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NASA NTRS1990

A reliable multicast for XTP

Multicast services needed for current distributed applications on LAN's fall generally into one of three categories: datagram, semi-reliable, and reliable. Transport layer multicast datagrams represent unreliable service in which the transmitting context 'fires and forgets'. XTP executes these semantics when the MULTI and NOERR mode bits are both set. Distributing sensor data and other applications in which application-level error recovery strategies are appropriate benefit from the efficiency in multidestination delivery offered by datagram service. Semi-reliable service refers to multicasting in which the control algorithms of the transport layer--error, flow, and rate control--are used in transferring the multicast distribution to the set of receiving contexts, the multicast group. The multicast defined in XTP provides semi-reliable service. Since, under a semi-reliable service, joining a multicast group means listening on the group address and entails no coordination with other members, a semi-reliable facility can be used for communication between a client and a server group as well as true peer-to-peer group communication. Resource location in a LAN is an important application domain. The term 'semi-reliable' refers to the fact that group membership changes go undetected. No attempt is made to assess the current membership of the group at any time--before, during, or after--the data transfer.

Dempsey, Bert J.↗

NASA NTRS1993

Recent advances in computational structural reliability analysis methods

The goal of structural reliability analysis is to determine the probability that the structure will adequately perform its intended function when operating under the given environmental conditions. Thus, the notion of reliability admits the possibility of failure. Given the fact that many different modes of failure are usually possible, achievement of this goal is a formidable task, especially for large, complex structural systems. The traditional (deterministic) design methodology attempts to assure reliability by the application of safety factors and conservative assumptions. However, the safety factor approach lacks a quantitative basis in that the level of reliability is never known and usually results in overly conservative designs because of compounding conservatisms. Furthermore, problem parameters that control the reliability are not identified, nor their importance evaluated. A summary of recent advances in computational structural reliability assessment is presented. A significant level of activity in the research and development community was seen recently, much of which was directed towards the prediction of failure probabilities for single mode failures. The focus is to present some early results and demonstrations of advanced reliability methods applied to structural system problems. This includes structures that can fail as a result of multiple component failures (e.g., a redundant truss), or structural components that may fail due to multiple interacting failure modes (e.g., excessive deflection, resonate vibration, or creep rupture). From these results, some observations and recommendations are made with regard to future research needs.

Thacker, Ben H.↗

NASA NTRS1994

Illustrated structural application of universal first-order reliability method

The general application of the proposed first-order reliability method was achieved through the universal normalization of engineering probability distribution data. The method superimposes prevailing deterministic techniques and practices on the first-order reliability method to surmount deficiencies of the deterministic method and provide benefits of reliability techniques and predictions. A reliability design factor is derived from the reliability criterion to satisfy a specified reliability and is analogous to the deterministic safety factor. Its application is numerically illustrated on several practical structural design and verification cases with interesting results and insights. Two concepts of reliability selection criteria are suggested. Though the method was developed to support affordable structures for access to space, the method should also be applicable for most high-performance air and surface transportation systems.

Verderaime, V.↗

NASA NTRS1995

Integrating Reliability Analysis with a Performance Tool

A large number of commercial simulation tools support performance oriented studies of complex computer and communication systems. Reliability of these systems, when desired, must be obtained by remodeling the system in a different tool. This has obvious drawbacks: (1) substantial extra effort is required to create the reliability model; (2) through modeling error the reliability model may not reflect precisely the same system as the performance model; (3) as the performance model evolves one must continuously reevaluate the validity of assumptions made in that model. In this paper we describe an approach, and a tool that implements this approach, for integrating a reliability analysis engine into a production quality simulation based performance modeling tool, and for modeling within such an integrated tool. The integrated tool allows one to use the same modeling formalisms to conduct both performance and reliability studies. We describe how the reliability analysis engine is integrated into the performance tool, describe the extensions made to the performance tool to support the reliability analysis, and consider the tool's performance.

