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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 127 records · Page 7
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1998

Overview of the X-33 Extended Flight Test Range

On July 1, 1996, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration signed a Cooperative Agreement No. NCC8-115 with Lockheed Martin Skunk Works to develop and flight test the X-33, a scaled version of a reusable launch vehicle. The development of an Extended Test Range, with range instrumentation providing continuous vehicle communications from Edwards Air Force Base Ca. to landing at Malmstrom Air Force Base Montana, was required to flight test the mach 15 vehicle over 950 nautical miles. The cooperative agreement approach makes Lockheed Martin Skunk Works responsible for the X-33 program. When additional Government help was required, Lockheed "subcontracted" to NASA Field Centers for certain work. It was through this mechanism that Dryden Flight Research Center became responsible for the Extended Test Range. The Extended Test Range Requirements come from two main sources: 1) Range Safety and 2) Lockheed Martin Skunk Works. The range safety requirements were the most challenging to define and meet. The X-33 represents a vehicle that launches like a rocket, reenters the atmosphere and lands autonomously like an aircraft. Historically, rockets have been launched over the oceans to allow failed rockets to be destroyed using explosive devices. Such approaches had to be reconsidered for the X-33 flying over land. Numerous range requirements come from Lockheed Martin Skunk Works for interface definitions with the vehicle communication subsystems and the primary ground operations center, defined the Operations Control Center. Another area of considerable interest was the reentry plasma shield that causes "blackout" of the radio frequency signals, such as the range safety commands. Significant work was spent to analyze and model the blackout problem using a cooperative team of experts from across the country. The paper describes the Extended Test Range a, an unique Government/industry team of personnel and range assets was established to resolve design issues and accomplish the X-33 requirements. The paper will also provide an overview of the technical approaches used to meet program requirements. The advances used to develop the extended test range will be discussed to show how other hypersonic and Access to Space programs can benefit from the development of the extended test range. Acknowledgment: The work described in this paper was NASA supported through cooperative agreement NCC8-115 with Lockheed Martin Skunk Works.

Mackall, D.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Appendix A: NAS-Wide Encounter Rate Evaluation Using Historical Radar Data and the Airspace Concept Evaluation System (ACES)

Regulations that establish operational and performance requirements for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are being developed by a consortium of government, industry and academic institutions. Those requirements will apply to detect-and-avoid (DAA) systems and other equipment necessary to integrate UAS with the National Airspace System (NAS) and are determined according to their contribution to the overall level of safety required to operate in the airspace. Several key gaps must be addressed in order to link equipment requirements to an airspace level of safety. Foremost among these is the calculation of the relative effectiveness of a particular system to mitigate violations of a separation standard with other aircraft, which is known as the systems risk ratio. The risk ratio is calculated as the probability of mid-air collision with a DAA system divided by the probability of mid-air collision without a DAA system. The risk ratio of a DAA system, in combination with the risk ratios of other collision avoidance mitigations, will determine the overall safety of the airspace measured in terms of the number of mid-air collisions per flight hour. Defining the required risk ratio that the DAA system needs to ensure the safety of the airspace requires an evaluation of the current airspace and a simulated evaluation that incorporates UAS aerodynamic performance and the mission characteristics of future UAS operations that are projected to be conducted in areas that interact with current operations. These evaluations will produce the frequency of encounters that currently exist in the airspace and those that could be generated with the introduction of UAS. Together, the frequency of encounters, an evaluation of unmitigated risk of collision, and a desired level of safety of the airspace will yield a required risk ratio of the DAA system. This study will focus on evaluating the encounter rates between aircraft based on historical radar data and encounter rates that could occur based on simulated UAS missions.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems↗
NASA NTRS1982

The design and development of a rectangular, shingle-type photovoltaic module

A shingle-type photovoltaic module has been designed and developed to meet the requirements of specifications for residential applications. The module is ideally suited for installation directly to the sheathing of a sloping, south-facing roof of a residential, industrial, or commercial building. The design requirements are examined, taking into account also module safety requirements. Aspects of module design and analysis are discussed, giving attention to installation details, solar cells and electrical circuit design, the encapsulation system, substrate lamination, and the module-to-module interconnecting cable. Details of module assembly experience and test and outdoor exposure experience are also considered.

