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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 127 records · Page 7

State Regulatory Authority (SRA) Coordination of Safety, Security, and Safeguards of Nuclear Facilities: A Framework for Analysis

This paper will explore the development of a framework for conducting an assessment of safety-security-safeguards integration within a State. The goal is to examine State regulatory structures to identify conflicts and gaps that hinder management of the three disciplines at nuclear facilities. Such an analysis could be performed by a State Regulatory Authority (SRA) to provide a self-assessment or as part of technical cooperation with either a newcomer State, or to a State with a fully developed SRA.

3S↗

Integrating PCTRAN with AI-Driven Host-Intrusion Detection and Secured Container Systems for Advanced Malware Analysis (Summer Internship Report)

This study presents a solution for enhancing the security of the Personal Computer Transient Analyzer (PCTRAN) PC-based Nuclear Power Plant Simulator by integrating the software with an artificial intelligence (AI)-driven host-intrusion detection system (HIDS), in addition to a secured container system, for malware analysis. PCTRAN is a Windows XP-based software package that has the ability to simulate a variety of accident and transient conditions for nuclear power plants (NPPs). It offers a high-resolution replica of the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) and displays the status of important parameters allowing for operator interaction. By including AI-driven HIDS for the NSSS, the framework can identify security threats in real-time, ensuring the integrity of the nuclear simulation environment. Additionally, the secured container system offers the ability to isolate and analyze malware, preventing potential threats from affecting core systems. The integration process involves extensive testing and validation in order to ensure accuracy, reliability, and compliance with security policies. This framework sets a new precedent for secure simulation and training in NPP operations, and offers insight for future advancements in cybersecurity.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Integration of the advanced transparency framework to advanced nuclear systems : enhancing Safety, Operations, Security and Safeguards (SOSS).

The advent of the nuclear renaissance gives rise to a concern for the effective design of nuclear fuel cycle systems that are safe, secure, nonproliferating and cost-effective. We propose to integrate the monitoring of the four major factors of nuclear facilities by focusing on the interactions between Safeguards, Operations, Security, and Safety (SOSS). We proposed to develop a framework that monitors process information continuously and can demonstrate the ability to enhance safety, operations, security, and safeguards by measuring and reducing relevant SOSS risks, thus ensuring the safe and legitimate use of the nuclear fuel cycle facility. A real-time comparison between expected and observed operations provides the foundation for the calculation of SOSS risk. The automation of new nuclear facilities requiring minimal manual operation provides an opportunity to utilize the abundance of process information for monitoring SOSS risk. A framework that monitors process information continuously can lead to greater transparency of nuclear fuel cycle activities and can demonstrate the ability to enhance the safety, operations, security and safeguards associated with the functioning of the nuclear fuel cycle facility. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has developed a risk algorithm for safeguards and is in the process of demonstrating the ability to monitor operational signals in real-time though a cooperative research project with the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). The risk algorithms for safety, operations and security are under development. The next stage of this work will be to integrate the four algorithms into a single framework.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Deception used for Cyber Defense of Control Systems

Control system cyber security defense mechanisms may employ deception to make it more difficult for attackers to plan and execute successful attacks. These deceptive defense mechanisms are organized and initially explored according to a specific deception taxonomy and the seven abstract dimensions of security previously proposed as a framework for the cyber security of control systems.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

ITIL{sup ®} and information security

This paper discusses the context of ITIL framework and management of information security. It is therefore a summary study, where the first part is focused on the safety objectives in connection with the ITIL framework. First of all, there is a focus on ITIL process ISM (Information Security Management), its principle and system management. The conclusion is about link between standards, which are related to security, and ITIL framework.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Collaborative Knowledge Discovery & Marshalling for Intelligence & Security Applications

This paper discusses the Knowledge Encapsulation Framework, a flexible, extensible evidence-marshalling environment built upon a natural language processing pipeline and exposed to users via an open-source semantic wiki. We focus our discussion on applications of the framework to intelligence and security applications, specifically, an instantiation of the KEF environment for researching illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Advanced Reactor Designs Security Analysis, Risk, and Recommendations: Risks, Consequences, and Possible by-Design Mitigation Approaches Associated with Select Advanced Reactors

