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Automating Maneuvers: Considerations for Collision Avoidance
As more space operators implement large constellations of spacecraft, automating orbit maintenance maneuvers becomes a key feature of their operations concept to ensure that the workload is manageable. However, the practice of performing a maneuver without sharing the plan with other nearby spacecraft causes a risk that two spacecraft will collide, not only destroying the spacecraft involved, but creating debris that will affect all other spacecraft using that orbit regime. In order to share the maneuver plan, a predicted ephemeris file containing the maneuver must be sent to a central authority to screen against predicted trajectories of all other on-orbit objects to determine where and when close approaches will occur that may need to be mitigated. Currently the screening authority used by US operators is the 19th Space Defense Squadron; screenings are performed once every 8 hours, meaning that spacecraft using automated maneuvering need to allow 16 hours to share their maneuver plan via the screening process in advance of maneuver execution in case one screening is missed and the next needs to be used. In an effort to speed up the screening process to benefit spacecraft using automated maneuvering, a prototype system for performing near-real-time screenings has been developed in support of the NASA Starling mission, a constellation of four cubesats that fly at the same altitude as the SpaceX Starlink constellation. Both of these constellations perform automated maneuvering, so without screening the planned maneuvers before execution, the two constellations would risk a collision. This paper describes the traditional conjunction assessment (CA) process, the prototype real-time CA screening capability, plans for the experiment to test the prototype, and next steps.
Automating Maneuvers: Considerations for Collision Avoidance
As more space operators implement large constellations of spacecraft, automating orbit maintenance maneuvers becomes a key feature of their operations concept to ensure that the workload is manageable. However, the practice of performing a maneuver without sharing the plan with other nearby spacecraft causes a risk that two spacecraft will collide, not only destroying the spacecraft involved, but creating debris that will affect all other spacecraft using that orbit regime. In order to share the maneuver plan, a predicted ephemeris file containing the maneuver must be sent to a central authority to screen against predicted trajectories of all other on-orbit objects to determine where and when close approaches will occur that may need to be mitigated. Currently the screening authority used by US operators is the 19th Space Defense Squadron; screenings are performed once every 8 hours, meaning that spacecraft using automated maneuvering need to allow 16 hours to share their maneuver plan via the screening process in advance of maneuver execution in case one screening is missed and the next needs to be used. In an effort to speed up the screening process to benefit spacecraft using automated maneuvering, a prototype system for performing near-real-time screenings has been developed in support of the NASA Starling mission, a constellation of four cubesats that fly at the same altitude as the SpaceX Starlink constellation. Both of these constellations perform automated maneuvering, so without screening the planned maneuvers before execution, the two constellations would risk a collision. This paper describes the traditional conjunction assessment (CA) process, the prototype real-time CA screening capability, plans for the experiment to test the prototype, and next steps.
Current Best Practices on Wildfire Risk Reduction for Electric Transmission and Distribution Systems
This report provides a set of best practices in response to Section 4(d) of Executive Order 14308, Empowering Commonsense Wildfire Prevention and Response. The information contained herein is expected to be used in conjunction with other materials at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Wildfire Risk Mitigation Technical Conference (Docket No. AD25-16-000), with possible direction to the North American Electric Reliability Corporation to take action. The objective of this report is to provide an overview of existing and emerging best practices currently employed or planned by utilities for wildfire mitigation, demonstrating how these efforts align with the executive order’s emphasis on reducing electric utility–caused wildfires while also balancing cost-effectiveness. Additionally, while most practices in utility-developed wildfire mitigation plans focus on risk reduction through robustness and operational reliability, this report also discusses best practices for resilience. The best practices are adopted from publicly available utility wildfire mitigation plans from the United States and Canada, recent findings from wildfire risk reduction research, and industry engagement.
