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An educational program, designed to train students with the specific skills needed to become safety specialists, is described. The discussion concentrates on application, selection, and utilization of various system safety analytical approaches. Emphasis is also placed on the management of a system safety program, its relationship with other disciplines, and new developments and applications of system safety techniques.
This paper examines key barriers that can possibly inhibit safe and reliable mission execution and, in the worst case, result in loss of human life due to many unknown contributory factors that can lead to Black Swan events. Some of the representative contributory factors include decision errors, overconfidence and a host of common causes including cultural and human factors. Decisions are always easy to criticize in hindsight when more information is available after a major accident. Depending on the type and complexity of the project and/or mission, the catastrophic risks of drifting into failure can be alleviated by implementing uniquely and strategically tailored Integrated-System-of-Systems, dynamic, risk-informed decision management processes. This paper presents some of the lessons learned from James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), NASA’s Human Space Flight program, and industry that provide motivation to organizations working on mega-complex missions to prudently accomplish targeted mission success. These lessons are important for future human Lunar, Mars and Beyond missions planned to be pursued by NASA through a public-private partnership using nimble but effective safety-conscious, proven sound engineering practices including implementation of integrated risk mitigation practices.
An exploratory human-in-the-loop simulation was conducted to investigate and characterize a Human-Autonomy Teaming (HAT) Assistant to support a remote operator of multiple small Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (sUAS) using a ground control station (GCS) in the context of a wildland fire surveillance mission. Operator performance using the GCS with the HAT Assistant (Assisted Mode) was compared to operator performance using the GCS without the HAT Assistant (Unassisted Mode) during two types of contingency-event scenarios (Low and High Complexity). In the Assisted Mode, the HAT Assistant provided updates to the level of risk to the mission along with recommendations for risk mitigation, which were not provided in the Unassisted Mode. No significant differences in objective performance and subjective ratings of workload, situation awareness, and trust in automation between the Assisted and Unassisted Modes were detected, however there were indications that participants preferred the Assisted GCS over the Unassisted GCS and directions for further development were explored. Additional work is necessary to further refine the HAT Assistant and better characterize its effects on remote operator performance while managing multiple sUAS assets. Future work is recommended to optimize the implementation of an assistant to support operator performance during different missions and across vehicle classes.
Factors that cause system safety programs to fail are discussed from the viewpoint that in general these programs have not achieved their intended aims. The one item which is considered to contribute most to failure of a system safety program is a poor statement of work which consists of ambiguity, lack of clear definition, use of obsolete requirements, and pure typographical errors. It is pointed out that unless safety requirements are stated clearly, and where they are readily apparent as firm requirements, some of them will be overlooked by designers and contractors. The lack of clarity is stated as being a major contributing factor in system safety program failure and usually evidenced in: (1) lack of clear requirements by the procuring activity, (2) lack of clear understanding of system safety by other managers, and (3) lack of clear methodology to be employed by system safety engineers.
The main objective of the Total and Spectral solar Irradiance Sensor (TSIS) is to acquire measurements to determine the direct and indirect effects of solar radiation on climate. TSIS total solar irradiance measurements will extend a 37-year long uninterrupted measurement record of incoming solar radiation, the dominant energy source driving the Earths climate and the most precise indicator of changes in the Suns energy output. TSIS solar spectral irradiance measurements will determine the regions of the Earths multi-layered atmosphere that are affected by solar variability, from which the solar forcing mechanisms causing changes in climate can be quantified. TSIS includes two instruments: the Total Irradiance Monitor (TIM) and the Spectral Irradiance Monitor (SIM), integrated into a single payload. The TSIS TIM and SIM instruments are upgraded versions of the two instruments that are flying on the Solar Radiation and Climate Experiment (SORCE) mission launched in January 2003. TSIS was originally planned for the nadir-pointing National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) spacecraft. The TSIS instrument passed a Critical Design Review (CDR) for NPOESS in December 2009. In 2010, TSIS was re-planned for the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) Polar Free Flyer (PFF). The TSIS TIM, SIM, and associated electronics were built, tested, and successfully completed pre-ship review as of December 2013.In early 2014, NOAA and NASA agreed to fly TSIS on the International Space Station (ISS). In the FY16 Presidents Budget, NASA assumes responsibility for the TSIS mission on ISS. The TSIS project includes requirements, interface, design, build and test of the TSIS payload, including an updated pointing system, for accommodation on the ISS. It takes advantage of the prior development of the TSIS sensors and electronics. The International Space Station (ISS) program contributions include launch services and robotic installation of the TSIS payload onto an ISS Express Logistics Carrier, mission operations, and communications. Total and Spectral solar irradiance data products will be produced, calibrated, and made publically available through the Goddard Earth Science Data and Information Services Center (GES DISC).The NASA GSFC TSIS project at GSFC is responsible for project management, system engineering, safety and mission assurance, and engineering oversight for the TSIS payload. The TSIS project has contracted with the University of Colorado Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics (LASP) for the design, development and testing of TSIS, support for ISS integration, science operations of the TSIS instrument, data processing, data evaluation and delivery to the GES DISC. TSIS will be delivered to Kennedy Space Center for integration in 2017, with launch and installation onto ISS planned for late 2017-early 2018. After a 90-day check-out period, NASA plans five years of TSIS operations.
