Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis
Materials for short course. This briefing from NASA is one segment of a larger 3-day course being presented by multiple entities.
conjunction assessment↗
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Modernization of FPGA Risk Analysis for Critical Space Applications
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Melanie D Berg↗
A Compendium for Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning for Satellite Collision Avoidance at NASA Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA)
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Collision Avoidance↗
Risk Analysis and High-Fidelity Modeling of Spent Nuclear Fuel Derailment Events
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11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
Risk Analysis of Radiological Release from Pu-238 Targets During Manual Handling
Pu-238 Isotope Production Targets are routinely installed in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) core, transferred, and stored in the spent fuel canal. These evolutions involve manual handling and manipulation of the targets underwater using long handled tools. The ATR Safety Analysis Report (SAR) postulates a design basis accident which results in damage from manual manipulation of targets, and radiological consequences must be determined for receptors inside the reactor facility, as well as public receptors. This presentation presents the analysis used to determine the radiological consequences due to potential target damage in the ATR canal. The analysis considered radionuclide release fractions, damage ratios for handling evolutions, and entrainment of radionuclides in the canal water.
Advanced Test Reactor↗
DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKIT FOR PLANT RESOURCE OPTIMIZATION
This paper presents the development of methods and tools that are being designed to optimize plant operations (e.g., maintenance/replacement schedules and optimal maintenance postures for plant components) in a manner that is more cost effective than current approaches and makes better use of available component health and cost data. These methods include both data- and model-based optimization methods. Model-based optimization methods directly include reliability and cost models to determine an optimal plant operational strategy. We consider gradient-based and evolutionary (based on genetic algorithms) optimization methods. The second class of methods target more specific use cases (e.g., project schedule optimization) and are not based on reliability models directly, but they require specific component reliability and cost data. This class of methods is based on variants of the knapsack problem with an aim to determine an optimal project schedule that maximizes the overall NPV. This paper also presents multi-objective methods designed to identify an optimal maintenance posture based on a Pareto frontier analysis. Rather than dictating the “right” tradeoff (i.e., identify the absolute best posture), we show how it is possible to perform a trade space exploration approach (i.e., identify value and costs of several postures and let the analysis account for desired value and cost metrics). This is performed by identifying maintenance postures that maximize value (e.g., system availability) and minimize operational costs, i.e., the Pareto frontier in a value-cost trade space. For all these methods we present detailed applicative examples that show their validity from a decision-making perspective.
97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
Important Human Actions for Advanced Reactors: Implications for Risk Analysis
n/a
99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
Space flight risk data collection and analysis project: Risk and reliability database
The focus of the NASA 'Space Flight Risk Data Collection and Analysis' project was to acquire and evaluate space flight data with the express purpose of establishing a database containing measurements of specific risk assessment - reliability - availability - maintainability - supportability (RRAMS) parameters. The developed comprehensive RRAMS database will support the performance of future NASA and aerospace industry risk and reliability studies. One of the primary goals has been to acquire unprocessed information relating to the reliability and availability of launch vehicles and the subsystems and components thereof from the 45th Space Wing (formerly Eastern Space and Missile Command -ESMC) at Patrick Air Force Base. After evaluating and analyzing this information, it was encoded in terms of parameters pertinent to ascertaining reliability and availability statistics, and then assembled into an appropriate database structure.
Source record↗
Human Systems Risk Network - A Ranking Analysis of Risks
INTRODUCTION The Human Systems Risk Board (HSRB) is responsible for understanding, managing, and mitigating the risks associated with spaceflight. For a particular mission, the HSRB assigns each human system risk a rating on a 5x5 grid assessing its likelihood and consequence, which is ultimately used to compare and rank the risks. The HSRB approaches risk management by primarily establishing the context of each human system risk individually with the understanding that mitigating one risk might affect the likelihood, consequence, and mitigation approaches of another. To support this effort the HSRB, subject matter experts, and risk custodian teams created directed acyclic graphs (DAG), often called a causal graph, for the twenty-nine risks. In this presentation, we propose a new ranking algorithm for the risks which includes the downstream influence of each risk according to the information in the DAGs and provide an application of graph theoretic tools. METHODS In 2014, Mindock and Klaus proposed a taxonomy for human system risk influences which we have adopted to categorize the nodes in each DAG. Analyzing the nodes that correspond to the risks in this taxonomy allows us to analyze and understand how each risk influences the others. We construct an auxiliary network, which we call the Primary Risk Network (PRN), where the nodes are the twenty-nine space flight risks and, a directed edge connects Risk A to Risk B if Risk A has some influence on the likelihood or consequence of Risk B as described in the DAGS. We perform a variety of graph theoretic ranking methods on the nodes (or risks) in the PRN, including Katz centrality. RESULTS We rank the nodes in the PRN using the Katz centrality score. The ten risks with the highest score are pictured in Figure 1, colored (light to dark) according to their score. We analyze other centrality measures like betweenness centrality, eigenvector centrality, and the Estrada index, and provide the meaning of the corresponding rankings in terms of the risks. Future work includes analyzing the other categories in the taxonomy defined by Mindock and Klaus [1]. For example, we are interested in analyzing the nodes that are labeled as countermeasures or capabilities and perform similar analysis to measure their effect on certain medical conditions.