Managing Research in a Risk World
The Office of Chief Medical Officer (OCHMO) owns all human health and performance risks managed by the Human System Risk Board (HSRB). While the HSRB manages the risks, the Human Research Program (HRP) manages the research portion of the overall risk mitigation strategy for these risks. The HSRB manages risks according to a process that identifies and analyzes risks, plans risk mitigation and tracks and reviews the implementation of these strategies according to its decisions pertaining to the OCHMO risk posture. HRP manages risk research work using an architecture that describes evidence-based risks, gaps in our knowledge about characterizing or mitigating the risk, and the tasks needed to produce deliverables to fill the gaps and reduce the risk. A planning schedule reflecting expected research milestones is developed, and as deliverables and new evidence are generated, research progress is tracked via the Path to Risk Reduction (PRR) that reflects a risk's research plan for a design reference mission. HRP's risk research process closely interfaces with the HSRB risk management process. As research progresses, new deliverables and evidence are used by the HSRB in conjunction with other operational and non-research evidence to inform decisions pertaining to the likelihood and consequence of the risk and risk posture. Those decisions in turn guide forward work for research as it contributes to overall risk mitigation strategies. As HRP tracks its research work, it aligns its priorities by assessing the effectiveness of its contributions and maintaining specific core competencies that would be invaluable for future work for exploration missions.
Trades Between Opposition and Conjunction Class Trajectories for Early Human Missions to Mars
Candidate human missions to Mars, including NASA's Design Reference Architecture 5.0, have focused on conjunction-class missions with long crewed durations and minimum energy trajectories to reduce total propellant requirements and total launch mass. However, in order to progressively reduce risk and gain experience in interplanetary mission operations, it may be desirable that initial human missions to Mars, whether to the surface or to Mars orbit, have shorter total crewed durations and minimal stay times at the destination. Opposition-class missions require larger total energy requirements relative to conjunction-class missions but offer the potential for much shorter mission durations, potentially reducing risk and overall systems performance requirements. This paper will present a detailed comparison of conjunction-class and opposition-class human missions to Mars vicinity with a focus on how such missions could be integrated into the initial phases of a Mars exploration campaign. The paper will present the results of a trade study that integrates trajectory/propellant analysis, element design, logistics and sparing analysis, and risk assessment to produce a comprehensive comparison of opposition and conjunction exploration mission constructs. Included in the trade study is an assessment of the risk to the crew and the trade offs between the mission duration and element, logistics, and spares mass. The analysis of the mission trade space was conducted using four simulation and analysis tools developed by NASA. Trajectory analyses for Mars destination missions were conducted using VISITOR (Versatile ImpulSive Interplanetary Trajectory OptimizeR), an in-house tool developed by NASA Langley Research Center. Architecture elements were evaluated using EXploration Architecture Model for IN-space and Earth-to-orbit (EXAMINE), a parametric modeling tool that generates exploration architectures through an integrated systems model. Logistics analysis was conducted using NASA's Human Exploration Logistics Model (HELM), and sparing allocation predictions were generated via the Exploration Maintainability Analysis Tool (EMAT), which is a probabilistic simulation engine that evaluates trades in spacecraft reliability and sparing requirements based on spacecraft system maintainability and reparability.
Advancing Geophysical Techniques to Image a Stratigraphic Hydrothermal Resource
Sedimentary-hosted geothermal energy systems are permeable structural, structural-stratigraphic, and/or stratigraphic horizons with sufficient temperature for direct use and/or electricity generation. Sedimentary-hosted (i.e., stratigraphic) geothermal reservoirs may be present in multiple locations across the central and eastern Great Basin of the USA, thereby constituting a potentially large base of untapped, economically accessible energy resources. Sandia National Laboratories has partnered with a multi disciplinary group of collaborators to evaluate a stratigraphic system in Steptoe Valley, Nevada using both established and novel geophysical imaging techniques. The goal of this study is to inform an optimized strategy for subsequent exploration and development of this resource and analogous ones. Building from prior Nevada Play Fairway Analysis (PFA), this team is primarily 1) collecting additional geophysical data, 2) employing novel joint geophysical inversion/modeling techniques to update existing 3D geologic models, and 3) integrating the geophysical results to produce a working, geologically constrained thermo-hydrological reservoir model. Prior PFA work highlights Steptoe Valley as a favorable resource basin that likely has both sedimentary and hydrothermal characteristics. However, there remains significant uncertainty on the nature and architecture of the resource(s) at depth, which increases the risk in exploratory drilling. Newly acquired gravity, magnetic, magnetotelluric, and controlled-source electromagnetic data products, in conjunction with new and preexisting geoscientific measurements and observations, are being integrated and evaluated for efficacy in understanding stratigraphic geothermal resources and mitigating exploration risk. Furthermore, the influence of hydrothermal activity on sedimentary-hosted reservoirs in favorable structural settings, and whether fault-controlled systems may locally enhance temperature and permeability in some deep stratigraphic reservoirs, will also be evaluated.
