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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 127 records · Page 7

Flight Systems Integration & Test: Lessons Learned for Future Success

This paper offers a comprehensive view of flight system integration and test (I&T) lessons learned related to mishaps and close calls, focusing on what can be done to improve the I&T process to avoid recurrence. Specific areas within the realm of I&T that are covered in this paper include: I&T team communication and training; design of flight and ground systems for I&T; planning and scheduling; configuration management and process documentation; ground support equipment and tools; cleanrooms and contamination; mechanical integration, handling, and deployments; electrical integration and electrostatic discharge; functional testing and troubleshooting; environmental testing and facilities; and launch site operations. To illustrate "real-world" lessons learned for I&T, examples from throughout the history of the U.S. space program are presented. Also presented are some best practices for I&T that can help mitigate mishaps and close calls on the ground or during flight.

Integration & Test↗

Lessons Learned from Large-Scale Aerospace Structural Testing

Large-scale testing of aerospace structures is frequently the final step in a development project to validate the structural performance, and that typically involves a large cost and time investment. In order to ensure that the testing provides the required data, avoiding errors that can result in an unsuccessful test and failure to meet objectives is critical. Presented herein are five lessons learned to provide insight to those conducting tests in order to help them avoid known pitfalls that may result in an unsuccessful test. Five subject large-scale tests are described, and include two composite wing tests, a composite hybrid-wing body center section test, a full-scale 27.5-ft diameter metallic barrel test, and an 8-ft diameter metallic barrel test. Problems identified during the testing and mitigation approaches to solve the problems are presented, then the lessons learned are summarized.

Lessons Learned↗

Lessons Learned from Large-Scale Aerospace Structural Testing

Large-scale testing of aerospace structures is frequently the final step in a development project to validate the structural performance, and that typically involves a large cost and time investment. In order to ensure that the testing provides the required data, avoiding errors that can result in an unsuccessful test and failure to meet objectives is critical. Presented herein are five lessons learned to provide insight to those conducting tests in order to help them avoid known pitfalls that may result in an unsuccessful test. Five subject large-scale tests are described, and include two composite wing tests, a composite hybrid-wing body center section test, a full-scale 27.5-ft diameter metallic barrel test, and an 8-ft diameter metallic barrel test. Problems identified during the testing and mitigation approaches to solve the problems are presented, then the lessons learned are summarized.

Lessons Learned↗

Spacecraft Line-Of-Sight Jitter Mitigation and Management Lessons Learned and Engineering Best Practices

Predicting, managing, controlling, and testing spacecraft line-of-sight (LoS) jitter caused by micro-vibrations due to onboard internal disturbance sources is a formidable multidisciplinary engineering task. It is especially challenging for those missions hosting high-performance, vibration-sensitive optical sensor payloads with stringent pointing stability requirements. Both NASA and ESA are planning technically aggressive spaceflight missions that include ultra-high-performance optical payloads with delicate, highly vibration-sensitive scientific and observational instruments. The GN&C community of practice will need to leverage and build upon their collective experiences and lessons learned to better address future micro-vibration challenges. To identify lessons learned and best engineering practices the NASA Engineering & Safety Center (NESC) sponsored a two-day Spacecraft LoS Jitter Workshop in late 2019. The workshop’s goal was to provide a multidisciplinary forum to elicit deeper understanding of the issues related to solving the spacecraft LoS jitter/micro-vibration problem. A primary objective was to identify and share best practices, rules of thumb, and options for jitter-related activities. Representatives from NASA, JPL, ESA, along with NASA’s industrial partners, independent consultant subject matter experts, and members of academia participated in the workshop. This paper will describe the motivation for the NASA Spacecraft LoS Jitter Workshop and summarize the identified findings, observations, and recommendations.

