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Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 413: Clean Slate II Plutonium Dispersion (TTR) Tonopah Test Range, Nevada (Rev. 1)

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 413 is located on the Tonopah Test Range, which is approximately 130 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada, and approximately 40 miles southeast of Tonopah, Nevada. The CAU 413 site consists of the release of radionuclides to the surface and shallow subsurface from the conduct of the Clean Slate II (CSII) storage–transportation test conducted on May 31, 1963. CAU 413 includes one corrective action site (CAS), TA-23-02CS (Pu Contaminated Soil). The known releases at CAU 413 are the result of the atmospheric deposition of contamination from the 1963 CSII test. The CSII test was a non-nuclear detonation of a nuclear device located inside a reinforced concrete bunker covered with 2 feet of soil. This test dispersed radionuclides, primarily plutonium, on the ground surface. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 413 will be evaluated based on information collected from a corrective action investigation (CAI). The investigation is based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on June 17, 2015, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; the U.S. Air Force; and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 413. The CAI will include radiological surveys, geophysical surveys, collection and analyses of soil samples, and assessment of investigation results. The collection of soil samples will be accomplished using both probabilistic and judgmental sampling approaches. To facilitate site investigation and the evaluation of DQO decisions, the releases at CAU 413 have been divided into seven study groups.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 414: Clean Slate III Plutonium Dispersion (TTR) Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision 1

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 414 is located on the Tonopah Test Range, which is approximately 130 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada, and approximately 40 miles southeast of Tonopah, Nevada. The CAU 414 site consists of the release of radionuclides to the surface and shallow subsurface from the conduct of the Clean Slate III (CSIII) storage–transportation test conducted on June 9, 1963. CAU 414 includes one corrective action site (CAS), TA-23-03CS (Pu Contaminated Soil). The known releases at CAU 414 are the result of the atmospheric dispersal of contamination from the 1963 CSIII test. The CSIII test was a nonnuclear detonation of a nuclear device located inside a reinforced concrete bunker covered with 8 feet of soil. This test dispersed radionuclides, primarily uranium and plutonium, on the ground surface. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 414 will be evaluated based on information collected from a corrective action investigation (CAI). The investigation is based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on June 7, 2016, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; the U.S. Air Force; and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective action alternatives for CAU 414.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

WISP: Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies (Final Technical Report)

The complex interdependencies of cyber systems (sensors and communications), physical grids and associated electricity market operations make protecting electric power grids a significant challenge. The energy sector is constantly under new, targeted, advanced and dangerous cyber-attacks that have the potential to result in the loss of human life. These threats are further exacerbated by our need to modernize the grid. One focus of cyber security research in smart grids is the securing of the SCADA system through advanced intrusion detection systems (IDS) and bad data detection algorithms in state estimation. These methods either require full knowledge of the system topology and parameters or fail to understand the physical behaviors under attack. WISP (Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies) is designed to provide additional protection to the power grid using only publicly available data. In particular, WISP exploits the spatio-temporal nature of the real time locational marginal prices (LMPs), in conjunction with other information such as bids, weather, outages and load data to analyze anomalous power pricing behaviors and then correlate those observations to localize regions of interest and identify potential cyber events. WISP is non-intrusive as the tool is deployed as a service in the Cloud or on premise and provides reliable information to system operators for enhanced situational awareness, without impeding energy delivery functions. The WISP technology comprises three modules: the data-driven anomaly detection core, the vulnerability and risk analysis and the root cause analysis. The data-driven anomaly detection core performs the tasks of feature selection, anomaly detection and attack region localization. The vulnerability and risk analysis module provides system level information of the vulnerable variables and times, assisting the operators in selecting monitoring and protection nodes. The root cause analysis module takes the detection results and identifies potential operational conditions that contribute to the detected anomalies. In Phase I, we have demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of WISP. We developed a realistic electricity market simulator capable of generating normal and attack market data under various operational conditions. We developed a series of cyber-attack detection and analysis algorithms and evaluated them under multiple data sources. Finally, we integrated all modules into an end-to-end software, providing functions for data management, data analytics and visualization. Specifically, we have achieved: (i) real-time data acceptance from external utility interfaces with >99% acceptance rate; (ii) high performance anomaly detection algorithms with >98% detection accuracy and <0.1% false alarm rate; and (iii) ultra-low computing delay <50 milliseconds. Additionally, our team developed algorithms to identify the vulnerable variables in electricity market operations and root cause analysis functions to identify major contributors to the price spikes. These ancillary modules are necessary when deploying WISP in real world industry environment. In Phase II, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of WISP software on realistic largescale power systems. We performed red team testing for the Phase I WISP software and identified software vulnerabilities and implemented corresponding mitigation solutions. We adapted the electricity market simulator for the Texas synthetic 2000-bus system and generated datasets for the false data injection attacks. We created database and visualization interfaces for the Texas system and the ISO New England system. We performed software optimization in terms of operation efficiency, computing speed and detection accuracy. Finally, we tested the software on the Texas system and the ISO New England system and evaluated the detection performance. Overall, we achieved above 89% detection rate, below 3% false alarm rate and below 37 seconds of end-to-end detection delay.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

