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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 127 records · Page 7
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1983

Environmental, health and safety assessment of photovoltaics

The environmental, health, and safety (E, H and S) concerns associated with the fabrication, deployment, and decommissioning of photovoltaic (PV) systems in terrestial applications are identified and assessed. Discussion is limited to crystalline silicon technologies. The primary E, H, and S concerns that arise during collector fabrication are associated with occupational exposure to materials of undetermined toxicity or to materials that are known to be hazardous, but for which process control technology may be inadequate. Stricter exposure standards are anticipated for some materials and may indicate a need for further control technology development. Minimizing electric shock hazards is a significant concern during system construction, operation and maintenance, and decommissioning.

Rose, E. C.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Extending ACTS Operations Through a University-Based Consortium

The Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS) program was slated for decommissioning in October 2000 as was announced at the 6th Ka-band Utilization Conference in May 2000. Quite a celebration was had at that event too centering on the decommissioning of this very successful technology program. With plans in place to move the spacecraft to an orbital graveyard and then shut the system down, NASA was challenged to consider the feasibility of extending operations for education and research purposes provided that an academic organization would be willing to cover operations costs. Continuing operations of the system was determined viable and in the fall of 2000, an announcement was made by NASA to consider extending operations. Plans are now in place to continue the operations of ACTS through a university-based consortium led by Ohio University, Athens, Ohio. Initial plans are for two more years of operations, with options to extend up to a total of four years. This paper will present the change in plans to continue operations of ACTS. A description of the multi-month transition of the spacecraft to its new and final orbital location is provided. With the spacecraft at this new location, an update on its performance is presented as well as estimates of long-term performance. The consortium development will be presented along with its organization, membership, and operations plans for using ACTS.

Bauer, Robert↗
NASA NTRS2005

Of Ashes and Atoms

This feature length DVD documentary, reviews the history of the Plum Brook Nuclear Reactor from the initial settlers of the area, through its use as a munitions facility during the second World War to the development of the nuclear facility and its use as one of the first nuclear test reactors built in the United States, and the only one built by NASA. It concludes with the beginning of the decommissioning of the facility. There is a brief review of the reactor design, and its workings. Through discussions with the NASA engineers and operators of the facility, the film reviews the work done to advance the knowledge of the effects of radiation, the properties of radiated materials, and the work to advance the state of the art in nuclear propulsion. The film shows footage of public tours, and shows actual footage of the facility in operation, and after its shutdown in 1973. The DVD was narrated by Kate Mulgrew, who leads the viewer through the history of the facility to its eventual ongoing decommissioning, and return to the state of pastoral uses.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2010

The Successful Implementation of NASA Orbital Debris Requirements for the Retirement of TDRS-1

