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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 127 records · Page 7
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2010

The Geostationary Operational Satellite R Series SpaceWire Based Data System Architecture

The GOES-R program selected SpaceWire as the best solution to satisfy the desire for simple and flexible instrument to spacecraft command and telemetry communications. Data generated by GOES-R instruments is critical for meteorological forecasting, public safety, space weather, and other key applications. In addition, GOES-R instrument data is provided to ground stations on a 24/7 basis. GOES-R requires data errors be detected and corrected from origin to final destination. This paper describes GOES-R developed strategy to satisfy this requirement

Krimchansky, Alexander↗
NASA NTRS2010

Workmanship Standards Personnel Training and Certification Explained

This slide presentation reviews the standards that NASA requires for workmanship and discusses the rationale and the NASA-STD-8739.x standard series. The training and certification of inspectors and operators is to guarantee that workmanship is qualified for NASA applications. The NASA workmanship standard documents review the standards for: Polymeric Applications, Surface Mount Technology, Soldered Electrical Connections, Crimp, Cable and Harnesses, Fiber Optic Terminations, including ANSI and IPC standards for Electrostatic Discharge Safety, Space Applications Electronic Hardware and Requirements for Soldered Electrical and Electronic Assemblies. It also reviews the certification requirements for appropriate personnel. It also reviews the various levels of trainers for the various requirements. There is also a review of calibration requirements for training equipment. Some variations on the curriculum are allowed. NASA requires operators and inspectors to be certified by their employer to ensure that oversight is being performed.

Plante, Jeannette F.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Fracture - An Unforgiving Failure Mode

During the 2005 Conference for the Advancement for Space Safety, after a typical presentation of safety tools, a Russian in the audience simply asked, "How does that affect the hardware?" Having participated in several International System Safety Conferences, I recalled that most attention is dedicated to safety tools and little, if any, to hardware. The intent of this paper on the hazard of fracture and failure modes associated with fracture is my attempt to draw attention to the grass roots of system safety - improving hardware robustness and resilience.

Goodin, James Ronald↗
NASA NTRS2014

CubeSat Material Limits For Design for Demise

The CubeSat form factor of nano‐satellite (a satellite with a mass between one and ten kilograms) has grown in popularity due to their ease of construction and low development and launch costs. In particular, their use as student led payload design projects has increased due to the growing number of launch opportunities. CubeSats are often deployed as secondary or tertiary payloads on most US launch vehicles or they may be deployed from the ISS. The focus of this study will be on CubeSats launched from the ISS. From a space safety standpoint, the development and deployment processes for CubeSats differ significantly from that of most satellites. For large satellites, extensive design reviews and documentation are completed, including assessing requirements associated with reentry survivability. Typical CubeSat missions selected for ISS deployment have a less rigorous review process that may not evaluate aspects beyond overall design feasibility. CubeSat design teams often do not have the resources to ensure their design is compliant with reentry risk requirements. A study was conducted to examine methods to easily identify the maximum amount of a given material that can be used in the construction of a CubeSats without posing harm to persons on the ground. The results demonstrate that there is not a general equation or relationship that can be used for all materials; instead a limiting value must be defined for each unique material. In addition, the specific limits found for a number of generic materials that have been previously used as benchmarking materials for reentry survivability analysis tool comparison will be discussed.

Kelley, R. L.↗
NASA NTRS2014

CubeSat Material Limits for Design for Demise

The CubeSat form factor of nano-satellite (a satellite with a mass between one and ten kilograms) has grown in popularity due to their ease of construction and low development and launch costs. In particular, their use as student led payload design projects has increased due to the growing number of launch opportunities. CubeSats are often deployed as secondary or tertiary payloads on most US launch vehicles or they may be deployed from the ISS. The focus of this study will be on CubeSats launched from the ISS. From a space safety standpoint, the development and deployment processes for CubeSats differ significantly from that of most satellites. For large satellites, extensive design reviews and documentation are completed, including assessing requirements associated with re-entry survivability. Typical CubeSat missions selected for ISS deployment have a less rigorous review process that may not evaluate aspects beyond overall design feasibility. CubeSat design teams often do not have the resources to ensure their design is compliant with re-entry risk requirements. A study was conducted to examine methods to easily identify the maximum amount of a given material that can be used in the construction of a CubeSats without posing harm to persons on the ground. The results demonstrate that there is not a general equation or relationship that can be used for all materials; instead a limiting value must be defined for each unique material. In addition, the specific limits found for a number of generic materials that have been previously used as benchmarking materials for re-entry survivability analysis tool comparison will be discussed.

