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At least 127 records · Page 7

Cyber Protection of Grid-Connected Devices Through Embedded Online Security

Cybersecurity research regarding the electric power grid has primarily been focused on protecting the communication layer of grid-connected devices against cyber-attack threats. Although many developed methods have greatly reduced the effects of a cyber-attack on the vulnerabilities of grid-connected devices, discovering new vulnerabilities is inevitable and a constant threat. As a result, the overall reliability and security of network communications with regard to grid-connected devices is a concern. Here, this paper proposes a method that further secures a system by focusing on the control and hardware layer of grid-connected devices. The device’s controller firmware will be validated and authenticated using integrated device emulation resources prior to being activated to control the grid-connected device. This verification process is performed while the controller is online and actively controlling power flows related to the device. Therefore, an attack to the system through a malicious firmware patch would be detected by the online security and rejected while safely maintaining continuous and stable control of the device. This method integrates the concepts of firmware hot-patching, digital twins, and active monitoring into an overall cybersecurity protection system.

cybersecurity↗

DISARM: Target Electronic Device Informed Mitigation of Software Runtime Side-Channel Vulnerabilities

Program runtime/timing attacks exploit variations in a program’s execution times to extract sensitive information from the program (e.g. encryption keys, sensitive variable data, intellectual property). State-of-the-art solutions to runtime side-channel attacks attempt to balance the execution time of the sensitive code for different control flow paths to eliminate the timing leakage. However, during the mitigation process, most techniques do not consider the underlying hardware/device on which the target program is supposed to run on. This can lead to over-fixing (unnecessary extra operations), under-fixing (not solving the imbalance properly), and even failures. Here, we propose DISARM, a joint hardware-software methodology (unlike any existing solution) for mitigating runtime side-channel vulnerabilities that utilizes timing values from real embedded devices to generate targeted software fixes. We implement DISARM to support C/C++/Java source codes and validate it across 22 standard benchmarks. DISARM outperforms state-of-the-art solutions such as PENDULUM and DifFuzzaR in terms of execution time overhead, code size overhead, and correctness on five different embedded/edge devices.

Timing/runtime side-channel↗

WeaselBoard :

Critical infrastructures, such as electrical power plants and oil refineries, rely on programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to control essential processes. State of the art security cannot detect attacks on PLCs at the hardware or firmware level. This renders critical infrastructure control systems vulnerable to costly and dangerous attacks. WeaselBoard is a PLC backplane analysis system that connects directly to the PLC backplane to capture backplane communications between modules. WeaselBoard forwards inter-module traffic to an external analysis system that detects changes to process control settings, sensor values, module configuration information, firmware updates, and process control program (logic) updates. WeaselBoard provides zero-day exploit detection for PLCs by detecting changes in the PLC and the process. This approach to PLC monitoring is protected under U.S. Patent Application 13/947,887.

Mulder, John C.↗

Nuclear Security: Facility Characterization

This presentation will describe the objectives of a security system; the balance between the use of hardware and guards; and design components for a balanced system.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

BeyondFingerprinting: AI-guided discovery of robust materials & processes

BeyondFingerprinting was a 2021-2024 Sandia Grand Challenge LDRD exploring the potential to develop new resilient materials and manufacturing processes by taking an artificial-intelligence (AI)-guided approach that integrates human-subject-matter expertise with algorithms enriched with physics-based constraints to unearth process-structure-property correlations. Such algorithms, trained on high-throughput experiments and simulations, are shown to serve as surrogate models that efficiently detect key “fingerprints” in materials data, prognose material performance, and guide effective process improvements. To accelerate broader adoption across mission areas, this AI-guided approach was demonstrated with three complex process-centric exemplars: electroplating, physical vapor deposition, and laser powder bed fusion. Together, these exemplars impact nearly every hardware component relevant to DOE and NNSA national security missions.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Roxana Paramo Ramirez: MSIIP 2025-2026 Internship [Poster]

At Sandia National Laboratories, there is a high level of importance placed on identifying and developing solutions to the nation’s current and future security problems. One of these problem would be hardware electronics validation and verification.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Design of a microprocessor based packet switch

The design of a packet switch incorporating a minicomputer to control and process data packets in a communications system has been reported. This paper proposes a design which uses a 6500 series microprocessor to realize the functions of a message switch in order to evaluate the viability of microprocessors in this application. The proposed design realizes the functions of header analysis, packet security, error control and line prioritization. The system hardware and software are presented together with a brief description of operation.