Shepard, N. F., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS1993

Development of a software safety process and a case study of its use

The goal of this research is to continue the development of a comprehensive approach to software safety and to evaluate the approach with a case study. The case study is a major part of the project, and it involves the analysis of a specific safety-critical system from the medical equipment domain. The particular application being used was selected because of the availability of a suitable candidate system. We consider the results to be generally applicable and in no way particularly limited by the domain. The research is concentrating on issues raised by the specification and verification phases of the software lifecycle since they are central to our previously-developed rigorous definitions of software safety. The theoretical research is based on our framework of definitions for software safety. In the area of specification, the main topics being investigated are the development of techniques for building system fault trees that correctly incorporate software issues and the development of rigorous techniques for the preparation of software safety specifications. The research results are documented. Another area of theoretical investigation is the development of verification methods tailored to the characteristics of safety requirements. Verification of the correct implementation of the safety specification is central to the goal of establishing safe software. The empirical component of this research is focusing on a case study in order to provide detailed characterizations of the issues as they appear in practice, and to provide a testbed for the evaluation of various existing and new theoretical results, tools, and techniques. The Magnetic Stereotaxis System is summarized.

Knight, John C.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Automated documentation generator for advanced protein crystal growth

To achieve an environment less dependent on the flow of paper, automated techniques of data storage and retrieval must be utilized. This software system, 'Automated Payload Experiment Tool,' seeks to provide a knowledge-based, hypertext environment for the development of NASA documentation. Once developed, the final system should be able to guide a Principal Investigator through the documentation process in a more timely and efficient manner, while supplying more accurate information to the NASA payload developer. The current system is designed for the development of the Science Requirements Document (SRD), the Experiment Requirements Document (ERD), the Project Plan, and the Safety Requirements Document.

Maddux, Gary A.↗
NASA NTRS2016

The Evolution of the NASA Commercial Crew Program Mission Assurance Process

In 2010, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) established the Commercial Crew Program (CCP) in order to provide human access to the International Space Station and low Earth orbit via the commercial (non-governmental) sector. A particular challenge to NASA has been how to determine that the Commercial Provider's transportation system complies with programmatic safety requirements. The process used in this determination is the Safety Technical Review Board which reviews and approves provider submitted hazard reports. One significant product of the review is a set of hazard control verifications. In past NASA programs, 100% of these safety critical verifications were typically confirmed by NASA. The traditional Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) model does not support the nature of the CCP. To that end, NASA S&MA is implementing a Risk Based Assurance process to determine which hazard control verifications require NASA authentication. Additionally, a Shared Assurance Model is also being developed to efficiently use the available resources to execute the verifications.

Mission Assurance↗
NASA NTRS1978

Carbon Monoxide Sensor

The fuel cell is a system which employs an electrochemical process to convert gases- J such as hydrogen and oxygen directly into electricity. Under NASA sponsorship, GE's Aircraft Equipment Division developed fuel cells to supply electrical power for the Gemini and Biosatellite spacecraft of the sixties and is currently working on advanced fuel cell development. This long-term effort has resulted in a series of spinoff applications using the same general technology for a variety of purposes, among them the recently marketed Dosimeter. The Dosimeter is designed to help users meet safety requirements for industrial atmospheres, as specified by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and other regulatory agencies. The compact, pocket-sized sensor measures personnel exposure to carbon monoxide and provides both a visual and an audible alarm if the concentration of the gas exceeds present levels. The Dosimeter offers substantial improvement in measuring accuracy over earlier warning indicators.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2015

A Battery Certification Testbed for Small Satellite Missions

A battery pack consisting of standard cylindrical 18650 lithium-ion cells has been chosen for small satellite missions based on previous flight heritage and compliance with NASA battery safety requirements. However, for batteries that transit through the International Space Station (ISS), additional certification tests are required for individual cells as well as the battery packs. In this manuscript, we discuss the development of generalized testbeds for testing and certifying different types of batteries critical to small satellite missions. Test procedures developed and executed for this certification effort include: a detailed physical inspection before and after experiments; electrical cycling characterization at the cell and pack levels; battery-pack overcharge, over-discharge, external short testing; battery-pack vacuum leak and vibration testing. The overall goals of these certification procedures are to conform to requirements set forth by the agency and identify unique safety hazards. The testbeds, procedures, and experimental results are discussed for batteries chosen for small satellite missions to be launched from the ISS.

