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At least 127 records · Page 7

Quantifying Cybersecurity Risk for NASA Missions

An end-to-end cyber risk assessment process is presented that is based on the combination of guidelines from the National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST), the standard 5x5 risk matrix, and quantitative methods for generating loss exceedance curves. The NIST guidelines provide a framework for cyber risk assessment, and the standard 5x5 matrix is widely used across the industry for the representation of risk across multiple disciplines. Loss exceedance curves are a means of quantitatively assessing the loss that occurs due to a given risk profile. Combining these different techniques enables us to follow the guidelines, adhere to standard 5x5 risk management practices and develop quantitative metrics simultaneously. Our quantification process is based on the consideration of the NASA and JPL Cost Risk assessment modeling techniques as we define the cost associated with the cybersecurity risk profile of a mission as a function of the mission cost.

Miller, Robert L.↗

Best Practices from NASA's Open Science Response to the Satellite Needs Working Group (SNWG) Process

The Satellite Needs Working Group (SNWG) in the U.S. Group on Earth Observations (USGEO) provides dedicated analysis and advice to the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), and is charged with identifying satellite data needs across the U.S. Government agencies to which the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) responds with solutions aligning with its missions and goals. The SNWG puts out a biennial survey to the U.S. Government agencies asking a variety of questions aimed at gleaning their current needs for satellite data. NASA’s response to the SNWG since 2016 has been to serve the community at large with open science and open data products derived through the SNWG process. With the next SNWG cycle set to kick off in 2022, the NASA SNWG team has been actively working to incorporate lessons learned from the past three cycles into the NASA-side process and tools. We will discuss the best practices and tools NASA has developed in response to the SNWG survey assessment process. These assist NASA’s decisions on how best to utilize existing, and proposing new, products and services to address the needs of other U.S. agencies.

Cerese Albers↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): FMEA/CIL assessment

The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). Direction was given by the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis and assessment using the instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206. The IOA analysis featured a top-down approach to determine hardware failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, the analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL documentation. The assessment process compared the independently derived failure modes and criticality assignments to the proposed NASA post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation. When possible, assessment issues were discussed and resolved with the NASA subsystem managers. Unresolved issues were elevated to the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office manager, Configuration Control Board (CCB), or Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) for further resolution. The most important Orbiter assessment finding was the previously unknown stuck autopilot push-button criticality 1/1 failure mode. The worst case effect could cause loss of crew/vehicle when the microwave landing system is not active. It is concluded that NASA and Prime Contractor Post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation assessed by IOA is believed to be technically accurate and complete. All CIL issues were resolved. No FMEA issues remain that have safety implications. Consideration should be given, however, to upgrading NSTS 22206 with definitive ground rules which more clearly spell out the limits of redundancy.

Hinsdale, L. W.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): FMEA/CIL assessment

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. Direction was given by the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis and assessment using the instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206. The IOA analysis features a top-down approach to determine hardware failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, the anlaysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA and prime contractor FMEA/CIL documentation. The assessment process compares the independently derived failure modes and criticality assignments to the proposed NASA Post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation. When possible, assessment issues are discussed and resolved with the NASA subsystem managers. The assessment results for each subsystem are summarized. The most important Orbiter assessment finding was the previously unknown stuck autopilot push-button criticality 1/1 failure mode, having a worst case effect of loss of crew/vehicle when a microwave landing system is not active.

Saiidi, Mo J.↗

Incorporating climate change into risk-informed resilience planning

In response to the development of portfolio-wide Climate Action Plans by federal agencies, federal sites are working to incorporate the impacts of climate change into their resilience assessments. However, it can be challenging to incorporate climate change scenarios into resilience assessments given the uncertainty inherent in climate change modeling. Incorporating these factors into a resilience plan requires an understanding of what the different climate scenarios mean, as well as how to estimate potential impacts of climate change on hazard occurrence on a regional, or even local, scale under different scenarios. We discuss approaches to incorporating this data into risk-informed resilience assessment processes, such as those implemented in the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Federal Energy Management Program’s (FEMP) Technical Resilience Navigator (TRN) and the Sustainability Performance Division’s (SPD) Vulnerability Assessment and Resilience Plan (VARP) Risk Assessment Tool. We also describe the climate scenarios and the availability of hazard data for site resilience planning, based on modeling included in the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the National Climate Assessment (NCA), and state-level reports. We present examples from the TRN risk assessment and the VARP Risk Assessment Tool to illustrate how sensitivity analysis can be used to incorporate climate change projections into the resilience planning process.

