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DOE OSTI2022

PRO-X Fuel Cycle Transportation and Crosscutting Progress Report

The PRO-X program is actively supporting the design of nuclear systems by developing a framework to both optimize the fuel cycle infrastructure for advanced reactors (ARs) and minimize the potential for production of weapons-usable nuclear material. Three study topics are currently being investigated by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) with support from Argonne National Laboratories (ANL). This multi-lab collaboration is focused on three study topics which may offer proliferation resistance opportunities or advantages in the nuclear fuel cycle. These topics are: 1) Transportation Global Landscape, 2) Transportation Avoidability, and 3) Parallel Modular Systems vs Single Large System (Crosscutting Activity).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

PRO-X Transportation Global Landscape

The Proliferation Resistance Optimization (PRO-X) program is actively supporting the design of new-build nuclear systems by identifying intrinsic characteristics or design choices to minimize the potential for diversion or production of weapons-usable nuclear material. The PRO-X program looks to optimize the safety, security, and performance of the fuel cycle infrastructure for a wide array of reactor types, including research reactors, small modular reactors (SMRs), and large advanced reactors (ARs).

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Study of charged-particle emission in neutron reactions on 10 B

The 10 B + n system has been studied by measuring charged particles from neutron-induced reactions in the 1 to 20 MeV energy range. Protons, deuterons, tritons, and α particles were measured at four angles using the pulsed white neutron spectrum at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center Weapons Neutron Research facility. Differential cross sections for each species are reported. These new data are combined with literature data in an R-matrix analysis of the 11 B compound system. Furthermore, a comparison is made to the molecular and cluster states candidates observed in these reactions.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Impacts of future nuclear power generation on the international monitoring system

Many countries are considering nuclear power as a means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and the IAEA (IAEA, 2022) has forecasted nuclear power growth rates up to 224% of the 2021 level by 2050. Nuclear power plants release trace quantities of radioxenon, an inert gas that is also monitored under international agreements as a signature of nuclear weapons tests. To better understand how nuclear energy growth (and resulting Xe emissions) could affect this global nonproliferation architecture, we modeled daily releases of radioxenon isotopes used for nuclear explosion detection in the International Monitoring System (IMS) that is part of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: 131m Xe, 133 Xe, 133m Xe, and 135 Xe to examine the change in the number of radioxenon detections as compared to the 2021 detection levels. If a 40-station IMS network is used, the detections of 133 Xe in 2050 would range from 82% for the low-power scenario to 195% for the high-power scenario, compared to the detections in 2021. If an 80-station IMS network is used, the detections of 133 Xe in 2050 would range from 83% of the 2021 detection rate for the low-power scenario to 209% for the high-power scenario. Essentially no detections of 131m Xe and 133m Xe are expected. The high growth scenario could lead to a six-fold increase in 135 Xe detections, but the total number of detections is still small (on the order of 1 detection per day in the entire network).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Neutron spectroscopy of plutonium using a handheld detection system

The ability to distinguish multiple forms of plutonium from one another, such as oxide and metal, is paramount in areas of nuclear nonproliferation and international safeguards. In its metal form, plutonium can be readily used in a nuclear weapon, while oxide forms are associated with nuclear reactor fuel. Oxide-based plutonium forms emit neutrons with an energy spectrum that is significantly different from the fission neutrons that are emitted from plutonium metal. Organic scintillation detectors output pulses that are proportional to the neutron energy deposited, and therefore present a means of distinguishing these plutonium forms based on their energy spectra. In this work, metal and oxide forms of plutonium were measured using a handheld detection system based on an organic glass scintillator. Monte Carlo modeling of these experiments was performed to provide insight into the origin of the features in the observed light output spectra. Through analysis of multiple regions of these spectra, in a matter of minutes we were able to unambiguously discriminate oxide and metal plutonium forms from one another and from a plutonium-beryllium neutron source, which was considered for comparison because these sources are commonly used in industrial applications. The ability to discriminate weapons-usable material from nuclear reactor fuel has applications in nuclear treaty verification and safeguards.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

