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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

It Depends - An Overview of Probabilistic Risk Analysis Concepts

How do you understand the data and assumptions in your probabilistic analysis? The PRA analyst needs to understand the data and input assumptions to effectively communicate the system/mission's risks. The decision maker also needs to understand conservatisms and how to interpret uncertainty in the PRA results. Properties such as assumptions on the distributions, uncertainty, use of test data, and common cause modeling can be the subject of much discussion, but often are the leading drivers of a risk profile.

risk assessment↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA's Identified Risk of Adverse Outcomes due to Inadequate Human Systems Integration Architecture

The NASA Human System Risk Board (HSRB) is responsible for tracking the evolution of the top ~30 human system risks identified to be associated with human spaceflight. As part of this process, the Board is charged with maintaining a consistent, integrated process to evaluate those risks and developing evidence-based risk posture recommendations. Risks are ranked by likelihood and consequence. Intermediate causal relationships between risk contributing factors and countermeasures that link hazards to outcomes are described using Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs). The DAGs are also useful for identifying common factors and countermeasures across the top 30 risks as well as communicating how astronaut exposure to spaceflight hazards leads to meaningful mission-level health and performance outcomes. One of the top risks tracked by the HSRB is The Risk of Adverse Outcomes Due to Inadequate Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA). This risk captures the possibility that due to decreasing real-time ground support during missions beyond LEO, crew will be unable to adequately respond to unanticipated critical malfunctions or detect safety-critical procedural errors. The HSIA risk is ranked red (high) for Lunar surface and Mars missions due to the probability of Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission consequences. This paper describes the evidence that supports the HSIA risk ranking and presents the central narrative of the HSIA risk DAG-- i.e., anomaly detection, diagnosis, intervention, and task performance. Characterizations of the current state of practice for each of the DAG’s central nodes and the future tools needed for successful anomaly response are provided.

human-systems integration architecture↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance Integration - the Future of Safe Deep Space Human Exploration

As a foundational element of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Artemis Campaign, the Gateway is an incrementally built cislunar spacecraft that will serve as a platform for deep space human exploration, science, and technology demonstration. The Gateway will be a unifying catalyst for international partners around the world to establish sustained deep space scientific investigations, lunar surface access, and missions to Mars. As human exploration moves farther away from Earth, spacecraft designs must prioritize and optimize mass and volume allocations, while minimizing human and spacecraft risk. To accomplish this objective, the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance functions develop, implement, and ensure compliance with requirements, in concert with the accurate characterization and transparent communication of residual hazard risks, for integrated safety, reliability and maintainability and quality assurance. Safety and Mission Assurance was a key contributor during Gateway program pre-formulation and formulation activities where safety and reliability analysis was embedded in the Gateway Systems Engineering and Integration team. During these early program stages, a preliminary Gateway Integrated Hazard Analysis and Preliminary Gateway Probabilistic Risk Assessment assisted in Gateway architectural and operational definition as part of a risk-informed design process. As the deep space architecture has matured, the integrated Safety and Mission Assurance analyses have matured, new safety review processes have been developed, and requirements have been refined to ensure compliance with integrated safety and mission assurance objectives. The Gateway Program is currently concluding the preliminary design review informed milestone, where the primary objectives included: - Ensured completeness and consistency of the preliminary design, including the meeting of all requirements within appropriate margins and acceptable risk posture. - Identification of any major issues moving forward to the Critical Design phase. At this milestone, Safety and Mission Assurance provided numerous products, including Gateway Top Risks and Risk Mitigation Plans, updated integrated hazard analyses, updated probabilistic risk assessment, Crew Survival Analysis Report, and updated Safety and Mission Assurance Requirements and Plans. These products provide a many-faceted perspective on the inherent risk and available mitigations involved in flying the current proposed vehicle design and anticipated stack configurations. In addition, Safety and Mission Assurance identified top technical, process and workforce concerns to be addressed as the program progresses toward the critical design phase. This paper will detail the evolution of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance integration functions, provide its current status and lessons learned for future human spaceflight programs. Throughout this paper the key tenets of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance will be discussed: - Application of a risk-informed approach to identify and mitigate areas of highest risk. - Leverage of valuable processes and lessons learned from earlier spaceflight programs. - Development of Safety and Mission Assurance products to inform design risk trades. - Utilization of common Safety and Mission Assurance practices to identify safety risks for multiple perspectives: top-down, bottom-up, and across lines of integration. - Approval of safety hazards at the appropriate level of authority, keeping most deliberation closest to design expertise and elevating risks of greatest concern for program-level consideration. - Championing of Safety and Mission Assurance processes and forums to foster a pervasive safety culture that is transparent, inclusive, and collaborative between all partners. These tenets have allowed the Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance function to play a key role in optimized vehicle design evolution, and early identification and mitigation of Gateway program and Artemis mission risk.