Rabinowitz, Hannah S.↗

Unrealized Critical Lanthanide Extraction from Sea Algae Mining (UNCLE SAM): Domestic production of critical minerals from seawater

The UNCLE-SAM project, under the Biotechnologies to Ensure a Robust Supply of Critical Materials for Clean Energy program, examined the biomining applications of seaweeds for sustainable, domestic production of critical mineral feedstocks. The ocean is a vast reserve of mineralogical wealth including rare earth elements (REEs) and platinum group metal (PGMs). These elements, categorized as “critical minerals”, are used in telecommunication devices, lasers, LED lighting, turbine generators, electric car motors, jet engine alloys, and many other applications. These critical elements are increasingly vital to a thriving, efficient and sustainable society. However, only a few countries in the global market currently produce and export REEs, leading to potential geopolitical supply disruptions. Marine macroalgae, often referred to as seaweeds, bioconcentrate critical minerals from seawater, including REEs and PGMs. Marine algae cultivation can generate a significant amount of biomass with minimal freshwater, fertilizer, and land requirements. In summary, the UNCLE-SAM project successfully evaluated the technological feasibility for marine macroalgal cultivation as a feedstock for critical minerals, explored the biological capacity of different seaweeds to provide economically relevant domestic mineral production, assessed processing techniques for thermal co-conversion of seaweeds into renewable fuel and mineral feedstocks, and executed techno-economic and lifecycle assessments for identifying the most critical gaps in our current understanding to move the technology into commercially relevant deployment. Further development of this technology could transform the bioproduct and REE mining industries and catalyze the development of a more sustainable future.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

UNrealized Critical Lanthanide Extraction from Sea Algae Mining (UNCLE SAM)

The UNCLE-SAM project, under the Biotechnologies to Ensure a Robust Supply of Critical Materials for Clean Energy program, examined the biomining applications of seaweeds for sustainable, domestic production of critical mineral feedstocks. The ocean is a vast reserve of mineralogical wealth including rare earth elements (REEs) and platinum group metal (PGMs). These elements, categorized as “critical minerals”, are used in telecommunication devices, lasers, LED lighting, turbine generators, electric car motors, jet engine alloys, and many other applications. These critical elements are increasingly vital to a thriving, efficient and sustainable society. However, only a few countries in the global market currently produce and export REEs, leading to potential geopolitical supply disruptions. Marine macroalgae, often referred to as seaweeds, bioconcentrate critical minerals from seawater, including REEs and PGMs. Marine algae cultivation can generate a significant amount of biomass with minimal freshwater, fertilizer, and land requirements. In summary, the UNCLE-SAM project successfully evaluated the technological feasibility for marine macroalgal cultivation as a feedstock for critical minerals, explored the biological capacity of different seaweeds to provide economically relevant domestic mineral production, assessed processing techniques for thermal co-conversion of seaweeds into renewable fuel and mineral feedstocks, and executed techno-economic and lifecycle assessments for identifying the most critical gaps in our current understanding to move the technology into commercially relevant deployment. Further development of this technology could transform the bioproduct and REE mining industries and catalyze the development of a more sustainable future.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

Performance assessment for climate intervention (PACI): preliminary application to a stratospheric aerosol injection scenario

As the prospect of exceeding global temperature targets set forth in the Paris Agreement becomes more likely, methods of climate intervention are increasingly being explored. With this increased interest there is a need for an assessment process to understand the range of impacts across different scenarios against a set of performance goals in order to support policy decisions. The methodology and tools developed for Performance Assessment (PA) for nuclear waste repositories shares many similarities with the needs and requirements for a framework for climate intervention. Using PA, we outline and test an evaluation framework for climate intervention, called Performance Assessment for Climate Intervention (PACI) with a focus on Stratospheric Aerosol Injection (SAI). We define a set of key technical components for the example PACI framework which include identifying performance goals, the extent of the system, and identifying which features, events, and processes are relevant and impactful to calculating model output for the system given the performance goals. Having identified a set of performance goals, the performance of the system, including uncertainty, can then be evaluated against these goals. Using the Geoengineering Large Ensemble (GLENS) scenario, we develop a set of performance goals for monthly temperature, precipitation, drought index, soil water, solar flux, and surface runoff. The assessment assumes that targets may be framed in the context of risk-risk via a risk ratio, or the ratio of the risk of exceeding the performance goal for the SAI scenario against the risk of exceeding the performance goal for the emissions scenario. From regional responses, across multiple climate variables, it is then possible to assess which pathway carries lower risk relative to the goals. The assessment is not comprehensive but rather a demonstration of the evaluation of an SAI scenario. Future work is needed to develop a more complete assessment that would provide additional simulations to cover parametric and aleatory uncertainty and enable a deeper understanding of impacts, informed scenario selection, and allow further refinements to the approach.