Sigma Division Capability Strategy

Sigma Division maintains a unique manufacturing science capability at Los Alamos National Laboratory that has made substantial contributions to weapons component process development for more than 70 years. This mission requires the ability to handle a range of radiological and hazardous materials, work with a variety of metallic and non-metallic components, and process materials systems with elements spanning hydrogen to uranium. Today, Sigma serves as a national resource for uranium research and development, provides hardware for experimental campaigns, supports production by demonstrating modern fabrication technologies, and conducts manufacturing science research primarily for customers across the nuclear weapons complex, including the Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, and Office of Defense Programs.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

High Explosive Testing Capabilities at Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) [Slides]

LANL is a non-profit Federally Funded Research & Development Center (FFRDC). LANL’s Integrated Weapons Experiments (J) Division addresses national security challenges by executing largescale, integrated, focused experiments, and tests of engineered devices and systems. J-NV plans, fields, and executes dynamic high explosive experiments at NNSS. This includes sub-critical experiments involving special nuclear material, as well as small- and largescale non-nuclear experiments. J-NV generates, analyzes, and disseminates unique, high-quality data.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Survey of Uranium Nitride and Mixed Oxide Fuels for Microreactor Applications

Different fuel systems are being proposed for use in microreactors including TRISO fuel and metallic U-Zr based fuel. TRISO fuel is considered the main fuel option for most of the industry teams. Given the need for compact size core and potential for long fuel life of a microreactor, high density fuels such as metallic and nitride fuels are potential options. Of interest here is the uranium nitride (UN) option, which can allow for higher fissile material content and higher thermal conductivity compared to conventional uranium oxide fuel, and also has higher melting temperature compared to metallic fuel. Meanwhile, the current availability is limited for high assay low enriched uranium (HALEU) that is needed for high density fuels, which motivates the consideration of using Pu as a potential replacement for HALEU until adequate production capacity is in place. Current Pu availability is mainly attributed to the inventory of excess weapons Pu rather than through reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. This inventory of excess Pu can be used in both metallic and oxide fuel systems to replace HALEU. Of interest here, the oxide form, that is the mixed oxide form of PuO 2 and UO 2 (MOX). In this report, the options of using UN or MOX, in both pellet and TRISO fuel forms, in microreactors are evaluated in relation to their properties, fuel performance and irradiation data, as well as fabrication. Gaps related to those areas are identified for both fuel systems, to guide future activities by DOE programs such as the advanced fuels campaign (AFC), to enable their use in microreactors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state, and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack. The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.” As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state,1 and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack.2 The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.”3 As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

From Count Rates to Quantifying Isotopic Activities – Field Analysis of Radiation Monitoring Data

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) provides a comprehensive bicoastal radiological and nuclear emergency response to United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration. A major part of the support is to provide systematic radiological search for lost or stolen sources, Radiological search is a core competency of the NNSS with its origin dating back to nuclear weapons test era. Search operations from multiple platforms is the common thread among the various NNSS assets, which include Aerial Measuring System (AMS), Maritime Support Team (MST), National Capitol Response (NCR), National Search Team (NST) and Radiological Assistance Program (RAP). Information collected and analyzed during search operations add to the actionable intelligence for the law enforcement agencies and provide valuable guidance for the tactical resolution of a nuclear or radiological crisis. Search is an intelligence and situational awareness driven operation and most often called upon during a radiological emergency, however it can be brought into play to thwart a potential threat by providing monitoring and surveillance support. The Office of Nuclear Incident Response (NA-84) serves as the technical leader in responding to and resolving nuclear and radiological threats worldwide and integrates its efforts with other NNSA stakeholders (e.g., NNSA office of Defense Nuclear Non-proliferation NA-22). The response includes expertise in the areas of radiological search, render safe, and consequence management. This article will discuss the methodologies, tools, procedures, and techniques to extract maximum radiological characterization information (isotopic composition, activities for individual isotopes, threat assessment etc.) from field monitoring or Search operation data.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cyber-Physical Tabletop Exercise for Small Modular Reactor Facilities