Carville, D. E.↗

Dynamic verification of very large space structures

The dynamic verification of spacecraft relies heavily on ground-based tests. These tests usually simulate flight environments or validate analytical models used in establishing design loads and in designing control algorithms. They also provide security against failures resulting from unanticipated or unmodeled hardware behavior. Future orbital antennas, space stations, and solar power systems are likely to be of sizes difficult to test using current ground test technology. In addition to size, other factors such as low natural frequencies, lightweight construction, and the presence of many structural joints, cause significant sensitivity of the test process to the earth-gravity environment. Yet, accuracy requirements on the verification process will be more stringent because of modern flexible-structure control approaches. This paper describes some of the problems and discusses research on potential solutions. The importance of an integrated ground test, analysis, and flight test program is emphasized. An ongoing research program of this type focusing on a 60-meter, deployable, truss-beam test article is described.

Hanks, B. R.↗

Pressure Sensitive Tape in the Manufacture of Reusable Solid Rocket Motors

ATK Launch Systems Inc. manufactures the reusable solid rocket motor (RSRM) for NASA's Space Shuttle program. They are used in pairs to launch the Space Shuttle. Pressure sensitive tape (PST) is used throughout the RSRM manufacturing process. A few PST functions are: 1) Secure labels; 2) Provide security seals; and 3) Protect tooling and flight hardware during various inert and live operations. Some of the PSTs used are: Cloth, Paper, Reinforced Teflon, Double face, Masking, and Vinyl. Factors given consideration for determining the type of tape to be used are: 1) Ability to hold fast; 2) Ability to release easily; 3) Ability to endure abuse; 4) Strength; and 5) Absence of adhesive residue after removal.

Champneys, Jeff↗

Controlling Infrastructure Costs: Right-Sizing the Mission Control Facility

Johnson Space Center's Mission Control Center is a space vehicle, space program agnostic facility. The current operational design is essentially identical to the original facility architecture that was developed and deployed in the mid-90's. In an effort to streamline the support costs of the mission critical facility, the Mission Operations Division (MOD) of Johnson Space Center (JSC) has sponsored an exploratory project to evaluate and inject current state-of-the-practice Information Technology (IT) tools, processes and technology into legacy operations. The general push in the IT industry has been trending towards a data-centric computer infrastructure for the past several years. Organizations facing challenges with facility operations costs are turning to creative solutions combining hardware consolidation, virtualization and remote access to meet and exceed performance, security, and availability requirements. The Operations Technology Facility (OTF) organization at the Johnson Space Center has been chartered to build and evaluate a parallel Mission Control infrastructure, replacing the existing, thick-client distributed computing model and network architecture with a data center model utilizing virtualization to provide the MCC Infrastructure as a Service. The OTF will design a replacement architecture for the Mission Control Facility, leveraging hardware consolidation through the use of blade servers, increasing utilization rates for compute platforms through virtualization while expanding connectivity options through the deployment of secure remote access. The architecture demonstrates the maturity of the technologies generally available in industry today and the ability to successfully abstract the tightly coupled relationship between thick-client software and legacy hardware into a hardware agnostic "Infrastructure as a Service" capability that can scale to meet future requirements of new space programs and spacecraft. This paper discusses the benefits and difficulties that a migration to cloud-based computing philosophies has uncovered when compared to the legacy Mission Control Center architecture. The team consists of system and software engineers with extensive experience with the MCC infrastructure and software currently used to support the International Space Station (ISS) and Space Shuttle program (SSP).

Martin, Keith↗

Engineering Trade-off Considerations Regarding Design-for-Security, Design-for-Verification, and Design-for-Test

The United States government has identified that application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) and field programmable gate array (FPGA) hardware are at risk from a variety of adversary attacks. This finding affects system security and trust. Consequently, processes are being developed for system mitigation and countermeasure application. The scope of this tutorial pertains to potential vulnerabilities and countermeasures within the ASIC/FPGA design cycle. The presentation demonstrates how design practices can affect the risk for the adversary to: change circuitry, steal intellectual property, and listen to data operations. An important portion of the design cycle is assuring the design is working as specified or as expected. This is accomplished by exhaustive testing of the target design. Alternatively, it has been shown that well established schemes for test coverage enhancement (design-for-verification (DFV) and design-for-test (DFT)) can create conduits for adversary accessibility. As a result, it is essential to perform a trade between robust test coverage versus reliable design implementation. The goal of this tutorial is to explain the evolution of design practices; review adversary accessibility points due to DFV and DFT circuitry insertion (back door circuitry); and to describe common engineering trade-off considerations for test versus adversary threats.