Close Approach Prediction Analysis of the Earth Science Constellation with the Fengyun-1C Debris
Routine satellite operations for the Earth Science Constellation (ESC) include collision risk assessment between members of the constellation and other orbiting space objects. Each day, close approach predictions are generated by a U.S. Department of Defense Joint Space Operations Center Orbital Safety Analyst using the high accuracy Space Object Catalog maintained by the Air Force's 1" Space Control Squadron. Prediction results and other ancillary data such as state vector information are sent to NASAJGoddard Space Flight Center's (GSFC's) Collision Risk Assessment analysis team for review. Collision analysis is performed and the GSFC team works with the ESC member missions to develop risk reduction strategies as necessary. This paper presents various close approach statistics for the ESC. The ESC missions have been affected by debris from the recent anti-satellite test which destroyed the Chinese Fengyun- 1 C satellite. The paper also presents the percentage of close approach events induced by the Fengyun-1C debris, and presents analysis results which predict the future effects on the ESC caused by this event. Specifically, the Fengyun-1C debris is propagated for twenty years using high-performance computing technology and close approach predictions are generated for the ESC. The percent increase in the total number of conjunction events is considered to be an estimate of the collision risk due to the Fengyun-1C break- UP.
Continuous Risk Management at NASA
NPG 7120.5A, "NASA Program and Project Management Processes and Requirements" enacted in April, 1998, requires that "The program or project manager shall apply risk management principles..." The Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) at NASA GSFC has been tasked with the responsibility for developing and teaching a systems level course for risk management that provides information on how to comply with this edict. The course was developed in conjunction with the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University, then tailored to the NASA systems community. This presentation will briefly discuss the six functions for risk management: (1) Identify the risks in a specific format; (2) Analyze the risk probability, impact/severity, and timeframe; (3) Plan the approach; (4) Track the risk through data compilation and analysis; (5) Control and monitor the risk; (6) Communicate and document the process and decisions. This risk management structure of functions has been taught to projects at all NASA Centers and is being successfully implemented on many projects. This presentation will give project managers the information they need to understand if risk management is to be effectively implemented on their projects at a cost they can afford.
Continuous Risk Management: A NASA Program Initiative
NPG 7120.5A, "NASA Program and Project Management Processes and Requirements" enacted in April, 1998, requires that "The program or project manager shall apply risk management principles..." The Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) at NASA GSFC has been tasked with the responsibility for developing and teaching a systems level course for risk management that provides information on how to comply with this edict. The course was developed in conjunction with the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University, then tailored to the NASA systems community. This presentation will briefly discuss the six functions for risk management: (1) Identify the risks in a specific format; (2) Analyze the risk probability, impact/severity, and timeframe; (3) Plan the approach; (4) Track the risk through data compilation and analysis; (5) Control and monitor the risk; (6) Communicate and document the process and decisions.
