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Automated and manual implementation concepts for supersonic transport activities and implications for flight and ground crews
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NASA's Chief Astronaut describes what he experienced from take-off to landing on the Shuttle missions he has flown. The Chief Astronaut, curently in training for his fourth flight, has served as a pilot on one Shuttle mission and commanded two more.
A Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) study of 18 worldwide loss-of-control accidents and incidents determined that the lack of external visual references was associated with a flight crew's loss of attitude awareness or energy state awareness in 17 of these events. Therefore, CAST recommended development and implementation of virtual day-Visual Meteorological Condition (VMC) display systems, such as synthetic vision systems, which can promote flight crew attitude awareness similar to a day-VMC environment. This paper describes the results of a high-fidelity, large transport aircraft simulation experiment that evaluated virtual day-VMC displays and a "background attitude indicator" concept as an aid to pilots in recovery from unusual attitudes. Twelve commercial airline pilots performed multiple unusual attitude recoveries and both quantitative and qualitative dependent measures were collected. Experimental results and future research directions under this CAST initiative and the NASA "Technologies for Airplane State Awareness" research project are described.
The systems experience gained from 17 years of DC-10 operation was used during the design of the MD-11 to automate system operation and reduce crew workload. All functions, from preflight to shutdown at the termination of flight, require little input from the crew. The MD-11 aircraft systems are monitored for proper operation by the Aircraft Systems Controllers (ASC). In most cases, system reconfiguration as a result of a malfunction is automated. Manual input is required for irreversible actions such as engine shutdown, fuel dump, fire agent discharge, or Integrated Drive Generator (IDG) disconnect. During normal operations, when the cockpit is configured for flight, all annunciators on the overhead panel will be extinguished. This Dark Cockpit immediately confirms to the crew that the panels are correctly configured and that no abnormalities are present. Primary systems annunciations are shown in text on the Alert Area of the Engine and Alert Display (EAD). This eliminates the need to scan the overhead. The MD-11 aircraft systems can be manually controlled from the overhead area of the cockpit. The center portion of the overhead panel is composed of the primary aircraft systems panels, which include FUEL, AIR, Electrical (ELEC) and Hydraulic (HYD) systems, which are easily accessible from both flight crew positions. Each Aircraft Systems Controller (ASC) has two automatic channels and a manual mode. All rectangular lights are annunciators. All square lights are combined switches and annunciators called switch/lights. Red switch/lights on the overhead (Level 3 alerts) are for conditions requiring immediate crew action. Amber (Level 2 or Level 1 alerts) indicates a fault or switch out of position requiring awareness or crew interaction. Overhead switches used in normal operating conditions will illuminate blue when in use (Level 0 alerts) such as WING ANTI-ICE - ON. An overhead switch/light with BLACK LETTERING on an amber or red background indicates a system failure and that crew interaction is required. A switch/light with blue or amber lettering and a BLACK BACKGROUND indicates a switch out of normal position and that crew action is necessary only if the system is in manual operation.
Although the aircraft checklist has long been regarded as the foundation of pilot standardization and cockpit safety, it has escaped the scrutiny of the human factors profession. The improper use, or the non-use, of the normal checklist by flight crews is often cited as the probable cause or at least a contributing factor to aircraft accidents. An attempt is made to analyze the normal checklist, its functions, format, design, length, usage, and the limitations of the humans who must interact with it. The development of the checklist from the certification of a new model to its delivery and use by the customer are discussed. The influence of the government, particularly the FAA Principle Operations Inspector, the manufacturer's philosophy, the airline's culture, and the end user, the pilot, influence the ultimate design and usage of this device. The effects of airline mergers and acquisitions on checklist usage and design are noted. In addition, the interaction between production pressures and checklist usage and checklist management are addressed. Finally, a list of design guidelines for normal checklists is provided.
This presentation discusses an upcoming simulation for data comm in the terminal area. The purpose of the presentation is to provide the REDAC committee with a summary of some of the work in Data Comm that is being sponsored by the FAA. The focus of the simulation is upon flight crew human performance variables, such as crew procedures, timing and errors. The simulation is scheduled to be conducted in Sept 2012.
