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At least 1,297 records · Page 72

Concept of operations for channel characterization and simulation of coaxial transmission channels at the National Ignition Facility (NIF)

The National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) executes experiments for inertial con nement fusion (ICF), world-class high energy density physics (HEDP), and critical national security missions. While the laser systems, target positioners, alignment systems, control systems, etc. enable the execution of such experiments, NIF’s utility would be greatly reduced without its suite of diagnostics. It would be e ectively “blind” to the incredible physics unleashed in its target chamber. Since NIF diagnostics are such an important part of its mission, the quality and reliability of the diagnostics, and of the data recorded from them, is crucial.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Inter-Domain Fusion for Enhanced Intrusion Detection in Power Systems: An Evidence Theoretic and Meta-Heuristic Approach

False alerts due to misconfigured or compromised intrusion detection systems (IDS) in industrial control system (ICS) networks can lead to severe economic and operational damage. However, research using deep learning to reduce false alerts often requires the physical and cyber sensor data to be trustworthy. Implicit trust is a major problem for artificial intelligence or machine learning (AI/ML) in cyber-physical system (CPS) security, because when these solutions are most urgently needed is also when they are most at risk (e.g., during an attack). To address this, the Inter-Domain Evidence theoretic Approach for Inference (IDEA-I) is proposed that reframes the detection problem as how to make good decisions given uncertainty. Specifically, an evidence theoretic approach leveraging Dempster–Shafer (DS) combination rules and their variants is proposed for reducing false alerts. A multi-hypothesis mass function model is designed that leverages probability scores obtained from supervised-learning classifiers. Using this model, a location-cum-domain-based fusion framework is proposed to evaluate the detector’s performance using disjunctive, conjunctive, and cautious conjunctive rules. The approach is demonstrated in a cyber-physical power system testbed, and the classifiers are trained with datasets from Man-In-The-Middle attack emulation in a large-scale synthetic electric grid. For evaluating the performance, we consider plausibility, belief, pignistic, and general Bayesian theorem-based metrics as decision functions. To improve the performance, a multi-objective-based genetic algorithm is proposed for feature selection considering the decision metrics as the fitness function. Finally, we present a software application to evaluate the DS fusion approaches with different parameters and architectures.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering Principles: What’s in it for me?

CIE is an emerging method to integrate cybersecurity considerations into the conception, design, development, and operation of any physical system that has digital connectivity, monitoring, or control. CIE complements—but does not replace—the application of cybersecurity standards or practices currently in place within an organization. Rather, it expands cybersecurity decisions into the engineering space, not by asking engineers to become cyber experts, but by calling on engineers to apply engineering tools and make engineering decisions that improve cybersecurity outcomes. CIE examines the engineering consequences that a sophisticated cyber attacker could achieve, and drives engineering changes that may provide deterministic mitigations to limit or eliminate those consequences. Engineers and technicians that design critical energy infrastructure installations can integrate the 12 principles of CIE into each phase of the engineering lifecycle, from concept to retirement. These principles are aimed at system or design engineers, operators, and technicians, rather than software engineers or operational cybersecurity practitioners, because the engineers who design, build, operate, and maintain the physical infrastructure are best positioned to leverage a system’s engineering design to diminish the severity of cyber attacks or digital technology failures. This approach creates new opportunities for engineering teams—and not just cybersecurity teams—to secure the system using the physics and mechanics of engineering controls—not just digital monitoring and controls.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

What Can We Learn from One Billion Ground System Log Messages?