AI-ENABLED MONITORING OPTIONS TOWARDS SECURE MICROREACTOR DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONS

Global nuclear energy deployment scenarios suggest favorable economics for smaller, more versatile, and self-contained reactor technologies. Recognizing their key features as integrated, autonomous and either semi-remotely operated or fully remotely operated systems, microreactors are expected to be deployed in large numbers servicing off/micro-grids, many in geographically remote locations. Integrated nature of these systems as well as ease of their transportation as complete units, simplified installation and relocation/decommissioning challenge traditional continuity-of-knowledge practices used for conventional light water reactors where refueling is done onsite at designated times only replacing portions of their cores and only after their full commissioning for operations including completion of their containment building with security and safeguards measures in place. This effort is exploring AI (artificial intelligence)-enabled monitoring options that would be design agnostic and would assure secure unit deployment and operations. The principle is to maintain situational awareness via real-time evaluations of simultaneous and remotely transmitted monitoring data capturing key safeguards attributes including such characteristics as temperature, radiation, vibrational signals (inter alia), and others. The key principle is to provide reliable and resilient security options while maintaining simplified and economical deployment. The paper will review feasible options for AI-enabled solutions for such evaluations.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

NW-MILO Acoustic Data Collection

There is an enduring requirement to improve our ability to detect potential threats and discriminate these from the legitimate commercial and recreational activity ongoing in the nearshore/littoral portion of the maritime domain. The Northwest Maritime Information and Littoral Operations (NW-MILO) Program at PNNL’s Coastal Security Institute in Sequim, Washington is establishing a methodology to detect and classify these threats - in part through developing a better understanding of acoustic signatures in a near-shore environment. The purpose of the acoustic data collection described here is to investigate the acoustic signatures of small vessels. The data is being recorded continuously, 24 hours a day, along with radar track data and imagery. The recording began in August 2008, and to date the data contains tens of thousands of signals from small vessels recorded in a variety of environmental conditions. The quantity and variety of this data collection, with the supporting imagery and radar track data, makes it particularly useful for the development of robust acoustic signature models and advanced algorithms for signal classification and information extraction. The underwater acoustic sensing system is part of a multi-modal sensing system that is operating near the mouth of Sequim Bay. Sequim Bay opens onto the Straight of Juan de Fuca, which contains part of the border between the U.S. and Canada. Table 1 lists the specific components used for the NW-MILO system. The acoustic sensor is a hydrophone permanently deployed at a mean depth of about 3 meters. In addition to a hydrophone, the other sensors in the system are a marine radar, an electro-optical (EO) camera and an infra-red (IR) camera. The radar is integrated with a vessel tracking system (VTS) that provides position, speed and heading information. The data from all the sensors is recorded and saved to a central server. The data has been validated in terms of its usability for characterizing the signatures of small vessels. The sampling rate of 8 kHz and low pass filtering to 2 kHz results in an alias-free signal in the frequency band that is appropriate for small vessels. Calibration was performed using a Lubell underwater speaker so that the raw data signal levels can be converted to sound pressure. Background noise is present due to a nearby pump and as a result of tidal currents. More study is needed to fully characterize the noise, but it does not pose an obstacle to using the acoustic data for the purposes of vessel detection and signature analysis. The detection range for a small vessel was estimated using the calibrated voltage response of the system and a cylindrical spreading model for transmission loss. The sound pressure of a typical vessel with an outboard motor was found to be around 140 dB mPa, and could theoretically be detected from 10 km away. In practical terms, a small vessel could reliably be detected from 3 - 5 km away. The data is archived in netCDF files, a standard scientific file format that is "self describing". This means that each data file contains the metadata - timestamps, units, origin, etc. - needed to make the data meaningful and portable. Other file formats, such as XML, are also supported. A visualization tool has been developed to view the acoustic data in the form of spectrograms, along with the coincident radar track data and camera images.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Assembled genomic and tissue-specific transcriptomic data resources for two genetically distinct lines of Cowpea (Vigna unguiculata (L.) Walp)