Certification↗
NASA NTRS2020

Electromagnetic Compatibility Considerations for International Space Station Payload Developers

The International Space Station (ISS) is a laboratory for scientific research, innovative technology development, and global education. The ISS provides a number of facilities and platforms for payload developers and investigators to conduct biological, microgravity, and Earth and space observation science, as well as for performing technology development. Due to the unique nature of the ISS vehicle and its electrical power and data systems, achieving electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) with the vehicle requires special considerations by the payload developer. The ISS electromagnetic interference (EMI) requirements and test methods are based on MIL-STD-461, “Electromagnetic Emissions and Susceptibility Requirements for the Control of Electromagnetic Interference”, Revision C, and MIL-STD-462, “Electromagnetic Interference Characteristics, Measurement of,” respectively. The low source impedance of the test setup requires special considerations when designing or selecting EMI power filters and switched mode power supplies. Many filters, suited for later revisions of MIL-STD-461, will result in non-compliant designs. ISS electrical power system power quality requirements, imposed to protect the stability of the system, can also affect EMI filter design. The selection and use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment for ISS applications requires special considerations to meet both EMC and crew safety requirements. Furthermore, the ISS environment can provide unique immunity challenges; if the payload developer ignores these challenges, the result is a possible loss of science or impact to technology demonstration. The ISS provides a unique opportunity for the science and technology development community. However, in order to be successful, the payload developer must incorporate special EMC considerations, many of which will be presented.

McCollum, Matthew↗
NASA NTRS1975

Systems cost performance analysis (study 2.3). Volume 1: Executive summary

A methodology for developing balanced designs of spacecraft subsystems which interrelates cost, performance, safety, and schedule considerations was developed. The methodology consists of a two-step process: selection of all hardware designs which satisfy the given performance and safety requirements; and estimating the cost and schedule required to design, build, and operate each spacecraft design. Aggregate equations were written to describe the performance, safety (reliability), cost, and schedule required for one type of stabilization and control subsystem in terms of the equipment used. The methodology was applied to unmanned, automated spacecraft subsystems, and the resulting model was implemented as a digital computer program.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2018

Optimization of Second Fault Detection Thresholds to Maximize Mission Probability of Success

In order to support manned spaceflight safety requirements, the Space Launch System (SLS) has defined program-level requirements for key systems to ensure successful operation under single fault conditions. The SLS program has also levied requirements relating to the capability of the Inertial Navigation System to detect a second fault. This detection functionality is required in order to feed abort analysis and ensure crew safety. Increases in navigation state error due to sensor faults in a purely inertial system can drive the vehicle outside of its operational as-designed environmental and performance envelope. As this performance outside of first fault detections is defined and controlled at the vehicle level, it allows for the use of system level margins to increase probability of mission success on the operational edges of the design. A top-down approach is utilized to assess vehicle sensitivity to second sensor faults. A wide range of failure scenarios in terms of both fault magnitude and time is used for assessment. The approach also utilizes a schedule to change fault detection thresholds autonomously. These individual values are optimized along a nominal trajectory in order to maximize probability of mission success in terms of system-level insertion requirements while minimizing the probability of false positives. This paper will describe an approach integrating Genetic Algorithms and Monte Carlo analysis to tune the threshold parameters to maximize vehicle resilience to second fault events over an ascent mission profile. The analysis approach and performance assessment and verification will be presented to demonstrate the applicability of this approach to second fault detection optimization to maximize mission probability of success through taking advantage of existing margin.

Anzalone, Evan J.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Optimization of Second Fault Detection Thresholds to Maximize Mission POS