Nicol, David M.↗

NASA NTRS1998

Issues and Methods for Assessing COTS Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability

Many vendors produce products that are not domain specific (e.g., network server) and have limited functionality (e.g., mobile phone). In contrast, many customers of COTS develop systems that am domain specific (e.g., target tracking system) and have great variability in functionality (e.g., corporate information system). This discussion takes the viewpoint of how the customer can ensure the quality of COTS components. In evaluating the benefits and costs of using COTS, we must consider the environment in which COTS will operate. Thus we must distinguish between using a non-mission critical application like a spreadsheet program to produce a budget and a mission critical application like military strategic and tactical operations. Whereas customers will tolerate an occasional bug in the former, zero tolerance is the rule in the latter. We emphasize the latter because this is the arena where there are major unresolved problems in the application of COTS. Furthermore, COTS components may be embedded in the larger customer system. We refer to these as embedded systems. These components must be reliable, maintainable, and available, and must be with the larger system in order for the customer to benefit from the advertised advantages of lower development and maintenance costs. Interestingly, when the claims of COTS advantages are closely examined, one finds that to a great extent these COTS components consist of hardware and office products, not mission critical software [1]. Obviously, COTS components are different from custom components with respect to one or more of the following attributes: source, development paradigm, safety, reliability, maintainability, availability, security, and other attributes. However, the important question is whether they should be treated differently when deciding to deploy them for operational use; we suggest the answer is no. We use reliability as an example to justify our answer. In order to demonstrate its reliability, a COTS component must pass the same reliability evaluations as the custom components, otherwise the COTS components will be the weakest link in the chain of components and will be the determinant of software system reliability. The challenge is that there will be less information available for evaluating COTS components than for custom components but this does not mean we should despair and do nothing. Actually, there is a lot we can do even in the absence of documentation on COTS components because the customer will have information about how COTS components are to be used in the larger system. To illustrate our approach, we will consider the reliability, maintainability, and availability (RMA) of COTS components as used in larger systems. Finally, COTS suppliers might consider increasing visibility into their products to assist customers in determining the components' fitness for use in a particular application. We offer ideas of information that would be useful to customers, and what vendors might do to provide it.

Schneidewind, Norman F.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Design for Reliability and Safety Approach for the NASA New Launch Vehicle

The United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is in the midst of a space exploration program intended for sending crew and cargo to the international Space Station (ISS), to the moon, and beyond. This program is called Constellation. As part of the Constellation program, NASA is developing new launch vehicles aimed at significantly increase safety and reliability, reduce the cost of accessing space, and provide a growth path for manned space exploration. Achieving these goals requires a rigorous process that addresses reliability, safety, and cost upfront and throughout all the phases of the life cycle of the program. This paper discusses the "Design for Reliability and Safety" approach for the NASA new crew launch vehicle called ARES I. The ARES I is being developed by NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in support of the Constellation program. The ARES I consists of three major Elements: A solid First Stage (FS), an Upper Stage (US), and liquid Upper Stage Engine (USE). Stacked on top of the ARES I is the Crew exploration vehicle (CEV). The CEV consists of a Launch Abort System (LAS), Crew Module (CM), Service Module (SM), and a Spacecraft Adapter (SA). The CEV development is being led by NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). Designing for high reliability and safety require a good integrated working environment and a sound technical design approach. The "Design for Reliability and Safety" approach addressed in this paper discusses both the environment and the technical process put in place to support the ARES I design. To address the integrated working environment, the ARES I project office has established a risk based design group called "Operability Design and Analysis" (OD&A) group. This group is an integrated group intended to bring together the engineering, design, and safety organizations together to optimize the system design for safety, reliability, and cost. On the technical side, the ARES I project has, through the OD&A environment, implemented a probabilistic approach to analyze and evaluate design uncertainties and understand their impact on safety, reliability, and cost. This paper focuses on the use of the various probabilistic approaches that have been pursued by the ARES I project. Specifically, the paper discusses an integrated functional probabilistic analysis approach that addresses upffont some key areas to support the ARES I Design Analysis Cycle (DAC) pre Preliminary Design (PD) Phase. This functional approach is a probabilistic physics based approach that combines failure probabilities with system dynamics and engineering failure impact models to identify key system risk drivers and potential system design requirements. The paper also discusses other probabilistic risk assessment approaches planned by the ARES I project to support the PD phase and beyond.