In Experiment 1, 16 pilots participated in a part-task simulation study that evaluated pilot data link communication for short and long message types and for two textual formats. No differences were found between the two textual formats when evaluating data link transaction times and pilot performance on a secondary task. Pilots initiated flight changes more quickly with the T-Scan format, where location of clearance information roughly corresponded to the cockpit instrument layout. Longer messages were less problematic than two short messages sent in close succession as pilots required more verbal clarification for closely spaced messages. 24 pilots participated in a second experiment that evaluated pilot communication performance for textual data link, two implementations of graphical data link, and a combined graphical and textual information modality. The two modalities incorporating text resulted in significantly faster transaction times and better performance on the secondary task than the two graphical-only implementations. The interval between messages was also more systematically varied in Experiment 2, and a short interval between messages significantly increased the access time for the second message. This delay in access was long enough to increase significantly the total transaction time of the second message, and this effect was exaggerated for the graphical-only implementations. Time to view the message before acknowledgement and time to initiate flight changes were not affected by the interval manipulation, This suggests that pilots adopt a sequential message handling strategy, and presenting messages closely in succession may present operational problems in a data link Air Traffic Control (ATC) environment. The results of this study also indicate that the perceived importance of message content is currently a crucial element in pilot data link communication.
These studies investigated acoustical analysis of the voice as a measure of workload in individual operators. In the first study, voice samples were recorded from a single operator during high, medium, and low workload conditions. Mean amplitude, frequency, syllable duration, and emphasis all tended to increase as workload increased. In the second study, NASA test pilots performed a laboratory task, and used a flight simulator under differing work conditions. For two of the pilots, high workload in the simulator brought about greater amplitude, peak duration, and stress. In both the laboratory and simulator tasks, high workload tended to be associated with more statistically significant drop-offs in the acoustical measures than were lower workload levels. There was a great deal of intra-subject variability in the acoustical measures. The results suggested that in individual operators, increased workload might be revealed by high initial amplitude and frequency, followed by rapid drop-offs over time.
The focus of this project is on alerting pilots to impending events in such a way as to provide the additional time required for the crew to make critical decisions concerning non-normal operations. The project addresses pilots' need for support in diagnosis and trend monitoring of faults as they affect decisions that must be made within the context of the current flight. Monitoring and diagnostic modules developed under the NASA Faultfinder program were restructured and enhanced using input data from an engine model and real engine fault data. Fault scenarios were prepared to support knowledge base development activities on the MONITAUR and DRAPhyS modules of Faultfinder. An analysis of the information requirements for fault management was included in each scenario. A conceptual framework was developed for systematic evaluation of the impact of context variables on pilot action alternatives as a function of event/fault combinations.
The method of the varicenter is-in the form it is used here-a generalization of the method of Encke, and it is developed to overcome certain difficulties of Encke's method which arise when the space vehicle does not remain in the neighborhood of one body, i.e., in a prevailing central field. It can be used for all types of space trajectories (orbits of Earth satellites, Moon £light trajectories, and interplanetary flights).
NASA Langley has developed a multi-mode decision support system for pilots operating in a Distributed Air-Ground Traffic Management (DAG-TM) environment. An Autonomous Operations Planner (AOP) assists pilots in performing separation assurance functions, including conflict detection, prevention, and resolution. Ongoing AOP design has been based on a comprehensive human factors analysis and evaluation results from previous human-in-the-loop experiments with airline pilot test subjects. AOP considers complex flight mode interactions and provides flight guidance to pilots consistent with the current aircraft control state. Pilots communicate goals to AOP by setting system preferences and actively probing potential trajectories for conflicts. To minimize training requirements and improve operational use, AOP design leverages existing alerting philosophies, displays, and crew interfaces common on commercial aircraft. Future work will consider trajectory prediction uncertainties, integration with the TCAS collision avoidance system, and will incorporate enhancements based on an upcoming air-ground coordination experiment.
