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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Dual Glovebox Thermal Vacuum Chamber: Testing Capabilities for Spacesuit Arms and Gloves

The development of Extravehicular Activity (EVA) suits and hand mobility EVA tasks are complex, high risk, and difficult to test in a simulated space environment. During the early assembly of the International Space Station (ISS), the Crew and Thermal Systems Division (CTSD) at NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) was tasked to design a chamber that could use two Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) arms and gloves in a simulated space environment versus testing with a full suit. The Dual Glovebox (DGB) Chamber was built and served to help develop EVA tools and operations to assist with Return to Flight for the Space Shuttle after the Columbia accident. With the recent development of the Exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU) and new commercial suits through the Extravehicular Activities Services (xEVAS) contract, the DGB can support the need to do suit component testing at thermal extremes and EVA operations without the cost of full suit testing. The DGB can simulate realistic delta pressures, vacuum down to 5x10-4 Torr (0.066 Pa) with roughing and cryogenic pumps, and a wide range of temperatures achieved via a combination of Liquid Nitrogen (LN2), conditioned Gaseous Nitrogen (GN2), Infrared (IR) lamps, and heater cables. Recent developmental work has verified operational status of the chamber and expanded the capabilities of the DGB to include thermal contact testing of suit gloves through two temperature-controlled grab bars. This paper will discuss the history and capabilities of the DGB, and the chamber’s future role in the development of new spacesuit systems.

spacesuit arms↗

NASA NTRS2026

Recirculating and Sub-Atmospheric Rapid Cycle Amine Swing Bed Testing at Various Metabolic Profiles, Temperatures, and Half-Cycle Times

Sixty years since the first spacewalk, NASA’s Extravehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU) exploration space suit has undergone numerous design improvements and iterations. As commercial manufacturers develop next-generation systems to support increasingly complex missions, including Moon-to-Mars architecture prototyping and the design of the Martian Portable Life Support System (PLSS), material selection and individual subunit testing under realistic metabolic and pressure conditions are paramount. To determine whether a reusable carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) scrubber design and adsorbent can be utilized in new suit configurations, an all-encompassing test rig is required to compare existing and newly developed technologies. The test rig must be capable of sub-atmospheric testing, calibrated humid CO 2 dosing, and facilitation of the evaluation of sorbents across a wide range of operational requirements. Recently, XploSafe has developed an Extravehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU) testing rig specifically designed to explore CO 2 and humidity control materials for spacesuits. This closed-loop recirculating swing bed (Rapid Cycle Amine Test Rig) was utilized to compare adsorbent utility across a wide range of xEMU operating conditions. Following successful testing with Xplo-SA9T over multiple simulated eight-hour Extravehicular Activity (EVA) tests, improvements to the test stand were considered. Regeneration vacuum supply within the test rig was updated to more closely resemble space vacuum, theoretically increasing half-cycle timing. An improved water vapor delivery system was incorporated to dose a wider calibrated range of humidity over both short and long-duration EVAs. A range of metabolic profiles between 800 and 3000 BTU/h were tested, and the corresponding average CO 2 steady-states were compared. The effect of dosing temperature at the adsorbent bed inlet between 10 and 40 ̊C and the corresponding CO 2 removal efficiency was also evaluated.

John R Tidwell↗

NASA NTRS2009

Mitigation of EMU Glove Cut Hazard by MMOD Impact Craters on Exposed ISS Handrails

