SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “mishaps”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 127 records · Page 7

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRS2001

Emotional/Mental Challenges Pre-, In-, and Post-Flight

Dr. Voss has flown aboard the Space Shuttle five times. She knows well her inner concerns, emotions, and mental challenges attending such highly demanding and risky adventures. And she has shared those ideas with her colleagues. She notes that their busy training schedules and fully committed on orbit time allow little time for dwelling on most of these issues. However, they are nonetheless real and may not be ignored with impunity. She thinks that perhaps they are more striking for rookie space farers, but all spacecrew members share them and can profit by assuring proper support and unique solutions for their own specific situation, which could vary with the mission. In her own experience, she found notable benefit from sharing with close members of her family, both before flight and during. The latter has proved of great value to all crew persons in the form of their personal ground contact time with family and friends. In addition, how one arranges and what one provides in the on board personal space and time goes far toward keeping a confident and upbeat view of the big picture. The type and amount of off duty diversions (e.g., music, reading material) are important, as are how one participates in group time. And it is universally agreed that viewing time at the spacecraft windows offers great joy and calm. Dr. Voss conjectures that there could be a difference in how people deal with these matters on busy, short-duration (Shuttle type) missions versus those of longer ones, particularly out of low earth orbit, where the options in the advent of mishap are fewer. Her final opinion is one of optimism and assurance that the human person will do well in coping with this new environment.

Voss, Janice↗

NASA NTRS2001

Report on Automated Semantic Analysis of Scientific and Engineering Codes

The loss of the Mars Climate Orbiter due to a software error reveals what insiders know: software development is difficult and risky because, in part, current practices do not readily handle the complex details of software. Yet, for scientific software development the MCO mishap represents the tip of the iceberg; few errors are so public, and many errors are avoided with a combination of expertise, care, and testing during development and modification. Further, this effort consumes valuable time and resources even when hardware costs and execution time continually decrease. Software development could use better tools! This lack of tools has motivated the semantic analysis work explained in this report. However, this work has a distinguishing emphasis; the tool focuses on automated recognition of the fundamental mathematical and physical meaning of scientific code. Further, its comprehension is measured by quantitatively evaluating overall recognition with practical codes. This emphasis is necessary if software errors-like the MCO error-are to be quickly and inexpensively avoided in the future. This report evaluates the progress made with this problem. It presents recommendations, describes the approach, the tool's status, the challenges, related research, and a development strategy.

Stewart. Maark E. M.↗

NASA NTRS2001

NASA's Lessons Learned and Technical Standards: A Logical Marriage

Gill, Paul↗

NASA NTRS2001

Lessons Learned and Technical Standards: A Logical Marriage

A comprehensive database of lessons learned that corresponds with relevant technical standards would be a boon to technical personnel and standards developers. The authors discuss the emergence of one such database within NASA, and show how and why the incorporation of lessons learned into technical standards databases can be an indispensable tool for government and industry. Passed down from parent to child, teacher to pupil, and from senior to junior employees, lessons learned have been the basis for our accomplishments throughout the ages. Government and industry, too, have long recognized the need to systematically document And utilize the knowledge gained from past experiences in order to avoid the repetition of failures and mishaps. The use of lessons learned is a principle component of any organizational culture committed to continuous improvement. They have formed the foundation for discoveries, inventions, improvements, textbooks, and technical standards. Technical standards are a very logical way to communicate these lessons. Using the time-honored tradition of passing on lessons learned while utilizing the newest in information technology, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has launched an intensive effort to link lessons learned with specific technical standards through various Internet databases. This article will discuss the importance of lessons learned to engineers, the difficulty in finding relevant lessons learned while engaged in an engineering project, and the new NASA project that can help alleviate this difficulty. The article will conclude with recommendations for more expanded cross-sectoral uses of lessons learned with reference to technical standards.

