SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “technical standards”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 127 records · Page 7

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRS2018

An Exploratory Evaluation of UAS Detect and Avoid Operations in the Terminal Environment

New technical standards for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) detect and avoid (DAA) systems mark recent progress toward realizing the goal of full integration of UAS into the National Airspace System (NAS). The DAA system is intended to provide a means of compliance with operating regulations that required pilots on board manned aircraft to remain "well clear" of other aircraft which is accomplished through out-the-window visual acquisition of other aircraft and application of a subjective judgment of safe separation. The requirements for the DAA system, including the specification of a DAA well clear threshold as well as functional requirements for detecting, tracking, alerting and guidance processing, and displays, are specified in DO-365, Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for DAA Systems developed within RTCA Special Committee 228 (SC-228). Intended as the first in a series of phased versions, these requirements are frequently referred to as the "Phase 1" DAA system. The Phase 1 DAA system is limited for use by aircraft transitioning to and from Class A or special use airspace, through Class D, E, and G airspace. In particular, the Phase 1 DAA MOPS are not intended for terminal airspace operations, a critical gap for enabling a full range of UAS operations. The application of the Phase 1 DAA system and DAA well clear threshold within the terminal area is predicted to result in a high number of unnecessary alerts when the UAS is safely separated from other traffic. The goal of the present study was to examine pilot performance and operational issues related to the operation of the Phase 1 DAA system in a terminal area. This experiment was intended as an exploratory study that would be used to inform the development of a new terminal area-specific DAA well clear definition, and associated alerting and guidance requirements. The two main objectives of this study were to: 1) characterize pilot behavior in the terminal environment with the Phase 1 DAA system, and 2) investigate the effect of modifications to the Phase 1 DAA alerting and guidance structure. In particular, the authors were interested in determining whether the removal of specific alerting and guidance levels, without changing the DAA well clear definition or alerting thresholds, would impact pilot performance while conducting terminal operations. The results indicate that the Phase 1 well clear definition and alerting and guidance resulted in frequent alerting that degraded pilots' ability to discriminate between encounters where another aircraft was safely separated versus when a maneuver was necessary. The resulting impact on pilot performance was slower response times and higher frequency and severity of losses of DAA well clear compared to those observed for experiments examining pilot performance in the en route environment. There was no significant effect of alerting and guidance display configuration on pilot performance.

Rorie, Conrad↗

NASA NTRS2019

NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program Status and Technology Investments Overview

The presentation provides an updated, high-level overview of the NEPP Program. The latest organizational chart is presented that shows the names of the Program and Assistant Program Managers. Additionally, the recent work that is on-going with the updating of several NASA NPDs, NPRs and technical standards is reviewed. Internal and external organizational interfaces are described. Finally, the current technology focus areas are described. These areas include passives, wide-band gap power devices, processor units (CPUs and GPUs), 2.5D and 3D device architectures, memories, and data analytics.

NEPAG↗

NASA NTRS2019

A Comparison of Two Terminal Area Detect and Avoid Well Clear Definitions

Technical requirements are currently under development for a detect and avoid system (DAA) that would support the operation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) within the National Airspace System (NAS). Such a system would aid UAS operators in maintaining sufficient separation, or "well clear", from other aircraft in their vicinity. The first set of technical standards for a UAS DAA system (referred to as "Phase 1" requirements) was limited to UAS operations transiting through Class D, E, and G airspace to, or from, Class A (or special-use) airspace. Explicitly out of scope of the Phase 1 requirements was the operation of UAS within terminal airspace in the NAS. Fern, Rorie, Roberts and Monk (2018) explored the application of a Phase 1 DAA system within Class D terminal airspace in a human-in-the-loop simulation. The results of the study demonstrated a poor fit of the Phase 1 DAA well clear (DWC) definition to these terminal operations. The original DWC definition was designed for the en-route environment and could not account for the complex, tightly-choreographed nature of traffic typically found near an airport. The interaction of the en-route DWC definition and the terminal area traffic led to excessive DAA alerting against safely-separated traffic. The frequent alerting quickly degraded pilots' ability to discriminate between encounters where a maneuver was or was not necessary. This resulted in slower response times, higher rates of losses of DAA well clear, and more severe losses of DAA well clear than had been observed in previous DAA research (e.g., Rorie et al., 2017). The current paper reports on a follow-on study to Fern et al. (2018) that tested two DWC definitions designed to accommodate standard terminal area operating procedures, such as traffic in the downwind leg of a VFR traffic pattern while the UAS is on final. The two definitions utilized identical horizontal and vertical thresholds but differed in whether or not Tau (a function that takes into account the closure rate of two aircraft) was included as a part of the DWC hazard zone. The "Tau" DWC candidate definition nominally extended the DWC hazard zone by 15 seconds in the direction of the intruder aircraft, while the "No Tau" DWC candidate definition did not extend the DWC hazard zone. The results of this follow-on study indicated that both candidate definitions improved pilot and DAA system performance relative to Fern et al (2018). Pilot response times and rates of losses of DWC returned to levels comparable to earlier research in the en-route environment. Several important differences between the two DWC candidate definitions, however, are also discussed.