Cowpea (Vigna unguiculata (L.) Walp) is an important legume crop for food security in areas of low-input and smallholder farming throughout Africa and Asia. Genetic improvements are required to increase yield and resilience to biotic and abiotic stress and to enhance cowpea crop performance. An integrated cowpea genomic and gene expression data resource has the potential to greatly accelerate breeding and the delivery of novel genetic traits for cowpea. Extensive genomic resources for cowpea have been absent from the public domain; however, a recent early release reference genome for IT97K-499-35 (Vigna unguiculata v1.0, NSF, UCR, USAID, DOE-JGI, http://phytozome.jgi.doe.gov/) has now been established in a collaboration between the Joint Genome Institute (JGI) and University California (UC) Riverside. Here we release supporting genomic and transcriptomic data for IT97K-499-35 and a second transformable cowpea variety, IT86D-1010. The transcriptome resource includes six tissue-specific datasets for each variety, with particular emphasis on reproductive tissues that extend and support the V. unguiculata v1.0 reference. Annotations have been included in our resource to allow direct mapping to the v1.0 cowpea reference. Access to this resource provided here is supported by raw and assembled data downloads.

Spriggs, Andrew↗

Pre-Shot Simulations of Near-Field and Far-Field Ground Motion for the Source Physics Experiment (SPE) Explosions at the Climax Stock, Nevada National Security Site: SPE3

The Source Physics Experiment (SPE) is designed to improve ground motion prediction capabilities for underground nuclear testing through the development of new physics-based models together with validation via new chemical explosion data. The SPE shots consist of different size and depth chemical explosions in a granite borehole at the Climax Stock on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The third shot in the series (SPE3) will be the same size (1000 kg TNT equivalent) and depth (45 m canister centroid) as the previous shot (SPE2). The main purpose of the SPE3 is to investigate the effects of the damage zone caused by the SPE2 chemical explosion on the SPE3 explosion, keeping all other parameters (e.g. size, depth, explosive type) the same. This SPE3 pre-shot report addresses progress made in simulation of the expected wavefield in the both the near- and the far-field. In this report we consider the far-field to be where seismic wave motion can be characterized by elastic or visco-elastic approximations, in contrast to the near-field where other, often non-linear effects, play a major role. The current simulations build on previous work from the SPE1 and SPE2 shots. The simulations are intended to highlight differences between SPE2 and SPE3 using a variety to approximations intended to mimic the expected effect of the damage zone. The simplest physics of damage zone effects suggest changes in the source region material properties (density, velocity), and in the yield strength (coupling) of the rock, should both impact the far-field signal. We can illustrate this in a simplistic way for P-waves in Figure A using the empirical Mueller-Muphy (1971) far-field explosion model (MM). First if the SPE2 explosion-induced damage reduces velocities and densities without affecting the yield strength or coupling, then by energy conservation the amplitudes for SPE 3 would increase as shown in the top of Figure A. Similarly if the explosion induced damage increased density (say by compacting pore space) the amplitude would decrease. This impedance effect, where the product of the density, wave-velocity, and ground-velocity squared is conserved, is well known. The second and harder effect to quantify, are changes in the energy coupling or yield strength. In the simple MM model this is represented by the coupling factor between cavity radius and yield. If we assume the granite was slightly weakened by SPE2 such that the cavity radius increases slightly then the overall amplitudes of SPE3 decrease relative to SPE2 as shown in the bottom of Figure A. In reality both effects, may exist due to the damage zone, and furthermore we know they are interrelated in complex ways. For S-waves we expect even more complex effects due to motion on joints and faults. For this reason we are developing physics-based near field simulation models coupled to far-field propagation codes to predict the overall effects of changes in the source emplacement region on observed signals. Near-field simulations have been performed using the Eulerian code (GEODYN). An ensemble model, calibrated to match records from past large-scale nuclear events is used. Both 2D axisymmetric (no faults) and fully three-dimensional GEODYN calculations (with /without faults) were conducted in which the damage zones sustained by SPE2 are retained as the initial condition for the SPE3 calculations. The results indicate that the waveform peak amplitudes are slightly decayed since the ensemble model includes no softening mechanism. The pulse widths are reduced, indicating the energy is dissipated more by the damage zone as expected. The dominant motions calculated in all the scenarios are spherically symmetric and non-spherical components are small as seen for the SPE2 calculations. The arrival time of the SPE3 waveform at the boreholes is shorter than SPE2 due to compaction during the previous explosion. As shown in the SPE 1 and 2 observations shear waves are generated, indicating the potential contributions from the induced motion on distributed joints. The effects of joints are evaluated using the Lagrangian hydrocode (GEODYN-L), which was benchmarked against the GEODYN calculations for the ensemble model. A new granite model calibrated for samples from the SPE site is used. The new model includes effects of poroelasticity and water saturation and may be scaled allowing application to both small and large scales. Parametric tests were performed to evaluate the effect of joints within the granite and the results demonstrate that in situ joints introduce anisotropy and significant tangential motions.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

