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At least 1,279 records · Page 71

SAGE III Aerosol Extinction Validation in the Arctic Winter: Comparisons with SAGE II and POAM III

The use of SAGE III multiwavelength aerosol extinction coefficient measurements to infer PSC type is contingent on the robustness of both the extinction magnitude and its spectral variation. Past validation with SAGE II and other similar measurements has shown that the SAGE III extinction coefficient measurements are reliable though the comparisons have been greatly weighted toward measurements made at mid-latitudes. Some aerosol comparisons made in the Arctic winter as a part of SOLVE II suggested that SAGE III values, particularly at longer wavelengths, are too small with the implication that both the magnitude and the wavelength dependence are not reliable. Comparisons with POAM III have also suggested a similar discrepancy. Herein, we use SAGE II data as a common standard for comparison of SAGE III and POAM III measurements in the Arctic winters of 2002/2003 through 2004/2005. During the winter, SAGE II measurements are made infrequently at the same latitudes as these instruments. We have mitigated this problem through the use potential vorticity as a spatial coordinate and thus greatly increased the number of coincident events. We find that SAGE II and III extinction coefficient measurements show a high degree of compatibility at both 1020 nm and 450 nm except a 10-20% bias at both wavelengths. In addition, the 452 to 1020-nm extinction ratio shows a consistent bias of approx. 30% throughout the lower stratosphere. We also find that SAGE II and POAM III are on average consistent though the comparisons show a much higher variability and larger bias than SAGE II/III comparisons. In addition, we find that the two data sets are not well correlated below 18 km. Overall, we find both the extinction values and the spectral dependence from SAGE III are robust and we find no evidence of a significant defect within the Arctic vortex.

Thomason, L. W.↗

International Space Station (ISS) S-Band Corona Discharge Anomaly Consultation

The Assembly and Contingency Radio Frequency Group (ACRFG) onboard the International Space Station (ISS) is used for command and control communications and transmits (45 dBm or 32 watts) and receives at S-band. The system is nominally pressurized with gaseous helium (He) and nitrogen (N2) at 8 pounds per square inch absolute (psia). MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. (MDA) was engaged to analyze the operational characteristics of this unit in an effort to determine if the anomalous behavior was a result of a corona event. Based on this analysis, MDA did not recommend continued use of this ACRFG. The NESC was requested to provide expert support in the area of high-voltage corona and multipactoring in an S-Band RF system and to assess the probability of corona occurring in the ACRFG during the planned EVA. The NESC recommended minimal continued use of S/N 002 ACRFG until a replacement unit can be installed. Following replacement, S/N 002 will be subjected to destructive failure analysis in an effort to determine the proximate and root cause(s) of the anomalous behavior.

Kichak, Robert A.↗

Photogrammetric Measurements of CEV Airbag Landing Attenuation Systems

High-speed photogrammetric measurements are being used to assess the impact dynamics of the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) for ground landing contingency upon return to earth. Test articles representative of the Orion capsule are dropped at the NASA Langley Landing and Impact Research (LandIR) Facility onto a sand/clay mixture representative of a dry lakebed from elevations as high as 62 feet (18.9 meters). Two different types of test articles have been evaluated: (1) half-scale metal shell models utilized to establish baseline impact dynamics and soil characterization, and (2) geometric full-scale drop models with shock-absorbing airbags which are being evaluated for their ability to cushion the impact of the Orion CEV with the earth s surface. This paper describes the application of the photogrammetric measurement technique and provides drop model trajectory and impact data that indicate the performance of the photogrammetric measurement system.

Barrows, Danny A.↗

Space Shuttle MMOD Threat Mitigation Techniques

Prior to each shuttle mission, threat assessments are performed to determine the risk of critical penetration, payload bay door radiator tube leak and crew module window replacement from Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD). Mission parameters, such as vehicle attitude, exposure time and altitude are used as inputs for the analysis. Ballistic limit equations, based on hypervelocity impact testing of shuttle materials are used to estimate the critical particle diameters of the outer surfaces of the vehicle. The assessments are performed using the BUMPER computer code at the NASA/JSC Hypervelocity Impact Technology Facility (HITF). The most critical involves the calculation of Loss of Crew and Vehicle (LOCV) risk. An overview of significant MMOD impacts on the Payload Bay Door radiators, wing leading edge reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) panels and crew module windows will be presented, along with a discussion of the techniques NASA has implemented to reduce the risk from MMOD impacts. This paper will describe on-orbit inspection of the RCC regions and the methods used discern hypervelocity impact damage. Impact damage contingency plans and on-orbit repair techniques will also be discussed. The wing leading edge impact detection system (WLEIDS) and it s role in the reduction of on-orbit risk reduction will be presented. Finally, an analysis of alternative shuttle flight attitudes on MMOD risk will be demonstrated.