climate intervention↗

Interpreted Cooper-Harper for broader use

The current aircraft assessment process typically makes extensive use of operational personnel during simulations and operational evaluations, with increased emphasis on evaluating the many pilot and/or operator/aircraft control loops. The need for a crew assessment in this broader arena has produced a variety of rating scales. The Cooper-Harper Rating Scale is frequently misused and routinely overlooked in the process, for these applications often extend the scale's use beyond its originally intended application. This paper agrees with the broader application of the Cooper-Harper Rating Scale and presents a concept for the development of a 'use unique' Interpreted Cooper-Harper Scale to help achieve this objective. This interpreted scale concept was conceived during efforts to support an FAA evaluation of a night vision enhancement system. It includes descriptive extensions, which are faithful to the intent of the current Cooper-Harper Scale and should provide the kind of detail that has historically been provided by trained test pilots in their explanatory comments.

Green, David L.↗

A Geometric Analysis to Protect Manned Assets from Newly Launched Objects - COLA Gap Analysis

A safety risk was identified for the International Space Station (ISS) by The Aerospace Corporation following the launch of GPS IIR-20 (March 24, 2009), when the spent upper stage of the launch vehicle unexpectedly crossed inside the ISS notification box shortly after launch. This event highlighted a 56-hour vulnerability period following the end of the launch Collision Avoidance (COLA) process where the ISS would be unable to react to a conjunction with a newly launched object. Current launch COLA processes screen each launched object across the launch window to determine if an object's nominal trajectory is predicted to pass within 200 km of the ISS (or any other manned/mannable object), resulting in a launch time closure. These launch COLA screens are performed from launch through separation plus I 00 minutes. Once the objects are in orbit, they are cataloged and evaluated as part of routine on-orbit conjunction assessment processes. However, as the GPS IIR-20 scenario illustrated, there is a vulnerability period in the time line between the end of launch COLA coverage and the beginning of standard on-orbit COLA assessment activities. The gap between existing launch and on-orbit COLA processes is driven by the time it takes to track and catalog a launched object, identify a conjunction, and plan and execute a collision avoidance maneuver. For the ISS, the total time required to accomplish an of these steps is 56 hours. To protect human lives, NASA/JSC has requested that an US launches take additional steps to protect the ISS during this "COLA gap" period. The uncertainty in the state of a spent upper stage can be quite large after all bums are complete and all remaining propellants are expelled to safe the stage. Simply extending the launch COLA process an additional 56 hours is not a viable option as the 3-sigma position uncertainty will far exceed the 200 km miss-distance criterion. Additionally, performing a probability of collision (Pc) analysis over this period is also not practical due to the limiting effects of these large orbit state uncertainties. An estimated upper bound for Pc for a typical spent upper stage if nominally aligned for a direct broadside collision with the ISS is only on the order of 10-6. For a smaller manned object such as a Soyuz capsule, the risk level decreases to an order of 10'8 . In comparison, the Air Force Range policy (AFI 91-217) for launch COLAs would only eliminate launch opportunities when conjunctions with objects exceed a Pc of 10'5 This paper demonstrates a conservative geometry-based methodology that may be used to determine if launch opportunities pose a threat to the ISS during the COLA gap period. The NASA Launch Services Program at Kennedy Space Center has developed this COLA gap analysis method and employed it fQr three NASA missions to identify potential ISS conjunctions and corresponding launch window closures during the 56-hour at-risk period. In the analysis, for each launch opportunity, the nominal trajectory of the spent upper stage and the orbit state of the ISS are propagated over the 56 hour period. Each time the upper stage crosses the orbit plane of the ISS, the relative radial and argument of latitude separations are calculated. A window cutout is identified if these separation differences fall within a mission-specific violation box, which is determined from the evaluation of a Monte Carlo dispersions analysis that quantifies the potential variation in the upper stage radial and argument of latitude differences. This paper details the results of these analyses and their impacts to each mission.