Terminal Area↗

NASA NTRS2019

Orbital Debris Quarterly News

Inside - NASA Technical Standard Process for Limiting Orbital Debris Revision Ratified - Testing and Modeling the Demisability of Fiber-Reinforced Plastics - An Extended Parametric Study of the Effects of Large Constellations on the Future Debris Environment - Meeting Reports - Abstracts from the NASA HVIT - Abstracts from the NASA ODPO - ODQN Vol. 23, Issue 1&2 Errata - Orbital Debris Analyst - Space Missions/Satellite Box Score

Phillip Anz-Meador↗

NASA NTRS2021

Classifications and Requirements for Testing Systems and Hardware to be Exposed to Dust in Planetary Environments

The purpose of this NASA Technical Standard is to establish minimum requirements and provide effective guidance regarding methodologies and best practices for testing systems and hardware to be exposed to dust in dust laden and generating environments. The intent is to facilitate consistency and efficiency in testing space systems, subsystems, or components with operations and missions in dusty environments.

Kristen Kathleen John↗

NASA NTRS2022

Repeatable Method for Conducting Chamber Studies of Aerosolized Lunar Simulant

The Artemis Mission goal of returning humans to the Moon requires new solutions to engineering problems posed by the extremely harsh environment of the lunar surface. Using the Apollo missions as historical evidence, dust will be a significant obstacle in the success of a sustained human and robotic presence. Hardware such as tools, machinery, extra-vehicular activity (EVA) suits, and components of landers and habitats will all be subject to various degrees of contamination by lunar dust, and each piece of hardware has its own considerations for performance under dusty conditions. Such hardware must be tested and verified for use during lunar missions under guidance from NASA technical standards. Aerosolized dust can be used to test and verify hardware in two ways: volumetric and surface area loading. Volumetric loading (measured in mass of airborne dust per volume of air) may cause hardware to malfunction via dust ingestion or other mechanisms. Surface area loading (measured in mass of settled dust per surface area) may cause hardware to malfunction by altering its thermal properties or by fouling optical surfaces such as camera lenses. This publication describes a method to achieve a stable, user-determined volumetric loading in an arbitrary chamber along with recommendations for how to use such chambers for customized hardware testing.

Benjamin J Sumlin↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Adopting an Objectives-Driven Assurance Case Approach for Achieving Space Flight Mission Planetary Protection Objectives

Traditionally, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has utilized prescriptive technical and process requirements to ensure safety and mission assurance performance objectives for planetary protection are achieved during space flight missions. While prescriptive requirements may be easier to communicate and manage throughout the systems engineering process, the highly constrained nature of prescriptive requirements can limit the ability to take advantage of cost-saving opportunities and offer limited ability to explore other options or alternative designs, processes, and methods. It can also be difficult to develop prescriptive requirements for objectives that are probabilistic in nature or that cannot be satisfied by direct verification. In contrast, the development of an assurance case allows for a compelling, comprehensible, and valid argument to be developed with supporting evidence that shows safety and mission assurance objectives have been satisfied. Analogous to how patent applications are constructed for inventions, an assurance case has a high-level claim of meeting a safety and mission assurance objective, followed by a more specific set of sub-claims and technical evidence which supports the claims. The objectives-driven assurance case approach allows for a better understanding and exploration of the trade space, more flexibility to balance trades, and the ability to realize and implement technical and process innovations for resource, time, and cost savings. The assurance case is a living case that evolves over the entire program life cycle. Recently, NASA’s Office of Planetary Protection (OPP) has adopted the assurance case approach as an acceptable methodology for demonstrating avoidance of contamination of target solar system bodies explored by NASA space flight missions. This methodology has been incorporated into NASA’s new technical standard for planetary protection and is currently being utilized by the Mars Sample Return campaign for safe sample containment during sample return.