Shortage of log-based data in a ground system they have traditionally been the under achievers in a satellite ground system. This is due to several factors: Once log messages scroll out of view on the TTC event console window they are soon forgotten. Application and system log files are scattered across directories within a system, across a multitude of servers, and across one or more databases making access cumbersome. Typical tools to perform log file content searching are generally crude and typically only employed as part of trouble-shooting exercises.As we move towards satellite constellations and fleets and add even more status information, the number of messages keeps growing. One mission now estimates that they could generate 3,000,000 messages per day 1 billion per year - for the life of their mission. What to do with those 1 billion messages? That is the challenge. With the recent technological advances in the management of large data sets, text-based processing, and data analytics, there are now capabilities that we can provide to the ground system engineers and satellite operators to address what we postulate are missed opportunities. Advanced real-time log analysis can allow us to be less reactionary in favor of being more proactive. Analytics goals include the ability to: Identify root cause of unexpected events, failures or error conditions enabled by correlating disparate data. Detect security breaches attempts before they are successful. Help admins ensure IT resources continue running optimally. Identify trends and patterns that may indicate impending failures or error conditions for valuable assets before they happen. Compare satellites in a fleet or constellation in terms of number of alarms, number of command sent to them, etc.. Answer questions like "Are the operations support needs increasing over the past year?" or "Have we seen this combination of alarm conditions before?" But really, once the tools are readily available the users will start realizing what can be done with their new powers. In this presentation we will show the results of analyzing millions of actual mission operations log messages, how the results can be displayed to the user, and how new products now available as open source can be applied to the challenges of large scale time-tagged text-based mission operations messages. Flight operations team members believe that this is a powerful new option for how they assess overall system and space asset health. Technical descriptions of the design, tools, and storage will be provided. One billion messages? Bring'em on!

Orsborne, Sharon↗

Audit Report on "Protection of the Department of Energy's Unclassified Sensitive Electronic Information"

The Department of Energy and its contractors store and process massive quantities of sensitive information to accomplish national security, energy, science, and environmental missions. Sensitive unclassified data, such as personally identifiable information (PII), official use only, and unclassified controlled nuclear information require special handling and protection to prevent misuse of the information for inappropriate purposes. Industry experts have reported that more than 203 million personal privacy records have been lost or stolen over the past three years, including information maintained by corporations, educational institutions, and Federal agencies. The loss of personal and other sensitive information can result in substantial financial harm, embarrassment, and inconvenience to individuals and organizations. Therefore, strong protective measures, including data encryption, help protect against the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information. Prior reports involving the loss of sensitive information have highlighted weaknesses in the Department's ability to protect sensitive data. Our report on Security Over Personally Identifiable Information (DOE/IG-0771, July 2007) disclosed that the Department had not fully implemented all measures recommended by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and required by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to protect PII, including failures to identify and encrypt PII maintained on information systems. Similarly, the Government Accountability Office recently reported that the Department had not yet installed encryption technology to protect sensitive data on the vast majority of laptop computers and handheld devices. Because of the potential for harm, we initiated this audit to determine whether the Department and its contractors adequately safeguarded sensitive electronic information. The Department had taken a number of steps to improve protection of PII. Our review, however, identified opportunities to strengthen the protection of all types of sensitive unclassified electronic information and reduce the risk that such data could fall into the hands of individuals with malicious intent. In particular, for the seven sites we reviewed: (1) Four sites had either not ensured that sensitive information maintained on mobile devices was encrypted. Or, they had improperly permitted sensitive unclassified information to be transmitted unencrypted through email or to offsite backup storage facilities; (2) One site had not ensured that laptops taken on foreign travel, including travel to sensitive countries, were protected against security threats; and, (3) Although required by the OMB since 2003, we learned that programs and sites were still working to complete Privacy Impact Assessments - analyses designed to examine the risks and ramifications of using information systems to collect, maintain, and disseminate personal information. Our testing revealed that the weaknesses identified were attributable, at least in part, to Headquarters programs and field sites that had not implemented existing policies and procedures requiring protection of sensitive electronic information. In addition, a lack of performance monitoring contributed to the inability of the Department and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to ensure that measures were in place to fully protect sensitive information. As demonstrated by previous computer intrusion-related data losses throughout the Department, without improvements, the risk or vulnerability for future losses remains unacceptably high. In conducting this audit, we recognized that data encryption and related techniques do not provide absolute assurance that sensitive data is fully protected. For example, encryption will not necessarily protect data in circumstances where organizational access controls are weak or are circumvented through phishing or other malicious techniques. However, as noted by NIST, when used appropriately, encryption is an effective tool that can, as part of an overall risk-management strategy, enhance security over critical personal and other sensitive information. The audit disclosed that Sandia National Laboratories had instituted a comprehensive program to protect laptops taken on foreign travel. In addition, the Department issued policy after our field work was completed that should standardize the Privacy Impact Assessment process, and, in so doing, provide increased accountability. While these actions are positive steps, additional effort is needed to help ensure that the privacy of individuals is adequately protected and that sensitive operational data is not compromised. To that end, our report contains several recommendations to implement a risk-based protection scheme for the protection of sensitive electronic information.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

