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DOE OSTI2024

EMP, Attachment 1: Sampling and Analysis Plan (Rev.1)

This Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) is written for the Environmental Radiation Task activities related to radioactive air emissions (stack) monitoring and environmental radiological ambient air surveillance of Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) operations at the PNNL-Richland campus and PNNL-Sequim campus. PNNL is a U.S. Department of Energy Office of Science laboratory in Richland, Washington. This plan is an attachment to PNNL’s Environmental Radiological Air Monitoring Plan (EMP) (PNNL-20919) and addresses a discrete, vital subject area that is subject to revision independent of the main text of the EMP document. This SAP provides the requirements for planning sampling events and the requirements imposed on the services provided by the analytical laboratory to the PNNL Environmental Radiation Task.

40 CFR 61 Subpart H↗

DOE OSTI2025

A new capability facilitating nuclear materials research: the Activated Materials Laboratory at the Advanced Photon Source

The Activated Materials Laboratory (AML), located in the Long Beamline Building (LBB) of the Advanced Photon Source (APS) of Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), serves as a centralized radiological facility for preparing radioactive samples for APS beamline experiments. The AML is equipped to receive shipments, handle open-form radioactive materials, encapsulate samples, and transport samples to-and-from beamline end-stations. The AML works closely with users and the APS radiological safety committee to make sure the safe conduct of experiments.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Uncertainty Analysis of Inhalation Dose Coefficients for Nuclear Incident Response

This study addressed the need to characterize variability in inhalation dose coefficients due to uncertainties in respiratory tract deposition, systemic biokinetics, and physiological parameters. A Python-based implementation of the International Commission on Radiological Protection Publication 66 Human Respiratory Tract Model was developed called the Radiological Exposure Dose Calculator (REDCAL) to propagate parameter uncertainty.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

DOE OSTI2025

Basis for Dose and Reactor Safety Design Criteria for Army Regulation AR 50–7 and DA Pamphlet

This report describes the basis used to develop the radiological dose acceptance and design criteria contained in the draft updates to Army Regulation 50–7 (AR 50–7) Army Reactor Program and its accompanying draft Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (PAM), Army Reactor Program Procedures. These criteria will apply to Army nuclear reactors that fall under AR 50–7 and its accompanying DA PAM and ensure alignment with the overall objectives of the Army Reactor Program. The development basis for the radiological dose and design criteria supports a modern, technology-neutral, risk-informed, and performance-based approach to Army regulation of reactors and the demonstration of “adequate protection of the public.” To establish these criteria that support the Army’s unique operational requirements, multiple well-known and well-established standards and their supporting documentation were reviewed to ensure consistency with existing regulatory safety levels, including guidance from U.S. and international sources. These include the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) regulations and policy, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission’s (CNSC’s) regulatory documents, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) safety standards, as well as industry input that is tailored specifically to advanced microreactors. This report walks through the key definitions and associated references used for these criteria, which are outlined in Section 2.0. Based on these definitions, the dose acceptance criteria were established for various receptors for routine reactor operations (Section 3.2), design basis accidents (Section 3.3), and beyond design basis accidents (Section 3.4). Comparisons of multiple national and international dose limits are provided in these sections. Lastly, Section 4.0 outlines the reactor safety design criteria contained in the draft DA PAM and their associated bases.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Using Best Basis Inventory Data to Direct Strategies for Real-Time Monitoring of Hanford High Level Waste

The proposed Direct Feed High Level Waste (DFHLW) approach for processing high-level tank waste at Hanford is intended to reduce processing time by bypassing the Pretreatment Facility and transferring waste directly from the tank farm to the WTP HLW vitrification facility. This processing strategy could reduce or eliminate the washing and leaching steps that would have occurred in the Pretreatment facility. Operation of the vitrification facility is subject to chemical and radiological limits protecting safety (e.g. Waste Acceptance Criteria, or WACs) and process quality (e.g. Process Control Limits, or PCLs). Without washing and leaching, there is a greater risk of exceeding the WACs and PCLs. Hanford process engineers have devised blending strategies based on known chemical and radiological composition, volumes, and solids loadings of individual layers within each waste tank. These blending campaigns succeed in predicting a processing strategy that does not exceed the WACs and PCLs. However, the calculations do not ascribe uncertainties to the tank analysis data, quantities of material taken from the tanks to make the blend, or potential for mixing of layers within tanks. In order to confirm that a process strategy is working, it would be advantageous to have inline or at-line analytical instrumentation installed in the processing facilities that deliver measurement results in real time.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2025