Kelley, R. L.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Center for Isotope Cosmochemistry and Geochronology at NASA Johnson Space Center

The Center for Isotope Cosmochemistry and Geochronology (CICG) at the NASA Johnson Space Center, led by Justin Simon, applies novel elemental and isotopic analytical techniques to understand solar system formation, from processes occurring during the earliest Solar Nebula, to the evolution of planetary bodies during planet formation and differentiation. CICG consists of an integrated suite of labs including dedicated spaces for specialized handling and preparation of meteorites and planetary return samples, metal-free clean chemistry, and mass spectrometry. In addition to a Thermo-Scientific Triton thermal ionization mass spectrometer (TIMS) for high precision isotopic analyses in processed samples, CICG houses two additional mass spectrometry instruments with added laser ablation capabilities for high spatial resolution in-situ measurements: (1) a Thermo-Scientific Element-XR inductively coupled mass spectrometer (ICP-MS) with a Teledyne Photon Machines Analyte Excite+ laser ablation system, and (2) a Nu Sapphire 1700 multi-collector ICP-MS, a large geometry instrument with a multi-pole collision cell for interference removal, with an Applied Spectra J200 tandem laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) femto-second laser ablation system. We detail the analytical capabilities of CICG in the context of current and future research projects related to the studies of protoplanetary disk evolution via early-formed Solar System solids, volatile abundances and distribution within the inner solar system, and geochemical and temporal investigations related to planet formation and differentiation. We also highlight opportunities through the relationship with the Center of the Advancement of Space Safety and Mission Assurance Research (CASSMAR) at the University of Texas at El Paso. CICG is open to collaborations and participates in the NASA Facility for Astromaterials Research (NFAR) program, which accepts research proposals for access to the unique facility capabilities.

Jacob B. Setera↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Decision Aid for Conjunction Risk Mitigation by Differential Drag

The NASA Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) team has conducted are view of the historical record of high-risk conjunctions involving CARA-protected missions and evaluated whether (and how much) differential drag can provide effective mitigation. From this analysis, CARA has identified a rule of thumb: missions with perigees below 560 km capable of tripling their drag area for 72 hours(or a larger scale factor for a lesser amount of time) can reliably use differential drag to remediate high-risk events.

mission design↗
DOE OSTI2024

The Fuel Motion Monitoring System at TREAT - Current Status and Future Plans

An important component of the United States Nuclear Fuel Safety Transient Testing Program, the Fuel Motion Monitoring System (FMMS) at Idaho National Laboratory's Transient Reactor Test Facility (TREAT) is fast-neutron hodoscope capable of imaging the location, movement, and relocation of nuclear fuel experiments under simulated transient accident conditions. The FMMS was refurbished in parallel with the TREAT restart program starting in 2014, restoring 96-channels of fast-neutron detection. Since returning to operation in 2017 the FMMS has supported many fuel safety experiments supporting accident tolerant fuel development, light-water reactor safety, space thermal nuclear propulsion fuel development, and advanced reactor research and development. In Phase 2 of the FMMS restoration. work is now under way to expand the FMMS' field-of-view by adding an additional 96 channels of fast neutron detectors to the system's hodoscope, along with an expanded data acquisition system and associated transient timing electronics. An overview of the FMSS system and its fast-neutron detectors will be presented along with examples of current FMMS imaging performance and associated information.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗
NASA NTRS2000

Space Shuttle Propulsion Safety Upgrades

This document is a viewgraph presentation which reviews the proposed upgrades to the Space Shuttle Propulsion system, to improve safety, and reduce significant hazards. The goals of the program are to reduce the risk of a catastrophe in ascent, to achieve significant reduction in orbital and entry systems, and to improve the crew cockpit situational awareness for managing the critical operational situations. The document reviews the upgrades to the propulsion system which are planned to improve the safety. These include modifications to the Advanced Thrust Vector Control, modifications to the Space Shuttle Main Engine Block III, improvement in the Advanced Health Management System, the use of Friction Stir welding on the external tank, which is expected to improve mechanical properties, and reduce defect rate, and the modification of the propellant grains geometry.

Humphries, William Randy, Jr.↗
NASA NTRS1985

Space station crew safety alternatives study. Volume 3: Safety impact of human factors

The first 15 years of accumulated space station concepts for Initial Operational Capability (IOC) during the early 1990's was considered. Twenty-five threats to the space station are identified and selected threats addressed as impacting safety criteria, escape and rescue, and human factors safety concerns. Of the 25 threats identified, eight are discussed including strategy options for threat control: fire, biological or toxic contamination, injury/illness, explosion, loss of pressurization, radiation, meteoroid penetration and debris. Of particular interest here is volume three (of five volumes) pertaining to the safety impact of human factors.