ARPA-E Grid Optimization (GO) Competition Challenge 1

The ARPA-E Grid Optimization (GO) Competition Challenge 1, from 2018 to 2019, focused on the basic Security Constrained AC Optimal Power Flow problem (SCOPF) for a single time period. The Challenge utilized sets of unique datasets generated by the ARPA-E GRID DATA program. Each dataset consisted of a collection of power system network models of different sizes with associated operating scenarios (snapshots in time defining instantaneous power demand, renewable generation, generator and line availability, etc.). The datasets were of two types: Real-Time, which included starting-point information, and Online, which did not. Week-Ahead data is also provided for some cases but was not used in the Competition. Although most datasets were synthetic and generated by GRIDDATA, a few came from industry and were only used in the Final Event. All synthetic Input Data and Team Results for the GO Competition Challenge 1 for the Sandbox, Trial Events 1 to 3, and the Final Event along with problem, format, scoring and rules descriptions are available here. Data for industry scenarios will not be made public. Challenge 1, a minimization problem, required two computational steps. Solver 1 or Code 1 solved the base SCOPF problem under a strict wall clock time limit, as would be the case in industry, and reported the base case operating point as output, which was used to compute the Objective Function value that was used as the scenario score. The feasibility of the solution was provided by the Solver 2 or Code 2, which solves the power flow problem for all contingencies based on the results from Solver 1. This is not normally done in industry, so the time limits were relaxed. In fact, there were no time limits for Trial Event 1. This proved to be a mistake, with some codes running for more than 90 hours, and a time limit of 2 seconds per contingency was imposed for all other events. Entrants were free to use their own Solver 2 or use an open-source version provided by the Competition. Containers, such as Docker, were considered to improve the portability of codes, but none that could reliably support a multi-node parallel computing environment, e.g., MPI, could be found. For more information on the competition and challenge see the "GO Competition Challenge 1 Information" and "GO Competition Challenge 1 Additional Information" resources below.

ACOPF↗

Supercritical carbon dioxide cycle control analysis.

This report documents work carried out during FY 2008 on further investigation of control strategies for supercritical carbon dioxide (S-CO{sub 2}) Brayton cycle energy converters. The main focus of the present work has been on investigation of the S-CO{sub 2} cycle control and behavior under conditions not covered by previous work. An important scenario which has not been previously calculated involves cycle operation for a Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor (SFR) following a reactor scram event and the transition to the primary coolant natural circulation and decay heat removal. The Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) Plant Dynamics Code has been applied to investigate the dynamic behavior of the 96 MWe (250 MWt) Advanced Burner Test Reactor (ABTR) S-CO{sub 2} Brayton cycle following scram. The timescale for the primary sodium flowrate to coast down and the transition to natural circulation to occur was calculated with the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 computer code and found to be about 400 seconds. It is assumed that after this time, decay heat is removed by the normal ABTR shutdown heat removal system incorporating a dedicated shutdown heat removal S-CO{sub 2} pump and cooler. The ANL Plant Dynamics Code configured for the Small Secure Transportable Autonomous Reactor (SSTAR) Lead-Cooled Fast Reactor (LFR) was utilized to model the S-CO{sub 2} Brayton cycle with a decaying liquid metal coolant flow to the Pb-to-CO{sub 2} heat exchangers and temperatures reflecting the decaying core power and heat removal by the cycle. The results obtained in this manner are approximate but indicative of the cycle transient performance. The ANL Plant Dynamics Code calculations show that the S-CO{sub 2} cycle can operate for about 400 seconds following the reactor scram driven by the thermal energy stored in the reactor structures and coolant such that heat removal from the reactor exceeds the decay heat generation. Based on the results, requirements for the shutdown heat removal system may be defined. In particular, the peak heat removal capacity of the shutdown heat removal loop may be specified to be 1.1 % of the nominal reactor power. An investigation of the oscillating cycle behavior calculated by the ANL Plant Dynamics Code under specific conditions has been carried out. It has been found that the calculation of unstable operation of the cycle during power reduction to 0 % may be attributed to the modeling of main compressor operation. The most probable reason for such instabilities is the limit of applicability of the currently used one-dimensional compressor performance subroutines which are based on empirical loss coefficients. A development of more detailed compressor design and performance models is required and is recommended for future work in order to better investigate and possibly eliminate the calculated instabilities. Also, as part of such model development, more reliable surge criteria should be developed for compressor operation close to the critical point. It is expected that more detailed compressor models will be developed as a part of validation of the Plant Dynamics Code through model comparison with the experiment data generated in the small S-CO{sub 2} loops being constructed at Barber-Nichols Inc. and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). Although such a comparison activity had been planned to be initiated in FY 2008, data from the SNL compression loop currently in operation at Barber Nichols Inc. has not yet become available by the due date of this report. To enable the transient S-CO{sub 2} cycle investigations to be carried out, the ANL Plant Dynamics Code for the S-CO{sub 2} Brayton cycle was further developed and improved. The improvements include further optimization and tuning of the control mechanisms as well as an adaptation of the code for reactor systems other than the Lead-Cooled Fast Reactor (LFR). Since the focus of the ANL work on S-CO{sub 2} cycle development for the majority of the current year has been on the applicability of the cycle to SFRs, work has started on modification of the ANL Plant Dynamics Code to allow the dynamic simulation of the ABTR. The code modifications have reached the point where a transient simulation can be run in steady state mode; i.e., to determine the steady state initial conditions at full power without an initiating event. The results show that the steady state solution is maintained with minimal variations during at least 4,000 seconds of the transient. More SFR design specific modifications to the ANL Plant Dynamics Code are required to run the code in a full transient mode, including models for the sodium pumps and their control as well as models for reactivity feedback and control of the reactor power.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2007

The Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2007 (NTSER) was prepared to meet the information needs of the public and the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for annual site environmental reports. It was prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec). This Executive Summary presents the purpose of the document, the major programs conducted at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), NTS key environmental initiatives, radiological releases and potential doses to the public resulting from site operations, a summary of nonradiological releases, implementation status of the NTS Environmental Management System, a summary of compliance with environmental regulations, pollution prevention and waste minimization accomplishments, and significant environmental accomplishments. Much of the content of this Executive Summary is also presented in a separate stand-alone pamphlet titled Nevada Test Site Environmental Report Summary 2007. This NTSER was prepared to satisfy DOE Order 231.1A, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting. Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the NTS Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts. This report meets these objectives for the NTS and three offsite Nevada facilities mentioned in this report.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

3He and BF3 Neutron Detector Pressure Effect and Model Comparison

Paper for SORMA conference Radiation detection systems for homeland security applications must possess the capability of detecting both gamma rays and neutrons. The radiation portal monitor (RPM) systems that are currently deployed use a plastic scintillator for detecting gamma rays and 3He gas-filled proportional counters for detecting neutrons. Proportional counters filled with 3He are the preferred neutron detectors for use in RPMs because 3He has a large neutron cross section, is relatively insensitive to gamma-rays, is neither toxic nor corrosive, can withstand extreme environments, and can be operated at a lower voltage than some of the alternative proportional counters. The amount of 3He required for homeland security and science applications has depleted the world supply and there is no longer enough available to fill the demand. Thus, alternative neutron detectors are being explored. Two possible temporary solutions that could be utilized while a more permanent solution is being identified are reducing the 3He pressure in the proportional counters and using boron trifluoride (BF3) gas-filled proportional counters. Reducing the amount of 3He required in each of the proportional counters would decrease the rate at which 3He is being used, not enough to solve the shortage but perhaps enough to increase the amount of time available to find a working replacement. BF3 is not appropriate for all situations as these detectors are less sensitive than 3He, BF3 gas is corrosive, and a much higher voltage is required than what is used with 3He detectors. Measurements of the neutron detection efficiency of 3He and BF3 as a function of tube pressure were made. The experimental results were also used to validate models of the RPMs.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