Assurance Case↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Advancing Dust Tolerant Mechanisms for a Sustained Exploration of the Moon

Introduction: “I think dust is probably one of our greatest inhibitors to a nominal operation on the Moon. I think we can overcome other physio-logical or physical or mechanical problems except dust.”– Gene Cernan, Apollo 17 Technical Debrief The Apollo missions revealed the impact of lu-nar dust on mechanisms. Lunar dust particles are jagged and electrostatically charged, giving them the ability to bind or damage mechanisms and alter thermal properties. Reports documented clogged equipment and jammed mechanisms in every mission, regardless of surface duration, as well as clogged mechanisms in the Extravehicular Mobility Suit (EMS), including zippers, wrist and hose locks, faceplates, and sunshades [1-2]. Several astronauts remarked they could not have sustained surface activity much longer because clogged joints would have frozen up completely [2]. Effective dust mitigation strategies are need-ed to support longer duration stays on the lunar surface [3-4]. State of the Art: Technology for mechanisms able to operate in dusty enviroments is advancing rapidly due to the needs of both Mars rovers and the Artemis program. Vacuum-tight connectors are essential for spacesuits and habitats, and their performance can be dependent on cleaning technologies, which have proven difficult on the lunar surface. Several TRL 3-5 technologies are undergoing tests with the expectation to reach TRL 6 within 1-2 years. Some mechanisms will be infused and tested on the VIPER (Volatiles Inves-tigating Polar Exploration Rover) mission planned for mid-2020s. NASA Funded Efforts: NASA has recognized the need for dust tolerant mechanisms, and has partnered with industry to advance the state-of-the-art. At NASA GRC, KSC, and JSC, the Dust Tolerant Mechanisms Project is working to devel-op advanced actuator seals for rotary joints and rotary bearing technologies for long-term sus-tained operation in lunar dust environments. An-other NASA project at NASA GRC, partnered with GSFC, JPL, and KSC is Motors for Dusty & Ex-treme Cold Environments (MDECE). MDECE is developing an unheated magnetically-geared mo-tor that can operate continuously for a long dura-tion at an ambient temperature of -243 ºC (33 K). NASA GRC has the capability to characterize the effects of dust on seals, mechanisms, and other mating surfaces and components under lunar conditions [5]. Through the SBIR/STTR program, NASA has funded several companies to advance dust toler-ant mechanisms via the Dust Tolerant Mecha-nisms sub-topic with applications in surface mobil-ity, spacesuits, connectors, joints, and more. LSIC and Community Efforts: The Lunar Surface Innovation Consortium (LSIC) Dust Miti-gation focus group has fostered collaborations across NASA, industry, and academia to develop solutions that minimizes the impact of lunar dust on robotic and human systems. Community ef-forts have included topical meetings on dust tol-erant mechanisms, featured technology presenta-tions, and feedback to NASA on potential gaps and needs. Testing: In 2021, NASA released NASA-STD-1008 [6]. This NASA Technical Standard estab-lishes minimum requirements and provides guid-ance for testing systems and hardware to be ex-posed to dust in planetary environments. The standard has specific sections dedicated to Mechanisms Testing (e.g. bearings, gears) as well as Seals and Mating Surfaces Testing (e.g. hatches, docking systems). Gaps and Needs: NASA is tracking dust tol-erant mechanisms as a gap in a cross-directorate analysis of capability areas needed to enable fu-ture human space-flight architectures. Two high-priority gap areas include additional facilities for testing mechanisms in lunar-surface conditions, and a better understanding of vulnerabilities to the smallest, nanometer-scale dust particles. Conclusion: Understanding and mitigating lu-nar dust is critical to successful, sustained opera-tions on the lunar surface – whether autonomous or otherwise. This presentation will discuss both the state-of-the-art and open needs in lunar dust tolerant mechanisms, technology impacts, mitiga-tion approaches, testing, LSIC community efforts, and more. References: [1] Gaier, J. R. (2020). The Im-pact of Dust on Lunar Surface Equipment During Apollo. Lunar Dust 2020. [2] GRC, & Gaier, J. R. (2005). The Effects of Lunar Dust on EVA Sys-tems During the Apollo Missions. [3] Johansen, M. R. (2020). An Update on NASA’s Lunar Dust Mitigation Strategy. Lunar Dust 2020. [4] ASI, CSA, ESA, JAXA, & NASA. (2016). Dust Mitiga-tion Gap Assessment Report. [5] Jimenez, N. et al (2022), LPSC Abstract 2572. [6] NASA-STD-1008, 2021.