Next-generation advanced reactors (ARs) incorporate enhanced safety systems, have smaller source terms, and feature compact modular designs, which should lessen their collective risk profiles. However, to fully evaluate risk, security needs to be a part of the equation. Without taking security into consideration, safety systems and components in the new ARs may be vulnerable to sabotage. These base attributes, coupled with enhanced security features specific to AR design through sound engineering and security-by-design (SeBD), should provide developers and operators with lower inherent security risk profiles. Building security early into the AR design may remove or passively secure potential critical targets from an adversary’s reach , thereby increasing overall safety and security. An integrated approach and diverse design team that includes engineering, operations, and security experts are fundamental to building security into the design without sacrificing fundamental operational efficiencies and principles. The objective of this project was to evaluate the security and safety interfaces for five classes of reactors, identify potential security vulnerabilities of structures, systems, and components (SSC), and underscore the need to consider security alongside safety in the design o f these concepts. The five reactor classes evaluated in this project and presented in this report are molten-salt reactors (MSR), high temperature gas reactors (HTGR), sodium-fast reactors (SFR), advanced light-water reactors (ALWR), and microreactors. These designs were selected because they reflect the concepts that are closest to market deployment and have received significant resource investments from the public and private sector. This project assesses the inherent security risks posed by common classes of ARs, provides a methodology and framework to assess security along with safety, and offers an analysis of potential mitigation strategies that could be incorporated. For each AR technology, the SSCs that relate to radionuclide source safety functions are discussed to understand the SSC contribution to safety and relative importance in the protective strategy for the design. The assumptions that went into evaluating each reactor concept originated from generic publicly available nonproprietary information and should not directly be used to qualify an absolute risk profile nor to rank specific AR designs. Instead, the purpose of the analysis is to understand and compare the generic inherent security risks of different AR technologies.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

Towards secure virtual directories : a risk analysis framework.

Directory services are used by almost every enterprise computing environment to provide data concerning users, computers, contacts, and other objects. Virtual directories are components that provide directory services in a highly customized manner. Unfortunately, though the use of virtual directory services are widespread, an analysis of risks posed by their unique position and architecture has not been completed. We present a detailed analysis of six attacks to virtual directory services, including steps for detection and prevention. We also describe various categories of attack risks, and discuss what is necessary to launch an attack on virtual directories. Finally, we present a framework to use in analyzing risks to individual enterprise computing virtual directory instances. We show how to apply this framework to an example implementation, and discuss the benefits of doing so.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

A Secure and Adaptive Hierarchical Multi-Timescale Framework for Resilient Load Restoration Using a Community Microgrid

Distribution system integrated community microgrids (CMGs) can partake in restoring loads during extended duration outages. At such times, the CMGs are challenged with limited resource availability, absence of robust grid support, and heightened demand-supply uncertainty. Here, this paper proposes a secure and adaptive three-stage hierarchical multi-timescale framework for scheduling and real-time (RT) dispatch of CMGs with hybrid PV systems to address these challenges. The framework enables the CMG to dynamically expand its boundary to support the neighboring grid sections and is adaptive to the changing forecast error impacts. The first stage solves a stochastic extended duration scheduling (EDS) problem to obtain referral plans for optimal resource rationing. The intermediate near-real-time (NRT) scheduling stage updates the EDS schedule closer to the dispatch time using new obtained forecasts, followed by the RT dispatch stage. To make the decisions more secure and robust against forecast errors, a novel concept called delayed recourse is designed. The approach is evaluated via numerical simulations on a modified IEEE 123-bus system and validated using OpenDSS and hardware-in-loop simulations. The results show superior performance in maximizing load supply and continuous secure distribution network operation under different operating scenarios.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Incentivizing Cyber Security Investment in the Power Sector Using An Extended Cyber Insurance Framework

Collaboration between the DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and public- sector partners has revealed that a dearth of cyber- incident data combined with the unpredictability of cyber attacks have contributed to a shortfall in first-party cyber insurance protection in the critical infrastructure community. This research explores the foundations of insurance theory and adopts behavioral manipulation methods to incentivize cyber-security investment. We validate the model by applying power industry performance data from 2013-2015 to assess risk facing the industry. Results show that the model can successfully discriminate between individual power companies as well as geographic regions on the basis of risk and can recommend cyber risk- management strategies tailored to individual risk profiles. Here, the adoption of this framework could invite more market participation, which will create a more robust cyber- incident reporting environment, contributing directly to the DHS goal of creating a national cyber- incident data repository.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