Recent cut damages to crewmember extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) gloves during extravehicular activity (EVA) onboard the International Space Station (ISS) has been found to result from contact with sharp edges or pinch points rather than general wear or abrasion. One possible source of cut-hazards are protruding sharp edged crater lips from impact of micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particles on external metallic handrails along EVA translation paths. During impact of MMOD particles at hypervelocity an evacuation flow develops behind the shock wave, resulting in the formation of crater lips that can protrude above the target surface. In this study, two methods were evaluated to limit EMU glove cut-hazards due to MMOD impact craters. In the first phase, four flexible overwrap configurations are evaluated: a felt-reusable surface insulation (FRSI), polyurethane polyether foam with beta-cloth cover, double-layer polyurethane polyether foam with beta-cloth cover, and multi-layer beta-cloth with intermediate Dacron netting spacers. These overwraps are suitable for retrofitting ground equipment that has yet to be flown, and are not intended to protect the handrail from impact of MMOD particles, rather to act as a spacer between hazardous impact profiles and crewmember gloves. At the impact conditions considered, all four overwrap configurations evaluated were effective in limiting contact between EMU gloves and impact crater profiles. The multi-layer beta-cloth configuration was the most effective in reducing the height of potentially hazardous profiles in handrail-representative targets. In the second phase of the study, four material alternatives to current aluminum and stainless steel alloys were evaluated: a metal matrix composite, carbon fiber reinforced plastic (CFRP), fiberglass, and a fiber metal laminate. Alternative material handrails are intended to prevent the formation of hazardous damage profiles during MMOD impact and are suitable for flight hardware yet to be constructed. Of the four materials evaluated, only the fiberglass formed a less hazardous damage profile than the baseline metallic target. Although the CFRP laminate did not form any noticeable crater lip, brittle protruding fibers are considered a puncture risk. In parallel with EMU glove redesign efforts, modifications to metallic ISS handrails such as those evaluated in this study provide the means to significantly reduce cut-hazards from MMOD impact craters.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗

NASA NTRS2022

Water Quality Contamination Sources and Controls for the Exploration Extra-vehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU)

NASA has been developing a new spacesuit, called the Exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU) for over a decade. This spacesuit is underdevelopment to support missions to the International Space Station (ISS) and also to the Moon. The xEMU uses controlled evaporative cooling through a membrane to reject waste heat from the crewmember, avionics, and environmental in-leak during autonomous operation. Given the unique mass and volume constraints imposed by the spacesuit application and the opportunities presented by the selection of a given membrane, the xEMU does not possess a separate feedwater loop to feed the evaporation process, rather the feedwater for the evaporation process is fed directly from the transport loop which collects heat from the sources within the suit. This has many benefits including mass/volume reductions from a lower component count within the system but does pose some additional potential constraints on water quality within the system in order to provide a working fluid that can be pumped, filtered, and used in contact with the remainder of the system while both avoiding fouling of the membrane as well as other deleterious effects such as creating conditions for corrosion of wetted surfaces within the transport loop. The discussion will seek to address the main sources of contamination and the applied controls. Sources considered will include: self-generated via materials selection and processes applied, influent working fluid, contamination of the influent working fluid via Ground Support Equipment (GSE) or processing equipment, microbial activity, and environmental influences such as elevated ambient CO2.

Colin Campbell↗

NASA NTRS1995

Computer Analysis of Electromagnetic Field Exposure Hazard for Space Station Astronauts during Extravehicular Activity

In order to estimate the RF radiation hazards to astronauts and electronics equipment due to various Space Station transmitters, the electric fields around the various Space Station antennas are computed using the rigorous Computational Electromagnetics (CEM) techniques. The Method of Moments (MoM) was applied to the UHF and S-band low gain antennas. The Aperture Integration (AI) method and the Geometrical Theory of Diffraction (GTD) method were used to compute the electric field intensities for the S- and Ku-band high gain antennas. As a result of this study, The regions in which the electric fields exceed the specified exposure levels for the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) electronics equipment and Extravehicular Activity (EVA) astronaut are identified for various Space Station transmitters.