The NASA Robotic Conjunction Assessment Process: Overview and Operational Experiences
Orbital debris poses a significant threat to spacecraft health and safety. Recent events such as China's anti-satellite test and the Breeze-M rocket explosion have led to an even greater awareness and concern in the satellite community. Therefore, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has established requirements that routine conjunction assessment screening shall be performed for all maneuverable spacecraft having perigees less than 2000 km or within 200 km of geosynchronous altitude. NASA s Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) has developed an operational collision risk assessment process to protect NASA s high-value unmanned (robotic) assets that has been in use since January 2005. This paper provides an overview of the NASA robotic conjunction assessment process, including descriptions of the new tools developed to analyze close approach data and of the risk mitigation strategies employed. In addition, statistical data describing the number of conjunctions experienced are presented. A debris avoidance maneuver performed by Aura in June of 2008 is described in detail to illustrate the process.
Requirement Metrics for Risk Identification
The Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) is part of the Office of Mission Assurance of the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). The SATC's mission is to assist National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) projects to improve the quality of software which they acquire or develop. The SATC's efforts are currently focused on the development and use of metric methodologies and tools that identify and assess risks associated with software performance and scheduled delivery. This starts at the requirements phase, where the SATC, in conjunction with software projects at GSFC and other NASA centers is working to identify tools and metric methodologies to assist project managers in identifying and mitigating risks. This paper discusses requirement metrics currently being used at NASA in a collaborative effort between the SATC and the Quality Assurance Office at GSFC to utilize the information available through the application of requirements management tools.
NASA's Optical Measurement Program 2014
The Optical Measurements Group (OMG) within the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO) addresses U.S. National Space Policy goals by monitoring and characterizing debris. Since 2001, the OMG has used the Michigan Orbital Debris Survey Telescope (MODEST) at Cerro Tololo Inter-American Observatory (CTIO) in Chile for general orbital debris survey. The 0.6-m Schmidt MODEST provides calibrated astronomical data of GEO targets, both catalogued and uncatalogued debris, with excellent image quality. The data are utilized by the ODPO modeling group and are included in the Orbital Debris Engineering Model (ORDEM) v. 3.0. MODEST and the CTIO/SMARTS (Small and Moderate Aperture Research Telescope System) 0.9 m both acquire filter photometric data, as well as synchronously observing targets in selected optical filters. This information provides data used in material composition studies as well as longer orbital arc data on the same target, without time delay or bias from a rotating, tumbling, or spinning target. NASA, in collaboration with the University of Michigan, began using the twin 6.5-m Magellan telescopes at Las Campanas Observatory in Chile for deep imaging (Baade) and spectroscopic data (Clay) in 2011. Through the data acquired on Baade, debris have been detected that are ~3 magnitudes fainter than detections with MODEST, while the data from Clay provide better resolved information used in material characterization analyses via selected bandpasses. To better characterize and model optical data, the Optical Measurements Center (OMC) at NASA/JSC has been in operation since 2005, resulting in a database of comparison laboratory data. The OMC is designed to emulate illumination conditions in space using equipment and techniques that parallel telescopic observations and source-target-sensor orientations. Lastly, the OMG is building the Meter Class Autonomous Telescope (MCAT) at Ascension Island. The 1.3-m telescope is designed to observe GEO and LEO targets, using a modified Ritchey-Chrétien configuration on a double horseshoe equatorial mount to allow tracking objects at LEO rates through the dome's keyhole at zenith. Through the data collection techniques employed at these unique facilities, NASA's ODPO has developed a multi-faceted approach to characterize the orbital debris risk to satellites in various altitudes and provide material characterization of debris via photometric and spectroscopic measurements. Ultimately, the data are used in conjunction with in-situ and radar measurements to provide accurate data for models of our space environment and service spacecraft risk assessment.
