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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2012

Lessons Learned for Improving Spacecraft Ground Operations

NASA has a unique history in processing the Space Shuttle fleet for launches. Some of this experience has been captured in the NASA Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS). This tool provides a convenient way for design engineers to review lessons from the past to prevent problems from reoccurring and incorporate positive lessons in new designs. At the Kennedy Space Center, the LLIS is being used to design ground support equipment for the next generation of launch and crewed vehicles. This paper describes the LLIS process and offers some examples.

Bell, Michael A.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Strategic Options for International Participation in Space Exploration: Lessons from U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation

The President's Commission on Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy suggests that after NASA establishes the Space Exploration vision architecture, it should pursue international partnerships. Two possible approaches were suggested: multiple independently operated missions and an integrated mission with carefully selected international components. The U.S.-Japan defense sectors have learned key lessons from experience with both of these approaches. U.S.-Japan defense cooperation has evolved over forty years from simple military assistance programs to more complex joint development efforts. With the evolution of the political-military alliance and the complexity of defense programs, these cooperative efforts have engaged increasingly industrial resources and capabilities as well as more sophisticated forms of planning, technology transfers and program management. Some periods of this evolution have been marked by significant frictions. The U.S.Japan FS-X program, for example, provides a poor example for management of international cooperation. In November 1988, the United States and Japan signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to co-develop an aircraft, named FS-X and later renamed F -2, as a replacement to the aging Japan support fighter F-l. The program was marked by numerous political disputes. After over a decade of joint development and testing, F -2 production deliveries finally began in 1999. The production run was curtailed due to much higher than anticipated costs and less than desired aircraft performance. One universally agreed "lesson" from the FSX/F-2 case was that it did not represent the ideal approach to bilateral cooperation. More recent cooperative programs have involved targeted joint research and development, including component development for ballistic missile defense systems. These programs could lay the basis for more ambitious cooperative efforts. This study examines both less-than-stellar international cooperation efforts as well as more successful initiatives to identify lessons from military programs that can help NASA encourage global investment in its Space Exploration Vision. The paper establishes a basis for examining related policy and industrial concerns such as effective utilization of dual-use technologies and trans-Pacific program management of large, complex cooperative programs.

Hudiburg, John J.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Lessons from 30 Years of Flight Software

This presentation takes a brief historical look at flight software over the past 30 years, extracts lessons learned and shows how many of the lessons learned are embodied in the Flight Software product line called the core Flight System (cFS). It also captures the lessons learned from developing and applying the cFS.

Flight Software↗
NASA NTRS2018

Laser Tracker Utilization Methodology in Measuring Truth Trajectories for INS Testing on 6 Degree of Freedom Table at the Marshall Space Flight Center's Contact Dynamics Simulation Laboratory with Lessons Learned

When performing Inertial Navigation System (INS) testing at the Marshall Space Flight Center's (MSFC) Contact Dynamics Simulation Laboratory (CDSL) early in 2017, a Leica Geosystems AT901 Laser Tracker system (LLT) measured the twist & sway trajectories as generated by the 6 Degree Of Freedom (6DOF) Table in the CDSL. These LLT measured trajectories were used in the INS software model validation effort. Several challenges were identified and overcome during the preparation for the INS testing, as well as numerous lessons learned. These challenges included determining the position and attitude of the LLT with respect to an INS-shared coordinate frame using surveyed monument locations in the CDSL and the accompanying mathematical transformation, accurately measuring the spatial relationship between the INS and a 6DOF tracking probe due to lack of INS visibility from the LLT location, obtaining the data from the LLT during a test, determining how to process the results for comparison with INS data in time and frequency domains, and using a sensitivity analysis of the results to verify the quality of the results. While many of these challenges were identified and overcome before or during testing, a significant lesson on test set-up was not learned until later in the data analysis process. It was found that a combination of trajectory-dependent gimbal locking and environmental noise introduced non-negligible noise in the angular measurements of the LLT that spanned the evaluated frequency spectrum. The lessons learned in this experiment may be useful for others performing INS testing in similar testing facilities.