Bioaccumulation Factor for Radium in Rio Grande Biota

The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL or Laboratory) Environmental Protection and Compliance Division’s Environmental Stewardship Group (EPC-ES) performs the radiological analysis portion of biota dose assessments using the computer program RESRAD-Biota (DOE 2004, DOE 2020). RESRAD-Biota uses a default bioaccumulation factor, B iv , for radium in aquatic animals. This bioaccumulation factor, also listed in Department of Energy (DOE) Standard, DOE-STD-1153-2019, is the ratio of a radionuclide concentration in fresh weight biota to the environment in which it resides, which for aquatic animals is water. DOE-STD-1153-2019 offers conservative values for these ratios that are specific to the radiological contaminant, the biota, and the environment. The B iv in RESRAD-Biota can be used for general screening (Level 1 screening). If the factor proves to be too conservative, then a site-specific B iv may be used. The biota dose assessment of fish from the northern New Mexico region of the Rio Grande fail the general screen, which indicates that further analysis is necessary. Level 2 analysis is site-specific but still has conservative limitations. Level 3 analysis is a more realistic and representative, sitespecific analysis. The purpose of this paper is to use data specific to the Rio Grande to calculate a new aquatic animal radium B iv . This B iv can then be used for Level 3 analysis of aquatic animals specifically in the northern New Mexico region of the Rio Grande. The calculated radium B iv is a useful value for performing detailed, accurate biota dose assessments and calculating dose to fish using RESRAD-Biota when only sediment data are available.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2025

Regulatory Considerations for Domestic Reprocessing Facility Physical Security

U.S. advanced non-light-water reactor vendors may pursue collocated on-site reprocessing activities. Therefore, these facilities are likely to possess formula quantities, or Category I quantities, of special nuclear material (SNM) during normal operations. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. NRC) has yet to formally establish a regulatory framework for commercial reprocessing. While Category I requirements would explicitly not apply in this circumstance under current regulatory requirements, regulatory certainty does not exist. A novel framework should be developed to ensure public health and safety while also risk-informing the physical security requirements. This report reviews the relevant background of related rulemaking activities and proposes risk-informed physical protection requirements to satisfy these objectives. Insights from NRC security-related rulemaking activities provide a substantial technical basis to approach potential establishment of physical security requirements for reprocessing facilities. If a licensee can provide justification that the material satisfies a sufficient self-protecting radiation dose threshold, the material may not be subject to theft or diversion requirements and only potential sabotage requirements would apply. Furthermore, if the material can be justified to be moderately dilute, a set of risk-informed requirements could provide adequate protection of public health and safety. A revised performance objective for prevention of theft of moderately dilute Category I SNM may be detection to allow prompt recovery by a local law enforcement agency. However, a significant caveat to the proposed categorization scheme is the unknown integration of radiological sabotage with requirements for the protection against theft. Future licensees should consult with the NRC regarding treatment of this regulatory topic. Additionally, the self-protecting radiation dose threshold (either the existing or a proposed future threshold) would need to be considered. An integrated approach may apply graded potential requirements for protection against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage currently applicable to commercial nuclear power plants and Category I SNM facilities defined within 10 CFR 73.1(a).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2026

Development of PNNL’s Plutonium Metallography Capability

The goal of this project was to develop plutonium metallography capabilities and establish workflows for characterization at PNNL’s Radiological Processing Facility (RPL). Developing and expanding on this capability opens more opportunities for PNNL to better support science through collaborations with other labs, plants, and sites withing the Department of Energy Complex and through programs within the National Nuclear Security Administration. This project established metallography equipment in an air glovebox, polishing protocols, as well as radiological and facility controls and procedures so that gram quantities of plutonium metal could be analyzed on multiple characterization tools. Data was collected and analyzed on two different delta phase plutonium - Gallium samples and a calciothermically reduced alpha plutonium metal using a combination of optical and electron microscopy, powder X-ray diffraction, and atom probe tomography. This report highlights the metallography capabilities, some preliminary data collections, and plans at PNNL to support plutonium material science.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2025

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Zero Trust Framework: CWMD Zero Trust Principles Model