A Framework for Federated Two-Factor Authentication Enabling Cost-Effective Secure Access to Distributed Cyberinfrastructure

As cyber attacks become increasingly sophisticated, the security measures used to mitigate the risks must also increase in sophistication. One time password (OTP) systems provide strong authentication because security credentials are not reusable, thus thwarting credential replay attacks. The credential changes regularly, making brute-force attacks significantly more difficult. In high performance computing, end users may require access to resources housed at several different service provider locations. The ability to share a strong token between multiple computing resources reduces cost and complexity. The National Science Foundation (NSF) Extreme Science and Engineering Discovery Environment (XSEDE) provides access to digital resources, including supercomputers, data resources, and software tools. XSEDE will offer centralized strong authentication for services amongst service providers that leverage their own user databases and security profiles. This work implements a scalable framework built on standards to provide federated secure access to distributed cyberinfrastructure.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Tailoring NIST Security Controls for the Ground System: Selection and Implementation -- Recommendations for Information System Owners

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) invests millions of dollars in spacecraft and ground system development, and in mission operations in the pursuit of scientific knowledge of the universe. In recent years, NASA sent a probe to Mars to study the Red Planet's upper atmosphere, obtained high resolution images of Pluto, and it is currently preparing to find new exoplanets, rendezvous with an asteroid, and bring a sample of the asteroid back to Earth for analysis. The success of these missions is enabled by mission assurance. In turn, mission assurance is backed by information assurance. The information systems supporting NASA missions must be reliable as well as secure. NASA - like every other U.S. Federal Government agency - is required to manage the security of its information systems according to federal mandates, the most prominent being the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002 and the legislative updates that followed it. Like the management of enterprise information technology (IT), federal information security management takes a "one-size fits all" approach for protecting IT systems. While this approach works for most organizations, it does not effectively translate into security of highly specialized systems such as those supporting NASA missions. These systems include command and control (C&C) systems, spacecraft and instrument simulators, and other elements comprising the ground segment. They must be carefully configured, monitored and maintained, sometimes for several years past the missions' initially planned life expectancy, to ensure the ground system is protected and remains operational without any compromise of its confidentiality, integrity and availability. Enterprise policies, processes, procedures and products, if not effectively tailored to meet mission requirements, may not offer the needed security for protecting the information system, and they may even become disruptive to mission operations. Certain protective measures for the general enterprise may not be as efficient within the ground segment. This is what the authors have concluded through observations and analysis of patterns identified from the various security assessments performed on NASA missions such as MAVEN, OSIRIS-REx, New Horizons and TESS, to name a few. The security audits confirmed that the framework for managing information system security developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for the federal government, and adopted by NASA, is indeed effective. However, the selection of the technical, operational and management security controls offered by the NIST model - and how they are implemented - does not always fit the nature and the environment where the ground system operates in even though there is no apparent impact on mission success. The authors observed that unfit controls, that is, controls that are not necessarily applicable or sufficiently effective in protecting the mission systems, are often selected to facilitate compliance with security requirements and organizational expectations even if the selected controls offer minimum or non-existent protection. This paper identifies some of the standard security controls that can in fact protect the ground system, and which of them offer little or no benefit at all. It offers multiple scenarios from real security audits in which the controls are not effective without, of course, disclosing any sensitive information about the missions assessed. In addition to selection and implementation of controls, the paper also discusses potential impact of recent legislation such as the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014 - aimed at the enterprise - on the ground system, and offers other recommendations to Information System Owners (ISOs).