Leggett, Jared O.↗
NASA NTRS2018

International Space Station Passive Thermal Control System Top Ten Lessons-Learned

Final document not an Abstract attached. The International Space Station (ISS) has been on-orbit for nearly 20 years, and there have been numerous technical challenges along the way from design to assembly to on-orbit anomalies and repairs. The Passive Thermal Control System (PTCS) management team has been a key player in successfully dealing with these challenges. The PTCS team performs thermal analysis in support of design and verification, launch and assembly constraints, integration, sustaining engineering, failure response, and model validation. This analysis is a significant body of work and provides a unique opportunity to compile a wealth of real world engineering and analysis knowledge and the corresponding lessons-learned. The PTCS lessons encompass the full life cycle of flight hardware from design to on-orbit performance and sustaining engineering. These lessons can provide significant insight for new projects and programs. Key areas to be presented include thermal model fidelity, verification methods, analysis uncertainty, and operations support.

Iovine, John V.↗
NASA NTRS2018

International Space Station Passive Thermal Control System Top Ten Lessons-Learned

Final document not an Abstract attached. The International Space Station (ISS) has been on-orbit for nearly 20 years, and there have been numerous technical challenges along the way from design to assembly to on-orbit anomalies and repairs. The Passive Thermal Control System (PTCS) management team has been a key player in successfully dealing with these challenges. The PTCS team performs thermal analysis in support of design and verification, launch and assembly constraints, integration, sustaining engineering, failure response, and model validation. This analysis is a significant body of work and provides a unique opportunity to compile a wealth of real world engineering and analysis knowledge and the corresponding lessons-learned. The PTCS lessons encompass the full life cycle of flight hardware from design to on-orbit performance and sustaining engineering. These lessons can provide significant insight for new projects and programs. Key areas to be presented include thermal model fidelity, verification methods, analysis uncertainty, and operations support.

Iovine, John V.↗
NASA NTRS2020

Lessons Learned from Sonic Boom Flight Research Projects conducted by NASA Armstrong Flight Research Center

Over the course of four years, a team of aerospace engineers at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Armstrong Flight Research Center completed four projects, each with the objective to research sonic boom signatures from a ground and building level perspective. The relatively compressed timeline of these projects resulted in the team amassing a large number of lessons learned. With each successive project, these lessons have been more relied upon and referenced. This report serves as a written record of the teams tribal knowledge capturing the relevant lessons learned and their importance for future projects.

Erin R Waggoner↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned in Space Life Support System Testing

The earlier problems can be found and corrected, the easier and cheaper it is to fix them. Doing less testing saves cost and time but doing too little testing increases the risk of operational failures causing large costs and delays. Integrated test is necessary to determine if the subsystems work together and the overall architecture performs as intended. This report reviews the testing lessons learned from the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook, a National Research Council report, and five reviews of International Space Station (ISS) lessons learned. The five reviews all mention two important points. First, that testing should be performed on the final integrated system, one as close as possible to the intended flight system. Second, “test as you fly,” while operating as planned in an environment as close as possible to the expected flight environment. Other lessons are the need for extensive preflight ground testing, the need to establish and defend an adequate budget, the problems using protoflight hardware on ISS, and the benefit of having ISS as a zero gravity test bed. The major ISS life support systems, carbon dioxide, water recycling, and oxygen recovery, were protoflight systems with little testing before launch to ISS. The failure rates these systems have been much greater than predicted and this has caused dissatisfaction with the protoflight approach. The more costly traditional approach is building qualification and test units in addition to flight units. The test units are used to test, analyze, and fix failure modes. Other work shows that there is an optimum cost-effective intuitive appeal of a human ecosystem in space.