The research focuses on the critical need for enhanced cybersecurity within the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office, specifically targeting Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear devices. Traditional perimeter-based security models are insufficient against modern cyber threats, prompting a shift toward Zero Trust principles (ZTP) that emphasize continuous verification and stringent security for all devices. Federal directives mandate the adoption of Zero Trust (ZT) across agencies, supported by guidelines from National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and National Security Agency (NSA). The research involved mapping ZT guidance from these agencies to develop tailored CWMD ZTP. The study identified gaps and areas for improvement, including clear transitional guidance from traditional to ZT architectures and the focus on explicit cross cutting capabilities. Design improvements are recommended to ensure increased comprehensive protection and resilience against sophisticated cyber threats for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) devices. Collaborative efforts among federal agencies are essential for the successful deployment of an optimized ZT guidance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2026

User’s Manual for RESRAD-RDD&IND Code Version 2: Vol. 2—User’s Guide for RESRAD-RDD&IND Code

Version 2.0 of the RESRAD-RDD&IND computer code is designed to support the implementation of protective action guides (PAGs) after a nuclear emergency incident including a radiological dispersal device (RDD) and/or an improvised nuclear device (IND) incident (EPA 2017). Eight different group types, addressing various decisions, are available for selection. The RESRAD-RDD&IND code calculates radiological doses, stay times, etc., for the selected group that the user wishes to focus on. (That is, the results for all the groups are not calculated simultaneously, and the input for those other groups do not matter, although some parameter values are shared between groups.) Version 2.0 has a user-friendly interface so that the RESRAD-RDD&IND code can be used with minimal training. For example, the user can select the major characteristics of the problem-event type, source term, and decision type from the left side of the interface and then calculate the results with the default assumptions for the exposure scenarios. More in-depth analysis would include specifying site-specific exposure scenario characteristics in the right side of the interface. The procedures for data entry and results viewing are self-explanatory. This is because common window maneuvering features and text instructions were incorporated in the interface design. General and context-specific help are available to aid users entering parameter values, as well. The RESRAD-RDD&IND computer code gives the user the option to select either an RDD or IND incident for analysis. For an RDD event analysis, 11 radionuclides (Am-241, Cf-252, Cm-244, Co-60, Cs-137, Ir-192, Po-210, Pu-238, Pu-239, Ra-226, and Sr-90) are included. These 11 radionuclides are the radionuclides most likely used for an RDD. More than 90 radionuclides can be selected for an IND event analysis. Initial default concentrations are provided for 44 radionuclides for a uranium-fueled IND event. These 44 radionuclides are those that would contribute significantly to the radiation dose associated with a uranium-fueled bomb detonation. The radionuclides generated from ingrowth of these 44 initial radionuclides are also automatically included in the analysis. Pu-239, Cs-134m, Ru-105, and Rb-89 and their progeny can be selected for analysis if they are detected and their concentrations are determined. This user’s guide, which is Volume 2 of the User’s Manual for RESRAD-RDD&IND Code Version 2, provides instructions to users on how to install the RESRAD-RDD&IND code, navigate the interface, and use the various features, including those discussed above, to set up an analysis and view/print the results in text outputs. Volume 1 of the User’s Manual for RESRAD-RDD&IND Code Version 2 (Yu et al. 2026), which contains descriptions of the methodology and theoretical basis for dose modeling and the mathematical equations implemented in the code, can be accessed and viewed through the Help menu in the code or can be downloaded from the RESRAD website (https://resrad.evs.anl.gov).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2024

The Urban Deployment Model: A Toolset for the Simulation and Performance Characterization of Radiation Detector Deployments in Urban Environments

Static and mobile radiation detectors can be deployed in urban environments for a range of nuclear security applications, including radiological source search-and-tracking scenarios. Modeling detector performance for such applications is challenging, as it does not depend solely on the detector capabilities themselves. Many factors must be taken into consideration, including specific source and background signatures, the topology and constraints of the deployment environment, the presence of nuisance sources, and whether detectors are mobile or static. When considering the simultaneous deployment of multiple, heterogeneous detectors, assessment of the system-wide performance requires the simulation of the individual detectors, and a system-level analysis of the detection performance. In radiological source search-and-tracking scenarios, performance is mostly dominated by the probability of encounter, which depends on the specifics of a given deployment, e.g., static vs. mobile detectors or a combination of both modalities, the number of detectors deployed, the dynamic vs. static setting of false alarm rates, and individual vs. networked operation. The Urban Deployment Model (UDM) toolset was specifically developed to cover the gap in the available generic frameworks for the simulation of radiation detector deployments at city scales. UDM provides a unified and modular framework to support the simulation and performance characterization of heterogeneous detector deployments in urban environments. This paper presents the key components along the UDM workflow.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2025

