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At least 127 records · Page 7
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DOE OSTI2026

NM 502 Road Safety Audit Report

The Texas A&M Transportation Institute (TTI) and the Los Alamos National Laboratory - Parking and Transportation Services (LANL) have been working in close collaboration to seek solutions for parking, traffic operations, traffic safety, and transit issues facing LANL. NM 502 is a main route for employee traffic entering the lab as well as traffic in and out of the Los Alamos Townsite. The section of roadway in the vicinity of Camino Entrada is of particular interest as it was the site of two very serious crashes involving the extended LANL family, and it is also the entry point onto NM 502 for Los Alamos County Operations to include the school district and transit vehicles.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
NASA NTRS1991

Mission safety evaluation report for STS-37, postflight edition

STS-37/Atlantis was launched on April 5, 1991 from Kennedy Space Center launch complex 39B at 9:23 a.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST). Launch was delayed 4 minutes 45 seconds because of safety concerns about the low cloud ceiling and the wind direction in the potential blast area. Based on the limited number and type of inflight anomalies encountered, the Space Shuttle operated satisfactorily throughout the STS-37 mission. A contingency EVA was performed by the crew on Flight Day (FD) 3 to free a sticky Gamma Ray Observatory (GRO) high gain antenna, after which the GRO primary payload was successfully deployed by the Orbiter's Remote Manipulator System. The GRO, which weighed just over 35,000 lbs, was the heaviest NASA science satellite ever deployed by the Space Shuttle into low Earth orbit. The scheduled entry/landing on FD 6 was waved off for one day due to high wind conditions at Edwards Air Force Base. Atlantis landed on FD 7, 11 April 1991 on Edwards AFB lakebed runway 33 at 9:55 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time.

Hill, William C.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Crew Factors in Flight Operations XIV: Alertness Management in Regional Flight Operations Education Module

Regional operations encompass a broad range of pilots and equipment. This module is intended to help all those involved in regional aviation, including pilots, schedulers, dispatchers, maintenance technicians, policy makers, and others, to understand the physiological factors underlying fatigue, how flight operations affect fatigue, and what can be done to counteract fatigue and maximize alertness and performance in their operations. The overall purpose of this module is to promote aviation safety, performance, and productivity. It is intended to meet three specific objectives: (1) to explain the current state of knowledge about the physiological mechanisms underlying fatigue; (2) to demonstrate how this knowledge can be applied to improving flight crew sleep, performance, and alertness; and (3) to offer strategies for alertness management. Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) and National Transportation Safety Board (NISH) reports are used throughout this module to demonstrate that fatigue is a safety issue in the regional operations community. The appendices at the end of this module include the ASRS reports used for the examples contained in this publication, brief introductions to sleep disorders and relaxation techniques, summaries of relevant NASA publications, and a list of general readings on sleep, sleep disorders, and circadian rhythms.

Rosekind, Mark R.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Crew Factors in Flight Operations XV: Alertness Management in General Aviation Education Module

Regional operations encompass a broad range of pilots and equipment. This module is intended to help all those involved in regional aviation, including pilots, schedulers, dispatchers, maintenance technicians, policy makers, and others, to understand the physiological factors underlying fatigue, how flight operations affect fatigue, and what can be done to counteract fatigue and maximize alertness and performance in their operations. The overall purpose of this module is to promote aviation safety, performance, and productivity. It is intended to meet three specific objectives: (1) to explain the current state of knowledge about the physiological mechanisms underlying fatigue; (2) to demonstrate how this knowledge can be applied to improving flight crew sleep, performance, and alertness; and (3) to offer strategies for alertness management. Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) and National Transportation Safety Board (NISH) reports are used throughout this module to demonstrate that fatigue is a safety issue in the regional operations community. The appendices at the end of this module include the ASRS reports used for the examples contained in this publication, brief introductions to sleep disorders and relaxation techniques, summaries of relevant NASA publications, and a list of general readings on sleep, sleep disorders, and circadian rhythms.

Rosekind, Mark R.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach for Defining IASMS Services, Functions, and Capabilities