Lessons Learned;↗

NASA's Composite Overwrap Lessons Learned on 40k Thrust Chamber Assemblies

Filament wound carbon fiber/polymer composite overwraps combined with additively manufactured (AM) copper alloy combustion chambers are a critical part of NASA’s Rapid Analysis and Manufacturing Propulsion Technology (RAMPT) project. The composite overwrap is a high strength-to-weight material and allows for significant weight reduction of the high-pressure thrust chamber assembly, reduction of overall cost, and reduced fabrication time while offering structural robustness. Integrated AM/composite overwrap chamber assemblies using 2,000 lbf (2k) and 7,000 lbf (7k) thrust were successfully hot fire tested at NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). These assemblies allowed the team to learn lessons related to the design, analysis, and manufacturing of these integrated assemblies. A final goal of the RAMPT project is to design and test a 40,000 lbf (40k) thrust chamber assembly. The40k chamber presented the team several new challenges including an integral inlet port in the main body of the composite overwrap. Through multiple iterations of manufacturing techniques, varied materials, and Non-Destructive Evaluations (NDE), many lessons were learned to obtain a final design solution that would not only allow for the interrupted port inlet but also allow for sufficient material margins for the most critically stressed part of the chamber. This paper will cover the manufacturing techniques exploring fabric designs to help subsidize the coverage in the areas left bare by the inlet port during the filament winding process and custom tooling needed for the final full chamber processing. The original material choice of bismaleimide (BMI) 5250-4 from the 7k chamber performed well for the extreme environment of hot fire testing but proved to be difficult with the increased scale and interrupted port design of the 40kchamber. Discussion in this paper will cover these changes, including evaluation of the design, comparison to the prior 2k and 7k designs, and show the final hardware that will be tested. One primary goal of this work and RAMPT project is to provide this development process and data to industry for infusion into future engine designs.

Filament Wound↗

Lessons Learned from Large-Scale Aerospace Structural Testing

Large-scale testing of aerospace structures is frequently the final step in a development project to validate the structural performance, and that step typically involves a large cost and time investment. To ensure that the testing provides the required data, avoiding errors that can result in an unsuccessful test and failure to meet objectives is critical. Five lessons learned are presented herein to provide insight to those conducting tests in order to help them avoid known pitfalls that may result in an unsuccessful test. Five large-scale tests are described, and include two composite wing tests, a composite hybrid-wing body center section test, a full-scale 27.5-ft diameter metallic barrel test, and an 8-ft diameter metallic barrel test. Problems identified during the testing and mitigation approaches to solve the problems are presented, then the lessons learned are identified and discussed.

Lessons Learned↗

Bioremediation of Chlorinated Volatile Organic Compounds: DOE Experiences and Lessons Learned

From the mid-1980s to the present, the Department of Energy (DOE) has developed, tested, and deployed diverse bioremediation strategies for chlorinated volatile organic compounds (cVOCs). A systematic review of these projects after decades of activity provides an opportunity to identify crosscutting themes and lessons learned. The knowledge provided by a DOE bioremediation retrospective represents a resource to support current and future bioremediation operations, and future decisions related to cVOC bioremediation. This systematic review examined the design, objectives, performance and outcomes for remediation projects at DOE sites including Savannah River, Hanford, Idaho, Mound and Pinellas. The results were used to identify emergent themes to provide actionable insights. The bioremediation retrospective technical team first developed standardized criteria to support the systematic review. Then, the evaluation was performed using a sequential process that was informed by local technical experts who identified and provided the structured information that served as the basis for the evaluation. The participation of these experts was invaluable to the effort. Importantly, DOE cVOC bioremediation efforts were implemented based on the foundational knowledge developed by U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) strategic and applied environmental technology development and certification programs, as well as technical, policy and regulatory guidance from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Interstate Technology and Regulatory Council (ITRC), U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), industry, and universities. To maximize the value of the DOE cVOC bioremediation retrospective, the systematic review strategy focused on identifying important DOE-specific experiences, trends and lessons learned that would extend the knowledge available from these other key entities.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Lessons Learned from Ecosystem-Scale Experimental Field Studies (Workshop Report)