Hyde, J. L.↗

Automated Target Planning for FUSE Using the SOVA Algorithm

The SOVA algorithm was originally developed under the Resilient Systems and Operations Project of the Engineering for Complex Systems Program from NASA s Aerospace Technology Enterprise as a conceptual framework to support real-time autonomous system mission and contingency management. The algorithm and its software implementation were formulated for generic application to autonomous flight vehicle systems, and its efficacy was demonstrated by simulation within the problem domain of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle autonomous flight management. The approach itself is based upon the precept that autonomous decision making for a very complex system can be made tractable by distillation of the system state to a manageable set of strategic objectives (e.g. maintain power margin, maintain mission timeline, and et cetera), which if attended to, will result in a favorable outcome. From any given starting point, the attainability of the end-states resulting from a set of candidate decisions is assessed by propagating a system model forward in time while qualitatively mapping simulated states into margins on strategic objectives using fuzzy inference systems. The expected return value of each candidate decision is evaluated as the product of the assigned value of the end-state with the assessed attainability of the end-state. The candidate decision yielding the highest expected return value is selected for implementation; thus, the approach provides a software framework for intelligent autonomous risk management. The name adopted for the technique incorporates its essential elements: Strategic Objective Valuation and Attainability (SOVA). Maximum value of the approach is realized for systems where human intervention is unavailable in the timeframe within which critical control decisions must be made. The Far Ultraviolet Spectroscopic Explorer (FUSE) satellite, launched in 1999, has been collecting science data for eight years.[1] At its beginning of life, FUSE had six gyros in two IRUs and four reaction wheels. Over time through various failures, the satellite has been left with one reaction wheel on the vehicle skew axis and two gyros. To remain operational, a control scheme has been implemented using the magnetic torque rods and the remaining momentum wheel.[2] As a consequence, there are attitude regions where there is insufficient torque authority to overcome environmental disturbances (e.g. gravity gradient torques). The situation is further complicated by the fact that these attitude regions shift inertially with time as the spacecraft moves through earth s magnetic field during the course of its orbit. Under these conditions, the burden of planning targets and target-to-target slew maneuvers has increased significantly since the beginning of the mission.[3] Individual targets must be selected so that the magnetic field remains roughly aligned with the skew wheel axis to provide enough control authority to the other two orthogonal axes. If the field moves too far away from the skew axis, the lack of control authority allows environmental torques to pull the satellite away from the target and can potentially cause it to tumble. Slew maneuver planning must factor the stability of targets at the beginning and end, and the torque authority at all points along the slew. Due to the time varying magnetic field geometry relative to any two inertial targets, small modifications in slew maneuver timing can make large differences in the achievability of a maneuver.

Heatwole, Scott↗

Development of Urine Receptacle Assembly for the Crew Exploration Vehicle

The Urine Receptacle Assembly (URA) initially was developed for Apollo as a primary means of urine collection. The aluminum housing with stainless steel honeycomb insert provided all male crewmembers with a non-invasive means of micturating into a urine capturing device and then venting to space. The performance of the URA was a substantial improvement over previous devices but its performance was not well understood. The Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) program is exploring the URA as a contingency liquid waste management system for the vehicle. URA improvements are required to meet CEV requirements, including: consumables minimization, flow performance, acceptable hygiene standards, crew comfort, and female crewmember capability. This paper presents the results of a historical review of URA performance during the Apollo program, recent URA performance tests on the reduced gravity aircraft flight under varying flow conditions, and a proposed development plan for the URA to meet CEV needs.

Cibuzar, Branelle Rae↗

Preliminary Airspace Operations Simulations Findings Report

Provides preliminary findings of the initial series (normal operations and contingency management) of airspace operations simulations. The key elements of this report discuss feedback from controller subjects for UAS flight above FL430. Findings provide initial evaluation of routine UAS operations above dense ARTCC airspace (ZOB), and identify areas of further research, policy direction and procedural development. This document further serves as an addendum to the detailed AOS simulation plan (Deliverable SIM001), incorporating feedback from FAA air traffic personnel and Access 5 IPTs.