TSIS-1 studies the Sun's energy input to Earth and how solar variability affects climate. TSIS-1 will measure both the total amount of light that falls on Earth, known as the total solar irradiance (TSI), and how that light is distributed among ultraviolet, visible and infrared wavelengths, called solar spectral irradiance (SSI). TSIS-1 will provide the most accurate measurements of sunlight and continue the long-term climate data record. TSIS-1 includes two instruments: the Total Irradiance Monitor (TIM) and the Spectral Irradiance Monitor (SIM), integrated into a single payload on the International Space Station (ISS). The TSIS-1 TIM and SIM instruments are upgraded versions of the two instruments that are flying on the Solar Radiation and Climate Experiment (SORCE) mission launched in January 2003. NASA Goddard's TSIS project responsibilities include project management, system engineering, safety and mission assurance, and engineering oversight for TSIS-1. TSIS-1 was installed on the International Space Station in December 2017. At the end of the 90-day commissioning phase, responsibility for TSIS-1 operations transitions to the Earth Science Mission Operations (ESMO) project at Goddard for its 5-year operations. NASA contracts with the University of Colorado Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics (LASP) for the design, development and testing of TSIS-1, support for ISS integration, science operations of the TSIS-1 instrument, data processing, data evaluation, calibration and delivery to the Goddard Earth Science Data and Information Services Center (GES DISC).
The Comet Astrobiology Exploration Sample Return (CAESAR) mission will acquire and return to Earth for laboratory analysis a minimum of 80 grams of surface material from the nucleus of comet 67P/Chur-yumov-Gerasimenko (67P). CAESAR will characterize the surface region sampled, preserve the collected sample in a pristine state, and return evolved volatiles by capturing them in a separate gas reservoir. NASA Goddard Space Flight Center provides project management, systems engineering, safety and mission assurance, contamination control, mission operations, and many other important functions. Northrop Grumman Space Systems will build the spacecraft, based on Dawn mission heritage, which like CAESAR, uses solar electric propulsion. CAESAR was selected by for Phase A study in the New Frontiers 4 Competition and will be proposed to New Frontiers 5.Collection of a sample from the surface of comet 67P is facilitated by a set of cameras that together provide images to support sample site selection, perform optical navigation, and document the sample before, during, and after col-lection. The sample is collected at the end of an arm during a 5-second touch-and-go (TAG) maneuver with the Sample Acquisition System (SAS)designed by Honeybee Robotics for the surface properties of comet 67P observed by the Rosetta mission. After sample collection, and while the sample is still cold (< -80°C), the TAG Arm inserts the sample container into the Sample Containment System (SCS) mounted inside the Sample Return Capsule (SRC). The SCS is sealed, preventing the sample from escaping into space. The sample is slowly warmed inside the SCS to enable sublimation of volatiles, which are collected in the Gas Containment System (GCS), a passively cooled gas reservoir. Separating the volatiles from the solid sample protects the solid sample from alteration. Once all sublimated H2O is transferred to the GCS, the GCS is sealed to capture the volatile sit contains, and the SCS is vented to space to maintain the solid sample under vacuum. The SCS vent is closed before Earth entry to prevent atmospheric contamination. Detailed laboratory analyses of the sample from 67P will trace the history of volatile reservoirs, delineate the chemical pathways that led from simple interstellar species to complex molecules, constrain the evolution of the comet, and evaluate the role of comets in delivering water and prebiotic organics to the early Earth. CAESAR will achieve these goals by carrying out coordinated sample analyses that will link macroscopic properties of the comet with microscale mineralogy, chemistry, and isotopic studies of volatiles and solids. Most of the sample (≥75%) will be set aside for analyses by generations of scientists using continually advancing tools and methods, yielding an enduring scientific treasure that only sample return can provide. This presentation will review development conducted during NF4 Phase A and discuss the NF5 mission concept.
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Introducing ATM-X and the partners we have for AAM. Other panelists: - Davis Hackenberg, Manager, AAM Mission Integration Office, NASA HQ - Dr. Misty Davies, Manager, Systems Wide Safety Project, NASA Ames
The measures necessary for achieving higher levels of system safety are analyzed with an eye toward maintaining the combat capability of the Air Force. Several education courses were provided for personnel involved in safety management. Data include: (1) Flight Safety Officer Course, (2) Advanced Safety Program Management, (3) Fundamentals of System Safety, and (4) Quantitative Methods of Safety Analysis.