Life support↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned in Space Life Support System Testing

The earlier problems can be found and corrected, the easier and cheaper it is to fix them. Doing less testing saves cost and time but doing too little testing increases the risk of operational failures causing large costs and delays. Integrated test is necessary to determine if the subsystems work together and the overall architecture performs as intended. This report reviews the testing lessons learned from the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook, a National Research Council report, and five reviews of International Space Station (ISS) lessons learned. The five reviews all mention two important points. First, that testing should be performed on the final integrated system, one as close as possible to the intended flight system. Second, “test as you fly,” while operating as planned in an environment as close as possible to the expected flight environment. Other lessons are the need for extensive preflight ground testing, the need to establish and defend an adequate budget, the problems using protoflight hardware on ISS, and the benefit of having ISS as a zero gravity test bed. The major ISS life support systems, carbon dioxide removal, water recycling, and oxygen recovery, were protoflight systems with little testing before launch to ISS. The failure rates of these systems have been much greater than predicted and this has caused dissatisfaction with the protoflight approach. The more costly traditional approach builds qualification and test units in addition to flight units. The test units are used to find, analyze, and fix failure modes. Other work shows that there is an optimum cost-effective amount of testing when redundant systems must have a specified reliability and confidence.

Harry W. Jones↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Assimilating Lessons Learned – From URGE to NASA's Student Airborne Science Activation (SaSa) Project

In the first half of 2021, formal and informal pods at several universities and NASA Center affiliates participated in the Unlearning Racism in Geosciences (URGE) curriculum and deliverables. As a result, several members from different URGE pods are propagating and applying the URGE lessons learned to the new 5-year NASA Student Airborne Science Activation project (SaSa). Starting in the Summer of 2022, SaSa will provide an 8-week summer Earth Science research experience focused on attracting and retaining early undergraduate students from historically underrepresented groups from minority-serving institutions (MSIs). The multicenter and field-based research experience will provide the students access to and experience with NASA airborne resources. Additionally, integrating NASA material into the MSI curricula and providing student mentorship at both MSIs and NASA Centers will enhance students' exposure to Earth Science research. The objectives of URGE and SaSa are highly compatible with one another, and the project timing allows for the integration of URGE lessons early in the SaSa curriculum design phase. As of December 2021, the first SaSa summer program application will be open and the first SaSa semester at the host MSIs will be completed. This presentation will discuss the assimilation of URGE lessons learned from our respective pods into the first SaSa academic semester and into the preparations for the first SaSa summer cohort. We will welcome additional feedback from the broader URGE community in advance of SaSa's first summer session.

Kristina Pistone↗
NASA NTRS2021

Lessons Learned in Remote Participant Concurrent Engineering Concept Development Studies

Team-X was born from a need to perform rapid space mission design for principal investigator-led competed proposals in the mid-1990s. Throughout the last 25 years, Team-X at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory has expanded its application of the collaborative, concurrent study approach into every facet necessary to win competed proposals. The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 created an immediate and new constraint on these studies – the need to conduct them with remote participants, both on the client side requesting the study, but also on the provider side producing the study. This paper provides lessons learned from dozens of design studies run by Team-X at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory during the COVID-19 pandemic. These lessons span all aspects of the information infrastructure: the people, processes, procedures, methods, tools, and “facilities”. These lessons learned will have applicability post-pandemic, as they have shown how best to incorporate participants, both on the provider side, and on the client side, who cannot travel or otherwise be co-located during collaborative, concurrent study sessions.

Nash, Alfred↗
NASA NTRS2021

Spacecraft Line-Of-Sight Jitter Management and Mitigation Lessons Learned And Engineering Best Practices

Predicting, managing, controlling, and testing spacecraft line-of-sight (LoS) jitter caused by micro-vibrations due to on-board internal disturbance sources is a formidable multidisciplinary engineering task. It is especially challenging for those missions hosting high-performance (e.g., nano-radian/milli-arcsecond class), vibration-sensitive optical sensor payloads with stringent pointing stability requirements. The Nation Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the European Space Agency (ESA) are planning technically aggressive spaceflight missions that include ultra-high-performance optical payloads with delicate, highly vibration-sensitive scientific and observational instruments. The guidance, navigation, and control community of practice will need to leverage collective experiences and document their best practices and lessons learned to address future micro-vibration challenges. To identify lessons learned and best practices the NASA Engineering & Safety Center sponsored a 2-day Spacecraft LoS Jitter Workshop in late 2019. The workshop’s goal was to provide a multidisciplinary forum to elicit deeper understanding of the issues related to addressing the spacecraft LoS jitter/micro-vibration problem. The primary objective was to identify, document, and share lessons learned, best practices, and preferred options for jitter-related analysis and test activities. Representatives from NASA, ESA, along with NASA’s industrial partners, independent consultant subject matter experts, and members of academia participated in the workshop. This paper will describe the motivation for the workshop and summarize the identified findings and recommendations.