In order to support manned spaceflight safety requirements, the Space Launch System (SLS) has defined program-level requirements for key systems to ensure successful operation under single fault conditions. To accommodate this with regards to Navigation, the SLS utilizes an internally redundant Inertial Navigation System (INS) with built-in capability to detect, isolate, and recover from first failure conditions and still maintain adherence to performance requirements. The unit utilizes multiple hardware- and software-level techniques to enable detection, isolation, and recovery from these events in terms of its built-in Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR) algorithms. Successful operation is defined in terms of sufficient navigation accuracy at insertion while operating under worst case single sensor outages (gyroscope and accelerometer faults at launch). In addition to first fault detection and recovery, the SLS program has also levied requirements relating to the capability of the INS to detect a second fault, tracking any unacceptable uncertainty in knowledge of the vehicle's state. This detection functionality is required in order to feed abort analysis and ensure crew safety. Increases in navigation state error and sensor faults can drive the vehicle outside of its operational as-designed environments and outside of its performance envelope causing loss of mission, or worse, loss of crew. The criteria for operation under second faults allows for a larger set of achievable missions in terms of potential fault conditions, due to the INS operating at the edge of its capability. As this performance is defined and controlled at the vehicle level, it allows for the use of system level margins to increase probability of mission success on the operational edges of the design space. Due to the implications of the vehicle response to abort conditions (such as a potentially failed INS), it is important to consider a wide range of failure scenarios in terms of both magnitude and time. As such, the Navigation team is taking advantage of the INS's capability to schedule and change fault detection thresholds in flight. These values are optimized along a nominal trajectory in order to maximize probability of mission success, and reducing the probability of false positives (defined as when the INS would report a second fault condition resulting in loss of mission, but the vehicle would still meet insertion requirements within system-level margins). This paper will describe an optimization approach using Genetic Algorithms to tune the threshold parameters to maximize vehicle resilience to second fault events as a function of potential fault magnitude and time of fault over an ascent mission profile. The analysis approach, and performance assessment of the results will be presented to demonstrate the applicability of this process to second fault detection to maximize mission probability of success.

Anzalone, Evan↗
DOE OSTI2021

Calculated Roughness Changes due to Clear-Cutting At Savannah River Site

At the Savannah River Site (SRS), multiple facilities are routinely producing and working with radiological constituents which require safety basis modeling by the National Nuclear Safety Administration. The models used to determine the safety basis employ roughness length as an input parameter which describes the roughness of the ground surface which influences momentum exchange near the surface and the subsequent generation of mechanical turbulence. Because roughness length is dependent on surface characteristics, including vegetation, any changes to the surface would have a subsequent impact on the roughness length and require a new safety basis analysis to be performed. An analysis of measurements prior to and after the dear-cuts and thinning was performed and roughness lengths were calculated for each of sixteen wind sectors. Not all sectors contained dear-cuts, so this provides comparison of natural variations in roughness. Based on the results of the estimated changes, consideration will be given to how these changes may affect atmospheric dispersion modeling. It was found that clear-cutting activities generally led to a reduction in roughness. Reductions in roughness length also occurred in some of the wind sectors containing only undisturbed forest, but those in sectors with dear-cuts were found to be slightly greater in magnitude than natural variation. Only in one instance was the change in roughness length found to exceed a decrease of 10%, indicating that there is no significant safety basis to the site as a whole based on previous clear-cutting activities.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
NASA NTRS1989

Historical overview of the US use of space nuclear power

Since 1961, the United States has successfully flown 35 space nuclear power sources on 20 space systems. These space systems have included the Apollo, Pioneer, Viking and Voyager spacecraft launched by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and navigation and communications satellites launched by the Department of Defense. These power sources performed as planned and i8n many cases exceeded their power requirements and/or lifetimes. All of the power sources met their safety requirements. This paper surveys past uses of space nuclear power in the US and thus serves as a historical framework for other papers in this Conference dealing with future US applications of space nuclear power.

Bennett, Gary L.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Orion GN&C Fault Management System Verification: Scope And Methodology

In order to ensure long-term ability to meet mission goals and to provide for the safety of the public, ground personnel, and any crew members, nearly all spacecraft include a fault management (FM) system. For a manned vehicle such as Orion, the safety of the crew is of paramount importance. The goal of the Orion Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) fault management system is to detect, isolate, and respond to faults before they can result in harm to the human crew or loss of the spacecraft. Verification of fault management/fault protection capability is challenging due to the large number of possible faults in a complex spacecraft, the inherent unpredictability of faults, the complexity of interactions among the various spacecraft components, and the inability to easily quantify human reactions to failure scenarios. The Orion GN&C Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR) team has developed a methodology for bounding the scope of FM system verification while ensuring sufficient coverage of the failure space and providing high confidence that the fault management system meets all safety requirements. The methodology utilizes a swarm search algorithm to identify failure cases that can result in catastrophic loss of the crew or the vehicle and rare event sequential Monte Carlo to verify safety and FDIR performance requirements.

Brown, Denise↗
NASA NTRS2008

Quo Vadis Payload Safety?