Source record↗

Notional Airspace Operations Demonstration Plan

The airspace operations demonstration (AOD) is intended to show that the Access 5 Step 1 functional requirements can be met. The demonstration will occur in two phases. The initial on-range phase will be carried out in restricted airspace to demonstrate the cooperative collision avoidance (CCA) functional requirements and to provide risk-reduction for the AOD by allowing the test team to rehearse some elements of the demonstration mission. The CCA system to be used in these flights is based on Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) which is a commercially-available system by which airplanes constantly broadcast their current position and altitude to other aircraft and ground resources over a dedicated radio datalink. The final phase will occur in the national airspace (NAS) and will be the formal demonstration of the remainder of the proposed functional requirements. The general objectives of the AOD are as follows: (1) Demonstrate that the UAS can aviate in the NAS (2) Demonstrate that the UAS can navigate in the NAS (3) Demonstrate that the UAS can communicate with the NAS (4) Demonstrate that the UAS can perform selected collision avoidance functions in the NAS (5) Demonstrate that the UAS can evaluate and avoid weather conflicts in the NAS (6) Demonstrate that the UAS can provide adequate command and control in the NAS In addition to the stated objectives, there are a number of goals for the flight demonstration. The demo can be accomplished successfully without achieving these goals, but these goals are to be used as a guideline for preparing for the mission. The goals are: (1) Mission duration of at least 24 hours (2) Loiter over heavy traffic to evaluate the data block issue identified during the Access 5 Airspace Operations Simulations (3) Document the contingency management process and lessons learned (4) Document the coordination process for Ground Control Stations (GCS) handoff (5) Document lessons learned regarding the process of flying in the NAS Preliminary planning for a notional mission to achieve the objectives and goals has been prepared. The planning is intended to serve as a guide for detailed planning of the AOD.

Trongale, Nicholas A.↗

Functional Requirements Document for HALE UAS Operations in the NAS: Step 1. Version 3

The purpose of this Functional Requirements Document (FRD) is to compile the functional requirements needed to achieve the Access 5 Vision of "operating High Altitude, Long Endurance (HALE) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) routinely, safely, and reliably in the national airspace system (NAS)" for Step 1. These functional requirements could support the development of a minimum set of policies, procedures and standards by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and various standards organizations. It is envisioned that this comprehensive body of work will enable the FAA to establish and approve regulations to govern safe operation of UAS in the NAS on a routine or daily "file and fly" basis. The approach used to derive the functional requirements found within this FRD was to decompose the operational requirements and objectives identified within the Access 5 Concept of Operations (CONOPS) into the functions needed to routinely and safely operate a HALE UAS in the NAS. As a result, four major functional areas evolved to enable routine and safe UAS operations for an on-demand basis in the NAS. These four major functions are: Aviate, Navigate, Communicate, and Avoid Hazards. All of the functional requirements within this document can be directly traceable to one of these four major functions. Some functions, however, are traceable to several, or even all, of these four major functions. These cross-cutting functional requirements support the "Command / Control: function as well as the "Manage Contingencies" function. The requirements associated to these high-level functions and all of their supporting low-level functions are addressed in subsequent sections of this document.

Source record↗

Multi-Sensor Testing for Automated Rendezvous and Docking Sensor Testing at the Flight Robotics Laboratory

The Exploration Systems Architecture defines missions that require rendezvous, proximity operations, and docking (RPOD) of two spacecraft both in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and in Low Lunar Orbit (LLO). Uncrewed spacecraft must perform automated and/or autonomous rendezvous, proximity operations and docking operations (commonly known as AR&D). The crewed missions may also perform rendezvous and docking operations and may require different levels of automation and/or autonomy, and must provide the crew with relative navigation information for manual piloting. The capabilities of the RPOD sensors are critical to the success of the Exploration Program. NASA has the responsibility to determine whether the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) contractor proposed relative navigation sensor suite will meet the requirements. The relatively low technology readiness level of AR&D relative navigation sensors has been carried as one of the CEV Project's top risks. The AR&D Sensor Technology Project seeks to reduce the risk by the testing and analysis of selected relative navigation sensor technologies through hardware-in-the-loop testing and simulation. These activities will provide the CEV Project information to assess the relative navigation sensors maturity as well as demonstrate test methods and capabilities. The first year of this project focused on a series of"pathfinder" testing tasks to develop the test plans, test facility requirements, trajectories, math model architecture, simulation platform, and processes that will be used to evaluate the Contractor-proposed sensors. Four candidate sensors were used in the first phase of the testing. The second phase of testing used four sensors simultaneously: two Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Advanced Video Guidance Sensors (AVGS), a laser-based video sensor that uses retroreflectors attached to the target vehicle, and two commercial laser range finders. The multi-sensor testing was conducted at MSFC's Flight Robotics Laboratory (FRL) using the FRL's 6-DOF gantry system, called the Dynamic Overhead Target System (DOTS). The target vehicle for "docking" in the laboratory was a mockup that was representative of the proposed CEV docking system, with added retroreflectors for the AVGS. The multi-sensor test configuration used 35 open-loop test trajectories covering three major objectives: (1) sensor characterization trajectories designed to test a wide range of performance parameters; (2) CEV-specific trajectories designed to test performance during CEV-like approach and departure profiles; and (3) sensor characterization tests designed for evaluating sensor performance under more extreme conditions as might be induced during a spacecraft failure or during contingency situations. This paper describes the test development, test facility, test preparations, test execution, and test results of the multi-sensor series of trajectories.