Safie, Fayssal, M.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Advanced Stirling Convertor Heater Head Durability and Reliability Quantification

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has identified the high efficiency Advanced Stirling Radioisotope Generator (ASRG) as a candidate power source for long duration Science missions, such as lunar applications, Mars rovers, and deep space missions, that require reliable design lifetimes of up to 17 years. Resistance to creep deformation of the MarM-247 heater head (HH), a structurally critical component of the ASRG Advanced Stirling Convertor (ASC), under high temperatures (up to 850 C) is a key design driver for durability. Inherent uncertainties in the creep behavior of the thin-walled HH and the variations in the wall thickness, control temperature, and working gas pressure need to be accounted for in the life and reliability prediction. Due to the availability of very limited test data, assuring life and reliability of the HH is a challenging task. The NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) has adopted an integrated approach combining available uniaxial MarM-247 material behavior testing, HH benchmark testing and advanced analysis in order to demonstrate the integrity, life and reliability of the HH under expected mission conditions. The proposed paper describes analytical aspects of the deterministic and probabilistic approaches and results. The deterministic approach involves development of the creep constitutive model for the MarM-247 (akin to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory master curve model used previously for Inconel 718 (Special Metals Corporation)) and nonlinear finite element analysis to predict the mean life. The probabilistic approach includes evaluation of the effect of design variable uncertainties in material creep behavior, geometry and operating conditions on life and reliability for the expected life. The sensitivity of the uncertainties in the design variables on the HH reliability is also quantified, and guidelines to improve reliability are discussed.

Krause, David L.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Solid Rocket Booster Large Main and Drogue Parachute Reliability Analysis

The parachutes on the Space Transportation System (STS) Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) are the means for decelerating the SRB and allowing it to impact the water at a nominal vertical velocity of 75 feet per second. Each SRB has one pilot, one drogue, and three main parachutes. About four minutes after SRB separation, the SRB nose cap is jettisoned, deploying the pilot parachute. The pilot chute then deploys the drogue parachute. The drogue chute provides initial deceleration and proper SRB orientation prior to frustum separation. At frustum separation, the drogue pulls the frustum from the SRB and allows the main parachutes that are mounted in the frustum to unpack and inflate. These chutes are retrieved, inspected, cleaned, repaired as needed, and returned to the flight inventory and reused. Over the course of the Shuttle Program, several improvements have been introduced to the SRB main parachutes. A major change was the replacement of the small (115 ft. diameter) main parachutes with the larger (136 ft. diameter) main parachutes. Other modifications were made to the main parachutes, main parachute support structure, and SRB frustum to eliminate failure mechanisms, improve damage tolerance, and improve deployment and inflation characteristics. This reliability analysis is limited to the examination of the SRB Large Main Parachute (LMP) and drogue parachute failure history to assess the reliability of these chutes. From the inventory analysis, 68 Large Main Parachutes were used in 651 deployments, and 7 chute failures occurred in the 651 deployments. Logistic regression was used to analyze the LMP failure history, and it showed that reliability growth has occurred over the period of use resulting in a current chute reliability of R = .9983. This result was then used to determine the reliability of the 3 LMPs on the SRB, when all must function. There are 29 drogue parachutes that were used in 244 deployments, and no in-flight failures have occurred. Since there are no observed drogue chute failures, Jeffreys Prior was used to calculate a reliability of R =.998. Based on these results, it is concluded that the LMP and drogue parachutes on the Shuttle SRB are suited to their mission and changes made over their life have improved the reliability of the parachute.

Clifford, Courtenay B.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Estimating the Reliability of a Soyuz Spacecraft Mission

Once the US Space Shuttle retires in 2010, the Russian Soyuz Launcher and Soyuz Spacecraft will comprise the only means for crew transportation to and from the International Space Station (ISS). The U.S. Government and NASA have contracted for crew transportation services to the ISS with Russia. The resulting implications for the US space program including issues such as astronaut safety must be carefully considered. Are the astronauts and cosmonauts safer on the Soyuz than the Space Shuttle system? Is the Soyuz launch system more robust than the Space Shuttle? Is it safer to continue to fly the 30 year old Shuttle fleet for crew transportation and cargo resupply than the Soyuz? Should we extend the life of the Shuttle Program? How does the development of the Orion/Ares crew transportation system affect these decisions? The Soyuz launcher has been in operation for over 40 years. There have been only two loss of life incidents and two loss of mission incidents. Given that the most recent incident took place in 1983, how do we determine current reliability of the system? Do failures of unmanned Soyuz rockets impact the reliability of the currently operational man-rated launcher? Does the Soyuz exhibit characteristics that demonstrate reliability growth and how would that be reflected in future estimates of success? NASA s next manned rocket and spacecraft development project is currently underway. Though the projects ultimate goal is to return to the Moon and then to Mars, the launch vehicle and spacecraft s first mission will be for crew transportation to and from the ISS. The reliability targets are currently several times higher than the Shuttle and possibly even the Soyuz. Can these targets be compared to the reliability of the Soyuz to determine whether they are realistic and achievable? To help answer these questions this paper will explore how to estimate the reliability of the Soyuz Launcher/Spacecraft system, compare it to the Space Shuttle, and its potential impacts for the future of manned spaceflight. Specifically it will look at estimating the Loss of Mission (LOM) probability using historical data, reliability growth, and Probabilistic Risk Assessment techniques