TDRS-1 was decommissioned on October 28th 2009 following more than 26 years of operation. The Grand Old Dame of the TDRSS constellation wa s launched aboard the maiden voyage of the Space Shuttle Challenger ( STS-6) in April 1983. TDRS-1 survived a malfunction of the Inertial Upper Stage eventually utilizing its own propulsion system to success fully reach its assigned station in geosynchronous orbit. The anomalo us beginning of the TDRS-1 mission was not without lasting consequenc es as the primary reaction control system (A-side) was completely di sabled with an apparent propellant leak and the secondary system (B-s ide) suffered damage to its negative roll thruster rendering the thru ster inoperable. Following decommissioning the challenge to completin g a successful TDRS-1 end-of-mission (EOM) was the implementation of the stringent orbital debris requirements of NPR 8715.6 with a parti ally functioning spacecraft not originally designed to meet those req uirements. The TDRS-1 EOM had three key goals: 1) removal of the spac ecraft from geosynchronous orbit; 2) depletion of the remaining prope llant; and 3) passivation of all other sources of energy storage or generation. The TDRS-1 EOM approach was one of minimizing risks while accomplishing the goals above. The orbit raising portion of EOM was accomplished using deltavelocity operations already proven during pre vious stationchanging maneuvers. The propellant depletion approach wa s necessarily more aggressive as over 20 hours of burn time was requ ired to deplete the remaining fuel. A novel approach utilizing a spin ning, thrusting, passively controlled spacecraft configuration was ut ilized to achieve reasonable burn durations that met schedule constra ints. This nonstandard configuration required careful analysis of ele ctrical, thermal, and communication subsystems. The configuration wa s thoroughly simulated prior to the start of operations and carefully characterized during the initial spin period and first burn. Passiva tion was by definition a unique operation not previously performed wi thin the TDRS 1-7 constellation. Use was made of a TDRS spacecraft si mulator to verify the operational procedure to mitigate risks and pro vide crew training. TDRS-1 orbit raising maneuvers commenced on June 5th 2010 and completed on June 14th with an apogee 370 km and a peri gee 352 km above geosynchronous altitude. 127 kg of propellant were e stimated to be remaining in the tanks at the completion of orbit rais ing. TDRS-1 was placed in its spinning orientation on June 16th and the first fuel depletion burn was performed the following day. A seri es of 10 depletion burns were performed ending on June 26th when both propellant tank pressures experienced dramatic drops. Final passivat ion was performed on June 27 th deactivating electronics, removing t he batteries from the bus and solar arrays, and disabling the space-t o-ground communications equipment. The Second TDRS Ground Terminal (S TGT) continued to open loop track TDRS-1 for several days attempting command reacquisition several times a day. All attempts were unsucce ssful confirming passivation was achieved. The TDRS-1 orbit at passiv ation was an orbital debris compliant 36,319 x 36,128 km in height. W hile differing spacecraft designs may preclude mimicking the exact TD RS-1 EOM approach, the TDRS-1 campaign serves to demonstrate that pr e-NPR 8715.6 designs can be made to meet the requirements resulting i n a reduced orbit debris environment for future missions

Mirczak, Walter↗
NASA NTRS2021

Goldstone Orbital Debris Radar: A Historical Review from a Decade of Observations (2007 – 2017)

The NASA Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO) has utilized the Goldstone bistatic radar since the early1990’s to statistically characterize the low Earth orbit(LEO) sub-centimeter population. The radar provides a unique capability to detect orbital debris population sizes down to an approximate size of 3 mm for altitudes less than 1000 km, and even smaller sizes at lower altitudes. Due to the limited number of hours that are available from this radar each year, it is often used to validate measurements obtained by other radar data sources in the range of orbital debris sizes where the radar systems have an overlap. Additionally, the Goldstone radar provides significantly improved sensitivity than is available from other ground-based radar data sources, which enables it to observe orbital debris populations that, although smaller, still represent a significant risk to both robotic and human missions in LEO. Over the decade of observations from 2007 to2017, a number of significant on-orbit events have occurred including the anti-satellite test againstFengyun-1C, and the accidental collision between Cosmos 2251 and Iridium 33. The orbital debris flux as measured by the Goldstone radar over this important time period is reviewed in this paper, as well as the evolution of the environment over the ensuing years since these events. In addition, the measurements provided by this radar in the years prior to the deployment of large constellations into the environment, as well as the significant increase in missions and mission participants in recent years, is of interest since it provides a baseline for monitoring the effects of these and other changes in the coming years. In 2018, the Goldstone bistatic orbital debris radar pointing geometry changed due to the decommissioning of the nearby receiver antenna, Deep Space Station (DSS) 15, located approximately 500 m from the transmitter antenna. The historical combination of the DSS-14 transmitter and DSS-15receiver enabled all of LEO to be observed using a single pointing due to the close proximity of the two antenna stations and the resulting beam overlap of the bistatic radar geometry. The updated bistatic Goldstone geometry, following the decommissioning of DSS-15,utilizes one of the pair of DSS-25 or DSS-26 antennas that are located approximately 10 km from the transmitter station. The resulting beam overlap with this pointing is such that in LEO, only a small fraction of LEO altitude coverage is observable at one time. Given the operational change of the radar, it is of interest to review the data collected by the original Goldstone bistatic radar over the final decade preceding this change.