Brewster, L.↗

Multi-Sensor Testing for Automated Rendezvous and Docking Sensor Testing at the Flight Robotics Lab

The Exploration Systems Architecture defines missions that require rendezvous, proximity operations, and docking (RPOD) of two spacecraft both in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and in Low Lunar Orbit (LLO). Uncrewed spacecraft must perform automated and/or autonomous rendezvous, proximity operations and docking operations (commonly known as AR&D). The crewed missions may also perform rendezvous and docking operations and may require different levels of automation and/or autonomy, and must provide the crew with relative navigation information for manual piloting. The capabilities of the RPOD sensors are critical to the success ofthe Exploration Program. NASA has the responsibility to determine whether the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) contractor-proposed relative navigation sensor suite will meet the requirements. The relatively low technology readiness level of AR&D relative navigation sensors has been carried as one of the CEV Project's top risks. The AR&D Sensor Technology Project seeks to reduce the risk by the testing and analysis of selected relative navigation sensor technologies through hardware-in-the-Ioop testing and simulation. These activities will provide the CEV Project information to assess the relative navigation sensors maturity as well as demonstrate test methods and capabilities. The first year of this project focused on a series of "pathfinder" testing tasks to develop the test plans, test facility requirements, trajectories, math model architecture, simulation platform, and processes that will be used to evaluate the Contractor-proposed sensors. Four candidate sensors were used in the first phase of the testing. The second phase of testing used four sensors simultaneously: two Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Advanced Video Guidance Sensors (AVGS), a laser-based video sensor that uses retroreflectors attached to the target vehicle, and two commercial laser range finders. The multi-sensor testing was conducted at MSFC's Flight Robotics Laboratory (FRL) using the FRL's 6-DOF gantry system, called the Dynamic Overhead Target System (DOTS). The target vehicle for "docking" in the laboratory was a mockup that was representative of the proposed CEV docking system, with added retroreflectors for the AVGS.' The multi-sensor test configuration used 35 open-loop test trajectories covering three major objectives: (l) sensor characterization trajectories designed to test a wide range of performance parameters; (2) CEV-specific trajectories designed to test performance during CEV-like approach and departure profiles; and (3) sensor characterization tests designed for evaluating sensor performance under more extreme conditions as might be induced during a spacecraft failure or during contingency situations. This paper describes the test development, test facility, test preparations, test execution, and test results of the multisensor series oftrajectories