Efforts to understand and predict ecosystem responses to environmental change require long-term, large-scale, spatially representative experiments and observations that capture natural variability, test predictive models, and generate transferable knowledge. Such studies are indispensable for unraveling the complexities of terrestrial ecosystems and their responses to disturbances and evolving environmental conditions, while generating the data necessary for developing mechanistic models and predictive tools that inform decision-making processes. Having a rich history of designing and executing large-scale ecosystem experiments, the U.S. Department of Energy’s Environmental System Science program convened a workshop in January 2025 that brought together leaders in the field to distill critical lessons from decades of experience in large-scale experiments. The workshop aimed to (1) provide an ecosystem experiment primer for best practices, thus ensuring a high scientific return on investment for funding agencies, and (2) offer a robust framework for the design and management of future research initiatives. This report synthesizes insights and experiences from workshop participants and is structured to capture the entire research life cycle, from goal setting and design to operations, adaptive management, team dynamics, collaborations, and the often overlooked aspect of decommissioning. By synthesizing decision-making and lessons learned across diverse research approaches, the report aims to provide a template of essential factors to consider when designing successful long-term, large-scale ecosystem experiments.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Lessons learned - Americans in space

Milestones in the learning process during development of spaceflight capability for different NASA missions are traced from the initial launch of the Mercury escape rocket to the advent of the Shuttle. A detached heat shield on the first manned Mercury orbital flight led to a decision for reentry with retrorockets attached, a situation which demonstrated a need for on-line communications with the spacecraft construction engineers. The Gemini program served to develop EVA techniques and docking procedures essential for the Apollo missions. Apollo 8 circled the moon after only one manned test flight of the equipment due to the success of the first flight. Lunar landing simulation training exposed the astronauts to situations beyond the human ability to respond. The training was justified when computer overload required the pilot to retake manual control of some spacecraft functions during the successful first lunar landing. All lessons previously learned were used to safely return the damaged Apollo 13 to earth. The Skylab missions provided an opportunity to maintain rotating teams of flight controllers on a 24-hr/day basis for periods of months. Finally, the six-year hiatus of U.S. manned space activities between the end of the Skylab missions and the first Shuttle flight provided time for incorporating previous lessons into new procedures, training strategies, and data resources.

Kranz, E.↗

Prelaunch processing scientific payloads since Challenger - Lessons learned exercise

The 'lessons learned' process that follows each NASA payload-processing operation is described with attention given to the development of a knowledge base from the results. The process is based on the subjective evaluation of operations problems by test-team members following a mission. The lessons learned from four Space Shuttle missions - STS-26R, -29R, -30R, and -30 - are examined with categorizations of incidents which is based on operational, documentation, hardware, and software categories. Recommendations for ways to address the incidents are categorized similarly, with operational categories such as admonitory, documentation modifications, and support changes. A basic numerical dataset is developed based on the results, and the data show that STS-26R had the highest number of incidents. The process is found to be an effective educational tool in payload-processing operations because it disseminates key individual experiences.

Schuiling, R. L.↗

SOCAP: Lessons learned in applying SIPE-2 to the military operations crisis action planning domain

This report describes work funded under the DARPA Planning and Scheduling Initiative that led to the development of SOCAP (System for Operations Crisis Action Planning). In particular, it describes lessons learned in applying SIPE-2, the underlying AI planning technology within SOCAP, to the domain of military operations deliberate and crisis action planning. SOCAP was demonstrated at the U.S. Central Command and at the Pentagon in early 1992. A more detailed report about the lessons learned is currently being prepared. This report was presented during one of the panel discussions on 'The Relevance of Scheduling to AI Planning Systems.'

Desimone, Roberto↗

Building a quality culture in the Office of Space Flight: Approach, lessons learned and implications for the future

The purpose of this paper is to describe the approach and lessons learned by the Office of Space Flight (OSF), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), in its introduction of quality. In particular, the experience of OSF Headquarters is discussed as an example of an organization within NASA that is considering both the business and human elements of the change and the opportunities the quality focus presents to improve continuously. It is hoped that the insights shared will be of use to those embarking upon similar cultural changes. The paper is presented in the following parts: the leadership challenge; background; context of the approach to quality; initial steps; current initiatives; lessons learned; and implications for the future.

Roberts, C. Shannon↗

The lift-fan powered-lift aircraft concept: Lessons learned

This is one of a series of reports on the lessons learned from past research related to lift-fan aircraft concepts. An extensive review is presented of the many lift-fan aircraft design studies conducted by both government and industry over the past 45 years. Mission applications and design integration including discussions on manifolding hot gas generators, hot gas dusting, and energy transfer control are addressed. Past lift-fan evaluations of the Avrocar are discussed. Lessons learned from these past efforts are identified.