NASA Vehicle System Safety Technology (VSST) project management uses systems analysis to identify key issues and maintain a portfolio of research leading to potential solutions to its three identified technical challenges. Statistical data and published safety priority lists from academic, industry and other government agencies were reviewed and analyzed by NASA Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) systems analysis personnel to identify issues and future research needs related to one of VSST's technical challenges, Crew Decision Making (CDM). The data examined in the study were obtained from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Aviation Accident and Incident Data System, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Accident/Incident Data System and the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). In addition, this report contains the results of a review of safety priority lists, information databases and other documented references pertaining to aviation crew systems issues and future research needs. The specific sources examined were: Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) Safety Enhancements Reserved for Future Implementation (SERFIs), Flight Deck Automation Issues (FDAI) and NTSB Most Wanted List and Open Recommendations. Various automation issues taxonomies and priority lists pertaining to human factors, automation and flight design were combined to create a list of automation issues related to CDM.
This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract NNC05CA85C, Task 7: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed L-band (960 to 1164 MHz) terrestrial en route communications system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents a preliminary safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the L-band communication system after the technology is chosen and system rollout timing is determined. The security risk analysis resulted in identifying main security threats to the proposed system as well as noting additional threats recommended for a future security analysis conducted at a later stage in the system development process. The document discusses various security controls, including those suggested in the COCR Version 2.0.
This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed C-band (5091- to 5150-MHz) airport surface communication system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents an initial high-level safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the C-band communication system after the profile is finalized and system rollout timing is determined. A security risk assessment has been performed by NASA as a parallel activity. While safety analysis is concerned with a prevention of accidental errors and failures, the security threat analysis focuses on deliberate attacks. Both processes identify the events that affect operation of the system; and from a safety perspective the security threats may present safety risks.
Report discusses safety program implementation for large R&D operating system. Analytical techniques are defined and suggested as tools for identifying potential hazards and determining means to effectively control or eliminate hazards.
Tremendous growth in the uncrewed and remotely piloted vehicle market is expected in low-altitude, uncontrolled airspace, resulting in potential decreases in safety without systems that support monitoring, assessing, and mitigating risk. At NASA, the System-Wide Safety (SWS) project has been developing a suite of data-driven tools to predict hazards so that the potential risks that these hazards pose can be mitigated. Services to predict various hazards have been developed, including battery capacity, proximity to static obstacles, population risks, global positioning system signal strength, radio frequency spectrum interference risk, and vertiport congestion. These services can monitor hazards along a flight path and if any risks posed by these hazards exceed a threshold, the uncrewed aircraft system (UAS) fleet manager can be alerted to mitigate the risk by modifying the flight path, changing the scheduled departure or arrival times, and/or diverting the vehicle to an alternate vertiport. These services were originally developed to monitor and assess risks during flight, but they have been adapted to assess hazard risks prior to departure so that a fleet manager can evaluate the potential risks for a fleet of UAS along their planned flight paths. These services have been integrated into a prototype tool called the Supplemental Data Service Provider-Consolidated Dashboard (SDSP-CD), developed at NASA Ames Research Center. The tool consists of a dashboard which provides a comprehensive overview for a number of risks and a map display that shows the details of the hazards along each flight’s path. Based on the findings from three previous studies, the SDSP-CD has been updated with new design elements and functions. In this paper, we describe lessons learned from the previous studies, changes made to the interface, and the feedback received during a follow-up usability study. Overall, participants reported that there is a substantial benefit of having a fleet manager use a consolidated dashboard to assess hazards for the vehicles in their fleet and to provide situational awareness to potential risks so that they can be mitigated prior to flight. Once the SDSP-CD matures, it will need to be integrated into flight and mission planning tools. Some initial thoughts on how this integration should be accomplished are shared in this paper. Finally, the functional differences between preflight vs. in-flight risk assessment and the differences in fleet manager vs. UAS pilot roles that may require different information and user interactions are discussed.
A qualitative identification of the steps required to assure the incorporation of radiological system safety principles and objectives into all phases of a manned space base program are presented. Specific areas of emphasis include: (1) radiological program management, (2) nuclear system safety plan implementation, (3) impact on program, and (4) summary of the key operation and design guidelines and requirements. The plan clearly indicates the necessity of considering and implementing radiological system safety recommendations as early as possible in the development cycle to assure maximum safety and minimize the impact on design and mission plans.
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This slide presentation reviews the Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) which is a program to promote effective worksite-based safety and health. In the VPP, management, labor, and OSHA establish cooperative relationships at workplaces that have implemented a comprehensive safety and health management system. The history of JSC's Total Health program and the movement from the Safety and Total Health program and the efforts to become certified by OSHA is reviewed.