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At least 127 records · Page 7

User type certification for advanced flight control systems

Advanced avionics through flight management systems (FMS) coupled with autopilots can now precisely control aircraft from takeoff to landing. Clearly, this has been the most important improvement in aircraft since the jet engine. Regardless of the eventual capabilities of this technology, it is doubtful that society will soon accept pilotless airliners with the same aplomb they accept driverless passenger trains. Flight crews are still needed to deal with inputing clearances, taxiing, in-flight rerouting, unexpected weather decisions, and emergencies; yet it is well known that the contribution of human errors far exceed those of current hardware or software systems. Thus human errors remain, and are even increasing in percentage as the largest contributor to total system error. Currently, the flight crew is regulated by a layered system of certification: by operation, e.g., airline transport pilot versus private pilot; by category, e.g., airplane versus helicopter; by class, e.g., single engine land versus multi-engine land; and by type (for larger aircraft and jet powered aircraft), e.g., Boeing 767 or Airbus A320. Nothing in the certification process now requires an in-depth proficiency with specific types of avionics systems despite their prominent role in aircraft control and guidance.

Gilson, Richard D.↗

An overview of the evolution of human reliability analysis in the context of probabilistic risk assessment.

Since the Reactor Safety Study in the early 1970's, human reliability analysis (HRA) has been evolving towards a better ability to account for the factors and conditions that can lead humans to take unsafe actions and thereby provide better estimates of the likelihood of human error for probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs). The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of recent reviews of operational events and advances in the behavioral sciences that have impacted the evolution of HRA methods and contributed to improvements. The paper discusses the importance of human errors in complex human-technical systems, examines why humans contribute to accidents and unsafe conditions, and discusses how lessons learned over the years have changed the perspective and approach for modeling human behavior in PRAs of complicated domains such as nuclear power plants. It is argued that it has become increasingly more important to understand and model the more cognitive aspects of human performance and to address the broader range of factors that have been shown to influence human performance in complex domains. The paper concludes by addressing the current ability of HRA to adequately predict human failure events and their likelihood.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

The NASA Aviation Safety Program: Overview

In 1997, the United States set a national goal to reduce the fatal accident rate for aviation by 80% within ten years based on the recommendations by the Presidential Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. Achieving this goal will require the combined efforts of government, industry, and academia in the areas of technology research and development, implementation, and operations. To respond to the national goal, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has developed a program that will focus resources over a five year period on performing research and developing technologies that will enable improvements in many areas of aviation safety. The NASA Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) is organized into six research areas: Aviation System Modeling and Monitoring, System Wide Accident Prevention, Single Aircraft Accident Prevention, Weather Accident Prevention, Accident Mitigation, and Synthetic Vision. Specific project areas include Turbulence Detection and Mitigation, Aviation Weather Information, Weather Information Communications, Propulsion Systems Health Management, Control Upset Management, Human Error Modeling, Maintenance Human Factors, Fire Prevention, and Synthetic Vision Systems for Commercial, Business, and General Aviation aircraft. Research will be performed at all four NASA aeronautics centers and will be closely coordinated with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and other government agencies, industry, academia, as well as the aviation user community. This paper provides an overview of the NASA Aviation Safety Program goals, structure, and integration with the rest of the aviation community.

Shin, Jaiwon↗

How To Make the Most of Your Human: Design Considerations for Single Pilot Operations

Reconsidering the function allocation between automation and the pilot in the flight deck is the next step in improving aviation safety. The current allocation, based on who does what best, makes poor use of the pilot's resources and abilities. In some cases it may actually handicap pilots from performing their role. Improving pilot performance first lies in defining the role of the pilot - why a human is needed in the first place. The next step is allocating functions based on the needs of that role (rather than fitness), then using automation to target specific human weaknesses in performing that role. Examples are provided (some of which could be implemented in conventional cockpits now). Along the way, the definition of human error and the idea that eliminating/automating the pilot will reduce instances of human error will be challenged.