Hametz, Mark E.↗

Application of IRTAM to Support ISS Program Safety

The International Space Station (ISS) orbits near the F-peak of the ionosphere (approximately 400 km altitude). Generally, satellites orbiting at this altitude would have a floating potential (FP) of approximately -1 V due to the electron temperature (Te). However, the ISS has 8 large negatively grounded 160 V solar array wings (SAW) that collect a significant electron current from the ionosphere. This current drives the ISS FP much more negative during insolation and is highly dependent on the electron density (Ne). Also, due to the size of the ISS, magnetic inductance caused by the geomagnetic field produces a delta potential up to 40 V across the truss, possibly producing positive potentials. During Extravehicular Activity (EVA) the negative FP can lead to an arcing hazard when it exceeds -45.5 V, and the positive FP can produce a DC current high enough to stimulate the astronaut's muscles and also cause a hazard. Data collected from the Floating Potential Monitoring Unit (FPMU) have shown that the probability of either of these hazards occurring during times with quiet to moderately disturbed geomagnetic activity is low enough to no longer be considered a risk. However, a study of the ionosphere Ne during severe geomagnetic storm activity has shown that the Ne can be enhanced by a factor of 6 in the ISS orbit. As a result, the ISS Safety Review Panel (SRP) requires that ionospheric conditions be monitored using the FPMU in conjunction with the ISS Plasma Interaction Model (PIM) to determine if a severe geomagnetic storm could result in a plasma environment that could produce a hazard. A 'Real-Time' plasma hazard assessment process was developed to support ISS Program real-time decision making providing constraint relief information for EVAs planning and operations. This process incorporates 'real time' ionospheric conditions, ISS solar arrays' orientation, ISS flight attitude, and where the EVA will be performed on the ISS. This assessment requires real time data that is presently provided by the FPMU including ISS floating potential, along with ionospheric Ne and Te, in order to determine the present environment. Once the present environment conditions are known to be either above, below, or near the current IRI values, the IRI is used to forecast what the environment could become in the event of a severe geomagnetic storm. If the FPMU should fail, the Space Environments team needs another source of data which is utilized to support a short-term forecast for EVAs. The IRI Real-Time Assimilative Mapping (IRTAM) model is an ionospheric model that uses real time measurements from approximately 70 digisondes to produce foF2 and hmF2 global maps in 15 minute cadence. The Boeing Space Environments team has used the IRI coefficients produced in IRTAM to calculate the Ne along the ISS orbital track. The results of the IRTAM model have been compared to FPMU measurements and show excellent agreement (figure 1). IRTAM has been identified as a potential FPMU back-up system will be used as a backup for the FPMU to support the ISS Program following completion of an FPMU/IRTAM validation campaign.

Hartman, William A.↗

US EPA Superfund Remediation Program Update: Revisions to Risk and Dose Assessment Models - 20368

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Superfund remedial program is finishing up a significant number of revisions to its guidance for the risk assessment process at radioactively contaminated Superfund sites. The six Preliminary Remediation Goal (PRG) and Dose Compliance Concentration (DCC) internet-based calculators for radiation risk and dose assessment at Superfund sites are being reformatted to match the chemical calculators and improve the user experience, revised to add a new peak risk and dose output option, and to add some adjustment options for external exposure. A new Radon Vapor Intrusion Screening Level (RVISL) calculator is expected to be finished in 2020, will be similar to the Vapor Intrusion Screening Level (VISL) for chemical calculator that was finished in 2018. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Integrated Technology Assessment Center (ITAC) Update

The Integrated Technology Assessment Center (ITAC) has developed a flexible systems analysis framework to identify long-term technology needs, quantify payoffs for technology investments, and assess the progress of ASTP-sponsored technology programs in the hypersonics area. For this, ITAC has assembled an experienced team representing a broad sector of the aerospace community and developed a systematic assessment process complete with supporting tools. Concepts for transportation systems are selected based on relevance to the ASTP and integrated concept models (ICM) of these concepts are developed. Key technologies of interest are identified and projections are made of their characteristics with respect to their impacts on key aspects of the specific concepts of interest. Both the models and technology projections are then fed into the ITAC's probabilistic systems analysis framework in ModelCenter. This framework permits rapid sensitivity analysis, single point design assessment, and a full probabilistic assessment of each concept with respect to both embedded and enhancing technologies. Probabilistic outputs are weighed against metrics of interest to ASTP using a multivariate decision making process to provide inputs for technology prioritization within the ASTP. ITAC program is currently finishing the assessment of a two-stage-to-orbit (TSTO), rocket-based combined cycle (RBCC) concept and a TSTO turbine-based combined cycle (TBCC) concept developed by the team with inputs from NASA. A baseline all rocket TSTO concept is also being developed for comparison. Boeing has recently submitted a performance model for their Flexible Aerospace System Solution for Tomorrow (FASST) concept and the ISAT program will provide inputs for a single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) TBCC based concept in the near-term. Both of these latter concepts will be analyzed within the ITAC framework over the summer. This paper provides a status update of the ITAC program.