Rossina Miller↗
NASA NTRS2021

NOAA-17 Break-up Engineering Investigation Board Final Report

The NOAA-17 break-up was found to be a single, localized debris event producing about100 trackable pieces; there is likely no catastrophic damage to the whole spacecraft. NOAA-17 debris is very much in family with NOAA-16 debris, and DMSP F11 and F13 are very much in family with each other and share similarities with NOAA-16 and 17; it is likely all four (“The Big Four”) share the same debris source. DMSP F13 break-up occurred simultaneous with a known battery overcharge and therefore battery rupture is most likely intermediate cause of the Big Four break-ups; this is a low confidence assessment since other debris sources cannot be definitively ruled out. No root cause was found as the NOAA-17 batteries were all confirmed to have been disconnected from the charge path as intended. Possible conditions for reconnection are all unlikely including short circuits and commanding from a “bad actor.” All related spacecraft pose a risk of similar break-ups for decades to come and are a threat to the critical 800-850 km polar orbit regime; even appropriately decommissioned spacecraft appear to be at risk. Recommendations include an update to the decommissioning procedure and consideration of further investigations and active debris removal, consistent with national policy.

Maggie Atkinson↗
DOE OSTI2021

Nuclear Deactivation and Downgrade of Enriched Uranium Facilities at the Y-12 National Security Complex

Buildings 9206 and 9212 at the Y-12 National Security Complex are both Hazard Category 2 nuclear facilities from the Manhattan Project era that supported various missions over the decades, including the processing of enriched uranium. The production mission for Building 9206 ended in the 1990s, while Building 9212 is still an active production facility. The disposition process for contaminated excess facilities is generally described in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Guide DOE O 430.1A, Life Cycle Asset Management, which provides guidance on facility surveillance and maintenance, deactivation, decommissioning, and transition in supplemental guides DOE G 430.1-2 through 430.1-5. Historically, production facilities similar to Buildings 9206 and 9212 have not always been cleaned out and deactivated prior to being excessed, which significantly complicates the decommissioning phase. Many legacy facilities were shut down before the formal DOE guidance was established. This paper presents the practical application and implementation of the DOE guidance for the nuclear deactivation of Buildings 9206 and 9212, and summarizes the lessons learned for application across the DOE enterprise.

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DOE OSTI2021

Nuclear Deactivation and Downgrade of Enriched Uranium Facilities at the Y-12 National Security Complex

Buildings 9206 and 9212 at the Y-12 National Security Complex are both Hazard Category 2 nuclear facilities from the Manhattan Project era that supported various missions over the decades, including the processing of enriched uranium. The production mission for Building 9206 ended in the 1990s, while Building 9212 is still an active production facility. The disposition process for contaminated excess facilities is generally described in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Guide DOE O 430.1A, Life Cycle Asset Management, which provides guidance on facility surveillance and maintenance, deactivation, decommissioning, and transition in supplemental guides DOE G 430.1-2 through 430.1-5. Historically, production facilities similar to Buildings 9206 and 9212 have not always been cleaned out and deactivated prior to being excessed, which significantly complicates the decommissioning phase. Many legacy facilities were shut down before the formal DOE guidance was established. This paper presents the practical application and implementation of the DOE guidance for the nuclear deactivation of Buildings 9206 and 9212, and summarizes the lessons learned for application across the DOE enterprise.

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DOE OSTI2022

Life after 30 years - a PV system in Colorado

The PV system consisted of 155 monocrystalline Si Arco M53 panels, installed in 1987. 80 were installed on a fixed tilt rack, and 75 on 5 separate dual-axis passive trackers. The system was decommissioned in 2017 due a campus re-design and building expansion at the Platte River Power Authority (PPRA) site. Prior to decommissioning a site visit established the following failure type observations: EVA browning (100%), cracked cells (60%), and cracked wires or grommets (9%, or more if replacements were made selectively on cracked parts). EVA browning is typical in modules of this vintage, whereas the occurrence of so many cracked cells is surprising and is likely weather-related. The fairly frequent occurrence of cracked wires and grommets serves as a reminder that accelerated testing of these components is important for goals of low-cost 50-year energy generation. In smaller numbers, thermal effects (7%), bent frames (1%), and cell corrosion (<1%) were observed. A sample of 20 modules was selected and brought to NREL for in-depth characterization. Because baseline measurements were not available using the nameplate rating, which can be inaccurate, revealed a mean module sample degradation of 0.7 %/year. Sporadic production data during the 30 years determined a system degradation rate closer to 1.2 %/year. Subsequently, four of these modules were re-mounted outdoors at NREL and are now approaching a total lifetime of 34 years.