As we complete the preparations for the fourth Hubble Space Telescope (HST) servicing mission, we note an anniversary approaching: it was 30 years ago in July that the first HST payload safety review panel meeting was held. This, in turn, was just over a year after the very first payload safety review, a Phase 0 review for the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite and its Inertial Upper Stage, held in June of 1977. In adapting a process that had been used in the review and certification of earlier Skylab payloads, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) engineers sought to preserve the lessons learned in the development of technical payload safety requirements, while creating a new process that would serve the very different needs of the new space shuttle program. Their success in this undertaking is substantiated by the fact that this process and these requirements have proven to be remarkably robust, flexible, and adaptable. Furthermore, the payload safety process has, to date, served us well in the critical mission of safeguarding our astronauts, cosmonauts, and spaceflight participants. Both the technical requirements and their interpretation, as well as the associated process requirements have grown, evolved, been streamlined, and have been adapted to fit multiple programs, including the International Space Station (ISS) program, the Shuttle/Mir program, and most recently the United States Constellation program. From its earliest days, it was anticipated that the payload safety process would be international in scope, and so it has been. European Space Agency (ESA), Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), German Space Agency (DLR), Canadian Space Agency (CSA), Russian Space Agency (RSA), and many additional countries have flown payloads on both the space shuttle and on the ISS. Our close cooperation and long-term working relationships have culminated in the franchising of the payload safety review process itself to our partners in ESA, which in turn will serve as a roadmap for extending the franchise to other Partners.

Fodroci, Michael P.↗
DOE OSTI2024

MARVEL Reactor Fuel Performance Report (Rev.2)

The Microreactor Applications Research Validation and EvaLuation (MARVEL) project is producing a high temperature liquid metal-cooled nuclear test bed at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to ultimately improve the integration of microreactors to end-user applications. This ambitious effort seeks to design, authorize, construct, test, and operate the reactor within five years. In order to construct and operate the MARVEL reactor in a timely manner, the system will utilize materials and component designs which have already been used, qualified, or licensed from previous reactors. The MARVEL reactor will be located at the INL Transient Reactor Test (TREAT) facility in the north high-bay equipment pit and will use the existing 304 stainless steel-clad U-ZrH1.6 pin-type fuel system developed by General Atomics and purchased from TRIGA International. This fuel has been previously qualified under the United States Department of Energy’s (US DOE) Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program. Even though the regulator of the MARVEL reactor is the US DOE, the standards and overall approach recommended by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is well-defined and utilized here. Following NUREG-1537 regulatory guidance, this report documents the authorization case for the MARVEL fuel system’s application to MARVEL and establishes stable and predictable fuel performance during the most thermophysically unfavorable conditions achievable in the MARVEL reactor. To that end, this report provides a comprehensive survey of the known thermophysical properties, performance, and quantitative relationships associated with the MARVEL reactor fuel element and uses this information to determine its mechanical integrity and risk of reaching unacceptable conditions during the most extreme accident scenarios predicted for the reactor using the most conservative assumptions available. The information contained herein is compiled from a combination of historical reports and peer reviewed scientific publication manuscripts. Known mechanisms under which the fuel is susceptible to failure are highlighted and compared to conditions that could exist in the MARVEL reactor during an unanticipated transient or accident scenario. The two scenarios considered for analysis in this report are (1) an unprotected loss of flow accident and (2) a hypothetical unprotected loss of coolant accident during the loss of flow accident. Preliminary 2D steady-state analyses herein indicate that both fuel-cladding chemical interactions and fuel-cladding mechanical interactions are negligible throughout the fuel’s operational cycle under both normal and high temperature accident scenario conditions. Although higher fidelity 3D time-dependent modeling and simulations are planned, the following may be concluded presently. The MARVEL fuel element maintains its geometric stability and structural integrity during the most extreme accident scenarios predicted for the MARVEL reactor. The hoop stress during the unprotected loss of flow accident reaches about -1.27 MPa; this negative stress indicates that it is compressive rather than tensile. The compressive stress is a result of the NaK pressure on the outside of the fuel element, caused by the restricted thermal expansion of the NaK coolant, exceeding the internal pressures generated inside of the fuel element. The hoop stress generated in the cladding during the unprotected loss of coolant accident reaches a maximum of about approximately 10 MPa, which is nearly an order of magnitude less than the predicted yield strength of the cladding under high-temperature accident scenario conditions. Calculations were compared with results from high performance computational simulations using BISON and are in very close agreement. A conservative MARVEL fuel meat peak temperature limit of 900 °C is recommended presently, which is about 180 °C higher than the peak fuel temperature predicted to occur during the most extreme accident. Based on the known properties and behavior of the MARVEL fuel element, the fuel successfully meets its design and safety requirements under normal and most extreme accident conditions with a large safety margin.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