Design for reliability (DFR)↗

Women in Science: Fermilab cybersecurity analyst Jeny Teheran

With 11 February marking the International Day of Women and Girls in Science, female physicists, engineers and computer scientists from CERN and from Fermilab share their experiences of building a career in science. Jeny Teheran is a security analyst and cybersecurity researcher at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory. That means keeping up with and taking care of hardware and software vulnerabilities so that the experiments can carry out their science in a secure manner. It's a fast-paced job where you have to come with the best solution you can put in place, right in the moment. "I would recommend this job because it challenges you. It pushes you to be on top of your game. You have to improve your analytical skills; you have to react fast; you have to communicate better." - Jeny says. Jeny came to Fermilab from the Caribbean coast of Colombia. She grew up in a house with few toys but lots of books, and says she has always felt close to science. With a degree in systems and computing engineering, she arrived at Fermilab four years ago as an intern to work on the offline production team for neutrino experiments. A year later, she was hired as a security analyst. "And I'm loving it," she says. Credits: Video production - Fermilab Creative Services Music Copyright: Universal Production Music Astral Light Chevalier Idea originally conceived by Tanya Levshina, Fermilab and Maria Dimou, CERN.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Remote operation of the DIII-D National Fusion Facility

Abstract Full remote scientific operation of the DIII-D National Fusion Facility is now possible through significant advances in the computer science hardware and software infrastructure made over the last decade. Capabilities around information visualization, data movement, and communication have all been enhanced. The level of capability deployed to remotely operate DIII-D required an infrastructure advancement over what had previously been achieved in the fusion community. The large quantity of real-time data that is automatically displayed on DIII-D’s control room screens can now be visualized by remote participants via web-based applications. New audio/video solutions using the VoIP and instant messaging application Discord have been implemented to mimic the dynamic and ad-hoc scientific conversations that are critical in successfully operating an experimental campaign. Discord’s ability for a user to rapidly move between audio channels, text with images, and share screens is a significant enhancement over traditional videoconferencing tools. In addition, multiple combinations of broadcast audio are made available via a web-based application to allow remote participants to simultaneously listen to general announcements/sounds while conducting their own specific conversations. Secure methodologies have been put into place to allow remote control of hardware including DIII-D’s plasma control system application. Secure methods also included the ability of the on-site team to closely coordinate their work with remote team members which has been enhanced through extensions to the wireless network and the use of tablet computers for audio/video/screen sharing. However, no amount of software can fully replace the need for ‘hands on hardware.’ This infrastructure was severely stress tested during the COVID-19 pandemic where occupancy of the DIII-D control room was restricted. Operational efficiency during the pandemic, measured in discharges per hour, remained high (3.8 ± 0.8) compared to values obtained pre-pandemic (3.7 ± 0.8).

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Assessing Energy Infrastructure Devices for Vulnerabilities

Industrial control systems prove to be vital to the health and security of the nation in our critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure includes the most foundational systems to support modern civilization which includes water and wastewater systems, communications, and the electricity we use to name a few sectors. However, these devices' overall composition remains largely unknown and are untested from a cyber security perspective. As part of the Cyber Testing for Resilient Industrial Control Systems (CyTRICS) program, I analyzed one such energy infrastructure device to better understand how it functions, what hardware and software components are present within it, and assess it for security vulnerabilities. To achieve this, I reverse engineered binary files using Ghidra to understand system functionality and learned more about how to collaborate with other researchers on a shared Ghidra project. I learned more about how web sockets function and how to interact with them through Python to test if they are secure or not. This work led me to assess possible vulnerabilities in this device and provide a better understanding of its composition and function, which are essential to INL's mission of securing our nation's energy infrastructure.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Cyber risk assessment and investment optimization using game theory and ML-based anomaly detection and mitigation for wide-area control in smart grids