Hwu, Shian U.↗

NASA NTRS2023

Technology Infusion in U.S. Spacesuits - A Comparative System Analysis

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has evolved multiple spacesuit systems for performing extravehicular activity (EVA) or space walks. These spacesuit systems include the Apollo Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU), Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) EMU, and Exploration EMU (xEMU). Each spacesuit system is like the other for functionality. However, each spacesuit system is different in configuration based on the technology infused into the system associated with the purpose of the mission. Each spacesuit system is made up of many components and the integrate environment targeted for operations leads to an integrated system that is complex. Since Apollo, NASA has invested in multiple technologies that make up these spacesuit systems in different iterations. The Apollo EMU was designed in the 1960’s with a focus to facilitate the first human to walk on the moon. The Space Shuttle EMU was designed in the 1970’s for reusable microgravity operations that began in the early 1980’s. The Space Shuttle EMU was enhanced to facilitate extended operation on the ISS. Over the last 15 years, NASA has been designing, developing, and testing a new spacesuit system, the xEMU which is considered a design, verification, and test unit. NASA is planning to land the first woman and first person of color on the Moon. NASA recently engaged industry through a new contractual arrangement to provide EVA services needed to return to the Moon and to continue operations on the ISS. Spacesuit systems are complex. Understanding the requirements, operational environment, the necessary technologies, and the integrated spacesuit system are paramount. In addition, understanding the technology infusion process to meet the mission objectives is critical. This paper will review the spacesuit systems for EVA and several component functions within the spacesuits, along with a system comparison of those technologies from Apollo to xEMU.

Extravehicular Activity (EVA)↗

NASA NTRS1991

EMU evolution

Evolution of Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) technology is necessary to support the Extravehicular Activity (EVA) requirements of the Space Station Freedom Program and those of the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI). Key qualities supporting long-duration missions include technologies that are highly reliable, durable, minimize logistics requirements, and are in-flight maintainable and serviceable. While these qualities are common to SSF and SEI EVA, development paths will differ where specific mission requirements impose different constraints. Development of reusable, regenerative technologies is necessary to minimize the logistics penalties. Increased battery discharge/recharge cycle life and usable wet life, compact high current density fuel cells, reusable CO2 absorbing media, and thermal radiation coupled with venting heat rejection technologies are just some methods of reducing consumables. Development must strive for durable, reliable systems that are in-flight serviceable and maintainable, which are vital for missions where logistics capabilities are extremely constrained. Key areas include suit components (e.g., gloves, boots, and cooling garments), and life support hardware such as fans, pumps, instrumentation, and emergency O2 systems. Higher pressure suits will reduce EVA prebreathe requirements and pre-EVA operations overall. Many challenges of higher pressure suits have been addressed by on-going development. Emphasis on glove development is necessary to provide low fatigue, dexterous glove mobility at higher suit pressures. Minimum impact hooks and scars which support an advanced SSF EMU have been identified. These accommodations permit upgrades that support servicing of low volume, high pressure oxygen systems, and hydrogen technologies such as fuel cell, and venting hydrogen heat rejection systems.

Rouen, M.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Extravehicular Activity Micormeteoroid and Orbital Debris Risk Assessment Methodology

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of vehicle failure due to an impact from an micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. Among the vehicles of importance to NASA is the extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) “spacesuit” used while performing a US extravehicular activity (EVA). An EMU impact is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching the airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. For this reason, a risk assessment is provided to the EVA office at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) prior to certification of readiness for each US EVA. To assess the risk of failure, a detailed finite element model (FEM) of the EMU has been created which has regions for the various shielding configurations. Each shielding configuration is based on the layers and materials over the innermost bladder layer that maintains the acceptable atmospheric environment for the astronaut. Ballistic limit equations (BLE) for each shielding configuration have been determined from hypervelocity impact testing of samples of the EMU layup.

Hoffman, K. D.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Extravehicular Activity Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk Assessment Methodology

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of vehicle failure due to an impact from a micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. Among the vehicles of importance to NASA is the extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) “spacesuit” used while performing a US extravehicular activity (EVA). An EMU impact is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching the airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. For this reason, a risk assessment is provided to the EVA office at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) prior to certification of readiness for each US EVA.