Gill, Paul↗

NASA NTRS1998

U.S. Civil Rotorcraft Accidents, 1963 through 1997

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has recorded 8,436 rotorcraft accidents during the period mid - 1963 through the end of 1997. Review and analysis of the NTSB summary narrative for each accident has been completed. In addition, FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) counts of the growing registered rotorcraft fleet over this period has obtained. Taken together, a large and informative data base is now available, which indicates that the accident rate (on a per airframe basis) has changed very little since the mid 1970s. The data base, even in the summary form provided by this paper, offers suggestions for safer designs and improved flight operations. For analysis purposes, each accident has been placed in one of 21 top level categories as defined by the NTSB. Analysis of this grouping shows that 70 percent of rotorcraft accidents are associated with four categories. The accident count in these top four categories are: (1) 2,408 Loss of engine power (2) 1,322 In flight collision with object (3) 1,114 Loss of control (4) 1,083 Airframe/component/system failure or malfunction. Single engine rotorcraft dominate these accident statistics because of their sheer numbers over the study period. One-third of the loss of engine power accidents with these aircraft is fuel/air mixture related and fuel exhaustion is a common event. This appears to be the case whether a piston or turbine engine is installed. This paper provides similar study results in the other major mishap categories. It shows that both minor and major design and flight operations changes can -- and should -- be made to reduce rotorcraft accidents in the future. The paper outlines these changes and suggests how they may be made.

Harris, Franklin D.↗

NASA NTRS2002

Final Qualification and Early On-Orbit Performance of the HESSI Cryocooler

The High Energy Solar Spectroscopic Imager (HESSI) spacecraft was launched on February 5, 2002. It now observes the Sun with the finest angular and energy resolutions ever achieved from a few keV to hundreds of keV, using an array of nine germanium detectors operating at 75K. The spacecraft was originally scheduled for launch in July 2000, but a vibration facility mishap damaged the primary structure of the spacecraft, along with the cryocooler, This paper describes issues in the qualification of a replacement for the original flight cooler, and describes early on-orbit performance.

Boyle, R. F.↗

NASA NTRS2002

NASA Materials Related Lessons Learned

Lessons Learned have been the basis for our accomplishments throughout the ages. They have been passed down from father to son, mother to daughter, teacher to pupil, and older to younger worker. Lessons Learned have also been the basis for the nation's accomplishments for more than 200 years. Both government and industry have long recognized the need to systematically document and utilize the knowledge gained from past experiences in order to avoid the repetition of failures and mishaps. Through the knowledge captured and recorded in Lessons Learned from more than 80 years of flight in the Earth's atmosphere, NASA's materials researchers are constantly working to develop stronger, lighter, and more durable materials that can withstand the challenges of space. The Agency's talented materials engineers and scientists continue to build on that rich tradition by using the knowledge and wisdom gained from past experiences to create futurist materials and technologies that will be used in the next generation of advanced spacecraft and satellites that may one day enable mankind to land men on another planet or explore our nearest star. These same materials may also have application here on Earth to make commercial aircraft more economical to build and fly. With the explosion in technical accomplishments over the last decade, the ability to capture knowledge and have the capability to rapidly communicate this knowledge at lightning speed throughout an organization like NASA has become critical. Use of Lessons Learned is a principal component of an organizational culture committed to continuous improvement.

Garcia, Danny↗

NASA NTRS1976

Explosive Entrances

Explosive Technology, Inc. manufactured explosives first used by NASA to separate stages of the Gemini launch vehicle. When firemen need to get into a burning building or chop a hole to provide ventilation, axes can be devastatingly slow. Controlled explosives developed to separate manned upper stages of space rockets in case of mishap have been adapted to cutting emergency exits and demolishing unsafe buildings and bridges. Detonation cuts through thick steel girders or other materials more cleanly than torches or saws. This device can also cut emergency holes in airplanes and trains so surviving passengers can escape.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2003

An Extensible Information Grid for Risk Management

This paper describes recent work on developing an extensible information grid for risk management at NASA - a RISK INFORMATION GRID. This grid is being developed by integrating information grid technology with risk management processes for a variety of risk related applications. To date, RISK GRID applications are being developed for three main NASA processes: risk management - a closed-loop iterative process for explicit risk management, program/project management - a proactive process that includes risk management, and mishap management - a feedback loop for learning from historical risks that escaped other processes. This is enabled through an architecture involving an extensible database, structuring information with XML, schemaless mapping of XML, and secure server-mediated communication using standard protocols.