Computational Fluid Dynamics Modeling to Facilitate Qualification of Stack Sampling Probe Location

Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) modeling was used to help evaluate modifications to a radiological effluent stack and assist with establishing a stack sampling location that met the mixing criteria for qualification. Requirements for stack sampling location are listed in the American National Standards Institute/Health Physics Society (ANSI/HPS) N13.1-2021 standard. Modeling was performed to help develop a suitable design for increasing building ventilation for the radiological effluent stack. The ANSI/HPS N13.1-2021 criteria for the air monitoring probe location are that the coefficient of variation of velocity uniformity, gaseous tracer uniformity, and particulate tracer uniformity must be less than or equal to 20%. Furthermore, no point in the sampling location may have a gaseous tracer concentration that varies from the mean concentration by more than 30%. Additionally, the flow angle at the sampling location must not be more than 20 degrees. The ANSI/HPS N13.1-2021 standard allows for models (physical or computational) to be employed to perform the full suite of qualification tests, followed by a more limited set of verification tests on the actual stack to qualify the stack sampling location. Here, a series of computational model simulations were employed to evaluate the stack qualification criteria. Significant time and re-source savings are achieved using CFD modeling. CFD modeling demonstrated that the stack meets the criteria at the sample probe location. Verification tests were performed on the modified stack to measure the velocity uniformity and flow angle at the stack sampling location, and results demonstrated that the CFD model results may be used to support the qualification of the stack sampling location.

Air Monitoring↗

NASA NTRS1972

Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 3: Reactor system preliminary nuclear safety analysis. Part 3: Nuclear Safety Analysis Document (NSAD)

Nuclear safety analysis as applied to a space base mission is presented. The nuclear safety analysis document summarizes the mission and the credible accidents/events which may lead to nuclear hazards to the general public. The radiological effects and associated consequences of the hazards are discussed in detail. The probability of occurrence is combined with the potential number of individuals exposed to or above guideline values to provide a measure of accident and total mission risk. The overall mission risk has been determined to be low with the potential exposure to or above 25 rem limited to less than 4 individuals per every 1000 missions performed. No radiological risk to the general public occurs during the prelaunch phase at KSC. The most significant risks occur from prolonged exposure to reactor debris following land impact generally associated with the disposal phase of the mission where fission product inventories can be high.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2002

Potential Operating Orbits for Fission Electric Propulsion Systems Driven by the SAFE-400

Safety must be ensured during all phases of space fission system design, development, fabrication, launch, operation, and shutdown. One potential space fission system application is fission electric propulsion (FEP), in which fission energy is converted into electricity and used to power high efficiency (Isp greater than 3000s) electric thrusters. For these types of systems it is important to determine which operational scenarios ensure safety while allowing maximum mission performance and flexibility. Space fission systems are essentially nonradioactive at launch, prior to extended operation at high power. Once high power operation begins, system radiological inventory steadily increases as fission products build up. For a given fission product isotope, the maximum radiological inventory is typically achieved once the system has operated for a length of time equivalent to several half-lives. After that time, the isotope decays at the same rate it is produced, and no further inventory builds in. For an FEP mission beginning in Earth orbit, altitude and orbital lifetime increase as the propulsion system operates. Two simultaneous effects of fission propulsion system operation are thus (1) increasing fission product inventory and (2) increasing orbital lifetime. Phrased differently, as fission products build up, more time is required for the fission products to naturally convert back into non-radioactive isotopes. Simultaneously, as fission products build up, orbital lifetime increases, providing more time for the fission products to naturally convert back into non-radioactive isotopes. Operational constraints required to ensure safety can thus be quantified.