Hoffman, Kevin D.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Compatibility Between Exploration EVA System and Exploration Spacecraft

Over the life of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU), numerous products detailing “how to build Extravehicular Activity (EVA) System hardware”, “how to interface with EVA System hardware” and “how to design hardware EVA will access and utilize” were generated to provide interoperability between a suited crewmember and the specified vehicle’s EVA task. Since the inception of these products, some have continued to receive updates due to the necessity of an on-going program while others remained unchanged for years and have led to discrepancies between the current accepted values and those considered outdated. For EVA-suited crewmember tasks beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO), new vehicles need a single consolidated location for the best practices and lessons learned from the EVA Community. This paper outlines what common EVA compatibility design requirements are expected of an Exploration spacecraft that has interactions between the vehicle and an EVA suited crewmember for and an approach for standardizing EVA compatibility across various vehicles at various destinations. The approach of standardization allows for flexibility by tailoring the applicability to meet the EVA tasks required for that vehicle’s operation beyond Low Earth Orbit. This paper will also describe the broad difference between microgravity and partial gravity EVA compatibility and how those requirements were identified and will be informed.

Compatibility↗

NASA NTRS2015

Failure Analysis Results and Corrective Actions Implemented for the EMU 3011 Water in the Helmet Mishap

During EVA (Extravehicular Activity) No. 23 aboard the ISS (International Space Station) on 07/16/2013 water entered the EMU (Extravehicular Mobility Unit) helmet resulting in the termination of the EVA (Extravehicular Activity) approximately 1-hour after it began. It was estimated that 1.5-L of water had migrated up the ventilation loop into the helmet, adversely impacting the astronauts hearing, vision and verbal communication. Subsequent on-board testing and ground-based TT and E (Test, Tear-down and Evaluation) of the affected EMU hardware components led to the determination that the proximate cause of the mishap was blockage of all water separator drum holes with a mixture of silica and silicates. The blockages caused a failure of the water separator function which resulted in EMU cooling water spilling into the ventilation loop, around the circulating fan, and ultimately pushing into the helmet. The root cause of the failure was determined to be ground-processing short-comings of the ALCLR (Airlock Cooling Loop Recovery) Ion Filter Beds which led to various levels of contaminants being introduced into the Filters before they left the ground. Those contaminants were thereafter introduced into the EMU hardware on-orbit during ALCLR scrubbing operations. This paper summarizes the failure analysis results along with identified process, hardware and operational corrective actions that were implemented as a result of findings from this investigation.

Steele, John↗

NASA NTRS2010

The Extravehicular Maneuvering Unit's New Long Life Battery and Lithium Ion Battery Charger

The Long Life (Lithium Ion) Battery is designed to replace the current Extravehicular Mobility Unit Silver/Zinc Increased Capacity Battery, which is used to provide power to the Primary Life Support Subsystem during Extravehicular Activities. The Charger is designed to charge, discharge, and condition the battery either in a charger-strapped configuration or in a suit-mounted configuration. This paper will provide an overview of the capabilities and systems engineering development approach for both the battery and the charger

Russell, Samuel P.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Development of a regenerable humidity and CO2 control system for an advanced EMU

A 5-h-regenerable nonventing humidity and CO2 control subsystem (HCCS) technology demonstration unit is being developed for potential use in an Advanced Extravehicular Mobility Unit for Space Station application. The HCCS incorporates a weak-base-anion exchange resin packed in a metal-foam-matrix heat exchanger. This system simultaneously removes CO2 and water vapor, with the resulting exothermic heat of reaction rejected to the heat exchanger. The system has no moving parts, resulting in a highly reliable simple configuration. Regeneration may be accomplished via internal heating and vacuum.

Nalette, Timothy A.↗

NASA NTRS1983

Shuttle EVA description and design criteria

The STS extravehicular mobility unit, orbiter EVA provisions, EVA equipment, factors affecting employment of EVA, EVA mission integration, baselined extravehicular activity are discussed. Design requirements are also discussed.