Maluf, David A.↗

NASA NTRS2003

NASA Materials Related Lessons Learned

Lessons Learned have been the basis for our accomplishments throughout the ages. They have been passed down from father to son, mother to daughter, teacher to pupil, and older to younger worker. Lessons Learned have also been the basis for the nation s accomplishments for more than 200 years. Both government and industry have long recognized the need to systematically document and utilize the knowledge gained from past experiences in order to avoid the repetition of failures and mishaps. Through the knowledge captured and recorded in Lessons Learned from more than 80 years of flight in the Earth s atmosphere, NASA s materials researchers are constantly working to develop stronger, lighter, and more durable materials that can withstand the challenges of space. The Agency s talented materials engineers and scientists continue to build on that rich tradition by using the knowledge and wisdom gained from past experiences to create futuristic materials and technologies that will be used in the next generation of advanced spacecraft and satellites that may one day enable mankind to land men on another planet or explore our nearest star. These same materials may also have application here on Earth to make commercial aircraft more economical to build and fly. With the explosion in technical accomplishments over the last decade, the ability to capture knowledge and have the capability to rapidly communicate this knowledge at lightning speed throughout an organization like NASA has become critical. Use of Lessons Learned is a principal component of an organizational culture committed to continuous improvement.

Garcia, Danny↗

NASA NTRS2004

Fallen Star

The Sept 8 mishap of the Genesis probe raised fears of the same fate happening to the Stardust comet sample return mission due to parachute into the Utah desert in 2006 with similar recovery hardware.The crash also raised a caution flag for designers of future lunar and Mars sample return missions.

Morring, Frank, Jr.↗

NASA NTRS2004

Semantic-Web Technology: Applications at NASA

We provide a description of work at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) on building system based on semantic-web concepts and technologies. NASA has been one of the early adopters of semantic-web technologies for practical applications. Indeed there are several ongoing 0 endeavors on building semantics based systems for use in diverse NASA domains ranging from collaborative scientific activity to accident and mishap investigation to enterprise search to scientific information gathering and integration to aviation safety decision support We provide a brief overview of many applications and ongoing work with the goal of informing the external community of these NASA endeavors.

Ashish, Naveen↗

NASA NTRS2005

A Chief Engineer's View of the NASA X-43A Scramjet Flight Test

This paper presents an overview of the preparation and execution of the first two flights of the NASA X-43A scramjet flight test project. The project consisted of three flights, two planned for Mach 7 and one for Mach 10. The first flight, conducted on June 2, 2001, was unsuccessful and resulted in a nine-month mishap investigation. A two-year return to flight effort ensued and concluded when the second Mach 7 flight was successfully conducted on March 27, 2004. The challenges faced by the project team as they prepared the first ever scramjet-powered airplane for flight are presented. Modifications made to the second flight vehicle as a result of the first flight failure and the return to flight activities are discussed. Flight results and lessons learned are also presented.

Marshall, Laurie A.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Old Journey, New Heights

If you could see the road ahead, you might pass up a fantastic opportunity because you're blinded by the potential pitfalls. In my case, I was testing the project management waters at the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center after ten years of being a research engineer. I was an eager (but ignorant) rookie project manager (PM) and I was willing to engage in just about any project without knowing what it would entail. The assignment I accepted was to help NASA's Environment Research Aircraft and Sensor Technology (ERAST) Project, a partnership with a fledgling Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle (UAV) industry, to tackle stratospheric flight. I remember one of our industrial partners querying me about whether or not I understood what 1 was getting into. Like one of those bobble-head toys that have become quite popular, I nodded. But in reality, I didn't have a clue. His response was, "Hang on, it's going to be a wild ride." He was right. In retrospect, if I had clearly understood the ten years of pitfalls that were coming, I might not have "hung on." Now I can look back and say that I would not trade the experience for anything. The lows included the destruction of a number of UAVs on my watch. Later someone told me that we should not be surprised if we lost one UAV for every ten flights. We wrote many chapters in the book on what can go wrong with UAVs-and we are still writing. As you can imagine, each mishap was accompanied by an investigation. What an education!