Helen Vaccaro↗

NASA NTRS2023

Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance Integration - The Future of Safe Deep Space Human Exploration

Helen Vaccaro↗

NASA NTRS2021

Perceptions of Climate Risk and Use of Climate Risk Information by Natural Resource Conservation Stakeholders Participating in ADVANCE Projects in Asia and Latin America

Integrating climate risk information into resilience-building activities in the field is important to ensure that adaptation is based on the best available science. Despite this, many challenges exist when developing, communicating, and incorporating climate risk information. There are limited resources on how stakeholders perceive risks, use risk information, and what barriers exist to limit knowledge integration. This paper seeks to define the following: 1) What do conservation stakeholders consider to be the most significant climate risks they face now and possibly in the future? 2) What have been the most significant barriers to their using climate risk information? 3) What sources and types of knowledge would be most useful for these managers to overcome these barriers? A survey was conducted among stakeholders (n = 224) associated with World Wildlife Fund projects in tropical and subtropical countries. A very high proportion of stakeholders used climate risk information and yet faced integration-related challenges, which included too much uncertainty and the lack of a relevant scale for planning. The main factors preventing the use of climate risk information in decision-making were unavailability of climate risk information, no or limited financial or human resources available to respond, lack of organizational mandate or support, and no or limited institutional incentives. Comparing perceived current and future risks revealed a decline in concern for some future climate hazards. Survey respondents identified scientific reports, climate scientists, and online sources as the most useful information sources of climate risk information, while (i) maps and illustrations; (ii) scenarios format; and (iii) data tables, graphs, and charts were identified as user-friendly formats.

Climate risk↗

NASA NTRS2011

Space Transportation System Liftoff Debris Mitigation Process Overview

Liftoff debris is a top risk to the Space Shuttle Vehicle. To manage the Liftoff debris risk, the Space Shuttle Program created a team with in the Propulsion Systems Engineering & Integration Office. The Shutt le Liftoff Debris Team harnesses the Systems Engineering process to i dentify, assess, mitigate, and communicate the Liftoff debris risk. T he Liftoff Debris Team leverages off the technical knowledge and expe rtise of engineering groups across multiple NASA centers to integrate total system solutions. These solutions connect the hardware and ana lyses to identify and characterize debris sources and zones contribut ing to the Liftoff debris risk. The solutions incorporate analyses sp anning: the definition and modeling of natural and induced environmen ts; material characterizations; statistical trending analyses, imager y based trajectory analyses; debris transport analyses, and risk asse ssments. The verification and validation of these analyses are bound by conservative assumptions and anchored by testing and flight data. The Liftoff debris risk mitigation is managed through vigilant collab orative work between the Liftoff Debris Team and Launch Pad Operation s personnel and through the management of requirements, interfaces, r isk documentation, configurations, and technical data. Furthermore, o n day of launch, decision analysis is used to apply the wealth of ana lyses to case specific identified risks. This presentation describes how the Liftoff Debris Team applies Systems Engineering in their proce sses to mitigate risk and improve the safety of the Space Shuttle Veh icle.

Mitchell, Michael↗

NASA NTRS2001

Institutionalizing Lessons Learned

The NASA Integrated Action Team (NIAT) was formed by the NASA Administrator in March 2000. The purpose of this team was to identify the actions that NASA must take to address systemic findings reported in 4 different anomaly investigations. Team membership represented senior managers from all the field centers and NASA Headquarters. NIAT report addressed 165 findings and developed 17 action plans that are described in five themes: people and teams, technology, risk, formulation rigor, and communications. The NIAT actions present a systems solution for strengthening formulation and implementation of programs and improving the environment for their support. NIAT results included: enhancing success by avoiding failures that could have been prevented through good planning and sound practice; ensuring that prudent risks do not compromise safety; and ensuring that mission risks are objectively assessed, appropriately mitigated and consciously accepted by the program team and customers. Definitions of Faster, Better, Cheaper and Success Criteria were also developed and included as part of the NIAT report. As a result of the NIAT report, program and project management process changes were incorporated into NASA's quality system documentation, including NPG 7120.513, "NASA Program and Project Management Processes and Requirements. This paper describes the NIAT results and the resulting updates to NPG 7120.5 that keep this program and project management description a living process.