dag↗
Beneficial Use of Harvested Ponded Fly Ash and Landfilled FGD Materials for High-Volume Surface Mine Reclamation
The overall motivation of this project was to demonstrate at laboratory, bench-scale, and full-scale demonstration levels that (a) coal ash surface impoundments can go through closure by removal as per USEPA and state regulations so that the material can be used as is (other than draining free water using CCRs piles) in high-volume beneficial applications, (b) FGD material from closed out FGD facilities can be excavated and recompacted for coal mine reclamation, and (c) harvested CCRs can be beneficially utilized (providing a net environmental gain) in large-volumes for reclamation at abandoned coal mine sites across the US, especially in the Eastern and Midwest coal mining regions. The objectives of this project were to: 1) promote the safe and cost-effective closure by removal of coal ash impoundments, 2) harvest landfilled FGD, and 3) promote the high-volume beneficial use of these harvested CCRs in the reclamation of abandoned surface coal mine sites across the eastern and midwestern coal mining regions of the United States. The major tasks carried out for this project are summarized below: 1) Conesville Full-Scale Demonstration Project: About 2 million tons of harvested CCR materials from the closure by removal of an inactive fly ash pond and an adjacent old FGD landfill were used for the full-scale demonstration project to fully reclaim a nearby partially completed abandoned surface coal mine. Site monitoring for the project duration was carried out and results are discussed. 2) Laboratory Testing: Geotechnical and environmental testing of harvested ponded fly ash and landfilled FGD material at the former Conesville power plant were carried out. Completing the laboratory testing allowed for QA/QC for the full-scale site construction and informed the formulation of the risk analysis. 3) Risk Analysis: We developed a reliable computational model for fate and transport. We used these models and the rich set of monitored data for the Conesville site to analyze risks to human health and ecological risks associated with high-volume surface mine reclamation using harvested CCRs. 4) GIS Siting Study: A Geographic Information System (GIS) study was carried out for three states in the Eastern coal mining region and two states in the Midwest coal region. This effort provided site specific GIS information for five states and allowed us to establish protocols that other states can follow in implementing their own state specific GIS study.
01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗
The Challenger disaster was caused by an Apollo decision
NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment.
Harry W Jones↗
[MaRS Project]
The Space Exploration Division of the Safety and Mission Assurances Directorate is responsible for reducing the risk to Human Space Flight Programs by providing system safety, reliability, and risk analysis. The Risk & Reliability Analysis branch plays a part in this by utilizing Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) tools to identify possible types of failure and effective solutions. A continuous effort of this branch is MaRS, or Mass and Reliability System, a tool that was the focus of this internship. Future long duration space missions will have to find a balance between the mass and reliability of their spare parts. They will be unable take spares of everything and will have to determine what is most likely to require maintenance and spares. Currently there is no database that combines mass and reliability data of low level space-grade components. MaRS aims to be the first database to do this. The data in MaRS will be based on the hardware flown on the International Space Stations (ISS). The components on the ISS have a long history and are well documented, making them the perfect source. Currently, MaRS is a functioning excel workbook database; the backend is complete and only requires optimization. MaRS has been populated with all the assemblies and their components that are used on the ISS; the failures of these components are updated regularly. This project was a continuation on the efforts of previous intern groups. Once complete, R&M engineers working on future space flight missions will be able to quickly access failure and mass data on assemblies and components, allowing them to make important decisions and tradeoffs.
Aruljothi, Arunvenkatesh↗
SMART: A Propositional Logic-Based Trade Analysis and Risk Assessment Tool for a Complex Mission
This paper introduces a new trade analysis software called the Space Mission Architecture and Risk Analysis Tool (SMART). This tool supports a high-level system trade study on a complex mission, such as a potential Mars Sample Return (MSR) mission, in an intuitive and quantitative manner. In a complex mission, a common approach to increase the probability of success is to have redundancy and prepare backups. Quantitatively evaluating the utility of adding redundancy to a system is important but not straightforward, particularly when the failure of parallel subsystems are correlated.
Ono, Masahiro↗
MRCI Subtask 2.4/2.5: Regional/Subregional Analysis and Risk Assessment Final Technical Summary Report
The objective of the Midwest Regional Carbon Initiative (MRCI) project is to implement a collaborative Regional Initiative (RI) to accelerate the deployment of carbon capture, and storage (CCS) in the Midwest-Northeastern quadrant of the United States. This report is a Technical Summary report describing work performed on Tasks 2.4 (Conducting Regional/Subregional Analysis) and 2.5 (Assessing and Managing Risk) during the MRCI project. In Task 2.4, detailed numerical reservoir simulation models were developed for selected carbon storage (CS) systems identified under Task 2.1 (Battelle, 2021a) in the MRCI study area. The objective of Task 2.4 is to demonstrate a dynamic modeling methodology for evaluating the suitability of the (selected) CS systems in the MRCI region for hosting a commercial-scale storage project. In this study, CO2 injectivity was evaluated for different CS systems with an annual injection rate of 1 million metric tonnes (MMT) of CO2 considered as the minimum requirement for a commercial scale project. The objective of Task 2.5 is to assess key risks associated with storing CO2 in the different CS systems across the MRCI region and to demonstrate a method(s) for assessing these risks that may be used by developers of future CO2 storage projects in the region. The risk analysis was limited to evaluating two types of leakage risks (i.e., wellbore leakage, flow across unfractured caprock) at three modeled sites considered in Task 2.4.