Taylor, J. L.↗

A systems approach to computer-based training

This paper describes the hardware and software systems approach used in the Automated Recertification Training System (ARTS), a Phase 2 Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) project for NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC). The goal of this project is to optimize recertification training of technicians who process the Space Shuttle before launch by providing computer-based training courseware. The objectives of ARTS are to implement more effective CBT applications identified through a need assessment process and to provide an ehanced courseware production system. The system's capabilities are demonstrated by using five different pilot applications to convert existing classroom courses into interactive courseware. When the system is fully implemented at NASA/KSC, trainee job performance will improve and the cost of courseware development will be lower. Commercialization of the technology developed as part of this SBIR project is planned for Phase 3. Anticipated spin-off products include custom courseware for technical skills training and courseware production software for use by corporate training organizations of aerospace and other industrial companies.

Drape, Gaylen W.↗

Formative and summative evaluation efforts for the Teacher Enhancement Institute conducted at the NASA Langley Research Center, summer 1994

The Teacher Enhancement Institute (TEI) at NASA Langley Research Center was developed in response to Executive Order 12821 which mandates national laboratories to 'assist in the mathematics and science education of our Nation's students, teachers, parents, and the public by establishing programs at their agency to provide for training elementary and secondary school teachers to improve their knowledge of mathematics and science. Such programs, to the maximum extent possible, shall involve partnerships with universities, state and local elementary and secondary school authorities, corporations and community based organizations'. The faculty worked closely with one another and the invited speakers to insure that the sessions supported the objectives. Speakers were informed of the objectives and given guidance concerning form and function for the session. Faculty members monitored sessions to assist speakers and to provide a quality control function. Faculty provided feedback to speakers concerning general objective accomplishment. Participant comments were also provided when applicable. Post TEI surveys asked for specific comments about each TEI session. During the second of the two, two week institutes, daily critiques were provided to the participants for their reflection. This seemed to provide much improved feedback to speakers and faculty because the sessions were fresh in each participant's mind. Between sessions one and two, some changes were made to the program as a result of the formative evaluation process. Those changes, though, were minor in nature and comprised what may be called 'fine tuning' a well conceived and implemented program. After the objectives were written, an assessment instrument was developed to test the accomplishment of the objectives. This instrument was actually two surveys, one given before the TEI and one given after the TEI. In using such a series, it was expected that changes in the participants induced by attendance at TEI may be discovered. Because the institute was limited in time and depth of exposure, attitudinal changes (self-assessment of ability and confidence) were chosen to be surveyed. On the pre-survey, seven general categories of questions were asked. The post-survey repeated three of these categories, providing a pre and post evaluation of the same questions and added a fourth category which asked the participant to self-assess objective accomplishment. The assessment process for TEI was valuable when one looks at the final accomplishments of the TEI. A number of aspects stand out: (1) formative evaluation during project development allowed the goals and objectives to guide the development of the institute; (2) formative evaluation provided positive guidance to presenters in developing and implementing their session; (3) formative evaluation helped presenters to improve or focus their sessions; (4) summative evaluation provided managers a way to gauge the success of the institute; (5) summative evaluation provided a benchmark for future programs to be measured against.