Schutte, Paul C.↗

Practical Application of PRA as an Integrated Design Tool for Space Systems

This paper presents the application of the first comprehensive Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) during the design phase of a joint NASA/NOAA weather satellite program, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite Series R (GOES-R). GOES-R is the next generation weather satellite primarily to help understand the weather and help save human lives. PRA has been used at NASA for Human Space Flight for many years. PRA was initially adopted and implemented in the operational phase of manned space flight programs and more recently for the next generation human space systems. Since its first use at NASA, PRA has become recognized throughout the Agency as a method of assessing complex mission risks as part of an overall approach to assuring safety and mission success throughout project lifecycles. PRA is now included as a requirement during the design phase of both NASA next generation manned space vehicles as well as for high priority robotic missions. The influence of PRA on GOES-R design and operation concepts are discussed in detail. The GOES-R PRA is unique at NASA for its early implementation. It also represents a pioneering effort to integrate risks from both Spacecraft (SC) and Ground Segment (GS) to fully assess the probability of achieving mission objectives. PRA analysts were actively involved in system engineering and design engineering to ensure that a comprehensive set of technical risks were correctly identified and properly understood from a design and operations perspective. The analysis included an assessment of SC hardware and software, SC fault management system, GS hardware and software, common cause failures, human error, natural hazards, solar weather and infrastructure (such as network and telecommunications failures, fire). PRA findings directly resulted in design changes to reduce SC risk from micro-meteoroids. PRA results also led to design changes in several SC subsystems, e.g. propulsion, guidance, navigation and control (GNC), communications, mechanisms, and command and data handling (C&DH). The fault tree approach assisted in the development of the fault management system design. Human error analysis, which examined human response to failure, indicated areas where automation could reduce the overall probability of gaps in operation by half. In addition, the PRA brought to light many potential root causes of system disruptions, including earthquakes, inclement weather, solar storms, blackouts and other extreme conditions not considered in the typical reliability and availability analyses. Ultimately the PRA served to identify potential failures that, when mitigated, resulted in a more robust design, as well as to influence the program's concept of operations. The early and active integration of PRA with system and design engineering provided a well-managed approach for risk assessment that increased reliability and availability, optimized lifecyc1e costs, and unified the SC and GS developments.

Kalia, Prince↗

Simulator Data Analysis to Inform Digitalized Environment Impacts on Human Reliability

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has developed a human reliability analysis (HRA) method, termed the Integrated Human Event Analysis System for Event and Condition Assessment (IDHEAS-ECA), in order to estimate human error probabilities (HEPs) in risk-informed regulatory applications. To update the quantification part of IDHEAS-ECA, the NRC required human performance and error data from fully digitalized main control rooms (MCRs); therefore, it requested that Idaho National Laboratory (INL) revisit previous data collection studies and investigate how the following three factors impact human reliability: self-checking, peer-checking, and automation. The HRA data collection studies revisited were the Human Reliability Data Extraction (HuREX) project, developed by the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), and the Simplified Human Error Experimental Program (SHEEP), developed by INL. HuREX is a representative HRA data collection study that collects human reliability data from full-scope simulators staffed by licensed operators. SHEEP, on the other hand, has been proposed to complement such full-scope studies by collecting data via simplified simulators staffed by non-licensed student operators. In the HuREX study, KAERI collected HRA data from fully digitalized MCRs for the Advanced Power Reactor (APR)–1400. The SHEEP data were obtained from simplified simulators that partially mimicked the features of digitalized MCRs. The present report mainly discusses how the impacts of the aforementioned three factors on human errors were derived from these two data collection studies.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Rancor-HUNTER: A Virtual Plant and Operator Environment for Predicting Human Performance

Advances in simulation capabilities to model physical systems have outpaced the development of simulations for humans using those physical systems. There is an argument that the infinite span of potential human behaviors inherently render human modeling more challenging than physical systems. Despite this challenge, the need for modeling humans interacting with these complex systems is paramount. As technologies have improved, many of the failure modes originating from the physical systems have been solved. This means the overall proportion of human errors has increased, such that it is not uncommon to be the primary driver of system failure in modern complex systems. Moreover, technologies such as automated systems may introduce emerging contexts that can cause new, unanticipated modes of human error. Therefore, it is now more important than ever to develop models of human behavior to realize overall system error reductions and achieve established safety margins. To support new and novel concepts of operations for the anticipated wave of advanced nuclear reactor deployments, human factors and human reliability analysis researchers need to develop advanced simulation-based approaches. This talk presents a simulation environment suitable to both collect data and then perform Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate human performance and develop better models of human behavior. Specifically, the Rancor Microworld Simulator models a complex energy production system in a simplified manner. Rancor includes computer-based procedures, which serve as a framework to automatically classify human behaviors without manual, subjective experimenter coding during scenarios. This method supports a detailed level of analysis at the task level. It is feasible for collecting large sample sizes required to develop quantitative modelling elements that have historically challenged traditional full-scope simulator study approaches. Additionally, the other portion of this experimental platform, the Human Unimodel for Nuclear Technology to Enhance Reliability (HUNTER), is presented to show how the collected data can be used to evaluate novel scenarios based on the contextual factors, or performance shaping factors, derived from Rancor simulations. Rancor-HUNTER is being used to predict operator performance with new procedures, such as results from control room modernization or new-build situations. Rancor-HUNTER is also proving a useful surrogate platform to model human performance for other complex systems.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Safety and Performance Analysis of the Non-Radar Oceanic/Remote Airspace In-Trail Procedure

This document presents a safety and performance analysis of the nominal case for the In-Trail Procedure (ITP) in a non-radar oceanic/remote airspace. The analysis estimates the risk of collision between the aircraft performing the ITP and a reference aircraft. The risk of collision is only estimated for the ITP maneuver and it is based on nominal operating conditions. The analysis does not consider human error, communication error conditions, or the normal risk of flight present in current operations. The hazards associated with human error and communication errors are evaluated in an Operational Hazards Analysis presented elsewhere.