A comparison of machine learning methods to classify radioactive elements using prompt-gamma-ray neutron activation data

The detection of illicit radiological materials is critical to establishing a robust second line of defence in nuclear security. Neutron-capture prompt-gamma activation analysis (PGAA) can be used to detect multiple radioactive materials across the entire Periodic Table. However, long detection times and a high rate of false positives pose a significant hindrance in the deployment of PGAA-based systems to identify the presence of illicit substances in nuclear forensics. In the present work, six different machine-learning algorithms were developed to classify radioactive elements based on the PGAA energy spectra. The model performance was evaluated using standard classification metrics and trend curves with an emphasis on comparing the effectiveness of algorithms that are best suited for classifying imbalanced datasets. We analyse the classification performance based on Precision, Recall, F1-score, Specificity, Confusion matrix, ROC-AUC curves, and Geometric Mean Score (GMS) measures. The tree-based algorithms (Decision Trees, Random Forest and AdaBoost) have consistently outperformed Support Vector Machine and K-Nearest Neighbours. Based on the results presented, AdaBoost is the preferred classifier to analyse data containing PGAA spectral information due to the high recall and minimal false negatives reported in the minority class.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

AMS / BARC Joint Survey Addendum Technical Report

This report details the data analysis results from data collected during the September-October 2019 joint survey series between the Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Aerial Measuring System (AMS) asset, and the Government of India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). This joint survey series took place at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), areas of public land in Southern Nevada, and at the DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) Large Area Calibration Pads (LACP) at the Grand Junction Regional Airport in Grand Junction, CO. The data detailed in this report were gathered at the LACP. More details regarding the setup of these surveys and personnel involvement can be found in the AMS / BARC Joint Survey Summary Report. The data from the LACP collected by AMS are consistent with past data collection campaigns at the LACP. The AMS Bell 412 (B412) helicopter, equipped with both the standard AMS thallium-doped sodium iodide (NaI(Tl)) 2"x4"x16" 12-detector system and a subset of the BARC Aerial Gamma Spectroscopy System (AGSS) consisting of two independent 3"x3"cylindrical NaI(Tl) detectors, measured each of the five calibration pads for a minimum of 10 minutes. After the helicopter measurements, a pressurized ion chamber (PIC) was used to directly measure radiation exposure rates on each of the pads for a period 5 minutes. The geophysical calibration procedure published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Erdi-Krausz et al. 2003) was used to determine the spectral stripping sensitivity matrix for naturally occurring radiological material (NORM). The sensitivity matrix is consistent with the AMS long term average. Additionally, the PIC data was used to calibrate the AMS system for exposure rate. The results of the exposure rate analysis are also consistent with AMS long-term averages.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

DICER: A new instrument at LANSCE to constrain neutron capture rates on radionuclides

With very few exceptions, direct measurements of neutron capture rates on radionuclides have not been possible. A number of indirect methods have been pursued such as the surrogate method, the γ-ray strength function method, the Oslo method and the β-Oslo method. Substantial effort has been devoted to quantify the usually large systematic errors that accompany the results from these techniques. A new instrument has been developed at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) to provide more accurate data on several radionuclides relevant to nuclear criticality safety, radiochemical diagnostics, astrophysics, nuclear forensics and nuclear security, by measuring the transmission of neutrons through radioactive samples and studying resonance properties. The Device for Indirect Capture on Radionuclides (DICER) and associated radionuclide production at the Isotope Production Facility (IPF), both at LANSCE, as well radioactive sample fabrication, have been under development the last few years. A description of the new apparatus, data on a few mid-weight stable isotopes and efforts on radionuclide measurements will be presented.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Fuzzy Logic Based Anomaly Detection for Embedded Network Security Cyber Sensor