Rockoff, L. A.↗
NASA NTRS1985

Space station crew safety alternatives study, volume 1

The first 15 years of accumulated space station concepts for initial operational capability (IOC) during the early 1990's were considered. Twenty-five threats to the space station are identified and selected threats addressed as impacting safety criteria, escape and rescue, and human factors safety concerns. Of the 25 threats identified, eight are discussed including strategy options for threat control: fire, biological or toxic contamination, injury/illness, explosion, loss of pressurization, radiation, meteoroid penetration and debris.

Peercy, R. L., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS1991

An interagency space nuclear propulsion safety policy for SEI - Issues and discussion

An interagency Nuclear Safety Policy Working Group (NSPWG) was chartered to recommend nuclear safety policy, requirements, and guidelines for the Space Exploration Initiative nuclear propulsion program to facilitate the implementation of mission planning and conceptual design studies. The NSPWG developed a top level policy to provide the guiding principles for the development and implementation of the nuclear propulsion safety program and the development of Safety Functional Requirements. In addition, the NSPWG reviewed safety issues for nuclear propulsion and recommended top level safety requirements and guidelines to address these issues. Safety topics include reactor start-up, inadvertent criticality, radiological release and exposure, disposal, entry, safeguards, risk/reliability, operational safety, ground testing, and other considerations. In this paper the emphasis is placed on the safety policy and the issues and considerations that are addressed by the NSPWG recommendations.

Marshall, A. C.↗
NASA NTRS2005

On Space Exploration and Human Error: A Paper on Reliability and Safety

NASA space exploration should largely address a problem class in reliability and risk management stemming primarily from human error, system risk and multi-objective trade-off analysis, by conducting research into system complexity, risk characterization and modeling, and system reasoning. In general, in every mission we can distinguish risk in three possible ways: a) known-known, b) known-unknown, and c) unknown-unknown. It is probably almost certain that space exploration will partially experience similar known or unknown risks embedded in the Apollo missions, Shuttle or Station unless something alters how NASA will perceive and manage safety and reliability

Bell, David G.↗
NASA NTRS1985

Space Station crew safety alternatives study. Volume 2: Threat development

The first 15 years of accumulated space station concepts for initial operational capability (IOC) during the early 1990's were considered. Twenty-five threats to the space station are identified and selected threats addressed as impacting safety criteria, escape and rescue, and human factors safety concerns. Of the 25 threats identified, eight are discussed including strategy options for threat control: fire, biological or toxic contamination, injury/illness, explosion, loss of pressurization, radiation, meteoroid penetration, and debris.

Raasch, R. F.↗
NASA NTRS1997

Commercialization of Kennedy Space Center Instrumentation Developed to Improve Safety, Reliability, Cost Effectiveness of Space Shuttle Processing, Launch, and Landing

Priorities and achievements of the Kennedy Space Center (KSF) Instrumentation Laboratories in improving operational safety and decreasing processing costs associated with the Shuttle vehicle are addressed. Technologies that have been or are in the process of technology transfer are reviewed, and routes by which commercial concerns can obtain licenses to other KSF Instrumentation Laboratory technologies are discussed.

Helms, William R.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Spacecraft Fire-Safety Experiments for Space Station: Technology Development Mission

Definitions, overall descriptions, and preliminary apparatus and instrumentation requirements are presented for three spacecraft fire-safety experiments appropriate for inclusion in a growth-version of the Space Station. The experiments are as follows: 1. Combustion and Flame Spread of Typical Spacecraft Materials in a Low­ Velocity Convective Flow in Low Gravity 2. Fire and Fire-Extinguishant Interactions with Various Fire Scenarios in Low Gravity 3. Smoldering and Deep-Seated Combustion in Low Gravity. The experiments were selected from an assessment of recommendations for advanced technologies for prevention, detection, and control of fires in spacecraft. The experiments and their facilities are intended to constitute a portion of a Spacecraft Fire Safety Technology Development Mission (TDM). Basic requirements for the mission study are that the Space Station is essential for the accomplishment of the experimental objectives and that the technology being developed is appropriate for the growth version of the Space Station. The advantages of these three experiments are that, not only do they explore problems relevant to the Space Station operation and utilization, but also they constitute tests adaptable to two multiuse facilities installed in the Space Station laboratory module, the Combustion Tunnel Facility and the Combustion Facility. Three additional spacecraft fire-safety experiments, essential precursors to the TD M for near-term performance, are also described as follows: 1. Near-Term Testing of Materials for Combustion and Flame Spread 2. Near-Term Extinguishment of Fires in a Low-Gravity Test Bed 3. Post-Fire Recovery of Sensitive Electrical and Electronic Equipment. For all the experiments, the study defines accommodations in terms of first-order space, mass, power, consumables, and crew-time estimates. The study also reviews the key problems to be addressed, namely experiment safety hazards, non-intrusive diagnostics development and waste-products disposal. A preliminary task and time schedule for design, development, and experiment fabrication is proposed.

Youngblood, Wallace W.↗