Swanson, Davin K.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Power Quality Lessons Learned

Power Quality is a physical description of the electrical characteristics that allow the system to function properly without significant loss of performance or life. This physical description includes steady state voltage limits, transient voltage limits in normal/abnormal conditions, ripple voltage, stability, fault conditions, and more. All which are vital for improving reliability, ensuring stable operation, defining proper fault recovery, and ensuring a ‘plug and play’ approach to design and integration. Typically, a specification for Power Quality is created based on expected system performance or an existing standard, such as the International Space Power System Interoperability Standards (ISPSIS). One example of such a specification is the Gateway Power Quality Specification. It defines the requirements and characteristics of the 120 Volt direct current electrical power system for the Gateway Electrical Power System (EPS) and the Gateway Electrical Power Consuming Equipment (EPCE). This specification also maintains a separate requirement verification section that defines test methods for requirement verification. The test methods include analysis, test, inspection, and demonstration. These test methodologies and requirements are used to ensure that the loads operate when connected to the specified power quality and performance as defined by this specification. The challenge with developing a specification is that desired system characteristics are not always fully matured before the specification is needed and many performance requirements may be application specific. This drives the need to utilize lessons learned through extensive analysis and testing as well as historical knowledge to finalize requirements. Some example requirements where this is important are Small and Large Signal Stability, Ripple Voltage, Inrush/Surge Currents, and Fault Containment. Lessons learned are also important in the testing, analysis, and verification to ensure consistent and accurate results to verify performance. This presentation will cover the lessons learned for power quality relative to ripple, inrush/surge, fault containment, testing/verification, and more.

Power Quality↗
NASA NTRS2024

Lessons Learned in Designing A Proposed Ultraviolet Sterilization System for Space

This paper presents a number of lessons learned while designing a proposed sterilization system for Mars Sample Return. This sterilization system is needed to inactivate any potentially hazardous Mars material on the exterior surface of the vessel containing sealed sample tubes filled with Mars rock cores, regolith and atmosphere. These returned samples would provide information on the geologic history of Mars, the evolution of its climate and the potential for ancient life. Mars Sample Return is categorized at Planetary Protection Category V Restricted Earth Return, so it is required to protect the Earth–Moon system from the biological impact of returning samples from Mars to Earth. This article reviews lessons learned in the development of a particular engineering implementation to support the protection of the Earth–Moon biosphere: the use of in situ ultraviolet LED illumination. The details of the biological efficacy of this approach or the policy-related impacts are outside of the scope of this manuscript. The lessons learned presented here include establishing design requirements for the system, the selection of a light source, optical design options, contamination control and approaches to thermal and power management.

Planetary Protection↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Collection, Usage, and Preliminary Examination of the Apollo Sample Suite: Lessons for Artemis