J I Nunez↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Integrating Human System Information with the Systems Platform for Aggregating and Relating Capabilities (SPARC)

Within Human Health and Performance, there exists a wealth of human system information that’s used a regular basis in support of NASA human exploration objectives, but the challenge is that all of this information was stored in multiple different locations and organized for specific uses, limiting its effectiveness and straining communication across multiple groups. To address this challenge, our project, the Systems Platform for Aggregating and Relating Capabilities (SPARC) was tasked with developing a new NASA internal web application that aggregates and relates multiple programs’ human system products, such as technical standards, program requirements and verifications, human system risks, research and evidence, and exploration capabilities, into one centralized platform that addresses the needs of human health and performance from multiple different perspectives. Using agile development methodologies, user-experience (UX) driven design principles, data visualization, and a strong emphasis on continuous improvement though consistent stakeholder engagement, the SPARC project released a beta version in less than 4 months, broadly launched version 1.0.0 Agency-wide three months after the beta, and has over 180 users in the first year of development. Our second year of development will see us moving from our initial capabilities to increasingly robust and complex integrations and visualizations, including Directed Acyclical Graphs (DAGs), natural language processing (NLP) for dynamic generation of relationships between the sources of truth, and an expansion into hierarchical levels of system design in support of the human exploration programs.

Data science↗

NASA NTRS2023

National Campaign Development Test Executive Summary

NASA’s vision for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) is to provide safe, sustainable, accessible, and affordable aviation for transformational local and intraregional missions and includes the transportation of passengers and cargo as well as aerial work missions, such as infrastructure inspection or search and rescue operations. NASA’s technical expertise, intergovernmental relationships, and high level of public trust will help this technology come to market concurrent with infrastructure readiness, public acceptance, and constructive regulation. By advising and integrating disparate AAM efforts across the country and working collaboratively with the FAA, the National Campaign (NC) objective is to motivate industry progress and support the development of policy, regulatory, and technical standards in a manner that best ensures public safety and benefit to the American people. NC began with the Dry Run and Developmental Test (NC-DT), which served as a pathfinder for collaboration and direct involvement with industry partners in integrated simulation exercises and flight tests. NC-DT culminated with an acoustics-gathering flight test in September 2021 with industry partner Joby’s prototype S4 2.0 air vehicle, which delivered the first foundational baseline of noise levels present in Electric Vertical Takeoff and Landing (eVTOL) vehicles. Through the DT phase, the NC team built and tested the airspace and range infrastructure while assessing the readiness level of industry partners leading up to future NC events. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of NC-DT.

National Campaign↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA'S Use of Ground-Based Multi-Layered Pressure Vessels (MLPV)

NASA has taken the US technical lead in assessing and reducing risks associated with operations of non-code MLPVs, with the goal of developing technical standards and processes for continued use, maintenance, inspection, and repair of MLPVs

Clifton T Arnold, Jr.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Navigating the Complexities of Safety and Mission Assurance Across NASA's Partnership Landscape

As NASA increasingly pursues collaborative public-private partnerships and international efforts to advance space exploration goals, ensuring robust safety and mission assurance protocols has become more complex. The evolving dynamics introduce multifaceted challenges spanning regulatory oversight, governance and acquisition models, and technical standardization. To address these issues, NASA plans to prioritize deeper integration of safety and mission assurance principles from the formulation and acquisition stages when structuring partnerships and contracts. This embeds appropriate oversight from the start. Additionally, it is vital to establish an enterprise-level capability focused on identifying and resolving cross-cutting risks that transcend individual missions. Together, all these initial thoughts will form the basis of a broad roadmap of decisions that aims to ensure strategic alignment from policy to implementation allowing NASA to harmonize the currently fragmented safety and mission assurance ecosystem as it navigates the complexities introduced by the new era of public-private space partnerships.