McBrayer, Robert O.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Cross-Cutting Risk Framework: Mining Data for Common Risks Across the Portfolio

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) defines risk management as an integrated framework, combining risk-informed decision making and continuous risk management to foster forward-thinking and decision making from an integrated risk perspective. Therefore, decision makers must have access to risks outside of their own project to gain the knowledge that provides the integrated risk perspective. Through the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) Flight Projects Directorate (FPD) Business Change Initiative (BCI), risks were integrated into one repository to facilitate access to risk data between projects. With the centralized repository, communications between the FPD, project managers, and risk managers improved and GSFC created the cross-cutting risk framework (CCRF) team. The creation of the consolidated risk repository, in parallel with the initiation of monthly FPD risk managers and risk governance board meetings, are now providing a complete risk management picture spanning the entire directorate. This paper will describe the challenges, methodologies, tools, and techniques used to develop the CCRF, and the lessons learned as the team collectively worked to identify risks that FPD programs projects had in common, both past and present.

risk-informed decision making↗

NASA NTRS1983

Space Station needs, attributes and architectural options. Volume 2, book 1, part 3: Manned Space Station relevance to commercial telecommunications satellites

A document containing a forecast of satellite traffic and revelant technology trends to the year 2000 was prepared which includes those space station capabilities and characteristics that should be provided to make the station useful to commercial satellite owners. The document was circulated to key representative organizations within the commercial telecommunications satellite and related communities of interest, including spacecraft manufacturers, commercial satellite owners, communications carriers, networks and risk insurers. The prospectus document is presented as well as the transmittal letter and the mailing list of the people and companies that were asked to review it. Key commercial telecommunications comments are summarized the actual response letters from the industry are included.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1993

Satellite communications systems and technology. Volume 1: Analytical chapters

This is Volume 1 (Analytical Chapters) of the final report of the NASA/NSF Panel Satellite Communications Systems and Technology. The panel surveyed advanced technology being developed for commercial use in the satellite communications field in Europe, Japan, and Russia. All aspects of satellite communications were considered, including fixed, broadcast, mobile, personal communications, navigation, low earth orbit, and small satellites. The focus was on experimental and advanced technology being developed in R&D and demonstration programs rather than on today's production capabilities. Focus was on commercial satellite technology, and does not review defense-related or other confidential satellite communications capabilities. The NASA/NSF panel concluded that the United States has lost its leading position in many critical satellite communications technologies. Although U.S. industry retains a leading position in today's marketplace for satellite communications systems and services, this position is largely founded on technologies and capabilities developed in the 1960's and 1970's. Because the United States is losing ground with respect to a wide range of technologies and systems that will be key to future communications markets, the market share of the U.S. satellite communications industry is at risk.

Edelson, Burton I.↗

NASA NTRS1993

Satellite communications systems and technology: Analytic Chapters - Volume 1

This is Volume I (Analytical Chapters) of the final report of the NASA/NSF Panel Satellite Communications Systems and Technology. The panel surveyed advanced technology being developed for commercial use in the satellite communications field in Europe, Japan, and Russia. All aspects of satellite communications were considered, including fixed, broadcast, mobile, personal communications, navigation, low earth orbit, and small satellites. The focus of the study was on experimental and advanced technology being developed in R&D and demonstration programs rather than on today's production capabilities. The report focuses on commercial satellite technology, and does not review defense-related or other confidential satellite communications capabilities. The NASA/NSF panel concluded that the United States has lost its leading position in many critical satellite communications technologies. Although U.S. industry retains a leading position in today's marketplace for satellite communications systems and services, this position is largely founded on technologies and capabilities developed in the 1960s and 1970s. Because the United States is losing ground with respect to a wide range of technologies and systems that will be key to future communications markets, the market share of the U.S. satellite communications industry is at risk.