Apollo Sample Collection and Usage: From 1969 to 1972 there were six Apollo missions to the surface of the Moon during which the astronauts collected 382 kg of rock and regolith (~2200 samples). The samples collected fall into these general categories: rocks (~66% by mass), rake samples (~4%), bulk regolith (~24%), and specialty regolith (deep drill cores, drive tubes, sealed bulk regolith) samples (~6%). In each category there are a variety of different subtypes available for study, e.g., among the bulk regolith samples there are also skim, trench, and (partially) shaded regolith samples each sampling unique types or depths of regolith. This variety of subsamples has enabled a multitude of different studies over the past 55 years (>3400 individual requests). We are still averaging ~50 unique requests and have allocated >500 individual Apollo samples annually for the past 10 years (2020 excepted). Looking at the 4,675 non-ANGSA (Apollo Next Generation Sample Analysis) samples allocated over the past 10 years, the proportions of allocated samples do not precisely align with the abundance (by mass) of those samples withing the collection: Rock (69.4 %); Rake (10.8 %); Bulk Regolith (15.5 %); Drive Tube (3.3 %); Core/Specialty (1.0 %). Apollo Preliminary Examination (PE): The PE process differs significantly for the various sample types enumerated above; we focus on regolith and rock samples here. During the Apollo mission era, the PE process evolved over the course of the missions; below is what was done for the Apollo 17 mission. For regolith samples, the PE process was: (1) documented bags containing regolith are opened, photographed, and described; (2) large rocks are removed and treated separately; (3) 25% to 33% of the bulk soil is scooped out, weighed, and stored in reserve; (4) the remaining sample is sieved to produce the size fractions <1, 1- 2, 2-4, and 4-10 mm, all of which are weighed. For rock samples, the process is: (1) removing rocks from the container(s) it came back from the Moon in; (2) rematching any materials that spalled off the rock to their original location; (3) numbering, weighing, and basic photographic documentation; (4) dusting with a gentle N2 gas jet; (5) Orthogonal photography; (6) detailed description of the textures and features of the rock; (7) rock modelling and measurement; (8) stereophotography; (9) determination of the orientation of the rock on the lunar surface. Drive tubes and deep drill cores were not characterized during PE beyond an initial weight and a sketch of the interior tube materials derived from 2D medical X-ray images. Catalogs: The ongoing utility of the Apollo samples is enabled by the robust cataloguing process for the samples [3-5], which allows the scientific community to accurately request samples uniquely suited to their proposed studies. A common misconception, however, is the amount of detail that goes into the initial catalog (e.g., [6]) for a collection from the preliminary examination (PE) period, versus what goes into the catalogs that come later in the life cycle of the samples from that mission (e.g., [7]). The only required data for a PE catalog is a weight, a basic photograph, and a description of the nature of the sample. Artemis PE: Over the past few years, the ongoing ANGSA project studied previously unopened Apollo 17 double drive tube samples 73001/2 [1], and a PE of the drive tubes was done. The PE took the existing core dissection process (developed during PE of Apollo cores in the 1970s, 1980s), and modernized it [7]. The main lesson from the ANGSA PE relative to future missions was that the physical work done during PE of lunar samples has not changed much over the past 5 decades. The use of “modern” technology during PE (e.g., XCT; multispectral analyses) resulted in an enhanced initial understanding of the 73001 and 73002 drive tubes, but greatly increased the time required. The lessons learned from recent astromaterial PEs (e.g., ANGSA and OREx) are important to consider when planning for Artemis, but the unique nature of the Artemis Campaign means many lessons learned from these mission will not be applicable. Given the time constraints (6 months) and likely number of samples that will be returned by Artemis (>200), the Artemis PE catalog will necessarily look much more like [4] than [6].

J Gross↗
DOE OSTI2013

Lessons-Learned from D and D Activities at the Five Gaseous Diffusion Buildings (K-25, K- 27, K-29, K-31 and K-33) East Tennessee Technology Park, Oak Ridge, TN - 13574

The East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) is the site of five former gaseous diffusion plant (GDP) process buildings that were used to enrich uranium from 1945 to 1985. The process equipment in the original two buildings (K-25 and K-27) was used for the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU), while that in the three later buildings (K-29, K-31 and K-33) produced low enriched uranium (LEU). Equipment was contaminated primarily with uranium and to a lesser extent technetium (Tc). Decommissioning of the GDP process buildings has presented several unique challenges and produced many lessons-learned. Among these is the importance of good, up-front characterization in developing the best demolition approach. Also, chemical cleaning of process gas equipment and piping (PGE) prior to shutdown should be considered to minimize the amount of hold-up material that must be removed by demolition crews. Another lesson learned is to maintain shutdown buildings in a dry state to minimize structural degradation which can significantly complicate characterization, deactivation and demolition efforts. Perhaps the most important lesson learned is that decommissioning GDP process buildings is first and foremost a waste logistics challenge. Innovative solutions are required to effectively manage the sheer volume of waste generated from decontamination and demolition (D and D) of these enormous facilities. Finally, close coordination with Security is mandatory to effectively manage Special Nuclear Material (SNM) and classified equipment issues. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Peer Review Lessons Learned - DOE and Regulator Perspectives - 17140