durability↗
DOE OSTI2022

GIF-VHTR Materials (Graphite) Project Plan: Progress since September 2021

¦1: Data, Design Methodology and Construction 1.1: Graphite Selection and Acquisition Strategy (Original tasks completed) 1.2: Graphite Properties (Virgin Materials) 1.3: Graphite Fracture Behaviour(Original tasks completed) 1.4: Graphite Oxidation Behaviour(Original tasks completed) 1.5: Graphite Component Testing 1.6: Graphite Irradiation Effects 1.7: Graphite Irradiation Induced Creep 1.8: Graphite Codes and Standards Development (ASME & ASTM) 1.9: Graphite BehaviourModels Development 1.10: Links to Existing Graphite Irradiation BehaviourDatabases 1.11: Materials Database ¦2: Operation and Inspection 2.1: Methodologies for determining requirements for inspection of graphite cores 2.2: Methodologies for ISI of graphite cores ¦3: Decommissioning and Disposal (New task added 2021) 3.1: Technical data for decommissioning and disposal issues

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage and Radioactive Waste Disposal in the United States: A Law and Policy Analysis - 20302

While Congress plays political football, spent nuclear fuel continues to sit in de facto interim nuclear waste storage sites throughout the country. This ad hoc approach - if it can even be called an approach - to nuclear waste management is in no one's best interests, because of financial, safety, environmental, and national security concerns with the status quo. Senate leadership had asserted that an up-or-down vote on the Yucca Mountain Project would take place in September or October 2019, but that did not occur. Rather, a conference bill was agreed to, and it provided that, although the nuclear program should receive some funding, funding was not made available for centralized interim storage ('CIS') or the Yucca Mountain Project. The President's FY2021 Budget Request does not contain any proposed funding for the Yucca Mountain Project ('the Project'). This paper will discuss the implications of that process, both for the Project itself and for the U.S. nuclear waste program more generally. In order to provide context for the current situation, this paper will begin by chronicling the history of U.S. nuclear waste management, from the passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 and to the present day. It will discuss the roles of the U.S. Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, federal and state political delegations, and the nuclear energy industry. The paper will then identify key themes that can be expected to affect the future of nuclear waste management in the United States. For example, it will consider whether development of additional CIS facilities is a viable short- to medium-term solution. CIS facilities may relieve immediate pressure at decommissioned or soon-to-be-decommissioned nuclear power plants; but with that pressure partially alleviated, support for building a long-term repository may be reduced. It will also discuss opposition by the State of New Mexico and others to the proposed New Mexico CIS project, based not only on siting concerns but also whether it might become a de facto repository, and whether the State of Texas and others may also be opposed, for similar reasons, to the proposed CIS facility in Texas. Additionally, the paper will examine consent-based siting and its implications for Nevada and other states that are potential hosts for spent nuclear fuel storage and disposal facilities. Further, if the Project is not a politically viable solution, the paper will examine whether it is now time for serious consideration of an alternate location for a permanent repository, as well as consideration of other options entirely, such as deep geologic disposal. The paper will conclude by looking ahead to the 2020 elections. It will describe the positions of candidates (particularly Presidential candidates) on spent nuclear fuel storage and disposal options, without advocating for any particular candidate or political party. Perhaps in 2020, we will at least see a start to a solution to the seemingly intractable problem of nuclear waste management in the United States. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2023

Wind Turbine Blade Repurposing and Recycling: Coupling Repurposing Methods with 3D Printing Technology