A complex human-machine system consists of more than merely one or more human operators and a collection of hardware components. In order to operate a complex system successfully, the human-machine system must be supported by an organizational infrastructure of operating concepts, rules, guidelines, and documents. The coherency of such operating concepts, in terms of consistency and logic, is vitally important for the efficiency and safety of any complex system. In high-risk endeavors such as aircraft operations, space flight, nuclear power production, manufacturing process control, and military operations, it is essential that such support be flawless, as the price of operational error can be high. When operating rules are not adhered to, or the rules are inadequate for the task at hand, not only will the system's goals be thwarted, but there may also be tragic human and material consequences. To ensure safe and predictable operations, support to the operators, in this case flight crews, often comes in the form of standard operating procedures. These provide the crew with step-by-step guidance for carrying out their operations. Standard procedures do indeed promote uniformity, but they do so at the risk of reducing the role of human operators to a lower level. Management, however, must recognize the danger of over-procedurization, which fails to exploit one of the most valuable assets in the system, the intelligent operator who is "on the scene." The alert system designer and operations manager recognize that there cannot be a procedure for everything, and the time will come in which the operators of a complex system will face a situation for which there is no written procedure. Procedures, whether executed by humans or machines, have their place, but so does human cognition.
Managing fatigue in 24/7 operations is complex; fatigue and performance degradation can have health and safety consequences for the workers and can have economic and community consequences. We will present new findings on sleep, circadian misalignment, and performance in operational personnel. The presentations will shed light on how sleep and circadian misalignment affect workers' performance, safety, and health across multiple operations, and their application in fatigue risk management.As part of this symposium, I will discuss how pilots can use short naps (controlled rest) as a countermeasure to elevated sleepiness in-flight. My presentation will describe how and when controlled rest is used operationally and outline best practice guidelines for maximizing the benefits while managing the associated risks.
In complex human-machine systems, operations, training, and standardization depend on a elaborate set of procedures which are specified and mandated by the operational management of the organization. The intent is to provide guidance to the pilots, to ensure a logical, efficient, safe, and predictable means of carrying out the mission objectives. In this report the authors examine the issue of procedure use and design from a broad viewpoint. The authors recommend a process which we call 'The Four P's:' philosophy, policies, procedures, and practices. We believe that if an organization commits to this process, it can create a set of procedures that are more internally consistent, less confusing, better respected by the flight crews, and that will lead to greater conformity. The 'Four-P' model, and the guidelines for procedural development in appendix 1, resulted from cockpit observations, extensive interviews with airline management and pilots, interviews and discussion at one major airframe manufacturer, and an examination of accident and incident reports. Although this report is based on airline operations, we believe that the principles may be applicable to other complex, high-risk systems, such as nuclear power production, manufacturing process control, space flight, and military operations.
The planned modernization of the U.S. National Airspace System (NAS) includes the development and use of a digital data link as a means to exchange information between aircraft and ground-based facilities. This report presents an operationally-oriented concept on how data link could be used for applications related directly to air traffic control. The specific goal is to establish the role that data link could play in the air-ground communications. Due regard is given to the unique characteristics of data link and voice communications, current principles of air traffic control, operational procedures, human factors/man-machine interfaces, and the integration of data link with other air and ground systems. The resulting concept is illustrated in the form of a paper-and-pencil simulation in which data link and voice communications during the course of a hypothetical flight are described.
Many aircraft accidents each year are caused by encounters with unseen airflow hazards near the ground, such as vortices, downdrafts, low level wind shear, microbursts, or turbulence from surrounding vegetation or structures near the landing site. These hazards can be dangerous even to airliners; there have been hundreds of fatalities in the United States in the last two decades attributable to airliner encounters with microbursts and low level wind shear alone. However, helicopters are especially vulnerable to airflow hazards because they often have to operate in confined spaces and under operationally stressful conditions (such as emergency search and rescue, military or shipboard operations). Providing helicopter pilots with an augmented-reality display visualizing local airflow hazards may be of significant benefit. However, the form such a visualization might take, and whether it does indeed provide a benefit, had not been studied before our experiment. We recruited experienced military and civilian helicopter pilots for a preliminary usability study to evaluate a prototype augmented-reality visualization system. The study had two goals: first, to assess the efficacy of presenting airflow data in flight; and second, to obtain expert feedback on sample presentations of hazard indicators to refine our design choices. The study addressed the optimal way to provide critical safety information to the pilot, what level of detail to provide, whether to display specific aerodynamic causes or potential effects only, and how to safely and effectively shift the locus of attention during a high-workload task. Three-dimensional visual cues, with varying shape, color, transparency, texture, depth cueing, and use of motion, depicting regions of hazardous airflow, were developed and presented to the pilots. The study results indicated that such a visualization system could be of significant value in improving safety during critical takeoff and landing operations, and also gave clear indications of the best design choices in producing the hazard visual cues.
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