Houts, Mike↗

NASA NTRS2002

Potential Operating Orbits for the SAFE-400

Safety must be ensured during all phases of space fission system design, development, fabrication, launch, operation, and shutdown. One potential space fission system application is fission electric propulsion (FEP), in which fission energy is converted into electricity and used to power high efficiency (Isp is greater than 3000s) electric thrusters. For these types of systems it is important to determine which operational scenarios ensure safety while allowing maximum mission performance and flexibility. Space fission systems are essentially non-radioactive at launch, prior to extended operation at high power. Once high power operation begins, system radiological inventory steadily increases as fission products build up. For a given fission product isotope, the maximum radiological inventory is typically achieved once the system has operated for a length of time equivalent to several half-lives. After that time, the isotope decays at the same rate it is produced, and no further inventory builds in. For an FEP mission beginning in Earth orbit, altitude and orbital lifetime increase as the propulsion system operates. Two simultaneous effects of fission propulsion system operation are thus (1) increasing fission product inventory and (2) increasing orbital lifetime. Phrased differently, as fission products build up, more time is required for the fission products to naturally convert back into non-radioactive isotopes. Simultaneously, as fission products build up, orbital lifetime increases, providing more time for the fission products to naturally convert back into non-radioactive isotopes. Operational constraints required to ensure safety can thus be quantified.

Houts, Mike↗

NASA NTRS1986

Image Processing System

Mallinckrodt Institute of Radiology (MIR) is using a digital image processing system which employs NASA-developed technology. MIR's computer system is the largest radiology system in the world. It is used in diagnostic imaging. Blood vessels are injected with x-ray dye, and the images which are produced indicate whether arteries are hardened or blocked. A computer program developed by Jet Propulsion Laboratory known as Mini-VICAR/IBIS was supplied to MIR by COSMIC. The program provides the basis for developing the computer imaging routines for data processing, contrast enhancement and picture display.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2003

Radiation Protection Studies of International Space Station Extravehicular Activity Space Suits

This publication describes recent investigations that evaluate radiation shielding characteristics of NASA's and the Russian Space Agency's space suits. The introduction describes the suits and presents goals of several experiments performed with them. The first chapter provides background information about the dynamic radiation environment experienced at ISS and summarized radiation health and protection requirements for activities in low Earth orbit. Supporting studies report the development and application of a computer model of the EMU space suit and the difficulty of shielding EVA crewmembers from high-energy reentrant electrons, a previously unevaluated component of the space radiation environment. Chapters 2 through 6 describe experiments that evaluate the space suits' radiation shielding characteristics. Chapter 7 describes a study of the potential radiological health impact on EVA crewmembers of two virtually unexamined environmental sources of high-energy electrons-reentrant trapped electrons and atmospheric albedo or "splash" electrons. The radiological consequences of those sources have not been evaluated previously and, under closer scrutiny. A detailed computational model of the shielding distribution provided by components of the NASA astronauts' EMU is being developed for exposure evaluation studies. The model is introduced in Chapters 8 and 9 and used in Chapter 10 to investigate how trapped particle anisotropy impacts female organ doses during EVA. Chapter 11 presents a review of issues related to estimating skin cancer risk form space radiation. The final chapter contains conclusions about the protective qualities of the suit brought to light form these studies, as well as recommendations for future operational radiation protection.

Cucinotta, Francis A.↗

NASA NTRS2004

Implementation of ALARA radiation protection on the ISS through polyethylene shielding augmentation of the Service Module Crew Quarters

With 5-7 month long duration missions at 51.6 degrees inclination in Low Earth Orbit, the ionizing radiation levels to which International Space Station (ISS) crewmembers are exposed will be the highest planned occupational exposures in the world. Even with the expectation that regulatory dose limits will not be exceeded during a single tour of duty aboard the ISS, the "as low as reasonably achievable" (ALARA) precept requires that radiological risks be minimized when possible through a dose optimization process. Judicious placement of efficient shielding materials in locations where crewmembers sleep, rest, or work is an important means for implementing ALARA for spaceflight. Polyethylene (CnHn) is a relatively inexpensive, stable, and, with a low atomic number, an effective shielding material that has been certified for use aboard the ISS. Several designs for placement of slabs or walls of polyethylene have been evaluated for radiation exposure reduction in the Crew Quarters (CQ) of the Zvezda (Star) Service Module. Optimization of shield designs relies on accurate characterization of the expected primary and secondary particle environment and modeling of the predicted radiobiological responses of critical organs and tissues. Results of the studies shown herein indicate that 20% or more reduction in equivalent dose to the CQ occupant is achievable. These results suggest that shielding design and risk analysis are necessary measures for reducing long-term radiological risks to ISS inhabitants and for meeting legal ALARA requirements. Verification of shield concepts requires results from specific designs to be compared with onboard dosimetry. c2004 COSPAR. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

NASA Center JSC↗