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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 127 records · Page 7
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the landing/deceleration subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Landing/Deceleration Subsystem hardware. The Landing/Deceleration Subsystem is utilized to allow the Orbiter to perform a safe landing, allowing for landing-gear deploy activities, steering and braking control throughout the landing rollout to wheel-stop, and to allow for ground-handling capability during the ground-processing phase of the flight cycle. Specifically, the Landing/Deceleration hardware consists of the following components: Nose Landing Gear (NLG); Main Landing Gear (MLG); Brake and Antiskid (B and AS) Electrical Power Distribution and Controls (EPD and C); Nose Wheel Steering (NWS); and Hydraulics Actuators. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Due to the lack of redundancy in the Landing/Deceleration Subsystems there is a high number of critical items.

Compton, J. M.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the EPD and C/remote manipulator system FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C)/Remote Manipulator System (RMS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA analysis of the EPD and C/RMS hardware initially generated 345 failure mode worksheets and identified 117 Potential Critical Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment process. These analysis results were compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline of 132 FMEAs and 66 CIL items.

Robinson, W. W.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the backup flight system FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Backup Flight System (BFS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and Potential Critical Items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter BFS hardware. The IOA product for the BFS analysis consisted of 29 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 21 Potential Critical Items (PCI) being identified. This product was originally compared with the proposed NASA BFS baseline and subsequently compared with the applicable Data Processing System (DPS), Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), and Displays and Controls NASA CIL items. The comparisons determined if there were any results which had been found by the IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. The original assessment determined there were numerous failure modes and potential critical items in the IOA analysis that were not contained in the NASA BFS baseline. Conversely, the NASA baseline contained three FMEAs (IMU, ADTA, and Air Data Probe) for CIL items that were not identified in the IOA product.

Prust, E. E.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the orbital maneuvering system FMEA/CIL, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter OMS hardware. The IOA analysis defined the OMS as being comprised of the following subsystems: helium pressurization, propellant storage and distribution, Orbital Maneuvering Engine, and EPD and C. The IOA product for the OMS analysis consisted of 284 hardware and 667 EPD and C failure mode worksheets that resulted in 160 hardware and 216 EPD and C potential critical items (PCIs) being identified. A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline which consisted of 101 hardware and 142 EPD and C CIL items.

Prust, Chet D.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the orbital maneuvering subsystem, volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) hardware and electrical power distribution and control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter OMS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the critical items list and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Haufler, W. A.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware, and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. The IOA product for the RCS analysis consisted of 208 hardware and 2064 EPD and C failure mode worksheets that resulted in 141 hardware and 449 EPD and C potential critical items (PCIs) being identified. A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. After comparison and discussions with the NASA subsystem manager, 96 hardware issues, 83 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, and 280 EPD and C issues, 158 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, and 280 EPD and C issues, 158 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, remain unresolved. Volume 1 contains the subsystem description, assessment results, and some of the IOA worksheets.

Prust, Chet D.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets.

Prust, Chet D.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 3

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 3 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets.

Prust, Chet D.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 4

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 4 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the potential critical items list.

Prust, Chet D.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 5

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 5 contains detailed analysis and superseded analysis worksheets and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Prust, Chet D.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Flight elements subpanel introduction and overview

Major objectives, milestones, key contacts, technology issues, accomplishments, and candidate programs are outlined. Topics addressed include: advanced avionics systems architectures; advanced information processing; avionics concepts; integrated Global Positioning System/guidance, navigation, and command concepts; advanced communication and telemetry; display and control concepts; advanced sensors and instrumentation; fault detection and fault management; advanced electric power, distribution, and control; EMA/power systems; and in-flight crew training. This presentation is represented by viewgraphs only.

