Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “apollo”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 127 records · Page 7

A Case Study of the Failure on Apollo 13: Based on TMX-65270, Report of Apollo 13 Review Board

The dramatic journey of the crippled Apollo 13 vehicle has been heavily documented and popularized. Many people know there was an explosion in the service module which caused the vehicle to lose its oxygen supply. Less well known is the set of circumstances which led to the explosion. This paper examines the manufacturing, processing and testing history of oxygen tank #2, detailing the additive effects which caused the oxygen to ignite and to overpressure the tank.

Anderson, Brenda Lindley↗

Apollo A-7L Spacesuit Development for Apollo 7 Through 14 Missions

Jim McBarron has over 50 years of experience with NASA spacesuit development and operations as well as the U.S. Air Force pressure suit. As a result of his experience and research, he shared his significant knowledge about early Apollo spacesuit development, A-7L suit requirements, and design details.

McBarron, James W., II↗

APOLLO: a facility-scale differentiable virtual accelerator at Fermilab FAST/IOTA

As the design complexity of modern accelerators grows, there is more interest in using advanced simulations that have fast execution time or yield additional insights like gradients. The FAST/IOTA facility has been working on implementing and experimentally validating an end-to-end digital twin that is both fast and gradient-aware, allowing for rapid prototyping of new software and experiments with minimal beam time costs. Our framework integrates physics and ML codes for linac and ring simulation through a set of generic interfaces between surrogate and physics-based sections. To reproduce device inputs and outputs, system state is exposed as a deterministic event loop in a specialized discrete event simulator architecture. Because Fermilab is undergoing control system transition, several APIs were implemented as final user interfaces - a fully asynchronous EPICS soft IOC, a gRPC-based Data Pool Manager (DPM), and legacy ACNET protocols. We discuss implementation details as well as challenges handling live data assimilation and future plans to extend modelling to main complex proton accelerators like PIPII and Booster.

Kuklev, Nikita [Fermilab]↗

Apollo operations handbook: Extravehicular mobility unit. Volume 1: System description, CSD-A-789-(1), Apollo 15-17, revision

This volume provides familiarization information essential to the operation of the extravehicular mobility unit (EMU), and describes the configuration combinations for the ATLB separable-components and the accessory contract end items. Configuration deviations may be made as dictated by specific crew/mission requirements. Operational procedures and malfunction detection procedures are found in Volume II of this handbook.

James L Gibson↗

Apollo 15 mission report: Apollo 15 guidance, navigation, and control system performance analysis report (supplement 1)

This report contains the results of additional studies which were conducted to confirm the conclusions of the MSC Mission Report and contains analyses which were not completed in time to meet the mission report deadline. The LM IMU data were examined during the lunar descent and ascent phases. Most of the PGNCS descent absolute velocity error was caused by platform misalignments. PGNCS radial velocity divergence from AGS during the early part of descent was partially caused by PGNCS gravity computation differences from AGS. The remainder of the differences between PGNCS and AGS velocity were easily attributable to attitude reference alignment differences and tolerable instrument errors. For ascent the PGNCS radial velocity error at insertion was examined. The total error of 10.8 ft/sec was well within mission constraints but larger than expected. Of the total error, 2.30 ft/sec was PIPA bias error, which was suspected to exist pre-lunar liftoff. The remaining 8.5 ft/sec is most probably satisified with a large pre-liftoff planform misalignment.

Source record↗