Fiber-reinforced thermoplastic composites continue to be implemented in several marketsbecause of their strength capacity and light weight. Especially in the wind industry, wind bladesare made of this material which makes them ideal for wind energy generation, but bladesbecome a problem at end-of-life. Because recycling thermoplastic composites technologiesare still not cost and environmentally effective, research in this space is needed. This paperpresents a case study for coupling repurposed wind turbine blades and 3D printing technology.The purpose is to remanufacture decommissioned wind blades into bus stop roof and seatingsections to then use recycled glass fiber from a decommissioned wind turbine blade to 3Dprint structural and/or fixtures needed in the assembly. We provide an overview of the designprocess, and the development process steps in repurposing and 3D printing the material,delving into key parameters required for a successful implementation.

Henao, Yulizza↗
DOE OSTI2025

U.S. Efforts in Support of Examinations at Fukushima Daiichi - September 2024 Meeting Notes

Information obtained from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Daiichi) is required to inform future Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) activities, improving the ability of the Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Incorporated (TEPCO Holdings) to characterize potential hazards and to ensure the safety of workers involved with cleanup activities. This information also has important implications for the safety and operation of U.S. Commercial nuclear power plants. A collaborative U.S. and Japanese effort was initiated in 2014 by the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy to identify Daiichi examination needs and evaluate recent Daiichi examination data to address these needs. This document summarizes information presented at and findings, action items, and recommendations by U.S. and Japanese experts in reactor safety and plant operations during the September 2024 Forensics Effort meeting. Significant safety insights were obtained in several areas: system and component performance, radionuclide surveys and sampling, debris end-state location, combustible gas effects, and plant operations and maintenance. In addition to reducing uncertainties and knowledge gaps in severe accident modeling progression, these insights continue to be used to assess whether additional updates are needed in guidance for severe accident prevention, mitigation, and emergency planning. Furthermore, Daiichi-related activities, such as code modeling improvements and analysis, testing, and new technology deployment efforts, have the potential to offer additional safety and economic benefits to the operating fleet and new light water reactor (LWR) and non-LWR designs.

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DOE OSTI2024

Winding Down: End of Service and Recycling for Wind Energy [Slides]

In this webinar hosted by the U.S. Department of Energy's WINDExchange initiative, experts from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory introduce attendees to key concepts in end-of-service processes for wind energy technologies and infrastructure, including decommissioning, repowering, and recycling. As wind energy projects across the United States become older, decisions about end-of-service options and component processing are of growing importance to project owners and operators, state and local decision-makers, and neighboring communities. There is also concern about the blade waste that must be processed, with a number of recycling solutions being developed to meet this need. This webinar introduces the processes and activities involved at the end of a wind energy project's lifespan; discusses the impacts these activities have on communities, landowners, the wind energy industry, and other stakeholders; explains different blade recycling methods; and discusses the future of recycling in the wind energy industry.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Photon detector response function methodology using MCNP and shift hybrid radiation transport code for wide-area contamination assay applications

Here, radiation transport modeling using the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) radiation transport code and Monte Carlo code, Shift, were employed to model detector responses for a variety of wide-area photon contamination scenarios. In this study, 2" × 2" and 3" × 3" cylindrical NaI(Tl) scintillation detector configurations at source detector-distances of 0.5 cm, 1 cm, 2.54 cm, 10 cm, and 30 cm were modeled. Media of soil, concrete, and steel were evaluated for contamination depths ranging from surface to a depth of an infinite thickness in each medium for photon energies ranging from 20 keV to 3 MeV, which correspond to the energies that current detectors can discern. Monoenergetic photon surface contamination detector responses for each of the media, source–detector distances, and detectors were estimated using MCNP v6.2. Shift was harnessed for improved variance reduction of particle transport in highly attenuating media to obtain average cell fluxes in the two MCNP NaI(Tl) scintillation detector configurations. Average cell flux values in Shift were coupled with detector responses from MCNP to convert average cell flux in a void to energy distribution of pulses in the NaI(Tl) scintillation detector crystal of interest. An optimized detector response function methodology was developed by coupling the MCNP radiation transport method with the Consistent Adjoint Driven Importance Sampling (CADIS) hybrid radiation transport method built into Shift to significantly decrease the runtime of thousands of MCNP pulse height simulations. The methodology may be utilized to quickly and accurately facilitate the assessment of a broad range of wide-area environmental contamination assay and decommissioning cleanup applications.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2020