MRCI,Report,Summary,Technical Challenges,dynamic m↗
Space Program Advocacy Can Distort Project Management and Damage Systems Engineering
Over-optimistic project advocacy often causes exaggerated performance claims and underestimated costs and schedules. This can distort project management and damage systems engineering. NASA projects such as the space shuttle and Hubble are extreme examples. NASA's spectacular success in the Apollo moon landings seems to have produced overconfidence and carelessness, but also to have gained tolerance for unrealistic claims and forgiveness when they were proven wrong. Apollo risk analysis predicted many astronaut fatalities. This was believed but was potentially damaging to the Apollo program, so risk analysis was discontinued. The moon landings beat bad odds because Apollo obsessively reduced risk. Its success seemed to confirm that risk analysis was unreasonably pessimistic and that risk could be overcome by good engineering. This understanding caused risk to be increased during space shuttle engineering and led to an unnecessarily dangerous approach. The shuttle design placed a fragile spacecraft next to the fuel tanks and failed to provide crew escape or launch abort. These design decisions directly caused the Challenger and Columbia tragedies. After Challenger, risk analysis was re-established. The current rocket and capsule design does consider risk and the result strongly resembles Apollo. Apollo advocacy led NASA to abandon risk analysis and this was ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies. Excessive advocacy that distorts risk, cost, and schedule could be prevented in an ideal organization that used systems engineering to make rational and fair decisions. However, most real organizations accommodate human and group needs using informal methods often described as "the system." Humans have biases, use innate decision making heuristics, instinctively rely on "gut feel," and establish deviant groups through groupthink. Expecting organizations to become totally rational is impractical, but specific problems such as neglecting risk and underestimating cost and schedule can be directly challenged with some hope of success.
Jones, Harry W.↗
Costing the satellite power system
The paper presents a methodology for satellite power system costing, places approximate limits on the accuracy possible in cost estimates made at this time, and outlines the use of probabilistic cost information in support of the decision-making process. Reasons for using probabilistic costing or risk analysis procedures instead of standard deterministic costing procedures are considered. Components of cost, costing estimating relationships, grass roots costing, and risk analysis are discussed. Risk analysis using a Monte Carlo simulation model is used to estimate future costs.
Hazelrigg, G. A., Jr.↗
Comparative Analysis of Static and Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment
Implementation of risk-informed design allows the design team to thoroughly explore the risks of a system while iterating the operations concept, design, and requirements until the system meets mission objects and is achievable within constraints. To arrive at a space system design that is likely to meet all constraints placed upon mass, cost, performance and risk, the system requirements must be understood and traded against each other as early as the conceptual design phase. Depending on the project phase and the goals of the risk analysis, various PRA methodologies could be used to produce quantitative risk estimates to enable such a process. In order to better understand the applicability, advantages, and limitations of various PRA methodologies, a comparative analysis of three bottom-up, component-based PRA approaches was performed. The three methods examined are a traditional static fault tree, a fault tree hybrid, and a dynamic Monte Carlo simulation. Each approach was used to assess a generic reaction control system (RCS) thruster pod and mission. The methods are assessed in terms of the process of modeling a system, the actionable information produced for the design team, and the overall fidelity of the quantitative risk evaluation generated. The paper also discusses the applicability of each methodology to the different phases of system development.
Probablistic↗
Analyzing Potential Failures and Effects in a Pilot-Scale Biomass Preprocessing Facility for Improved Reliability
This study demonstrates a failure identification methodology applied to a preprocessing facility generating conversion-ready feedstocks from biomass meeting conversion process critical quality attribute (CQA) specifications. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) was used as an industrially relevant risk analysis approach to evaluate a logging residue preprocessing system to prepare feedstock for pyrolysis conversion. Risk evaluations considered both system-level and operation unit-level assessments considering process efficiency, product quality, cost, sustainability, and safety. Key outputs included estimations of semi-quantitative risk scores for each failure, identification of the failure impacts, identification of failure causes associated with material attributes and process parameters, ranking success rates of failure detection methods, and speculation of potential mitigation strategies for decreasing failure risk scores. Results showed that deviations from moisture specifications had cascading consequences for other CQAs along with process safety implications. Failures linked to fixed carbon specifications carried the highest risk scores for product quality and process efficiency impacts. As increased throughput can be inversely related to meeting product quality specifications; achieving throughput and other material-based CQAs simultaneously will likely require system optimization or prioritization based on system economics. Ultimately, this work successfully demonstrates FMEA as a risk analysis approach for other bioenergy process systems.
09 BIOMASS FUELS↗