Brewster, Linda L.↗

Impact of Solar Array Position on ISS Vehicle Charging

The International Space Station (ISS), because of its large structure and high voltage solar arrays, has a complex plasma interaction with the ionosphere in low Earth orbit (LEO). This interaction of the ISS US Segment photovoltaic (PV) power system with the LEO ionospheric plasma produces floating potentials on conducting elements of the ISS structure relative to the local plasma environment. To control the ISS floating potentials, two Plasma Contactor Units (PCUs) are installed on the Z1 truss. Each PCU discharges accumulated electrons from the Space Station structure, thus reducing the potential difference between the ISS structure and the surrounding charged plasma environment. Operations of the PCUs were intended to keep the ISS floating potential to 40 Volts (Reference 1). Exposed dielectric surfaces overlying conducting structure on the Space Station will collect an opposite charge from the ionosphere as the ISS charges. In theory, when an Extravehicular Activity (EVA) crewmember is tethered to structure via the crew safety tether or when metallic surfaces of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) come in contact with conducting metallic surfaces of the ISS, the EMU conducting components, including the perspiration-soaked crewmember inside, can become charged to the Space Station floating potential. The concern is the potential dielectric breakdown of anodized aluminum surfaces on the EMU producing an arc from the EMU to the ambient plasma, or nearby ISS structure. If the EMU arcs, an electrical current of an unknown magnitude and duration may conduct through the EVA crewmember, producing an unacceptable condition. This electrical current may be sufficient to startle or fatally shock the EVA crewmember (Reference 2). Hence, as currently defined by the EVA community, the ISS floating potential for all nominal and contingency EVA worksites and translation paths must have a magnitude less than 40 volts relative to the local ionosphere at all times during EVA. Arcing from the EMU is classified as a catastrophic hazard, which requires two-failure tolerant controls, i.e., three hazard controls. Each PCU is capable of maintaining the ISS floating potential below the requirement during EVA. The two PCUs provide a single failure tolerant control of ISS floating potential. In the event of the failure of one or two PCUs, a combination of solar array shunting and turning the solar arrays into their own wakes will be used to supply control of the plasma hazard (Reference 3). The purpose of this paper is to present on-orbit information that shows that ISS solar array placement with respect to the ISS velocity vector can control solar array plasma charging, and hence, provide an operational control for the plasma hazard. Also, this paper will present on-orbit information that shows that shunting of the ISS solar arrays can control solar array plasma charging, and hence, provide an additional operational control for the plasma hazard.

Alred, John↗

Introduction and Mission Response Team (MRT)

On February 1, 2003 the Space Shuttle Columbia, returning to Earth with a crew of seven astronauts, disintegrated along a track extending from California to Louisiana. Observers on the ground filmed breakup of the spacecraft. Debris fell along a 567 statute mile track from Littlefield, Texas to Fort Polk, Louisiana; the largest ever recorded debris field. At the time of the accident the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) flight surgeon on-duty at the Mission Control Center (MCC) in Houston, Texas initiated the medical contingency response. The DOD surgeon at Patrick Air Force Base was notified, NASA medical personnel were recalled and the services of Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) were requested. Subsequent to the accident the NASA flight surgeons that had supported the crew on orbit now provided medical support to the crewmember s families. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and numerous other federal, state and local agencies along with the citizens of Texas and Louisiana responded to the disaster. Search and recovery was managed from a Disaster Field Office (DFO) established in Lufkin, Texas. Mishap Investigation Team (MIT) medical operations were managed from Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana. Accident investigation teams (Columbia Accident Investigation Task Force (CAITF) and Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB)) appointed immediately after the disaster included current and former authorities in space medicine. In August 2003, the CAIB concluded its investigation and released its findings in a report published in February 2004.

Pool, Sam↗

Operational Experience with Long Duration Wildfire Mapping: UAS Missions Over the Western United States

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, United States Forest Service, and National Interagency Fire Center have developed a partnership to develop and demonstrate technology to improve airborne wildfire imaging and data dissemination. In the summer of 2007, a multi-spectral infrared scanner was integrated into NASA's Ikhana Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) (a General Atomics Predator-B) and launched on four long duration wildfire mapping demonstration missions covering eight western states. Extensive safety analysis, contingency planning, and mission coordination were key to securing an FAA certificate of authorization (COA) to operate in the national airspace. Infrared images were autonomously geo-rectified, transmitted to the ground station by satellite communications, and networked to fire incident commanders within 15 minutes of acquisition. Close coordination with air traffic control ensured a safe operation, and allowed real-time redirection around inclement weather and other minor changes to the flight plan. All objectives of the mission demonstrations were achieved. In late October, wind-driven wildfires erupted in five southern California counties. State and national emergency operations agencies requested Ikhana to help assess and manage the wildfires. Four additional missions were launched over a 5-day period, with near realtime images delivered to multiple emergency operations centers and fire incident commands managing 10 fires.

Hall, Philip↗

Eta Carinae: X-ray Line Variations during the 2003 X-ray Minimum, and the Orbit Orientation

The future evolution of Eta Carinae will be as a supernova (or hypernova) and black hole. The evolution is highly contingent on mass and angular momentum changes and instabilities. The presence of a companion can serve to trigger instabilities and provide pathways for mass and angular momentum exchange loss. X-rays can be used a a key diagnostic tool: x-ray temperatures trace pre-shock wind velocities, periodic x-ray variability traces the orbit, and x-ray line variations traces the flow and orientation of shocked gas. This brief presentation highlights x-ray line variations from the HETG and presents a model of the colliding wind flow.