Johnny T Nguyen↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Navigating the Complexities of Safety and Mission Assurance Across NASA's Partnership Landscape

Johnny T Nguyen↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Frank Discussion on Lessons Learned From Adopting and Applying NASA-STD-6030 for Spaceflight Systems

With the advancement and adoption of Additive Manufacturing (AM) for spaceflight systems, numerous lessons have been learned during the qualification and certification of AM components. The lessons learned covered in this presentation will provide an overview of the challenges faced by NASA centers and commercial partners working to design AM hardware that complies with NASA-STD-6030 Additive Manufacturing Requirements (AMR). Topics of interest include tailoring of requirements for specific projects, documentation requirements, and addressing conservative approaches towards mechanical property development and analysis. In addition to that, this presentation aims to impress that these lessons learned will influence the future revisions of the NASA technical standard to facilitate and advance AM technology adoption on NASA projects.

Additive Manufacturing↗

DOE OSTI2023

Results from an International Interlaboratory Study on Light- and Elevated Temperature-Induced Degradation (LETID) in Solar Modules

This presentation reports recently submitted results from an international interlaboratory comparison study on light- and elevated temperature-induced degradation (LETID) on crystalline silicon photovoltaic (PV) modules. A large global network of PV module manufacturers and PV testing laboratories collaborated to design a protocol for LETID detection, and screen a large and diverse set of prototype modules for LETID. We summarize the range of observed degradation and provide initial conclusions on the reproducibility of results across labs. In LETID-sensitive modules, both open-circuit voltage (VOC) and short-circuit current (ISC) degrade by a roughly similar magnitude. We observe, as do previous studies, that LETID affects each cell in a module differently. An investigation of the potential mismatch losses caused by nonuniform LETID degradation found that mismatch loss is insignificant compared to the direct LETID-related losses. We summarize the conclusions drawn from the study, provide an update on a forthcoming standard technical specification for LETID testing of PV modules (IEC TS 63342 ED1), and discuss unresolved questions and potential future work on LETID in PV modules.

degradation↗

DOE OSTI2023

Modeling of Stress Distribution in Molten Salt Thermal Energy Storage Tanks for In-Service Central Receiver Power Plants

Failures in molten nitrate salts thermal energy storage tanks (TES) have been occurring in several concentrating solar power (CSP) plants around the world after a few months or years of operation. These failures are mainly related to a combination of high stress, corrosion, large deformation, and thermal cycling. Most of these failures are a consequence of the infancy of this technology; technical standards for design, fabrication, implementation, and operation of molten salt tanks operating at temperatures up to 565 degrees Celsius do not exist and most of current in-service tanks have been designed using the recommendations from the American Petroleum Institute (API) 650 and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers ASME section II standards, which are applicable for TES tanks operating at lower temperatures. We have developed a 3-dimensional model of a representative molten salt hot tank design that uses typical CSP plant operation conditions and allows determining the temperature and stress distribution in the tank. The model also considers the initial floor residual stresses and distortion after its welding fabrication. We have identified critical thermal gradients in the tank floor and shell and locations in the tank where the stresses are high and could become susceptible points for failure.

concentrating solar power↗

DOE OSTI2020

Update to the Performance Assessment for the Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility - 20124