Assuring safety in the NAS with the inclusion of new entrants, such as Advanced Air Mobility (AAM), will require overcoming unique safety challenges that result from combining innovative technologies with novel airspace concepts for moving people and cargo using autonomous vehicles. The focus of the In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) is to overcome AAM’s safety assurance challenges. The IASMS Concept of Operations (ConOps) describes an interconnected set of services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs) designed to manage operational risks, identify unknown risks, and inform system designs. This paper describes an approach for defining SFCs based on technology trends in research, assessment of known and unknown risks in voluntary safety reports, and causal and contributing factors in aviation accidents and incidents. This approach would identify potential SFCs that further expand the Monitor, Assess, and Mitigate (M-A-M) functionality that represents the enabling framework of the IASMS. Safety implications that will result from integration of AAM in the transformation of the National Airspace System (NAS) were addressed in National Academies committees reports on AAM and IASMS. Development of a ConOps for IASMS was a top recommendation and can be represented as a reframing of safety assurance that builds on real-time alerting such as the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System, and adds the more encompassing in-time temporal parameter in recognition of the different timelines for collecting and assessing safety data for risk mitigations. For example, mining for safety trends from data sources such as the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing system occurs over a longer time period. Research on AAM operations poses that SFCs can be designed to monitor the safety margin appropriate for AAM including with regards to the distance between current flight parameters and nominal ideal conditions. These in-time comparisons will become more complex as the density of operations increases at least in certain areas and can include planned and actual 4D trajectory, and in-time comparisons having implications on conflict modeling and prediction including expected and actual departure time, fix/waypoint crossing times, and arrival time. These comparisons would be integrated as part of SFCs that redefine and inform new safety margin. An increased safety margin improves management of operational risks while reducing the potential for anomalies. An increased safety margin also has implications for operator confidence in the certainty of its operations and trust in automation. Technology trends in research could be used to refine existing SFCs and define needs for additional SFCs that provide safety improvements to the design and operation of vehicles, airspace design, and operator performance requirements. NASA is developing innovative approaches to safeguard against major accidents and incidents that have occurred in the NAS and those anticipated with the inclusion of envisioned AAM operations. The innovations use operational performance data to monitor, detect, and predict flight variations exceeding safe nominal patterns, such as would be caused by navigational error, severe weather complications, or hijacking of UAS controls. These innovative approaches have high potential to prevent accidents and incidents in the new AAM era. It is anticipated that elements of the innovations will evolve into SFCs for the IASMS. Voluntary safety reports can be monitored to identify anomalies related to design or operational performance risks. Reports could be periodically monitored and assessed for specific topics. Reports might serve as weak signals or precursors indicative of emergent risk such as when combined with other safety information. The architecture could include SFCs that are based on voluntary safety reports recognizing the periodic temporal nature of data analysis. As previously mentioned, aviation accidents with their causal and contributing precursors can inform the need for SFCs in the IASMS. Accidents and incidents at San Francisco International Airport such as Asiana 214 and Air Canada 759 illustrate how combinations of different factors lead to increased risk. These types of precursors and different factors have implications on the types of SFCs that could be needed to monitor and manage different sources and types of design and operational risk. Continuing to assure the safety of AAM as designs and operations gain in complexity can be accompanied by defining SFCs that also increase in complexity. These SFCs can leverage information from findings and recommendations synthesized across on-going research, voluntary safety reports, and accident and incident reports. These SFCs can serve to refine accuracy of algorithms and resolve limitations with current practices. The IASMS architecture represents the framework for the SFCs and their critical role in safety assurance.

In-Time Aviation Safety Management System↗
NASA NTRS1991

Who or what saved the day? A comparison of traditional and glass cockpits

This study examined incidents reported to NASAs Aviation Safety Reporting System from a different perspective: rather than focusing on the factors contributing to or causing incidents, this study concentrated on who and what (subsystems and information) enabled the recovery from an anomaly. Incident reports describing altitude deviations were classified as to cockpit type (glass or traditional), flight phase, agent restoring safety, and cockpit subsystems providing specific information that helped restore safety. The data revealed and quantified the agents, information, and factors that 'saved the day'. The flight crews used many sources of information to detect the altitude deviations: altimeter, outside scene, altitude alert, kinesthesia, attitude and communications monitoring. In the glass cockpits the crews also used the map display and autothrottles to detect deviations from assigned altitudes. There was an interaction between the person detecting the anomaly (controller/flight crew) and the type of cockpit. Glass cockpit flight crews detect proportionally more deviations than their counterparts in traditional cockpits, while controllers tend to detect more deviations involving traditional cockpits. There was no effect of cockpit position (captain/first officer). A model that details the flow of altitude information between air traffic control, flight crews, and cockpit subsystems, was developed and validated. This model identifies strengths and weaknesses in the flow of altitude information within the current ground/air system.

Degani, Asaf↗
NASA NTRS1991

Mission safety evaluation report for STS-48, postflight edition

Space Shuttle Discovery was launched into a 57 deg inclination orbit from the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Launch Complex 39A at 7:11 p.m. EDT on 12 Sep. 1991. STS-48 was the second mission since return-to-flight to have KSC as the planned end-of-mission landing site, and the first mission to have a planned night landing at KSC. However, due to weather conditions at KSC, Discovery flew one extra orbit and landed at Edwards AFB, Calif. at 3:38 a.m. EDT on 18 Sep. 1991. Operation of all systems was generally satisfactory during the 5 day mission. On flight day 3, the Upper Atmospheric Research Satellite (UARS) was deployed from Discovery's payload bay 350 statute miles above Earth. This orbiting observatory will study mankind's effects on the planet's atmosphere and its shielding ozone layer. STS-48 safety risk factors are addressed that represent a change from previous flights, factors from previous flights that had an impact on this flight, and factors that are unique to this flight.