The electric power grid is increasingly becoming susceptible to cyber attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in the smart grid control, information, and physical layers. Successful cyber attacks can have catastrophic impacts on the social and economic well-being of any nation all over the globe. It has, thus, become imperative to secure the smart grid against such adversarial actions to ensure stable, secure, and reliable operation of the grid. The existing research and industry practices prove to be inadequate in terms of providing pragmatic and effective defense methodologies and measures for long-term cybersecurity planning and real-time cybersecurity for grid operation. For example, existing works lack models that incorporate uncertain behavior of cyber-attackers and pragmatic defense measures for cyber risk assessment and cybersecurity investment optimization which often provide unreliable and strictly qualitative solutions to these problems. At the same time, with the growing number of cyber incidents in the grid, there still exists a need to develop attack-resilient algorithms for wide-area monitoring, protection, and control (WAMPAC) applications like the wide-area voltage control systems (WAVCS) for Flexible AC Transmissions Systems (FACTS) that lack in scalable and feasible solutions from the cybersecurity perspective. This dissertation proposes novel models and methodologies for: (1) Cybersecurity planning, and (2) Cybersecurity for system operation. The cybersecurity planning is achieved through cyber risk assessment and cybersecurity resource investment optimization for long-term cybersecurity of the grid using game theory and attack-defense trees. Cybersecurity for system operation consists of development of cyber anomaly detection and mitigation algorithms for flexible AC transmission system (FACTS) controller-based wide-area voltage control systems (WAVCS) using machine learning (ML), and software defined networking-based moving target defense network routing for achieving real-time cyber-physical security for grid operations. This is followed by hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) implementation and evaluation of these attack prevention, detection, and mitigation algorithms and methodologies showcasing their feasibility in a close to real-world environment. For cybersecurity planning, a novel approach involving a combination of game theory and attack defense trees (ADT) for optimal cybersecurity resource allocation in the smart grid is proposed. This methodology involves modeling of the cyber-physical smart grid substations as ADTs, defining attacker costs, defense costs, and attack probabilities for attack access points. Using game theoretical formulation, optimal defense strategies for the defender of the system to invest cybersecurity resources in the grid are obtained. Additionally, a game-theoretic framework is developed for quantitative cyber-physical risk assessment of the grid under a dynamically changing cyber threat space and uncertain behavior of cyber attackers which is further used to optimize investments in the smart grid's cybersecurity resources. The attacker, defender, and the smart grid system are modeled while incorporating attacker-stochasticity and federal guidelines for smart grid cybersecurity. This allows quantification of threat, vulnerabilities, and attack impact of the grid for quantitative risk assessment. The defender's budget to invest in the security resources in the grid is optimized based on the strategies leading to minimum system risk. The evaluation of the proposed solutions highlight the feasibility for practical implementation of these methodologies and algorithms in the smart grid, while taking the federal requirements and guidelines for smart grid security into consideration. For achieving cybersecurity for system operation, attack prevention, detection, and mitigation algorithms and methodologies are developed specifically for FACTS-based WAVCS. Anomaly detection and mitigation in the WAVCS are achieved using algorithms based on machine learning which involves offline training and testing of ML models with CPS datasets incorporating physics-based features that allow accurate distinction between system faults and cyber attacks. For attack prevention, a methodology based on software defined network (SDN)-based moving target defense (MTD) network routing is proposed that enables prevention of Denial of Service (DoS) type attacks on the smart grid communication system. Subsequently, these methodologies and algorithms are implemented and evaluated on an HIL testbed that allows for real-time attack prevention, detection, and mitigation of emulated cyber attacks on the WAVCS in a close to real-world environment. The results show highly accurate and efficient performance of the implemented algorithms and methodologies with the smart grid system operating within the NERC's system operation limits even in the presence of DoS and data integrity cyber attacks. This work opens up future research opportunities in other directions such as (1) Expanding cybersecurity planning methodologies to real-time cyber contingency analysis with different game formulations; and (2) Applying the cybersecurity for system operation algorithms to broader categories of wide-area control applications.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Ground Software Technologies – Embracing Change: Mission Drivers and Technology Opportunities to Enable Long Lived Missions