Carreno, Victor A.↗

Human Factors Directions for Civil Aviation

Despite considerable progress in understanding human capabilities and limitations, incorporating human factors into aircraft design, operation, and certification, and the emergence of new technologies designed to reduce workload and enhance human performance in the system, most aviation accidents still involve human errors. Such errors occur as a direct or indirect result of untimely, inappropriate, or erroneous actions (or inactions) by apparently well-trained and experienced pilots, controllers, and maintainers. The field of human factors has solved many of the more tractable problems related to simple ergonomics, cockpit layout, symbology, and so on. We have learned much about the relationships between people and machines, but know less about how to form successful partnerships between humans and the information technologies that are beginning to play a central role in aviation. Significant changes envisioned in the structure of the airspace, pilots and controllers' roles and responsibilities, and air/ground technologies will require a similarly significant investment in human factors during the next few decades to ensure the effective integration of pilots, controllers, dispatchers, and maintainers into the new system. Many of the topics that will be addressed are not new because progress in crucial areas, such as eliminating human error, has been slow. A multidisciplinary approach that capitalizes upon human studies and new classes of information, computational models, intelligent analytical tools, and close collaborations with organizations that build, operate, and regulate aviation technology will ensure that the field of human factors meets the challenge.

Hart, Sandra G.↗

A Longitudinal Analysis of the Causal Factors in Major Maritime Accidents in the USA and Canada (1996-2006)

Accident reports provide important insights into the causes and contributory factors leading to particular adverse events. In contrast, this paper provides an analysis that extends across the findings presented over ten years investigations into maritime accidents by both the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and Canadian Transportation Safety Board (TSB). The purpose of the study was to assess the comparative frequency of a range of causal factors in the reporting of adverse events. In order to communicate our findings, we introduce J-H graphs as a means of representing the proportion of causes and contributory factors associated with human error, equipment failure and other high level classifications in longitudinal studies of accident reports. Our results suggest the proportion of causal and contributory factors attributable to direct human error may be very much smaller than has been suggested elsewhere in the human factors literature. In contrast, more attention should be paid to wider systemic issues, including the managerial and regulatory context of maritime operations.

Johnson, C. W.↗

SNL Human Reliability Analysis (Capstone Final Report)

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) requested a measure of possible human error for each state verification method for a safety mechanism performed at partnering production agencies. A team of three human factors individuals were tasked with conducting observations during site visits of both production agencies in order to complete a Human Reliability Analysis (HRA). A HRA will be used because it provides both qualitative and quantitative reports of human error. This report is the first phase of that effort, which will describe the methods which occur at one of the production agencies.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

NASA: Model development for human factors interfacing

The results of an intensive literature review in the general topics of human error analysis, stress and job performance, and accident and safety analysis revealed no usable techniques or approaches for analyzing human error in ground or space operations tasks. A task review model is described and proposed to be developed in order to reduce the degree of labor intensiveness in ground and space operations tasks. An extensive number of annotated references are provided.

Smith, L. L.↗

Partial least square method for modelling ergonomic risks factors on express bus accidents in the east coast of peninsular west Malaysia

Public, stake holders and authorities in Malaysian government show great concern towards high numbers of passenger’s injuries and passengers fatalities in express bus accident. This paper studies the underlying factors involved in determining ergonomics risk factors towards human error as the reasons in express bus accidents in order to develop an integrated analytical framework. Reliable information about drivers towards bus accident should lead to the design of strategies intended to make the public feel safe in public transport services. In addition there is an analysis of ergonomics risk factors to determine highly ergonomic risk factors which led to accidents. The research was performed in east coast of peninsular Malaysia using variance-based structural equation modeling namely the Partial Least Squares (PLS) regression techniques. A questionnaire survey was carried out at random among 65 express bus drivers operating from the city of Kuantan in Pahang and among 49 express bus drivers operating from the city of Kuala Terengganu in Terengganu to all towns in the east coast of peninsular west Malaysia. The ergonomic risks factors questionnaire is based on demographic information, occupational information, organizational safety climate, ergonomic workplace, physiological factors, stress at workplace, physical fatigue and near miss accidents. The correlation and significant values between latent constructs (near miss accident) were analyzed using SEM SmartPLS, 3M. The finding shows that the correlated ergonomic risks factors (occupational information, t=2.04, stress at workplace, t = 2.81, physiological factor, t=2.08) are significant to physical fatigue and as the mediator to near miss accident at t = 2.14 at p<0.05and T-statistics, t>1.96. The results shows that the effects of physical fatigue due to ergonomic risks factors influence the human error as the reasons in express bus accidents.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

A Method for the Study of Human Factors in Aircraft Operations

A method for the study of human factors in the aviation environment is described. A conceptual framework is provided within which pilot and other human errors in aircraft operations may be studied with the intent of finding out how, and why, they occurred. An information processing model of human behavior serves as the basis for the acquisition and interpretation of information relating to occurrences which involve human error. A systematic method of collecting such data is presented and discussed. The classification of the data is outlined.