Deckert, Wallace H.↗

Previous experience in manned space flight: A survey of human factors lessons learned

Previous experience in manned space flight programs can be used to compile a data base of human factors lessons learned for the purpose of developing aids in the future design of inhabited spacecraft. The objectives are to gather information available from relevant sources, to develop a taxonomy of human factors data, and to produce a data base that can be used in the future for those people involved in the design of manned spacecraft operations. A study is currently underway at the Johnson Space Center with the objective of compiling, classifying, and summarizing relevant human factors data bearing on the lessons learned from previous manned space flights. The research reported defines sources of data, methods for collection, and proposes a classification for human factors data that may be a model for other human factors disciplines.

Chandlee, George O.↗

NASA Access Mechanism: Lessons learned document

The six-month beta test of the NASA Access Mechanism (NAM) prototype was completed on June 30, 1993. This report documents the lessons learned from the use of this Graphical User Interface to NASA databases such as the NASA STI Database, outside databases, Internet resources, and peers in the NASA R&D community. Design decisions, such as the use of XWindows software, a client-server distributed architecture, and use of the NASA Science Internet, are explained. Users' reactions to the interface and suggestions for design changes are reported, as are the changes made by the software developers based on new technology for information discovery and retrieval. The lessons learned section also reports reactions from the public, both at demonstrations and in response to articles in the trade press and journals. Recommendations are included for future versions, such as a World Wide Web (WWW) and Mosaic based interface to heterogeneous databases, and NAM-Lite, a version which allows customization to include utilities provided locally at NASA Centers.

Burdick, Lisa↗

The Network Operations Control Center upgrade task: Lessons learned

This article synthesizes and describes the lessons learned from the Network Operations Control Center (NOCC) upgrade project, from the requirements phase through development and test and transfer. At the outset, the NOCC upgrade was being performed simultaneously with two other interfacing and dependent upgrades at the Signal Processing Center (SPC) and Ground Communications Facility (GCF), thereby adding a significant measure of complexity to the management and overall coordination of the development and transfer-to-operations (DTO) effort. Like other success stories, this project carried with it the traditional elements of top management support and exceptional dedication of cognizant personnel. Additionally, there were several NOCC-specific reasons for success, such as end-to-end system engineering, adoption of open-system architecture, thorough requirements management, and use of appropriate off-the-shelf technologies. On the other hand, there were several difficulties, such as ill-defined external interfaces, transition issues caused by new communications protocols, ambivalent use of two sets of policies and standards, and mistailoring of the new JPL management standard (due to the lack of practical guidelines). This article highlights the key lessons learned, as a means of constructive suggestions for the benefit of future projects.

Sherif, J. S.↗

The lift-fan aircraft: Lessons learned

This report summarizes the highlights and results of a workshop held at NASA Ames Research Center in October 1992. The objective of the workshop was a thorough review of the lessons learned from past research on lift fans, and lift-fan aircraft, models, designs, and components. The scope included conceptual design studies, wind tunnel investigations, propulsion systems components, piloted simulation, flight of aircraft such as the SV-5A and SV-5B and a recent lift-fan aircraft development project. The report includes a brief summary of five technical presentations that addressed the subject The Lift-Fan Aircraft: Lessons Learned.

Deckert, Wallace H.↗

Support of an Active Science Project by a Large Information System: Lessons for the EOS Era

The ability of large information systems to support the changing data requirements of active science projects is being tested in a NASA collaborative study. This paper briefly profiles both the active science project and the large information system involved in this effort and offers some observations about the effectiveness of the project support. This is followed by lessons that are important for those participating in large information systems that need to support active science projects or that make available the valuable data produced by these projects. We learned in this work that it is difficult for a large information system focused on long term data management to satisfy the requirements of an on-going science project. For example, in order to provide the best service, it is important for all information system staff to keep focused on the needs and constraints of the scientists in the development of appropriate services. If the lessons learned in this and other science support experiences are not applied by those involved with large information systems of the EOS (Earth Observing System) era, then the final data products produced by future science projects may not be robust or of high quality, thereby making the conduct of the project science less efficacious and reducing the value of these unique suites of data for future research.

Angelici, Gary L.↗