1. Physical Security Engineering by Design for Nuclear Facilities; 2. Nuclear Power Plant Site Security Management – A Security Strategy; 3. The UAE Women in Nuclear Energy Security
1. Security by design, or SeBD, is a comprehensive approach that integrates the physical protection system of a nuclear plant into every stage of its existence. This includes planning, designing, constructing, commissioning, and operating the facility, using a combination of analytical, physical, technological, and procedural measures. Essentially, SeBD involves intentionally applying and incorporating security into all aspects of design and operation throughout the entire lifecycle of a facility. By implementing this methodology throughout various phases such as program development, process implementation, staff training and procedures management in conjunction with plant equipment, facilities can be optimized to minimize security risks without compromising functional design requirements. This ultimately improves the overall security posture of the site and reduces the need for costly modifications or additional security resources post-design. 2. A site security strategy is a living document that is revised on a periodic or event-driven basis, ensuring that site security operations and corresponding procedures provide long-term, effective protection for the entire nuclear power plant (NPP) site. A site security strategy aims to mitigate threats across the entire NPP site via in-depth defense approaches and mutual support; therefore, if a layer is omitted or altered, then the effect across all layers must be re-evaluated. Therefore, the aim of the site security strategy is to provide an appropriate, scalable security regime that deters, denies, delays, and detects incidents and, equally importantly, reassures legitimate users and the regulator that due diligence and regulatory compliance have been achieved, ensuring that the site is safe and secure. Robust access control for vehicles and pedestrians is at the heart of the strategy. Vehicle and pedestrian searching and screening are seen as the strongest mitigation methods against vehicle- and pedestrian-borne attacks. The security strategy must also be supported through comprehensive staff training and the development of robust processes, procedures, and planning. If all these measures are to be effective, then training must be implemented during each phase of construction, partial operation/commissioning, and full operation. No single element of site security is completely isolated from the influence of other elements. Ideally, consideration of all key elements will result in a security strategy that is integrated and proportional to the threat and that does not over specify individual security solutions through the application of isolated measures but rather applies a holistic, all-encompassing approach. 3. When women enter the labor force, numerous positive outcomes emerge, including increased GDP, educational gains, and decreased maternal mortality. Despite these benefits, women's employment rates and equality vary significantly worldwide as does support for women in the workforce. This paper will explore the multifaceted benefits of women's employment, the factors influencing labor force participation rates, and the urgency to achieve gender equality as outlined in the 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It will then examine the emerging presence of women in the traditionally male-dominated nuclear field, specifically within the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a testament to their resilience and determination to break social norms and advance gender equality.
The hazard components of representative key risks. The physical climate perspective
The framework of Representative Key Risks (RKRs) has been adopted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group II in order to categorize, assess and communicate a wide range of regional and sectoral key risks, expected to become severe as a consequence of the potentially detrimental convergence of changing climate conditions, exposure and vulnerability of human and natural systems, and responses through (mal)adaptation measures. Other papers in this special issue treat each of eight RKRs by holistically assessing their current status and future evolution as a result of this convergence. However, their treatment cannot always organize such assessment according to a systematic gradation of climatic changes, often times having to extrapolate the big-picture evolution of risk from either qualitative effects of “low” medium” and “high” warming, or limited/focused analysis of the consequences of particular mitigation choices (e.g., benefits of limiting warming to 1.5 or 2C). In this study we offer as systematic a representation as possible – given current literature and assessments – of the future evolution of the hazard components of RKRs. We draw on the assessment of changes in climatic impact-drivers relevant to RKRs described in the 6th Assessment Report by Working Group 1 (WGI) supplemented when needed by more recent literature. We identify the relevant hazards for each RKR, based upon the WGII authors’ assessment, and we report on their current state and expected future changes in magnitude, intensity and/or frequency, linking these changes to Global Warming Levels to the extent possible. For some of these quantities - like regional trends in oceanic and atmospheric temperature and precipitation, some heat and precipitation extremes, permafrost thaw and Northern Hemisphere snow cover - a strong and quantitative relationship with global average temperature change has been assessed. For others - like frequency and intensity of tropical cyclones and extra-tropical storms, and fire weather - the link to increasing global temperatures can only be described qualitatively. For some processes - like the behavior of ice-sheets, or changes in circulation dynamics - large uncertainties about the effects of different levels of warming remain, and for a few others - like ocean pH and air pollution - the composition of the scenario of anthropogenic emissions is most relevant, rather than the warming reached. In almost all cases, however, the basic message remains that every small increment in CO2 concentration in the atmosphere and associated warming will bring changes in climate phenomena that will contribute to increasing risk of impacts on human and natural systems when these changes happen in conjunction with these systems’ conditions of exposure and vulnerability, and in lack of effective adaptation. Our picture of the evolution of RKR-relevant climatic impact-drivers complements and enriches the treatment of RKRs in the other papers in at least two ways: by filling in an often only cursory or limited representation of the physical climate aspects driving impacts, and by providing a fuller representation of their future possible evolution which represents an important component – if never the only one – of the potential future evolution of risk severity.