The DOE NNSA Nevada Field Office (NFO) Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity requires an external peer review to complete an extensive stage of site characterization and groundwater flow and contaminant transport model(s) development. The external peer review evaluates whether assumptions, methods, and conclusions derived from model(s) outputs are based on sound scientific principles and examines the scientific appropriateness of the model(s) outputs for informing the regulatory decision. The regulatory decision which is made by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) is whether the model is acceptable to advance to the next UGTA strategy stage. Depending on the specific corrective action unit, the next stage is a Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan or Closure Stage. Three external peer reviews have taken place to date for the UGTA Activity. The first one resulted in a second phase of characterization and model development. The second external peer review resulted in advancement to the next UGTA strategy stage. While advancement to the next strategy stage was recommended by the third external peer review, a series of supplemental data collection and analyses and model simulation activities to address external peer review comments, including drilling three new wells and sampling multiple wells, occurred before moving into the next UGTA strategy stage. Twelve participants representing different aspects of the peer reviews (NDEP, NNSA/NFO, science advisors, presenters, and external peer reviewers) were interviewed to generate a combined lessons learned. Questions were asked regarding their experience with the process including panel selection, focused questions, presentations, interactions between UGTA Activity participants and reviewers, and results. The interview results were combined with the outcome of a published lessons learned report developed following the first external peer review. In general, those interviewed believed that all three external peer reviews were satisfactory and met the goals of the FFACO process. The following seven lessons learned were identified: (1) Ensure the panel is not biased and has a balance of technical and regulatory background; (2) Clearly state the review objective(s) at the start of the review; (3) Ask focused questions that support the peer review objective(s) but that do not ask the specific regulatory question; (4) Establish a peer review panel earlier in the strategy process; (5) Establish one point of contact for the entire review and conduct periodic meetings with the peer review panel to ensure focus remains on the review objective(s) and to ensure that pertinent information is provided; (6) Ensure that presentations are well coordinated, anomalous data or analysis results are addressed, and are focused on supporting the peer review objective(s); and (7) Carefully consider the panel's recommendations prior to embarking on a particular path forward. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Lessons Learned Concerning the Onsite Disposal Facility at the Fernald Preserve, Harrison, Ohio - 16176

An onsite disposal facility (OSDF) was constructed at the Fernald Preserve, Ohio, for the disposal of contaminated soil and debris generated during a Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act site cleanup. Completed in October of 2006, the 30 ha facility contains 2.26 million m{sup 3} of waste materials, has a maximum height of approximately 19.8 m, and consists of eight individual cells. The dimensions of cells 1-7 are approximately 213 m x 122 m each, or 26,000 m{sup 2} (2.60 ha). The dimensions of cell 8 (the last cell constructed) are larger than those of the other cells (approximately 3.8 ha). Each cell was constructed with a leachate collection system (LCS) that collected rainwater and storm-water runoff during waste placement and prevented it from entering the underlying environment. Other engineered features include a multilayer composite liner system, a leak detection system (LDS) positioned beneath the primary liner, and a multilayer composite cover that was placed over each cell following the completion of waste-placement activities. The LCS and LDS layers are designed to convey (by gravity) any leachate/fluid that enters the system through pipes to the west side of the facility and into tanks located in valve houses. From there, leachate can be sampled and conveyed to treatment. Groundwater is monitored beneath each cell via monitoring wells. In November 2006, the US DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) assumed responsibility for the long-term care and maintenance of the OSDF. LM has nine years of monitoring and maintenance experience with the Fernald OSDF. Monitoring data is reported each year in the Fernald Annual Site Environmental Report. The data collected and inspections conducted indicate that the facility is operating as designed. The past nine years has provided LM with the opportunity to evaluate how well many of the design and as-built features of the facility have functioned over time as they pertain to environmental monitoring, valve-house operation and maintenance, and leachate transmission. Lessons learned concerning the long-term care and maintenance of the OSDF at the Fernald Preserve are presented. The main lessons learned include the following: How bivariate plots can be used to address environmental monitoring challenges created by installing an engineered disposal facility in a location where contamination is above the background level but below cleanup standards. How valve-house design decisions can help to alleviate long-term monitoring challenges. How scale buildup can lead to leachate transmission issues. Some additional minor lessons learned are also presented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