Clatterbuck, Guy E.↗
NASA NTRS1981

A review of in-flight emergencies in the ASRS data base

A series of 154 in-flight emergencies as reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System are described. The various types of emergencies are examined and an attempt is made to determine the human errors and other factors associated with each incident, as well as the measures taken to resolve the emergency. It is concluded that nearly one half of those emergencies reported were related to failure or malfunction of aircraft subsystems. Of all the emergencies, nearly one quarter were associated with power plant failure. Other frequently encountered emergency types are associated with operation in instrument meteorological conditions without appropriate clearance or qualification, and with low fuel state situations. Human error is prominently featured in many of the incidents, appearing in the actions of pilots and air traffic controllers.

Porter, R. F.↗
NASA NTRS1981

Operational problems experienced by single pilots in instrument meteorological conditions

The development and implementation of a search strategy to extract pertinent reports from the Aviation Safety Reporting System-2 (ASRS-2) database are described. For any particular occurence to be pertinent to the study, it must have satisfied the following conditions: the aircraft must be of the type usually flown by a single pilot; operation on an IFR flight plan in instrument meteorological conditions; pilot experienced an operational problem. The occurances consist of reports by the pilot about his own performance, by the pilot about the system performance, or by an air traffic controller about a pilot's performance.

Weislogel, S.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Mission safety evaluation report for STS-39, postflight edition

After a delay of approximately 2 months due to a rollback from the pad to replace the External Tank door lug housing, Space Shuttle Discovery was launched from NASA-Kennedy at 7:33 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time on 28 April 1991. STS-39 was the first unclassified DoD Shuttle mission. On 28 April, countdown proceeded normally through the T-20 minute hold. No significant problems were encountered except for the Operations Sequence-2 recorder starting unexpectedly; it was stopped by an uplink command. Discovery landed on KSC runway 15 at 2:55 p.m. EDT on 6 May 1991. This was the second time in 6 months that the Space Shuttle was diverted to KSC for landing because of high winds at Edwards AFB, Calif. This was also the 7th of 40 Shuttle missions to land at KSC in the history of the Space Shuttle Program. The Main Landing Gear outer right tire shredded 3 of the 16 cords due to either an uneven landing or a maximum force breaking test during rollout. Contributing factors to the tire cord shredding were the development of last minute crosswinds and reluctance of the ground controllers to distract the Shuttle pilots with warnings of the low flight path. As a corrective action, communication procedures will be modified for future flights.

Hardie, Kenneth O.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Mission safety evaluation report for STS-38, postflight edition

After several months delay due to Liquid Hydrogen (LH2) leaks in the External Tank (ET) 17 in LH2 umbilical disconnect, Atlantis was launched at 6:48 p.m. Eastern Standard Time on 15 Nov. 1990. Atlantis was cleared for launch after the replacement of the ET 17 in umbilical disconnect and a successful tanking test on 24 Oct. 1990. No technical concerns were encountered during the countdown. The end of the STS-38 mission was extended by one day because of high crosswinds at the primary landing site, Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB), Calif. On the next day, 20 Nov. 1990, the winds were too high for a safe landing at EAFB, and a decision was made to select the Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) at the primary landing site. The deorbit burn was performed on orbit 79 of the STS-38 mission. Reentry and descent were effected with no problems. Postlanding inspection of Atlantis' exterior found little evidence of damage. There has been a concern about returning an Orbiter to KSC, because the last mission to do so experienced tire failure. Atlantis' tires and brakes were in excellent condition with no indication of excessive wear.

Hill, William C.↗
NASA NTRS1995

"Oops, It didn't arm." - A Case Study of Two Automation Assisted Altitude Deviations

Altitude deviations are the most common pilot error reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. Last year, altitude deviations were reported to the ASRS at the rate of about one per hour. The reporting pilot's narrative is usually our only source of information about what happened in these incidents. In a recent line-oriented, simulator study, twenty-two airline crews flew a realistic, two-hour mission in a DC-9 and an MD-88 aircraft. This paper will describe and analyze two of the five altitude deviations that were observed during this study. The paper focuses on the flight crews' use (or misuse) of the autopilot and autothrottle during these incidents.

Plamer, Everett↗
NASA NTRS1997

Identification of Error Patterns in Terminal-Area ATC Communications

Advancing air traffic management technologies have enabled a greater number of aircraft to use the same airspace more effectively. As aircraft separations are reduced and final approaches are more finely timed, there is less room for error. The present study examined 122 terminal-area, loss-of-separation and procedure violation incidents reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) by air traffic controllers. Narrative description codes were used for the incidents for type of violation, contributing factors, recovery strategies, and consequences. Usually multiple errors occurred prior to the violation. Error sequences were analyzed and common patterns of errors were identified. In half of the incidents, errors were noticed in time to correct mistakes. Of these, almost 43% committed additional errors during the recovery attempt. This analysis shows that redundancies in the present air traffic control system may not be sufficient to support large increases in traffic density. Error prevention and design considerations for air traffic management systems are discussed.

Quinn, Cheryl↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Part 121 Low Altitude Events: An Analysis of ASRS Reports

This presentation provides an aviation SME's human factors analysis of selected Low Altitude and Controlled Flight Towards Terrain (CFTT) events involving Part 121 air carriers as reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS).

low altitude↗