Carlson, Randal D.↗

Risk Management for the International Space Station

The International Space Station (ISS) is an extremely complex system, both technically and programmatically. The Space Station must support a wide range of payloads and missions. It must be launched in numerous launch packages and be safely assembled and operated in the harsh environment of space. It is being designed and manufactured by many organizations, including the prime contractor, Boeing, the NASA institutions, and international partners and their contractors. Finally, the ISS has multiple customers, (e.g., the Administration, Congress, users, public, international partners, etc.) with contrasting needs and constraints. It is the ISS Risk Management Office strategy to proactively and systematically manages risks to help ensure ISS Program success. ISS program follows integrated risk management process (both quantitative and qualitative) and is integrated into ISS project management. The process and tools are simple and seamless and permeate to the lowest levels (at a level where effective management can be realized) and follows the continuous risk management methodology. The risk process assesses continually what could go wrong (risks), determine which risks need to be managed, implement strategies to deal with those risks, and measure effectiveness of the implemented strategies. The process integrates all facets of risk including cost, schedule and technical aspects. Support analysis risk tools like PRA are used to support programatic decisions and assist in analyzing risks.

Sebastian, J.↗

Setting the Bar for the Replacement of the Probability of Collision Metric

To date, satellite conjunction assessment (CA) risk analysis has largely embraced the probability of collision (Pc) as the omnibus metric to evaluate collision likelihood, and its use in such assessments has mostly been straightforward: at the point at which a conjunction mitigation decision is required, the calculated Pc is compared to a threshold; and if the calculated Pc exceeds that threshold, then a mitigation action is warranted. With only minor variation, this approach is employed by major CA risk assessment centers (e.g., NASA, EUSST, CNES, JAXA) and is advanced as the preferred method in the published CA best practices handbooks. Despite this near unanimity of operational practice, there is a major strain of secondary literature critical of the Pc and willing to propose alternatives. Alfano (2005) pointed out the ability of the Pc to underrepresent the risk in certain situations and counselled a maximum Pc construct. Carpenter (2017, 2019) reiterated this criticism and proposed using instead a confidence interval on the miss distance. Balch et al. (2019) identified what they argued was a defect in the entire Bayesian Pc construct and believed that the use of a more conservative methodology based on covariance ellipsoid overlap was necessary. Delande (2022) introduced the framework of collision “plausibility” to the risk assessment process and sketched out how this might be used operationally. Elkantassi (2022) published a full development of the miss distance confidence interval approach and applied it to several worked examples. While these different approaches to collision risk assessment do differ in their details, they all converge on two central points: first, the Pc’s failure to give an adequate expression of the risk in dilution region situations is a fatal flaw; and second, a conjunction should be presumed risky and in need of mitigation until the evidence of the situation can establish otherwise. These criticisms, if correct, would counsel a number of modifications to current CA operational practice; as such, they force a re-examination of fundamental aspects of the CA problem, including the following: 1. Is the CA risk assessment a probability problem, a statistics problem, or something else? 2. If it is a statistics problem, does it lend itself naturally to a hypothesis test construction? 3. If it can be construed as a hypothesis test, what form should the null hypothesis take, to wit: what constraints exist on the choice of the null hypothesis, what selections are in best alignment with all of the attendant parameters of the problem, and what is implied philosophically by different choices? 4. What are the implications of using the different proposed risk assessment parameters for CA? This question should be answered both in determining how frequently the dilution region situation cited by the critics of the Pc actually appears in an operationally significant manner and the missed detection and false alarm rates of all of the proposed risk assessment metrics, compared both to the Pc and to each other. This paper explores and offers preliminary answers to the above questions, presenting a researched treatment of the philosophical nature of the CA problem and the null hypothesis choice that achieves the greatest consistency with all of the different aspects of operational CA conduct. It then profiles all of the different proposed risk assessment metrics enumerated in the earlier paragraph against an extremely large database of conjunction events at both the 550km and 700km altitudes. The combination of the philosophical exploration of the CA problem and the results of the profiling activity articulates what a risk assessment metric will need to demonstrate, in terms of both innate construction and performance, in order to be a true competitor to the Pc.

conjunction assessment↗

Fault Management Algorithm Risk Assessment for the NASA Space Launch System

This paper presents the false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) risk assessment process currently being conducted for the Space Launch System (SLS) Artemis II Fault Management (FM) detection functions. The analysis scope, general assumptions and guide rules, and key modeling concepts were discussed to establish the basis of the risk assessments conducted. Initial analyses indicated a dominance in the total risk by software and firmware failures. This paper presents efforts applied to refine the software risks and the overall impact of implementing those modifications. Current analyses conducted on the detection functions implemented for the SLS Artemis II mission indicate primary risk drivers for the individual FM detection functions are flight software failures, firmware design failures, and hardware Common Cause Failures (CCFs). There still remains issues of how to account for time and redundancy in the software risk estimations.

probability risk analysis↗