Barnhart, W.↗

Designing and Developing Web-Based Administrative Tools for Program Management

The task assigned for this internship was to develop a new tool for tracking projects, their subsystems, the leads, backups, and other employees assigned to them, as well as all the relevant information related to the employee (WBS (time charge) codes, time distribution, certifications, and assignments). Currently, this data is tracked manually using a number of different spreadsheets and other tools simultaneously by a number of different people; some of these documents are then merged into one large document. This often leads to inconsistencies and loss in data due to human error. By simplifying the process of tracking this data and aggregating it into a single tool, it is possible to significantly decrease the potential for human error and time spent collecting and checking this information. II. Objective The main objective of this internship is to develop a web-based tool using Ruby on Rails to serve as a method of easily tracking projects, subsystems, and points of contact, along with employees, their assignments, time distribution, certifications, and contact information. Additionally, this tool must be capable of generating a number of different reports based on the data collected. It was important that this tool deliver all of this information using a readable and intuitive interface.

Material↗

Airline Crew Training

The discovery that human error has caused many more airline crashes than mechanical malfunctions led to an increased emphasis on teamwork and coordination in airline flight training programs. Human factors research at Ames Research Center has produced two crew training programs directed toward more effective operations. Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) defines areas like decision making, workload distribution, communication skills, etc. as essential in addressing human error problems. In 1979, a workshop led to the implementation of the CRM program by United Airlines, and later other airlines. In Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT), crews fly missions in realistic simulators while instructors induce emergency situations requiring crew coordination. This is followed by a self critique. Ames Research Center continues its involvement with these programs.

Source record↗

Associations between errors and contributing factors in aircraft maintenance

In recent years cognitive error models have provided insights into the unsafe acts that lead to many accidents in safety-critical environments. Most models of accident causation are based on the notion that human errors occur in the context of contributing factors. However, there is a lack of published information on possible links between specific errors and contributing factors. A total of 619 safety occurrences involving aircraft maintenance were reported using a self-completed questionnaire. Of these occurrences, 96% were related to the actions of maintenance personnel. The types of errors that were involved, and the contributing factors associated with those actions, were determined. Each type of error was associated with a particular set of contributing factors and with specific occurrence outcomes. Among the associations were links between memory lapses and fatigue and between rule violations and time pressure. Potential applications of this research include assisting with the design of accident prevention strategies, the estimation of human error probabilities, and the monitoring of organizational safety performance.

Professional Competence↗

Bayesian Safety Risk Modeling of Human-Flightdeck Automation Interaction

Usage of automatic systems in airliners has increased fuel efficiency, added extra capabilities, enhanced safety and reliability, as well as provide improved passenger comfort since its introduction in the late 80's. However, original automation benefits, including reduced flight crew workload, human errors or training requirements, were not achieved as originally expected. Instead, automation introduced new failure modes, redistributed, and sometimes increased workload, brought in new cognitive and attention demands, and increased training requirements. Modern airliners have numerous flight modes, providing more flexibility (and inherently more complexity) to the flight crew. However, the price to pay for the increased flexibility is the need for increased mode awareness, as well as the need to supervise, understand, and predict automated system behavior. Also, over-reliance on automation is linked to manual flight skill degradation and complacency in commercial pilots. As a result, recent accidents involving human errors are often caused by the interactions between humans and the automated systems (e.g., the breakdown in man-machine coordination), deteriorated manual flying skills, and/or loss of situational awareness due to heavy dependence on automated systems. This paper describes the development of the increased complexity and reliance on automation baseline model, named FLAP for FLightdeck Automation Problems. The model development process starts with a comprehensive literature review followed by the construction of a framework comprised of high-level causal factors leading to an automation-related flight anomaly. The framework was then converted into a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) using the Hugin Software v7.8. The effects of automation on flight crew are incorporated into the model, including flight skill degradation, increased cognitive demand and training requirements along with their interactions. Besides flight crew deficiencies, automation system failures and anomalies of avionic systems are also incorporated. The resultant model helps simulate the emergence of automation-related issues in today's modern airliners from a top-down, generalized approach, which serves as a platform to evaluate NASA developed technologies

Ancel, Ersin↗