NASA's Optical Measurement Program 2014
The Optical Measurements Group (OMG) within the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO) addresses U.S. National Space Policy goals by monitoring and characterizing debris. Since 2001, the OMG has used the Michigan Orbital Debris Survey Telescope (MODEST) at Cerro Tololo Inter-American Observatory (CTIO) in Chile for general orbital debris surveys. The 0.6-m Schmidt MODEST provides calibrated astronomical data of GEO targets, both catalogued and uncatalogued debris, with excellent image quality. The data are utilized by the ODPO modeling group and are included in the Orbital Debris Engineering Model (ORDEM) v. 3.0. MODEST and the CTIO/SMARTS (Small and Moderate Aperture Research Telescope System) 0.9 m are both employed to acquire filter photometry data as well as synchronously observe targets in selected optical filters. Obtaining data synchronously yields data for material composition studies as well as longer orbital arc data on the same target without time delay or bias from a rotating, tumbling, or spinning target. Observations of GEO orbital debris using the twin 6.5-m Magellan telescopes at Las Campanas Observatory in Chile for deep imaging (Baade) and spectroscopic data (Clay) began in 2011. Through the data acquired on Baade, debris has been detected that reaches approx. 3 magnitudes fainter than detections with MODEST, while the spectral data from Clay provide better resolved information used in material characterization analyses. To better characterize and model optical data, the Optical Measurements Center (OMC) at NASA/JSC has been in operation since 2005, resulting in a database of comparison laboratory data. The OMC is designed to emulate illumination conditions in space using equipment and techniques that parallel telescopic observations and sourcetarget- sensor orientations. Lastly, the OMG is building the Meter Class Autonomous Telescope (MCAT) at Ascension Island. The 1.3-m telescope is designed to observe GEO and LEO targets, using a modified Ritchey-Chrétien configuration on a double horseshoe equatorial mount to allow tracking objects at LEO rates through the dome's keyhole at zenith. Through the data collection techniques employed at these unique facilities, NASA's ODPO has developed a multifaceted approach to characterize the orbital debris risk to satellites in various altitudes and provide insight leading toward material characterization of debris via photometric and spectroscopic measurements. Ultimately, the data are used in conjunction with in-situ and radar measurements to provide accurate data for models of our space environment and for facilitating spacecraft risk assessment.
Fragility Functions Resource Report: Documented Sources for Electricity and Water Resilience Valuation
Fragility curves provide the vulnerability between hazard intensity and an asset. Federal installations may include many different electricity and water infrastructure types (or assets) such as generators, wind turbines, solar PV, switch yards, substations and power lines as well as water distribution systems that could be affected by different hazards. The vulnerability of each asset is a function of its age, type of materials and maintenance. In addition, the vulnerability changes with the hazards intensity and has a probability distribution function associated with it. The fragility functions are used in conjunction with hazard probability and consequence valuations to determine the values at risk for examination of investment grade analyses of alternative mitigation strategies. This document provides examples of fragility functions and links to their sources for different electricity and water infrastructure assets by hazard type.
An Operational Algorithm for Evaluating Satellite Collision Consequence
Risk is properly considered as the combination of likelihood and consequence; but conjunction assessment has usually limited itself to the consideration of only collision likelihood. When considered from an orbital regime protection perspective, the focus shifts to the question of the amount of debris that a collision might produce (the “consequence”). The present paper presents an operational algorithm for determining the expected amount of debris production should a conjunction result in a collision, and an assessment of the algorithm’s fidelity against a database of characterized objects.