Jennings, Raymond D.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Assessing the Fire Risk for a Historic Hangar

NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) is evaluating options of reuse of its historic Hangar 1. As a part of this evaluation, a qualitative fire risk assessment study was performed to evaluate the potential threat of combustion of the historic hangar. The study focused on the fire risk trade-off of either installing or not installing a Special Hazard Fire Suppression System in the Hangar 1 deck areas. The assessment methodology was useful in discussing the important issues among various groups within the Center. Once the methodology was deemed acceptable, the results were assessed. The results showed that the risk remained in the same risk category, whether Hangar 1 does or does not have a Special Hazard Fire Suppression System. Note that the methodology assessed the risk to Hangar 1 and not the risk to an aircraft in the hangar. If one had a high value aircraft, the aircraft risk analysis could potentially show a different result. The assessed risk results were then communicated to management and other stakeholders.

Datta, Koushik↗

NASA NTRS2012

Mission Operations Assurance

Integrate the mission operations assurance function into the flight team providing: (1) value added support in identifying, mitigating, and communicating the project's risks and, (2) being an essential member of the team during the test activities, training exercises and critical flight operations.

project tracking↗

NASA NTRS2021

Europa Clipper Payload Verification and Validation: Early Architecture and Implementation

NASA’s Europa Clipper mission will investigate the Jovian icy moon Europa with a sophisticated payload consisting of a suite of nine instruments. Clipper’s observations will help provide answers to a broad range of scientific objectives related to Europa’s habitability. As the project proceeds through Phase C, we are building confidence in the system’s ability to achieve these science goals by implementing a rigorous payload verification and validation (V&V) program. This paper details the planned structure and implementation of the Europa Clipper payload V&V program as it exists leading up to the project critical design review (CDR), before the bulk of instrument- or payload- level V&V activities have begun. We first explain the context for payload V&V on Europa Clipper, including its interfaces with other parts of the project system. We then describe the taxonomy of V&V concepts and their interrelationships, followed by a discussion on how this framework allows us to codify interfaces, processes, and ideas that are key to a successful V&V program. We focus on key aspects of the planning phases of V&V, especially establishing a complete set of verification items and accurately mapping them into appropriate verification activities. The second half of the paper describes the logistics of implementing this framework onto our actual payload system, including the processes and tools we use to manage and communicate agreements, changes, and risks across the project. We conclude with a reflection on the unique drivers and challenges of the V&V program concept development so far and the work that is planned for phase D implementation.

Srivastava, Priyanka↗

NASA NTRS2019

Airborne Radar for sUAS Sense and Avoid

A primary challenge for the safe integration of small UAS operations into the National Airspace System (NAS) is traffic deconfliction, both from manned and unmanned aircraft. The UAS Traffic Management (UTM) project being conducted at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) considers a layered approach to separation provision, ranging from segregation of operations through airspace volumes (geofences) to autonomous sense and avoid (SAA) technologies for higher risk, densely occupied airspace. Cooperative SAA systems, such as Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and/or vehicle-to-vehicle communication systems provide significant additional risk mitigation but they fail to adequately mitigate collision risks for non-cooperative (non-transponder equipped) airborne aircraft. The RAAVIN (Radar on Autonomous Aircraft to Verify ICAROUS Navigation) flight test being conducted by NASA and the Mid-Atlantic Aviation Partnership (MAAP) was designed to investigate the applicability and performance of a prototype, commercially available sUAS radar to detect and track non-cooperative airborne traffic, both manned and unmanned. The radar selected for this research was a Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave (FMCW) radar with 120 degree azimuth and 80 degree elevation field of view operating at 24.55GHz center frequency with a 200 MHz bandwidth. The radar transmits 2 watts of power thru a Metamaterial Electronically Scanning Array antenna in horizontal polarization. When the radar is transmitting, personnel must be at least 1 meter away from the active array to limit nonionizing radiation exposure. The radar physical dimensions are 18.7cm by 12.1cm by 4.1cm and it weighs less than 820 grams making it well suited for installation on small UASs. The onboard, SAA capability, known as ICAROUS, (Independent Configurable Architecture for Reliable Operations of Unmanned Systems), developed by NASA to support sUAS operations, will provide autonomous guidance using the traffic radar tracks from the onboard radar. The RAAVIN set of studies will be conducted in three phases. The first phase included outdoor, ground-based radar evaluations performed at the Virginia Tech’s Kentland Farm testing range in Blacksburg, VA. The test was designed to measure how well the radar could detect and track a small UAS flying in the radar’s field of view. The radar was used to monitor 5 test flights consisting of outbound, inbound and crossing routes at different ranges and altitudes. The UAS flown during the ground test was the Inspire 2, a quad copter weighing less than 4250 grams (10 pounds) at maximum payload. The radar was set up to scan and track targets over its full azimuthal field of view from 0 to 40 degrees in elevation. The radar was configured to eliminate tracks generated from any targets located beyond 2000 meters from the radar and moving at velocities under 1.45 meters per second. For subsequent phases of the study the radar will be integrated with a sUAS platform to evaluate its performance in flight for SAA applications ranging from sUAS to manned GA aircraft detections and tracking. Preliminary data analysis from the first outdoor ground tests showed the radar performed well at tracking the vehicle as it flew outbound and repeatedly maintained a track out to 1000 meters (maximum 1387 meters) until the vehicle slowed to a stop to reverse direction to fly inbound. As the Inspire flew inbound tracks from beyond 800 meters, a reacquisition time delay was consistently observed between when the Inspire exceeds a speed of 1.45 meters per second and when the radar indicated an inbound target was present and maintained its track. The time delay varied between 6 seconds to over 37 seconds for the inbound flights examined, and typically resulted in about a 200 meter closure distance before the Inspire track was maintained. The radar performed well at both acquiring and tracking the vehicle as it flew crossing routes out past 400 meters across the azimuthal field of view. The radar and ICAROUS software will be integrated and flown on a BFD-1400-SE8-E UAS during the next phase of the RAAVIN project. The main goal at the conclusion of this effort is to determine if this radar technology can reliably support minimum requirements for SAA applications of sUAS. In particular, the study will measure the range of vehicle detections, lateral and vertical angular errors, false and missed/late detections, and estimated distance at closest point of approach after an avoidance maneuver is executed. This last metric is directly impacted by sensor performance and indicates its suitability for the task.