Lutomski, Michael G.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Reliability and Probabilistic Risk Assessment - How They Play Together

Since the Space Shuttle Challenger accident in 1986, NASA has extensively used probabilistic analysis methods to assess, understand, and communicate the risk of space launch vehicles. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), used in the nuclear industry, is one of the probabilistic analysis methods NASA utilizes to assess Loss of Mission (LOM) and Loss of Crew (LOC) risk for launch vehicles. PRA is a system scenario based risk assessment that uses a combination of fault trees, event trees, event sequence diagrams, and probability distributions to analyze the risk of a system, a process, or an activity. It is a process designed to answer three basic questions: 1) what can go wrong that would lead to loss or degraded performance (i.e., scenarios involving undesired consequences of interest), 2) how likely is it (probabilities), and 3) what is the severity of the degradation (consequences). Since the Challenger accident, PRA has been used in supporting decisions regarding safety upgrades for launch vehicles. Another area that was given a lot of emphasis at NASA after the Challenger accident is reliability engineering. Reliability engineering has been a critical design function at NASA since the early Apollo days. However, after the Challenger accident, quantitative reliability analysis and reliability predictions were given more scrutiny because of their importance in understanding failure mechanism and quantifying the probability of failure, which are key elements in resolving technical issues, performing design trades, and implementing design improvements. Although PRA and reliability are both probabilistic in nature and, in some cases, use the same tools, they are two different activities. Specifically, reliability engineering is a broad design discipline that deals with loss of function and helps understand failure mechanism and improve component and system design. PRA is a system scenario based risk assessment process intended to assess the risk scenarios that could lead to a major/top undesirable system event, and to identify those scenarios that are high-risk drivers. PRA output is critical to support risk informed decisions concerning system design. This paper describes the PRA process and the reliability engineering discipline in detail. It discusses their differences and similarities and how they work together as complementary analyses to support the design and risk assessment processes. Lessons learned, applications, and case studies in both areas are also discussed in the paper to demonstrate and explain these differences and similarities.

Safie, Fayssal↗

NASA NTRS2016

Reliability and Maintainability Analysis for the Amine Swingbed Carbon Dioxide Removal System