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. This evolving threat landscape includes adversaries having offensive cyber capabilities to attack information technology (IT) systems and operation technology (OT) systems. These adversaries may have the ability to attack the physical protection system (PPS) networks with potential consequential impacts that could degrade the effectiveness of the PPS. These cyber attacks may also be used to attack the safety and operational systems used to operate and ensure the safety of the reactor. Additionally, adversaries may gain access to unmanned aerial systems (UAS) that may be used to provide reconnaissance and surveillance of the facility, provide information to the adversaries, and be equipped with kinetic capabilities such as explosives or weapons that can be used to directly attack the facility. The Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy’s Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program funded Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop a cyber-physical tabletop exercise (TTX). This exercise was conducted on a hypothetical small modular reactor (SMR) facility, and only considered a potential adversary cyber attack on the PPS to a physical attack on the hypothetical facility to achieve a radiological release. This cyber-physical TTX is meant to provide lessons learned to integrate the cyber security system design and the physical protection system (PPS) design to decrease design, operation, and maintenance costs as well as increase effectiveness for defending against design basis threat attacks at the facility. This TTX will also provide a framework and method for SMR and microreactor vendors to conduct their own cyber-physical TTX and gain impactful insights to improving the cyber and physical protection system design for their SMR or microreactor facility design.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Optical noise in a free-space quantum communications link from natural and nuclear disturbed environments*

Satellite communications at radio frequencies can experience a ‘blackout’ period following the atmospheric detonation of a nuclear weapon. The wavelengths used for free-space quantum communications will not incur the same ‘blackout’ effects from a nuclear detonation, but the optical systems will suffer from a phenomenon called redout. Redout occurs in an optical detector when ambient light scatters into the optical receiver, causing elevated background photon counts in the detector such that background noise overwhelms the signal. In this work, the duration of the redout effect is quantified from a nuclear disturbed environment on a ground-to-space quantum optical link. In addition, we comment on various techniques for reducing ambient and nuclear disturbed background counts in a quantum free-space optical link. For low-altitude nuclear detonations (i.e., under 50 km), the maximum interference time will be less than 1 min. Implementing a telescope, timing gate, and wavelength filter to the detector can reduce the background counts in the detector significantly. Aerosol levels and ground albedo are major contributors to background noise in a ground-to-satellite quantum channel, and ground station location should factor in both variables.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗
DOE OSTI2024

The National Criticality Experiments Research Center: Capability Expansion and Experiments in the Last Three Years

The National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) is a general purpose criticality experiments facility located inside the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Critical experiments containing any special nuclear material, any enrich ment/separation, most physical forms, and any configuration are possible within the constraints of the defined safety basis. NCERC draws upon physical assets and experimental knowledge to solve some of the most difficult problems with respect to criticality safety, reactor physics, and reactor kinetics. In terms of physical assets, NCERC houses hundreds of kilograms of special nuclear material with a majority consisting of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weapons grade plutonium (WGPu). NCERC is home to four critical assembly machines: Comet, Planet, Flattop, and Godiva IV. To support various derivative diagnostics on fissioning systems, NCERC houses a count room to measure irradiated samples and dosimeters. This paper will step through each of these capabilities explaining recently completed work and upgrades.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility Capability eXpansion (DCX) Strategy

The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility is a vital and important part of the Nation’s nuclear security enterprise. The Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/ NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan (SSMP) identifies DARHT as a weapons mission critical facility along with the need to modernize DARHT to support weapons modernization efforts. With more than two decades of operations, DARHT has a storied history. Conceived in the 1970s, constructed in the 1990s, and operational since 2000, DARHT has advanced from open-air hydrodynamic experiments (hydros) to foam-confined hydros, to vessel-confined hydros, and in 2022, the 75 th hydro was successfully completed. Radiography has advanced from a single-axis, single-pulse system to a dual-axis, multi-pulse capability to variable fields of view (VFV) on both accelerators. The culmination of these experiences, accomplishments, and advancements has brought us to a very important question: What do the next two decades at DARHT look like? The world is not the same place it was in the 1990s when construction at DARHT was in progress. Evolving threats, an expanding mission, and technology changes necessitate adaptation. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) states that the nuclear weapons infrastructure has suffered the effects of age and underfunding with no margin for further delay in recapitalizing the physical infrastructure. To adapt, the aging facility, accelerators, vessels, and detector systems require improvements to ensure DARHT remains the Nation’s hydrodynamic data foundation for stockpile certification, safety, surety, and global security threats.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Analysis of measurements from an array of radioxenon samplers near to Hartlepool Nuclear Power Station