Proven Technologies for the Solidification of Complex Liquid Radioactive Waste (LRW): Global Case Studies of Applications and Disposal Options - 20424

Legacy radioactive waste streams from the Cold War still exist and newly generated waste streams from nuclear power plants and research institutes go untreated and expose environmental hazards at many nuclear sites. The nature of the waste is diverse, depending upon the source or the process from which it originated. The most problematic waste streams include complex liquids such as organic (tri-butyl-phosphate TBP) solutions contaminated with Pu and U isotopes, mixed sludge types, high acid radioactive waste, H-3 contaminated organic and aqueous streams, etc. Technological, environmental and economic challenges exist for the treatment and disposal of such waste streams. A proven technology that has been applied to LRW on a global basis provides one option as a low-cost solution to legacy streams and small volume, highly complex LRW frequently found during decommissioning at nuclear power plants and weapons sites. The engineered polymer technology from Nochar, USA, is capable of solidifying standard and highly complex LLW and ILW waste streams for interim or final storage, or for incineration. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

FIU Project 3: Waste and D&D Engineering and Technology Development [Slides]

This project focuses on delivering solutions under deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) in support of DOE EM-4.11 as well as IT development for environmental applications (KM-IT for EM-4.11) and waste & material management (WIMS for EM-4.22). All technology development related activities will also engage the Office of Technology Development (EM-3.2). This work is also relevant to infrastructure management activities being carried out at DOE sites such as Oak Ridge, Savannah River, Hanford, Idaho and Portsmouth. As appropriate and within the parameters of the DOE-FIU Cooperative Agreement (CA), coordination at the proper level will occur with the sites and national laboratories involved in the project research efforts as well as with the points-of-contact at DOE HQ (e.g., HQ Project Leads, HQ Field Liaisons, Office of Technology Development, CA Technical Monitor, COR, etc.).

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Radiation Hardened Foam Cold Test Plan - Phase II: Foam Characterization Testing and Environmental Chamber Testing of FoamBag Fixative Foam

This document outlines the Phase II test objectives and implementation plan for a down-select foam fixative technology intended to facilitate activities in support of the Savannah River Site (SRS) F/H labs deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) efforts. It is a collaborative effort between Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), Florida International University (FIU), and the SRS F/H labs team intended to test and evaluate the potential of a polyurethane resin foam in mitigating the release of contamination during dismantling operations on radioactively contaminated piping in legacy facilities. The cold test plan addresses specific requirements highlighted by site and safety personnel and will be executed at FIU and SRNL test and lab facilities. Results from the cold tests will inform the hot test at F/H labs, which will use the foam fixative to confine and/or isolate residual contamination within a 3-dimensional void space of Hastelloy C-22 piping designated for removal from the area and transported to a designated disposal facility. Phase I testing was previously conducted using Hilti CP620 fixative foam. Results from Phase I testing indicate Hilti CP-620 fixative foam is incompatible with SRS site hot taps as an effective foam delivery method into Hastelloy C-22 piping. Phase II testing will be conducted using FoamBag TM fixative foam as an alternative fixative foam option. Phase II testing will address eight test objectives: (1) evaluation of the adhesion and bonding properties of FoamBag TM in Hastelloy C-22 piping, (2) evaluation of the adhesion of FoamBag TM in piping under various moisture conditions, (3) determination of the heat profile of FoamBag TM during curing, (4) determination of the internal pipe pressure after FoamBag TM deployment and curing, (5) conduct a leak test to determine if FoamBag TM is effective at creating a full seal within piping, (6) headspace testing of FoamBag TM to determine if there are any associated off-gas hazards during FoamBag TM curing, (7) conduct environmental chamber testing of FoamBag TM to understand how environmental parameters impacts FoamBag TM curing, and (8) conduct fire testing to evaluate FoamBag TM fire retardant characteristics.

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