Source record↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Updates and Correlation of EMU System-Level Model (SINDA EMU)

During United States Extravehicular Activity 80 (US EVA 80), water was observed in the helmet of an Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) during cabin repressurization. One of the primary methods of determining the likely cause of this failure was through a comparison of EVA 80 to other historical EVAs using an analytical approach. The Systems Improved Numerical Differential Analysis EMU model (SINDA EMU) is a system-level model of the EMU that was used in this investigation. SINDA EMU was initially developed and correlated to test data in the 1980s. Since its conception, SINDA EMU has been continually adjusted based on new test data and changes to the EMU design. To support the water in the helmet investigation, SINDA EMU needed to be further updated and recorrelated to ensure accurate results. These changes included changing the primary carbon dioxide (CO2) removal technology, implementing logic to allow for re-evaporation of sweat runoff from the liquid cooling and ventilation garment (LCVG), and improving the transient modeling capabilities. To validate the implementation of these adjustments, SINDA EMU was correlated to test data from the 1990s and human-in-the-loop (HITL) testing from 2014. These updates and correlation efforts proved that SINDA EMU is an effective tool for investigating the EVA 80 water in the helmet failure event.

Noah Lial Andersen↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Comparative Analysis for EMU Fleet Latent Loading Characterization in Support of US EVA 80 Failure

During United States Extravehicular Activity 80 (US EVA 80), water was observed in the helmet of an Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) during cabin repressurization. One of the primary mechanisms that can cause water in the helmet of an EMU is integrated performance induced sublimator carryover. The sublimator is a heat exchanger that removes heat and humidity from the ventilation loop. Water vapor is condensed from the gas and removed by slurper holes in the sublimator. Sublimator carryover is caused by the inability of the EMU sublimator to remove all of the condensed water vapor, resulting in liquid water entering the helmet. To determine if sublimator carryover was a likely cause of the US EVA 80 failure, a comparative analysis of numerous historical EVAs was conducted to calculate the total latent load (total water vapor generated by the crewmember) for numerous historical EVAs and ground tests using the Systems Improved Numerical Differencing Analyzer EMU (SINDA EMU) model. The analysis showed that US EVA 80 was associated with a comparatively high latent load when compared to other EVAs that did not present water in the helmet. Further, this analysis showed that other historical EVAs which had visible water in the helmet were also associated with higher latent loads. This analysis provides evidence that the likely cause of the US EVA 80 water in the helmet event was not the failure of an individual component, but rather sublimator carryover caused by excessive production of water vapor by the crewmember. The evidence from this analysis agrees with results from the Test, Teardown, and Evaluation (TT&E) of the EMU which did not show any failure of individual components of the EMU that would lead to water in the helmet.

Noah Andersen↗

NASA NTRS1969

Apollo life-support and protective systems

Apollo extravehicular mobility unit /EMU/ system developed from Gemini EVA system with improved thermal control and mobility to support contingency extravehicular transfer in emergency

Faget, M. A.↗

NASA NTRS1999

Space-to-Space Communications System

The Space-to-Space Communications System (SSCS) is an Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Time-Division-Multiple Access (TDMA) system that is designed, developed, and deployed by the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) to provide voice, commands, telemetry and data services in close proximity among three space elements: International Space Station (ISS), Space Shuttle Orbiter, and Extravehicular Mobility Units (EMU). The SSCS consists of a family of three radios which are, Space-to-Space Station Radio (SSSR), Space-to-Space Orbiter Radio (SSOR), and Space-to-Space Extravehicular Mobility Radio (SSER). The SSCS can support up to five such radios at a time. Each user has its own time slot within which to transmit voice and data. Continuous Phase Frequency Shift Keying (CPFSK) carrier modulation with a burst data rate of 695 kbps and a frequency deviation of 486.5 kHz is employed by the system. Reed-Solomon (R-S) coding is also adopted to ensure data quality. In this paper, the SSCS system requirements, operational scenario, detailed system architecture and parameters, link acquisition strategy, and link performance analysis will be presented and discussed

Kwei tU↗