A Managed Tokens Service for Securely Keeping and Distributing Grid Tokens

Fermilab is transitioning authentication and authorization for grid operations to using bearer tokens based on the WLCG Common JWT (JSON Web Token) Profile. One of the functionalities that Fermilab experimenters rely on is the ability to automate batch job submission, which in turn depends on the ability to securely refresh and distribute the necessary credentials to experiment job submit points. Thus, with the transition to using tokens for grid operations, we needed to create a service that would obtain, refresh, and distribute tokens for experimenters’ use. This service would avoid the need for experimenters to be experts in obtaining their own tokens and would better protect the most sensitive long-lived credentials. Further, the service needed to be widely scalable, as we are currently keeping credentials active for approximately 15 experiments, each with 1-3 different credentials, and distributing those credentials to 2-20 submit points per experiment, with those numbers steadily increasing. To address these issues, we created and deployed a Managed Tokens service. The service is written in Go, taking advantage of that language’s native concurrency primitives to easily be able to scale operations as we onboard experiments. The service uses as its first credentials a set of kerberos keytabs, stored on the same secure machine that the Managed Tokens service runs on. These kerberos credentials allow the service to use htgettoken via condor_vault_storer to store vault tokens in the HTCondor credential managers (credds) that run on the batch system scheduler machines (HTCondor schedds); as well as downloading a local, shorter-lived copy of the vault token. The kerberos credentials are then also used to distribute copies of the locally-stored vault tokens to experiment submit points. When experimenters schedule jobs to be submitted, these distributed vault tokens are used to access a Hashicorp Vault instance (run separately from the Managed Tokens service), and previously-stored refresh tokens there are used to obtain the bearer token that is submitted with the job. We will discuss here the design of the Managed Tokens service, including elaborating on certain choices we made with regards to concurrent operations, configuration, monitoring, and deployment.

Bhat, Shreyas↗

Trust-but-Verify in Cyber-Physical Systems

Cyber-physical systems span a wide spectrum, from long-lived legacy systems to more modern installations. Trust is an issue that arises across the spectrum, albeit with different variants of goals and constraints. On the one end of the spectrum, legacy systems are characterized by function-based designs in which trust is an implicitly in-built concept -- the operation is historically designed, implemented, and optimized in a benign stance with respect to intended use. On the other end of the spectrum, modern systems are characterized by offerings from manufacturers, vendors, and system installers -- the devices and deployments use a variety of security features that offer promises of increased trust. All along this spectrum of cyber-physical systems, extending trust beyond the traditional cyber portions to the arteries that connect the physical portions to the cyber portions is a major challenge. Here, we identify a Trust-but-Verify approach that spans this spectrum in addressing trust.

Perumalla, Kalyan↗

Generic Data Display (GD2)

SAND2023-11967O Generic Data Display (GD2) is a real-time data visualization application that can display user-defined input data. The open-source software is comprised of a back end system written in Python, and a front end user interface written in JavaScript. The back end system collects data from a variety of input sources, such as message queue, HTTP, XML, JSON, and others. The front end displays data in an Open MCT web interface, and users can configure the system by providing JSON formatted configuration files. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Figueroa, Benjamin↗

On-Site Inspection RadioIsotopic Spectroscopy (Osiris) System-Integration and Field-Testing Report

We have designed a system for the acquisition and analysis of high-resolution gamma-ray spectra during on-site inspections under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The On-Site Inspection RadioIsotopic Spectroscopy—OSIRIS —gamma-ray spectrometer is a mechanically-cooled, battery-powered ORTEC IDM-200V, chosen to avoid the need for liquid nitrogen during on-site inspections. The spectrometer is controlled and the spectral data analyzed by a Panasonic Toughbook notebook computer. Spectral data analysis is similar to that performed by traditional gamma-ray spectrometers, except the OSIRIS gamma-ray spectral data are filtered to display only radioisotopic information relevant to CTBT on-site inspections, for example, the fission-product isotope Zr-95 and its daughter isotope Nb-95. The OSIRIS software assists the user during operation with software checklists for startup and shutdown, and menu-selected display windows during energy calibration and data acquisition. OSIRIS can be operated in either sample-counting mode or the in-situ mode. In this report, the extensive system-integration tests of the OSIRIS system carried out in 2015-2017 are described, including tests at Idaho National Laboratory, at the Nevada National Security Site (formerly, the Nevada Test Site), and at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in Richland, Washington. We also note recent software enhancements and the steps to our successful commercialization of OSIRIS.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