Resiliency and security in critical infrastructure control systems in the modern world of cyber terrorism constitute a relevant concern. Developing a network security system specifically tailored to the requirements of such critical assets is of a primary importance. This paper proposes a novel learning algorithm for anomaly based network security cyber sensor together with its hardware implementation. The presented learning algorithm constructs a fuzzy logic rule based model of normal network behavior. Individual fuzzy rules are extracted directly from the stream of incoming packets using an online clustering algorithm. This learning algorithm was specifically developed to comply with the constrained computational requirements of low-cost embedded network security cyber sensors. The performance of the system was evaluated on a set of network data recorded from an experimental test-bed mimicking the environment of a critical infrastructure control system.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Operational Focused Data Analytics for Optimizing Radiation Portal Monitor-Based Nuclear Smuggling Detection Systems at Global Ports of Entry

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence has deployed a fleet of radiation portal monitors (RPMs) across the world at global ports of entry including seaports, airports, and land border crossings. These RPMs are integrated into radiation detection systems (RDS) that also include fixed cameras, optical character recognition (OCR) systems, primary scanning systems (e.g., X-ray or gamma-ray), and secondary scanning systems (e.g., spectroscopic radiation portal monitors, portable radiation detection systems). The data from these sensing technologies is collected at the Central Alarm Station (CAS) where servers and computers reside to control and operate the system. Operators utilize the data collected by the CAS and declared cargo information to make decisions on how to respond to an alarm.This work explores the use of CAS-located data, looking at both the sensor data streams and operator inputs, to perform analysis which supports customs and border protection agencies to improve training capability and operational effectiveness. We focus on analyzing site level effectiveness and behavior by rolling up CAS-located data collected from individual occurrences. To-date, more than 15 sites (e.g., seaports, airports, border crossings) have been analyzed in this manner with the goal of understanding system operations to verify effectiveness and recommend potential improvements. This work first aims to provide background information on relevant CAS-located data sources and our current operational system analytics process including example results. After summarizing our current analytic techniques, we discuss how the future data analytics systems can provide key benefits to improving operational performance while minimizing the burden these detection systems place on operators.

Kuhn, Michael↗

DICER: A new instrument at LANSCE to constrain neutron capture rates on radionuclides

. With very few exceptions, direct measurements of neutron capture rates on radionuclides have not been possible. A number of indirect methods have been pursued such as the surrogate method, the γ-ray strength function method, the Oslo method and the β-Oslo method. Substantial effort has been devoted to quantify the usually large systematic errors that accompany the results from these techniques. A new instrument has been developed at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) to provide more accu rate data on several radionuclides relevant to nuclear criticality safety, radiochemical diagnostics, astrophysics, nuclear forensics and nuclear security, by measuring the transmission of neutrons through radioactive samples and studying resonance properties. The Device for Indirect Capture on Radionuclides (DICER) and as sociated radionuclide production at the Isotope Production Facility (IPF), both at LANSCE, as well radioactive sample fabrication, have been under development the last few years. A description of the new apparatus, data on a few mid-weight stable isotopes and efforts on radionuclide measurements will be presented.

Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP)↗

Zachary D. Barker: Final DHS HS-STEM Report

Working at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) this summer has provided a very unique and special experience for me. I feel that the research opportunities given to me have allowed me to significantly benefit my research group, the laboratory, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Energy. The researchers in the Single Particle Aerosol Mass Spectrometry (SPAMS) group were very welcoming and clearly wanted me to get the most out of my time in Livermore. I feel that my research partner, Veena Venkatachalam of MIT, and I have been extremely productive in meeting our research goals throughout this summer, and have learned much about working in research at a national laboratory such as Lawrence Livermore. I have learned much about the technical aspects of research while working at LLNL, however I have also gained important experience and insight into how research groups at national laboratories function. I believe that this internship has given me valuable knowledge and experience which will certainly help my transition to graduate study and a career in engineering. My work with Veena Venkatachalam in the SPAMS group this summer has focused on two major projects. Initially, we were tasked with an analysis of data collected by the group this past spring in a large public environment. The SPAMS instrument was deployed for over two months, collecting information on many of the ambient air particles circulating through the area. Our analysis of the particle data collected during this deployment concerned several aspects, including finding groups, or clusters, of particles that seemed to appear more during certain times of day, analyzing the mass spectral data of clusters and comparing them with mass spectral data of known substances, and comparing the real-time detection capability of the SPAMS instrument with that of a commercially available biological detection instrument. This analysis was performed in support of a group report to the Department of Homeland Security on the results of the deployment. The analysis of the deployment data revealed some interesting applications of the SPAMS instrument to homeland security situations. Using software developed in-house by SPAMS group member Dr. Paul Steele, Veena and I were able to cluster a subset of data over a certain timeframe (ranging from a single hour to an entire week). The software used makes clusters based on the mass spectral characteristics of the each particle in the data set, as well as other parameters. By looking more closely at the characteristics of individual clusters, including the mass spectra, conclusions could be made about what these particles are. This was achieved partially through examination and discussion of the mass spectral data with the members of the SPAMS group, as well as through comparison with known mass spectra collected from substances tested in the laboratory. In many cases, broad conclusions could be drawn about the identity of a cluster of particles.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Connecting the Dots: An Assessment of Cyber-risks in Networked Building and Municipal Infrastructure Systems