Szatkowski, George N.↗

NASA NTRS1975

Advanced communications experiments for Spacelab

The Spacelab design and mission capabilities appear to provide a practical vehicle for meeting communication experiment needs. Results of recent discussions and numerous contractual activities have conclusively corroborated the potential useful role that a manned laboratory in space can afford to the communications community. Some examples of the experiments that appear presently as strong candidates for early flights on the Spacelab missions of the 1980s are discussed. Particular attention is given to radio frequency interference, bandwidth compressive modulation, laser experimentation, and use of large deployable communications antenna. It can be expected that the Spacelab will reduce the time, risk, and cost for conducting some communications experiments and developing the related space technology.

Ehrlich, E.↗

NASA NTRS1991

Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS)

The NASA Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS) provides high risk technologies having the potential to dramatically enhance the capabilities of the satellite communications industry. This experimental satellite, which will be launched by NASA in 1993, will furnish the technology necessary for providing a range of services. Utilizing the ACTS very-high-gain-hopping spot-beam antennas with on-board routing and processing, Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) digital networks which provide on-demand, full-mesh-convectivity 1.544-MBPS services with only a single hop can be established. The high-gain spot-beam antenna at Ka-band permits wide area, flexible networks providing high data rate services between modest-size earth terminals.

Plecity, Mark S.↗

NASA NTRS2014

Ka-Band Link Study and Analysis for a Mars Hybrid RF/Optical Software Defined Radio

The integrated radio and optical communications (iROC) project at the NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) is investigating the feasibility of a hybrid RF and optical communication subsystem for future deep space missions. The hybrid communications subsystem enables the advancement of optical communications while simultaneously mitigating the risk of infusion by combining an experimental optical transmitter and telescope with a reliable Ka-band RF transmitter and antenna. The iROC communications subsystem seeks to maximize the total data return over the course of a potential 2-year mission in Mars orbit beginning in 2021. Although optical communication by itself offers potential for greater data return over RF, the reliable Ka-band link is also being designed for high data return capability in this hybrid system. A daily analysis of the RF link budget over the 2-year span is performed to optimize and provide detailed estimates of the RF data return. In particular, the bandwidth dependence of these data return estimates is analyzed for candidate waveforms. In this effort, a data return modeling tool was created to analyze candidate RF modulation and coding schemes with respect to their spectral efficiency, amplifier output power back-off, required digital to analog conversion (DAC) sampling rates, and support by ground receivers. A set of RF waveforms is recommended for use on the iROC platform.

communication↗