I have performed a reliability & maintainability analysis for the Amine Swingbed payload system. The Amine Swingbed is a carbon dioxide removal technology that has gone through 2,400 hours of International Space Station on-orbit use between 2013 and 2016. While the Amine Swingbed is currently an experimental payload system, the Amine Swingbed may be converted to system hardware. If the Amine Swingbed becomes system hardware, it will supplement the Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly (CDRA) as the primary CO2 removal technology on the International Space Station. NASA is also considering using the Amine Swingbed as the primary carbon dioxide removal technology for future extravehicular mobility units and for the Orion, which will be used for the Asteroid Redirect and Journey to Mars missions. The qualitative component of the reliability and maintainability analysis is a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). In the FMEA, I have investigated how individual components in the Amine Swingbed may fail, and what the worst case scenario is should a failure occur. The significant failure effects are the loss of ability to remove carbon dioxide, the formation of ammonia due to chemical degradation of the amine, and loss of atmosphere because the Amine Swingbed uses the vacuum of space to regenerate the Amine Swingbed. In the quantitative component of the reliability and maintainability analysis, I have assumed a constant failure rate for both electronic and nonelectronic parts. Using this data, I have created a Poisson distribution to predict the failure rate of the Amine Swingbed as a whole. I have determined a mean time to failure for the Amine Swingbed to be approximately 1,400 hours. The observed mean time to failure for the system is between 600 and 1,200 hours. This range includes initial testing of the Amine Swingbed, as well as software faults that are understood to be non-critical. If many of the commercial parts were switched to military-grade parts, the expected mean time to failure would be 2,300 hours. Both calculated mean times to failure for the Amine Swingbed use conservative failure rate models. The observed mean time to failure for CDRA is 2,500 hours. Working on this project and for NASA in general has helped me gain insight into current aeronautics missions, reliability engineering, circuit analysis, and different cultures. Prior my internship, I did not have a lot knowledge about the work being performed at NASA. As a chemical engineer, I had not really considered working for NASA as a career path. By engaging in interactions with civil servants, contractors, and other interns, I have learned a great deal about modern challenges that NASA is addressing. My work has helped me develop a knowledge base in safety and reliability that would be difficult to find elsewhere. Prior to this internship, I had not thought about reliability engineering. Now, I have gained a skillset in performing reliability analyses, and understanding the inner workings of a large mechanical system. I have also gained experience in understanding how electrical systems work while I was analyzing the electrical components of the Amine Swingbed. I did not expect to be exposed to as many different cultures as I have while working at NASA. I am referring to both within NASA and the Houston area. NASA employs individuals with a broad range of backgrounds. It has been great to learn from individuals who have highly diverse experiences and outlooks on the world. In the Houston area, I have come across individuals from different parts of the world. Interacting with such a high number of individuals with significantly different backgrounds has helped me to grow as a person in ways that I did not expect. My time at NASA has opened a window into the field of aeronautics. After earning a bachelor's degree in chemical engineering, I plan to go to graduate school for a PhD in engineering. Prior to coming to NASA, I was not aware of the graduate Pathways program. I intend to apply for the graduate Pathways program as positions are opened up. I would like to pursue future opportunities with NASA, especially as my engineering career progresses.

Dunbar, Tyler↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The optimum cost-effective test time for redundant systems with specified reliability and confidence

This paper investigates the optimum test time to determine the number of redundant units needed to achieve high reliability with high confidence. Newly designed systems often have high initial failure rates which can be reduced by testing to find failure modes and remove them by redesign. To accurately estimate the required number of redundant units, the test time must be extended to accurately determine the failure rate. If the measured failure rate is used, there is a 50% chance that the actual hardware failure rate is higher. Using the measured failure rate gives only a 50% confidence that the failure rate and number of spares are not too low. After the test, given the measured failure rate and the desired reliability, the number of spares can be determined and the confidence in the reliability computed. Instead of accepting the reliability results of a fixed duration test, it is possible to set the requirements for both the redundant reliability and the confidence level and then compute the test time needed to minimize the total cost required to achieve these requirements. The confidence that the redundant reliability is not too low is increased by using a higher than measured failure rate to increase the number of spares. The higher number of spares increases cost. Longer test time reduces the variance in the failure rate and the increase in the number of spares, so that test cost increases and spares cost decreases. The total cost is the sum of the cost of the test time and the spares. The optimum test time produces the minimum total cost for the system failure rate, mission length, and required reliability and confidence level. Longer testing is justified by reduced cost. Some examples are given.

Harry W Jones↗

NASA NTRS2014

Reliability Growth in Space Life Support Systems

A hardware system's failure rate often increases over time due to wear and aging, but not always. Some systems instead show reliability growth, a decreasing failure rate with time, due to effective failure analysis and remedial hardware upgrades. Reliability grows when failure causes are removed by improved design. A mathematical reliability growth model allows the reliability growth rate to be computed from the failure data. The space shuttle was extensively maintained, refurbished, and upgraded after each flight and it experienced significant reliability growth during its operational life. In contrast, the International Space Station (ISS) is much more difficult to maintain and upgrade and its failure rate has been constant over time. The ISS Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly (CDRA) reliability has slightly decreased. Failures on ISS and with the ISS CDRA continue to be a challenge.

life support↗

NASA NTRS2012

Design and Analysis of a Flexible, Reliable Deep Space Life Support System

This report describes a flexible, reliable, deep space life support system design approach that uses either storage or recycling or both together. The design goal is to provide the needed life support performance with the required ultra reliability for the minimum Equivalent System Mass (ESM). Recycling life support systems used with multiple redundancy can have sufficient reliability for deep space missions but they usually do not save mass compared to mixed storage and recycling systems. The best deep space life support system design uses water recycling with sufficient water storage to prevent loss of crew if recycling fails. Since the amount of water needed for crew survival is a small part of the total water requirement, the required amount of stored water is significantly less than the total to be consumed. Water recycling with water, oxygen, and carbon dioxide removal material storage can achieve the high reliability of full storage systems with only half the mass of full storage and with less mass than the highly redundant recycling systems needed to achieve acceptable reliability. Improved recycling systems with lower mass and higher reliability could perform better than systems using storage.