Corcoran, M. F.↗

Heart Rhythm Monitoring in the Constellation Lunar and Launch/Landing EVA Suit: Recommendations from an Expert Panel

Currently there are several physiological monitoring requirements for Extravehicular Activity (EVA) in the Human-Systems Interface Requirements (HSIR) document, including continuous heart rhythm monitoring. However, it is not known whether heart rhythm monitoring in the lunar surface space suit is a necessary capability for lunar surface operations or in launch/landing suit the event of a cabin depressurization enroute to or from the moon. Methods: Current US astronaut corps demographic information was provided to an expert panel of cardiovascular medicine experts, including specialists in electrophysiology, exercise physiology, interventional cardiology and arrhythmia. This information included averages for male/female age, body mass index (BMI), blood pressure, cholesterol, inflammatory markers, echocardiogram, ranges for coronary artery calcium (CAC) scores for long duration astronauts, and ranges for heart rate (HR) and metabolic (MET) rates obtained during microgravity and lunar EVA. Results: The panel determined that no uncontrolled hazard was likely to occur in the suit during lunar surface or contingency microgravity ops that would require ECG monitoring in the highly screened US astronaut population. However having the capability for rhythm monitoring inside the vehicle (IVA) was considered critical to manage an astronaut in distress. Discussion: Heart rate (HR) monitoring alone allows effective monitoring of astronaut health and function. Consequently, electrocardiographic (ECG) monitoring capability as a clinical tool is not essential in the lunar or launch/landing space suit. However, the panel considered that rhythm monitoring could be useful in certain clinical situations, it was not considered required for safe operations. Also, lunar vehicles should be required to have ECG monitoring capability with a minimum of 5-lead ECG (derived 12- lead) for IVA medical assessments.

Scheuring, Richard A.↗

Long-Range Transhorizon Lunar Surface Radio Wave Propagation in the Presence of a Regolith and a Sparse Exospheric Plasma

Long-range, over-the-horizon (transhorizon) radio wave propagation is considered for the case of the Moon. In the event that relay satellites are not available or otherwise unwarranted for use, transhorizon communication provides for a contingency or backup option for non line-of-sight lunar surface exploration scenarios. Two potential low-frequency propagation mechanisms characteristic of the lunar landscape are the lunar regolith and the photoelectron induced plasma exosphere enveloping the Moon. Although it was hoped that the regolith would provide for a spherical waveguide which could support a trapped surface wave phenomena, it is found that, in most cases, the regolith is deleterious to long range radio wave propagation. However, the presence of the plasma of the lunar exosphere supports wave propagation and, in fact, surpasses the attenuation of the regolith. Given the models of the regolith and exosphere adopted here, it is recommended that a frequency of 1 MHz be considered for low rate data transmission along the lunar surface. It is also recommended that further research be done to capture the descriptive physics of the regolith and the exospheric plasma so that a more complete model can be obtained. This comprehensive theoretical study is based entirely on first principles and the mathematical techniques needed are developed as required; it is self-contained and should not require the use of outside resources for its understanding.

Manning, Robert M.↗

Defining Constellation Suit Helmet Field of View Requirements Employing a Mission Segment Based Reduction Process

Field of view has always been a design feature paramount to helmet design, and in particular space suit design, where the helmet must provide an adequate field of view for a large range of activities, environments, and body positions. For Project Constellation, a slightly different approach to helmet requirement maturation was utilized; one that was less a direct function of body position and suit pressure and more a function of the mission segment in which the field of view is required. Through taxonimization of various parameters that affect suited FOV, as well as consideration for possible nominal and contingency operations during that mission segment, a reduction process was able to condense the large number of possible outcomes to only six unique field of view angle requirements that still captured all necessary variables without sacrificing fidelity. The specific field of view angles were defined by considering mission segment activities, historical performance of other suits, comparison between similar requirements (pressure visor up versus down, etc.), estimated requirements from other teams for field of view (Orion, Altair, EVA), previous field of view tests, medical data for shirtsleeve field of view performance, and mapping of visual field data to generate 45degree off-axis field of view requirements. Full resolution of several specific field of view angle requirements warranted further work, which consisted of low and medium fidelity field of view testing in the rear entry ISuit and DO27 helmet prototype. This paper serves to document this reduction progress and followup testing employed to write the Constellation requirements for helmet field of view.

McFarland, Shane M.↗