Mission lifecycles have proven to extend well beyond their original design. The benefits to this are countless but introduce challenges in today’s rapidly changing ground infrastructure and software technologies used to enable mission success. What remains constant is the risk posture missions maintain when accepting change and the use of new technologies. Larger missions are ready for change in early lifecycle development but near launch and especially in operations, few continue to evolve beyond what is set in place in phase C. This paper will discuss how the Advance Multi-Mission Operations System (AMMOS) intends to address, three driving missions concerns: Maintaining functionality (hardware/software) for decades, rapidly responding to security vulnerabilities in software, and finally the ability to quickly evolve infrastructure and software changes. These driving concerns are briefly described below: 1. Maintaining functionality (hardware/software) for decades. Hardware updates considerably faster than 10 years ago. Expectations that a system can remain in place for more than 10 years is no longer valid. Expecting to find hardware replacements for a system older than 5 years will increasingly become more and more challenging. How than do missions plan for hardware changes for long lived missions? Principle Objective: Provide abstraction by virtualizing and containerizing software abstract away any hardware dependencies and package up the application lightweight units. 2. Rapidly responding to security vulnerabilities in software. Cost is often the main impediment and largely driven by the revalidation and testing of system that undergo change. In todays, environment security updates are a major diver demanding systems remain up to date. How then do missions accept these changes and avoid large testing efforts? Principle Objective: Help reduce the cost of re-testing by automation of testing, deployment, and compartmentalizing change. 3. Ability to quickly evolve infrastructure and software changes. Responding quickly to change is similar to the second concern in this paper regarding security vulnerabilities. In this case, it address broader concerns of updating software and infrastructure on a more realistic timeline. How do missions stay up to date with the most recent versions of software and allowing for improved functionality? Principle Objective: Use continuous integration techniques at the system level to ensure rapid turnaround. This paper explores each of these concerns in more detail. It focuses the AMMOS’s current plans, challenges and current roadmap.

Giovannoni, Brian J.↗

FAIR Ecosystems for Science at Scale

High Performance Computing (HPC) centers provide resources to users who require greater scale to “get science done”. They deploy infrastructure with singular hardware architectures, cutting-edge software environments, and stricter security measures as compared with users’ own resources. As a result, users often create and configure digital artifacts in ways that are specialized for the unique infrastructure at a given HPC center. Each user of that center will face similar challenges as they develop specialized solutions to take full advantages of the center’s resources, potentially resulting in significant duplication of effort. Much duplicated effort could be avoided, however, if users of these centers found it easier to discover others’ solutions and artifacts as well as share their own. The FAIR principles address this problem by presenting guidelines focused around metadata practices to be implemented by vaguely defined “communities”; in practice, these tend to gather by domain (e.g. bioinformatics, geosciences, agriculture). Domain-based communities can unfortunately end up functioning as silos that tend both to inhibit sharing of solutions and best practices as well as to encourage fragile and unsustainable improvised solutions in the absence of best-practice guidance. We propose that these communities pursuing “science at scale” be nurtured both individually and collectively by HPC centers so that users can take advantage of shared challenges across disciplines and potentially across HPC centers. We describe an architecture based on the EOSC-Life FAIR Workflows Collaboratory, specialized for use with and inside HPC centers such as the Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility (OLCF), and we speculate on user incentives to encourage adoption. We note that a focus on FAIR workflow components rather than FAIR workflows is more likely to benefit the users of HPC centers.

Wilkinson, Sean [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000214437479)↗

Packet Capture Solutions: PcapDB Benchmark for High-Bandwidth Capture, Storage, and Searching

PcapDB stands alone when looking at the overall field of competitors, from the cost-effective COTS hardware, to the efficient utilization of disk space that enables a longer packet history. A scalable, 100GbE-enabled system that indexes every packet and indexes flow data without complicated load-balancing requirements. The Transport Layer search and indexing approach led to patent-pending flow indexing technology, providing a specialized database system specifically optimized around providing fast flow searches. While there are a plethora of options in network packet capture, there are very few that are able to effectively manage capture rates of more than 10 Gb/s, distributed capture and querying, and a responsive user interface. By far, the primary competitor in the market place is Endace and DeepSee; in addition to meeting the technical requirements we set out in this document, they provide technical support and a fully 'appliance like' system. In terms of cost, however, our experience has been that the yearly maintenance charges alone outstrip the entire hardware cost of solutions like PcapDB. Investment in cyber security research and development is a large part of what has enabled us to build the base of knowlegable workers needed to defend government resources in the rapidly evolving cyber security landscape. We believe projects like Bro, WireCap, and Farm do more than just fill temporary gaps in our capabilities. They give allow us to build the firm foundation needed to tackle the next generation of cyber challenges. PcapDB was built with loftier ambitions than simply solving the packet capture of a single lab site, but instead to provide a robust, scaleable packet capture solution to the DOE complex and beyond.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