reliability↗

NASA NTRS2017

Thermal Protection for Mars Sample Return Earth Entry Vehicle: A Grand Challenge for Design Methodology and Reliability Verification

Mars Sample Return is our Grand Challenge for the coming decade. TPS (Thermal Protection System) nominal performance is not the key challenge. The main difficulty for designers is the need to verify unprecedented reliability for the entry system: current guidelines for prevention of backward contamination require that the probability of spores larger than 1 micron diameter escaping into the Earth environment be lower than 1 million for the entire system, and the allocation to TPS would be more stringent than that. For reference, the reliability allocation for Orion TPS is closer to 11000, and the demonstrated reliability for previous human Earth return systems was closer to 1100. Improving reliability by more than 3 orders of magnitude is a grand challenge indeed. The TPS community must embrace the possibility of new architectures that are focused on reliability above thermal performance and mass efficiency. MSR (Mars Sample Return) EEV (Earth Entry Vehicle) will be hit with MMOD (Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris) prior to reentry. A chute-less aero-shell design which allows for self-righting shape was baselined in prior MSR studies, with the assumption that a passive system will maximize EEV robustness. Hence the aero-shell along with the TPS has to take ground impact and not break apart. System verification will require testing to establish ablative performance and thermal failure but also testing of damage from MMOD, and structural performance at ground impact. Mission requirements will demand analysis, testing and verification that are focused on establishing reliability of the design. In this proposed talk, we will focus on the grand challenge of MSR EEV TPS and the need for innovative approaches to address challenges in modeling, testing, manufacturing and verification.

Design and Verification for Reliability↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Methodology for Reliability Assessments of Arbitrary Satellite Constellations

The commercial success of small satellite development and multi-satellite missions has led to constellation missions being proposed in every sector of the market. This paradigm shift has the potential to enable more capable and cost-effective space science missions. However, these novel approaches to space missions have outstripped existing policy and analysis methods for assessing the reliability of multi-satellite missions. Mission designers and decisionmakers need new methods and standards for modeling how the reliability of constituent spacecraft elements affect the aggregate reliability of constellations across a wide range of concepts and application-specific requirements. The Space Mission Analysis Branch at NASA’s Langley Research Center has developed a methodology for simulating the on-orbit reliability of arbitrary spacecraft constellations. In this paper, the authors describe the methodology and provides examples of how it can be used to evaluate specific constellation designs. To demonstrate the flexibility of the approach, several different constellation configurations are considered, including both homogenous and heterogenous designs. Next, the authors demonstrate the ability to perform broad parameter sweeps to develop greater insight into the intrinsic reliability trends associated with constellation concepts. Finally, the authors provide tables and novel data graphics which enable decisionmakers to quickly discern the relationships between constellation sizes, topologies, replenishment strategies, and overall constellation reliability.

satellite↗

NASA NTRS1973

Assuring reliability program effectiveness.

An attempt is made to provide simple identification and description of techniques that have proved to be most useful either in developing a new product or in improving reliability of an established product. The first reliability task is obtaining and organizing parts failure rate data. Other tasks are parts screening, tabulation of general failure rates, preventive maintenance, prediction of new product reliability, and statistical demonstration of achieved reliability. Five principal tasks for improving reliability involve the physics of failure research, derating of internal stresses, control of external stresses, functional redundancy, and failure effects control. A final task is the training and motivation of reliability specialist engineers.

Ball, L. W.↗

NASA NTRS1975

Optimization of system reliability by the sequential unconstrained minimization technique

The reliability of a complex system was optimized by a new approach for implementing the sequential unconstrained minimization technique (SUMT) with the aid of Hooke and Jeeves pattern search and heuristic programming. Two optimization problems were considered. In the first, the system reliability was maximized subject to a nonlinear weight constraint. In the second, the weight of the system was minimized without violating the requirements of the minimal system reliability and the minimum reliability for each component. The sensitivities of the system reliability and that of the system weight to the reliability of each component were determined under optimal conditions.

Hwang, C. L.↗