Sollock, Paul E.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Flight elements subpanel

A summary of findings of the Flight Elements Subpanel is given in viewgraph form. Topics covered include advanced avionics architecture; processors; integrated Global Positioning System and guidance, navigation and control; displays and controls; telemetry; sensors and instrumentation; fault detection and management; electrical power distribution and control; spacecraft power supplies; and in-flight crew training.

Keckler, Claude R.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Power system state estimation for a spacecraft power system

An application of the maximum likelihood state estimator to a space-based power system is presented. The state estimator uses current and voltage measurements to generate estimates of node voltages for an electrical power distribution system for the Space Shuttle. Preliminary results on the effect of noisy measurements on estimated parameters are reported. The software used in generating these results is part of an overall package being developed at Louisiana Tech University. Intended applications of this package include the analysis of power systems and real-time parallel processing on the Space Shuttle.

Berry, F. C.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Multiple-Ring Digital Communication Network

Optical-fiber digital communication network to support data-acquisition and control functions of electric-power-distribution networks. Optical-fiber links of communication network follow power-distribution routes. Since fiber crosses open power switches, communication network includes multiple interconnected loops with occasional spurs. At each intersection node is needed. Nodes of communication network include power-distribution substations and power-controlling units. In addition to serving data acquisition and control functions, each node acts as repeater, passing on messages to next node(s). Multiple-ring communication network operates on new AbNET protocol and features fiber-optic communication.

Kirkham, Harold↗
NASA NTRS1991

Power Subsystem

Topics concerning the Common Lunar Lander are presented in view graph form and include: energy storage and power generation; electrical power distribution and control; pyrotechniques; input from other subsystems; and design refinement following vehicle integration.

Kluksdahl, Betsy↗
NASA NTRS1995

Computer-Assisted Monitoring Of A Complex System

Propulsion System Advisor (PSA) computer-based system assists engineers and technicians in analyzing masses of sensory data indicative of operating conditions of space shuttle propulsion system during pre-launch and launch activities. Designed solely for monitoring; does not perform any control functions. Although PSA developed for highly specialized application, serves as prototype of noncontrolling, computer-based subsystems for monitoring other complex systems like electric-power-distribution networks and factories.

Beil, Bob J.↗
NASA NTRS1998

Reflight of the First Microgravity Science Laboratory: Quick Turnaround of a Space Shuttle Mission

Due to the short flight of Space Shuttle Columbia, STS-83, in April 1997, NASA chose to refly the same crew, shuttle, and payload on STS-94 in July 1997. This was the first reflight of an entire mission complement. The reflight of the First Microgravity Science Laboratory (MSL-1) on STS-94 required an innovative approach to Space Shuttle payload ground processing. Ground processing time for the Spacelab Module, which served as the laboratory for MSL-1 experiments, was reduced by seventy-five percent. The Spacelab Module is a pressurized facility with avionics and thermal cooling and heating accommodations. Boeing-Huntsville, formerly McDonnell Douglas Aerospace, has been the Spacelab Integration Contractor since 1977. The first Spacelab Module flight was in 1983. An experienced team determined what was required to refurbish the Spacelab Module for reflight. Team members had diverse knowledge, skills, and background. An engineering assessment of subsystems, including mechanical, electrical power distribution, command and data management, and environmental control and life support, was performed. Recommendations for resolution of STS-83 Spacelab in-flight anomalies were provided. Inspections and tests that must be done on critical Spacelab components were identified. This assessment contributed to the successful reflight of MSL-1, the fifteenth Spacelab Module mission.

Simms, Yvonne↗
NASA NTRS2002

Shuttle Reference Data

This collection of shuttle reference data contains the following information: shuttle abort history, shuttle abort modes, abort decisions, space shuttle rendezvous maneuvers, space shuttle main engines, space shuttle solid rocket boosters, hold-down posts, SRB (solid rocket boosters) ignition, electrical power distribution, hydraulic power units, thrust vector control, SBR rate gyro assemblies, SBR separation and Space Shuttle Super Super Light Weight Tank (SLWT).

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