The buildings and city streets we walk down are changing. Driven by various data-driven use cases, there is increased interest in networking and integrating lighting and other building systems (e.g., heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC), security, scheduling) that were previously not internet-facing, and equipping them with sensors that collect information about their environment and the people that inhabit it. These data-enabled systems can potentially deliver improved occupant and resident experiences and help meet the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) national energy and carbon reduction goals. Deploying connected devices new to being networked, however, is not without its challenges. This paper explores tools available to system designers and integrators that facilitate a cybersecurity landscape assessment – or more specifically the identification of threats, vulnerabilities, and adversarial behaviors that could be used against these networked systems. These assessments can help stakeholders shift security prioritization proactively toward the beginning of the development process.

cyber-risk assesment, adversarial behavior, MITRE ↗

Microgrid Cyber Security Reference Architecture (V2)

This document describes a microgrid cyber security reference architecture leveraging defense-in-depth techniques that are executed by first describing actor communication using data exchange attributes, then segmenting the microgrid control system network into enclaves, and finally grouping enclaves into functional domains. To illustrate the design approach, two notional microgrid control implementations are presented. Both include a discussion on types of communication occurring on that network, data exchange attributes for the actors, and examples of segmentation via enclaves and functional domains. The second example includes results from Red Team analysis and quantitative scoring according to a novel system that derives naturally from the implementation of the cyber security architecture.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Unraveling the Noise: An Investigation Plan for Signal Interference in Hearing Aids

Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) has revolutionized the performance of hearing aids with functionalities like seamless audio streaming and enhanced auditory functions. However, BLE operates within the highly congested 2.4 GHz frequency band, making it susceptible to signal interference that can degrade performance, reduce audio quality, and impact user experience. This paper documents interference patterns in BLE communication and introduces practical mitigation techniques aimed at improving the reliability of hearing aids. Attack vectors associated with Bluetooth enabled hearing aids include communication jamming, the interception of data between target devices, and GATT handle exploitation. Attackers could also use the vulnerabilities to block communications or intercept sensitive audio streams, posing significant security and privacy risks. These threats compromise two critical components of the CIA triad: (1) availability, by causing persistent connectivity issues, and (2) integrity, by enabling unauthorized data modifications. It is necessary to deal with these problems to ensure hearing aids work well and safely. This study investigates the impact of BLE signal interference on hearing aids, using tools such as HackRF [1], a Python tool to simulate interference scenarios, and Ubertooth [2] to sniff Bluetooth traffic between hearing aids and the device with the application. This paper investigates testing of BLE traffic in search of specific interference patterns that would impact the functionality of hearing aids, including jamming and flooding. This research focuses on developing robust mitigation techniques with the aim of securing BLE-enabled hearing aids against those vulnerabilities.

Baldwin, David [Savannah River National Laboratory↗

AI-based Cyber Event OSINT via Twitter Data

Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) is largely regarded as a necessary component for cybersecurity intelligence gathering to secure network systems. With the advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) and increasing usage of social media, like Twitter, we have a unique opportunity to obtain and aggregate information from social media. In this study, we propose an AI-based scheme capable of automatically pulling information from Twitter, filtering out security-irrelevant tweets, performing natural language analysis to correlate the tweets about each cybersecurity event (e.g., a malware campaign), and validating the information. This scheme has many applications, such as providing a means for security operators to gain insight into ongoing events and helping them prioritize vulnerabilities to deal with. To give examples of the possible uses, we present three case studies demonstrating the event discovery and investigation processes.

Dale, Dakota↗