As part of a scientific research and development project, the radionuclide fingerprint of an operating advanced gas-cooled reactor 25 (AGR) has been studied across several facets (Goodwin et al., 2024). One part of this project was to deploy an array of 26 radioxenon samplers to the region for a period of around 1 year, to measure any radioxenon emissions from the reactors of the 27 Hartlepool nuclear power station at a range of tens of kilometres away. The array of 3 sensors was operational for around 12 28 months from March 2022 and detected many occurrences of isotopes of radioxenon. Here we provide a detailed analysis and 29 interpretation of the data and where possible, attribution of detections to a source or region. Whilst a key part of this work is to 30 measure any emissions of radioxenon from Hartlepool, this work presents one of the most comprehensive efforts to determine the 31 source of a great number of (mostly) 133Xe detections. A combination of different types of atmospheric dispersion modelling 32 techniques, including the use of stack monitoring data from nearby civil radioxenon-emitting nuclear facilities has enabled the 33 majority of detections to be attributed to one or more possible sources. Whilst emissions from Hartlepool have been detected on 34 the systems, the majority of detections are associated with a medical isotope production facility in Fleurus, Belgium (IRE).

Advanced gas-cooled reactor↗
DOE OSTI2021

Radiological Handling and Containment Considerations in Support of an American Medical Isotope Producer

This work will discuss evaluation and design of new and modified facility level radiological containment, transfer, and handling systems in support of the United States’ American Medical Isotope Production Act. In the United States alone, Molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) is used as a precursor to locally generate its decay product, technetium-99m (Tc-99m), for use in approximately 40,000 medical procedures every day to detect cancer and heart disease. Currently, however, Mo-99 is primarily produced overseas and typically requires highly enriched uranium (HEU) which is classified as weapon -usable. This poses a serious security risk to the United States and, in 2012, Congress passed the American Medical Isotope ACT which aimed to cease all Mo-99 production that requires HEU and support American based companies who have found safer production methods. Through this effort, a system was designed and developed to access irradiated material in processing hot cells for ease of material introduction and removal in the confined area. The proposed solution uses a double-door design that allows for easy access to material while also providing shielding through a mechanically manipulated carousel. A system was also designed to transport irradiated materials from target reactors to a target receipt box using a rail guide system, pneumatic motor, and lead screw drive.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

An Autonomous Critical Data Extrapolator for the AGN-201m

Nuclear nonproliferation serves as a key goal, being undertaken by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To recognize proliferation there are two pathways that states, who intend to use nuclear material for malicious purposes can take, diversion can misuse. Diversion is when fissile nuclear material is declared to the IAEA for non-weapon purposes, but then covertly removed. If the source of nuclear material, that is not declared and not fissionable, is placed inside the reactor core to create fissile material used to create weapons then the state is using the second pathway of proliferation, misuse. With the emerging development in areas of simulation and machine learning the creation of virtual models of reactor systems, digital twins, serve as a potential method to identify proliferation through detecting anomalous behavior in the reactor. A digital twin for a physical nuclear reactor has never been developed, as digital twins serve as an emerging technology. To investigate the process for development and use of a digital twin for a nuclear reactor Idaho State University’s AGN-201m serves as the nuclear reactor used for development of this digital twin. A data acquisition system has been installed to the reactor system allowing for the transfer of collected data from a reactor operation to Idaho National Laboratory’s Deeplynx data warehouse. When utilizing data to train reactor physics and machine learning models, a significant challenge encountered is the initial state of the data. Nuclear proliferation will have the capacity to be detected when the reactor immediately starts up, nor will it occur after the reactor shuts down. Generally, it will be detected when the reactor is operating at some desired power over a sufficient period for that specific reactor design. For the AGN-201m this will be when the reactor is critical (generally 1 mW or above) for a timespan that is within or less than the range of a regular business day. Datasets sent to Deeplynx have had to be manually cut to when the reactor is critical based on plots of power levels. This method is inefficient and laborious, especially when using multiple datasets at once to train a model. To provide a more streamlined approach an automated critical data extrapolator is developed, with capabilities of recognizing when the reactor operation first reaches criticality, and when the reactor undergoes a SCRAM and is shutdown.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