may exhibit significant motion between the Shuttle worksite and the EVA crewman due to the system flexibility throughout the topology (particularly within the SRMS/SSRMS joints and links). Since the attachment points of both manipulators span the flexible structure of the ISS, simulation analysis may also need to take that into consideration. Moreover, due to the lengthy time duration associated with the maneuver and repair, orbital effects become a factor and require the ISS vehicle control system to maintain active attitude control. Several facets of the ORM operation make the associated analytical efforts different from previous mission support, including: (1) the magnitude of the SRMS handled payload (Le., Orbiter class), (2) the orbital effects induced on the integrated system consisting of the large Shuttle and ISS masses connected by a light flexible SRMS, (3) long duration environmental consequences due to the lengthy operational times associated with the maneuver and repair of the TPS, (4) active attitude control (as opposed to free drift) interacting with the SRMS and SSRMS manipulators (also due to the length of the maneuver and repair), (5) relative dynamics between the EVA crewman and thc worksite influenced by the extended flexible topology. In order to meet these analysis challenges, an ORM simulation architecture was developed leveraging upon numerous pre-existing simulation elements to analyze the various subsystems individually. For example, core manipulator subsystem simulations for both the SRMS and SSRMS were originally combined to provide the dual-arm dynamics topology simulation (in the absence of orbital dynamics and vehicle control). This capability was later merged with the simulation used to analyze SRMS loading with a heavy payload in the orbital environment with an active payload control system (in this case, the ISS Attitude Control System (ACS)), configured for the ORM. The resulting worksite dynamics simulation, based off of the modified ORM simulation, provided the extended topological chain of vehicles and manipulators, while taking into account the orbital effects of both the Shuttle and ISS (as well as its ACS). Verification and validation (V&V) of these integrated simulations became a challenge in itself. A systematic approach needed to be developed such that integration simulation results could be tested against previous constituent simulations upon which these simulations were built. General V&V categories included: (1) core orbital state propagation, (2), stand-alone SRMS, (3) stand-alone SSRMS, (4) stand-alone ISS ACS, (5) integrated Shuttle, SRMS, ISS (with active ACS) in the orbital environment, and (5) dual-arm SRMS/SSRMS dynamics topology. Integrated simulation V&V run suites were created and correlated to verification runs from subsystem simulations, in order to establish the validity of the results. This paper discusses the simulation design challenges encountered while developing simulation capabilities to mirror the ORM operations. The paper also describes the incremental build approach that was utilized, starting with the subsystem simulation elements and integration into increasing more complex simulations until the resulting ORM worksite dynamics simulation had been assembled. Furthermore, the paper presents an overall integrated simulation V&V methodology based upon a subsystem level testing, integrated comparisons, and phased checkout.

Thermal Protection System↗
DOE OSTI2012

Attributes from NMIS Time Coincidence, Fast-Neutron Imaging, Fission Mapping, And Gamma-Ray Spectrometry Data

This work tests a systematic procedure for analyzing data acquired by the Nuclear Materials Identification System (NMIS) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory with fast-neutron imaging and high-purity germanium (HPGe) gamma spectrometry capabilities. NMIS has been under development by the US Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Verification since the mid-1990s, and prior to that by the National Nuclear Security Administration Y-12 National Security Complex, with NMIS having been used at Y-12 for template matching to confirm inventory and receipts. In this present work, a complete set of NMIS time coincidence, fast-neutron imaging, fission mapping, and HPGe gamma-ray spectrometry data was obtained from Monte Carlo simulations for a configuration of fissile and nonfissile materials. The data were then presented for analysis to someone who had no prior knowledge of the unknown object to accurately determine the description of the object by applying the previously mentioned procedure to the simulated data. The best approximation indicated that the unknown object was composed of concentric cylinders: a void inside highly enriched uranium (HEU) (84.7 {+-} 1.9 wt % 235 U), surrounded by depleted uranium, surrounded by polyethylene. The final estimation of the unknown object had the correct materials and geometry, with error in the radius estimates of material regions varying from 1.58% at best and 4.25% at worst; error in the height estimates varied from 2% to 12%. The error in the HEU enrichment estimate was 5.9 wt % (within 2.5Σ of the true value). The accuracies of the determinations could be adequate for arms control applications. Future work will apply this iterative reconstructive procedure to other unknown objects to further test and refine it.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2012

International Legal Framework for Denuclearization and Nuclear Disarmament -- Present Situation and Prospects

This thesis is the culminating project for my participation in the OECD NEA International School of Nuclear Law. This paper will begin by providing a historical background to current disarmament and denuclearization treaties. This paper will discuss the current legal framework based on current and historical activities related to denuclearization and nuclear disarmament. Then, it will propose paths forward for the future efforts, and describe the necessary legal considerations. Each treaty or agreement will be examined in respect to its requirements for: 1) limitations and implementation; 2) and verification and monitoring. Then, lessons learned in each of the two areas (limitations and verification) will be used to construct a proposed path forward at the end of this paper.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

PROACTIVE Focus Area 4: Structured Decision Metrics Analysis (Final Report)

A structured decision metrics analysis was developed as one of the tasks under PROACTIVE’s Focus Area 4 (FA4) and used structured decision metrics for processes, items, and facilities (PIF) to determine the efficacy of an M&V system in meeting treaty goals and technical objectives. The method starts with the functional decomposition of a “treaty” with the M&V system overlaid on it. A Functional Decomposition Rubric (FDR) for each PIF is used to determine a score ranging from 0 (weak) to 4 (strong) for assurance, security, and burden. The individual scores are combined to provide an overall Verification System Score (VSS) which assesses the overall verification system’s suitability given goals; scores for each step of the process are also given. The outcome of the evaluation is to identify needs or modifications to the enterprise model, verification system, or proposed testbed capabilities. VeriScore was used to evaluate FA4’s Spiral 0 exercise; those results are included in this report. The VeriScore and FDR framework can also be used in a non-treaty environment, as any goal/objective/method structure will work, thus expanding its applicability beyond traditional arms control structures.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