High Brightness Room Temperature III-Nitride Based Single Photon Source

Single photon sources (SPS) are quantum light sources where photons are emitted one at a time instead of randomly (e.g. lasers) or in a bunch (e.g. thermal) that can significantly impact quantum information science (computing and secure communications) and quantum metrology. Some highly desirable features of SPS are low second order correlation (g 2 ),controllable emission, electrically injected room temperature operation with high photon rate, high extraction efficiency and controllable directionality. Approaches taken thus far using different material systems have only addressed a subset of these features. III-nitride based approach offers a clear pathway to deterministic, room temperature (R.T.), electrically injected practical SPS as one can potentially also leverage the knowledge and technology from the light emitting diode (LED) world. Here we will describe a hybrid approach wherein a TiO2 based photonic crystal (PC) cavity is fabricated around an InGaN quantum dot (QD) embedded nanoscale post deterministically placed inside a photonic crystal cavity. This project takes the initial steps necessary to achieve a practical, compact SPS. We have used finite difference time domain simulations to optimize the cavity design to achieve high quality factor, mode overlap with QD and high extraction. We have fabricated InGaN quantum dots using a top-down approach involving dry etch and photoelectrochemical etch followed by electron beam lithography based nanofabrication of photonic crystal cavities.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Berkeley Lab 2021 Annual Financial Report

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) continued to successfully operate during the ongoing COVID pandemic, providing world-class science facilities to both researchers and scientific users in its five national user facilities. The dedication and commitment of the Lab community to continuing the Lab’s mission has been unparalleled during this difficult time. Due to the diligence of the Lab’s Operations teams and each person who came on site, the Lab was able to safely operate these facilities. In December, the Lab received its annual appraisal from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). The Lab received “A” grades for each of the performance goals which include mission accomplishment, leadership, health and safety, security and emergency management, business systems, and facilities. The University of California manages the Lab on behalf of the DOE.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Advanced Data Science Model for Detecting Intelligent Malware

This study focused on developing a robust artificial intelligence (AI) model capable of detecting and characterizing advanced malware in Internet of Things (IoT) devices using network data. By analyzing network traffic with various machine learning (ML) models, our AI model can identify and characterize malicious activities to significantly improve malware detection accuracy and reliability as compared to traditional methods. The developed AI/ML model was trained using network data from IoT devices, leveraging classifiers such as Random Forest, Gradient Boosting, AdaBoost, and others to optimize detection performance. This project demonstrates a scalable framework for real-time malware detection and characterization in IoT networks, capable of identifying infected devices and facilitating the necessary steps to remove or isolate them, thereby preventing further infections. Although digital twin (DT) integration is not yet implemented in the current model, it represents a promising future enhancement. By creating a virtual replica of physical IoT devices, DT technology would allow for real-time monitoring and analysis without directly accessing operational technology, thus reducing the risk of compromising or reducing the performance of actual devices. This integration would further enhance the security of IoT ecosystems, combining AI technology to better flag and detect indications of malware-infected devices within a nuclear system environment.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Capability 9.3 Assembly and Deployment

Large space systems are required for a range of operational, commercial and scientific missions objectives however, current launch vehicle capacities substantially limit the size of space systems (on-orbit or planetary). Assembly and Deployment is the process of constructing a spacecraft or system from modules which may in turn have been constructed from sub-modules in a hierarchical fashion. In-situ assembly of space exploration vehicles and systems will require a broad range of operational capabilities, including: Component transfer and storage, fluid handling, construction and assembly, test and verification. Efficient execution of these functions will require supporting infrastructure, that can: Receive, store and protect (materials, components, etc.); hold and secure; position, align and control; deploy; connect/disconnect; construct; join; assemble/disassemble; dock/undock; and mate/demate.

Dorsey, John↗

Upper E Traffic Management

Recent advances in technologies related to propulsion, aircraft structures, flight automation, and aerodynamics have led to an increase in the number of vehicles that can operate in low atmospheric density airspace. There are expectations that aerospace operations in Upper Class E airspace above Flight Level (FL) 600 will significantly increase over the next two decades, presenting challenges for the diversified operations within this airspace. Increase in demand combined with disparate vehicle performance characteristics and unconventional operational needs will require a re-evaluation of the current traffic management approach. This presentation will address the needs and possible solutions to support this market in meeting their objectives while maintaining safety, security, efficiency, and equity of the national airspace system.

Upper E Traffic Management↗