GOVERNANCE↗

Smart Grid Integration Laboratory

The initial federal funding for the Colorado State University Smart Grid Integration Laboratory is through a Congressionally Directed Project (CDP), DE-OE0000070 Smart Grid Integration Laboratory. The original program requested in three one-year increments for staff acquisition, curriculum development, and instrumentation all which will benefit the Laboratory. This report focuses on the initial phase of staff acquisition which was directed and administered by DOE NETL/ West Virginia under Project Officer Tom George. Using this CDP funding, we have developed the leadership and intellectual capacity for the SGIC. This was accomplished by investing (hiring) a core team of Smart Grid Systems engineering faculty focused on education, research, and innovation of a secure and smart grid infrastructure. The Smart Grid Integration Laboratory will be housed with the separately funded Integrid Laboratory as part of CSU's overall Smart Grid Integration Center (SGIC). The period of performance of this grant was 10/1/2009 to 9/30/2011 which included one no cost extension due to time delays in faculty hiring. The Smart Grid Integration Laboratory's focus is to build foundations to help graduate and undergraduates acquire systems engineering knowledge; conduct innovative research; and team externally with grid smart organizations. Using the results of the separately funded Smart Grid Workforce Education Workshop (May 2009) sponsored by the City of Fort Collins, Northern Colorado Clean Energy Cluster, Colorado State University Continuing Education, Spirae, and Siemens has been used to guide the hiring of faculty, program curriculum and education plan. This project develops faculty leaders with the intellectual capacity to inspire its students to become leaders that substantially contribute to the development and maintenance of Smart Grid infrastructure through topics such as: (1) Distributed energy systems modeling and control; (2) Energy and power conversion; (3) Simulation of electrical power distribution system that integrates significant quantities of renewable and distributed energy resources; (4) System dynamic modeling that considers end-user behavior, economics, security and regulatory frameworks; (5) Best practices for energy management IT control solutions for effective distributed energy integration (including security with the underlying physical power systems); (6) Experimental verification of effects of various arrangements of renewable generation, distributed generation and user load types along with conventional generation and transmission. Understanding the core technologies for enabling them to be used in an integrated fashion within a distribution network remains is a benefit to the future energy paradigm and future and present energy engineers.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Geologic Framework Model for the Underground Nuclear Explosions Signatures Experiment P Tunnel Testbed, Aqueduct Mesa, Nevada National Security Site

Three-dimensional geologic framework model of the P-Tunnel Complex and vicinity has been constructed for the Underground Nuclear Explosion Signature Experiment to address anisotropy of physical properties within the experiment medium. The P-Tunnel geologic framework model was constructed using EarthVision geologic modeling software by Dynamic Graphics, Inc. The model area covers 4.36 square kilometers and includes the entire P-Tunnel Complex. The model extends vertically from 2,004 meters above mean sea level, the highest land surface elevation in the model area, to 1,000 meters above mean sea level. The P-Tunnel Complex lies at an elevation of approximately 1,676 meters above mean sea level. The model incorporates data and information from more than 55 years of geological and geophysical studies in the P-Tunnel region, including surface and subsurface geology maps, tunnel construction drawings, a digital elevation model of the topography, and orthophoto imagery. The model consists of thirteen layers, with each layer defining a distinct stratigraphic interval with similar physical properties. Because no faults with significant offset are present within the model area, no faults are incorporated directly into the model. Small-offset faults and other prominent fractures mapped during tunnel construction, however, were digitized and gridded to produce fault and fracture planes that can be viewed within the model. The model has been exported as simple ASCII text files that define the model layers as either two-dimensional surfaces representing the tops of each model layer, or as three-dimensional volumes. The model was also exported as binary-STL files for three-dimensional printing.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Remotely Monitored Sealing Array Software

The Remotely Monitored Sealing Array (RMSA) utilizes the Secure Sensor Platform (SSP) framework to establish the fundamental operating capabilities for communication, security, power management, and cryptography. In addition to the SSP framework the RMSA software has unique capabilities to support monitoring a fiber optic seal. Fiber monitoring includes open and closed as well as parametric monitoring to detect tampering attacks. The fiber monitoring techniques, using the SSP power management processes, allow the seals to last for years while maintaining the security requirements of the monitoring application. The seal is enclosed in a tamper resistant housing with software to support active tamper monitoring. New features include LED notification of fiber closure, the ability to retrieve the entire fiber optic history via translator command, separate memory storage for fiber optic events, and a more robust method for tracking and resending failed messages.

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