DelFrate, John↗

NASA NTRS2005

Genesis Noble Gas Measurements

The original thrust of our Genesis funding was to extend and refine the noble gas analytical capabilities of this laboratory to improve the precision and accuracy of noble gas measurements in order to optimize the scientific return from the Genesis Mission. This process involved both instrumental improvement (supplemented by a SRLIDAP instrument grant) and refinement of technique. The Genesis landing mishap shifted our emphasis to the irregular aluminum heat shield material from the flat collector wafers. This has required redesign of our laser extraction cells to accommodate the longer focal lengths required for laser extraction from non-flat surfaces. Extraction of noble gases from solid aluminum surfaces, rather than thin coatings on transparent substrates has required refinement of controlled-depth laser ablation techniques. Both of these bring new problems, both with potentially higher blanks form larger laser cells and the larger quantities of evaporated aluminum which can coat the sapphire entrance ports. This is mainly a problem for the heavy noble gases where larger extraction areas are required, necessitating the new aluminum vapor containment techniques described below. With the Genesis Mission came three new multiple multiplier noble gas mass spectrometers to this laboratory, one built solely by us (Supergnome-M), one built in collaboration with Nu-Instruments (Noblesse), and one built in collaboration with GVI (Helix). All of these have multiple multiplier detection sections with the Nu-Instruments using a pair of electrostatic quad lenses for isotope spacing and the other two using mechanically adjustable positions for the electron multipliers. The Supergnome-M and Noblesse are installed and running. The GVI instrument was delivered a year late (in March 2005) and is yet to be installed by GVI. As with all new instruments there were some initial development issues, some of which are still outstanding. The most serious of these are performance issues with the miniature channel electron multipliers. The delayed installation of Helix by the GVI is partly due to failure of the initial batch of Burle channel multipliers to perform as expected. A number of the channel multipliers designed for Noblesse by Burle have also failed upon baking. Burle has now refined the design of these and we have installed two of the new multipliers and are assessing their performance. The remaining multipliers Will be upgraded to the new design from Burle once we confirm that the problem has been fixed.

Hohenberg, Charles M.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Validation (not just verification) of Deep Space Missions

ion & Validation (V&V) is a widely recognized and critical systems engineering function. However, the often used definition 'Verification proves the design is right; validation proves it is the right design' is rather vague. And while Verification is a reasonably well standardized systems engineering process, Validation is a far more abstract concept and the rigor and scope applied to it varies widely between organizations and individuals. This is reflected in the findings in recent Mishap Reports for several NASA missions, in which shortfalls in Validation (not just Verification) were cited as root- or contributing-factors in catastrophic mission loss. Furthermore, although there is strong agreement in the community that Test is the preferred method for V&V, many people equate 'V&V' with 'Test', such that Analysis and Modeling aren't given comparable attention. Another strong motivator is a realization that the rapid growth in complexity of deep-space missions (particularly Planetary Landers and Space Observatories given their inherent unknowns) is placing greater demands on systems engineers to 'get it right' with Validation.

verification↗

NASA NTRS2006

The X-43 Fin Actuation System Problem - Reliability in Shades of Gray

Following the loss of the first X-43 during launch, the mishap investigation board indicated the Fin Actuator System (FAS) needed to have a larger torque margin. To supply this added torque, a second actuator was added. The consequences of what seemed to be a simple modification would trouble the X-43 program. Because of the second actuator, a new computer board was required. This proved to be subject to electronic noise. This resulted in the actuator latch up in ground tests of the FAS for the second launch. Such a latch up would cause the Pegasus booster to fail, as the FAS was a single string system. The problem was corrected and the second flight was successful. The same modifications were added to the FAS for flight three. When the FAS underwent ground tests, it also latched up. The failure indicated that each computer board had a different tolerance to electronic noise. The problem with the FAS was corrected. Subsequently, another failure occurred, raising questions about the design, and the probability of failure for the X-43 Mach 10 flight. This was not simply a technical issue, but illuminated the difficulties facing both managers and engineers in assessing risk, design requirements, and probabilities in cutting edge aerospace projects.

Peebles, Curtis↗

NASA NTRS2005

The Implications of Handling Qualities in Civil Helicopter Accidents Involving Hover and Low Speed Flight

Because of increasing accident rates in Army helicopters in hover and low speed flight, a study was made in 1999 of accidents which could be attributed to inadequate stability augmentation. A study of civil helicopter accidents from 1993-2004 was then undertaken to pursue the issue of poor handling qualities in helicopters which, in almost all cases, had no stability augmentation. The vast majority of the mishaps studied occurred during daylight in visual meteorological condition, reducing the impact of degraded visual environments (DVE) on the results. Based on the Cooper-Harper Rating Scale, the handling qualities of many of the helicopters studied could be described as having from "very objectionable" to "major" deficiencies. These costly deficiencies have resulted in unnecessary loss of life, injury, and high dollar damage. Low cost and lightweight augmentation systems for helicopters have been developed in the past and are still being investigated. They offer the potential for significant reductions in the accident rate.

Dugan, Daniel C.↗