In 2019, Savannah River Remediation developed a revision to the performance assessment (PA) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Operations Office (SR) for the near-surface disposal of low-level waste at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Soluble waste from SRS Tank Farms undergoes salt processing to remove cesium and other high activity constituents. The low-activity decontaminated salt solution (DSS) is then immobilized by mixing it into a cementitious waste form known as saltstone. After mixing, the saltstone is poured into leak-tight concrete vaults, known as saltstone disposal units (SDUs), where the waste form cures. By the time of facility closure, the SDF is expected to consist of 15 SDUs with a combined capacity of 1.06 E+09 L (280 Mgal) of cured saltstone. The facility operates under a Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS) from DOE and a permit from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). Since the start of operations in 1990, the SDF has received almost 6.7 E+07 L (18 Mgal) of DSS, resulting in the safe disposal of 2.7 E+16 Bq (7.3 E+05 Ci) of activity. Due to the radioactive decay of short-lived contaminants, the total remaining activity in the disposed waste is estimated to be approximately 1.4 E+16 Bq (3.9 E+05 Ci), as of September 2018. The Disposal Authorization Statement requires a demonstration that the system of engineered and natural features of the disposal facility will limit releases from the facility and be protective of human health and the environment for at least the next 1,000 years. The long-term performance of the facility was evaluated under the requirements of the DoE's Radioactive Waste Management Manual (US DOE Manual 435.1-1). Simulations were performed to demonstrate that the disposal facility would meet performance objectives specified in the manual. The evaluation was based on numerical models that simulate the releases of contaminants from the saltstone waste form. Contaminants were transported through groundwater and air pathways to points of assessment to evaluate compliance. In addition, the potential consequences of an inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) were also evaluated. In accordance with the guidance and recommendations in US DoE's technical standard for DAS, deterministic and probabilistic analyses were performed to demonstrate the SDF system, which includes the engineered cover system, the SDUs, the waste form, and the natural features of the site, provides a reasonable expectation that saltstone disposal will meet performance objectives. Post-closure doses to future members of the public (MOP) were evaluated; dose estimates from the air pathway were well below the 1.0 E-04 Sv/yr (10 mrem/yr) performance objective within 1,000 years, and the calculated doses to the MOP from all exposure pathways, including the groundwater and air pathways, were well below the 2.5 E-04 Sv/yr (25 mrem/yr) performance objective within 1,000 years. Doses following an assumed intrusion event within the facility boundaries were well below the IHI performance objectives, where the acute IHI dose was below the acute IHI dose performance objective of 5.0 E-03 Sv (500 mrem) and the chronic IHI dose was below the chronic IHI dose performance objective of 1.0 E-03 Sv/yr (100 mrem/yr) within 1,000 years. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

New Beginnings: Optimising Waste and End-state at UK Nuclear Sites to Enable Environmental Permit surrender (the GRR) - 20193

The decommissioning of nuclear sites involves the management of large volumes of radioactive waste, other conventional waste, and the clean-up of land and groundwater contamination. In the UK, the disposal of radioactive waste from nuclear sites is regulated by the Environment Agency (England), Natural Resources Wales (Wales) and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (Scotland). All three environment agencies seek to make sure that the generation and disposal of radioactive waste is optimised: ensuring impacts to people are 'as low as reasonably achievable' (ALARA). With a large proportion of UK nuclear sites embarking on decommissioning, the environment agencies have collaboratively developed new guidance: the 'Management of radioactive waste from the decommissioning of nuclear sites: Guidance on the Requirements for Release from radioactive substances regulation' (referred to as the GRR)[1]. The environment agencies worked in liaison with the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), the UK nuclear safety regulator, and the UK government body responsible, the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). Prior to finalising the guidance, a 12 month trial was completed at three of the NDA's nuclear sites, enabling the environment agencies to test their draft GRR guidance against 'real world scenarios' and the challenge of incorporating its requirements into decommissioning plans. Experience gained during the trial was incorporated into the current version of the GRR, published in July 2018. The GRR represents the 'new beginning' of this paper's title because for the first time, the UK environmental regulators have expressed in detail their requirements for surrender of environmental permits for nuclear sites. The GRR provides a framework for a UK nuclear site to plan, assess and justify its management of radioactive waste and deliver through decommissioning, an optimal, environmentally safe and sustainable end-state. This paper will describe the requirements and technical standards within the GRR, the establishment of defensible clean-up criteria and the production of a Waste Management Plan (WMP), supported by a Site-Wide Environmental Safety Case (SWESC). It will describe the experience gleaned by operators and regulators during the trial and it will highlight current work by regulators to implement the new approach proportionately. Finally, this paper will look forward and outline planned amendments to legislation in the UK affecting nuclear sites that should enable the full benefits of the GRR to be realised in the future. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