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Fuel Safety Research Plan for Accident Tolerant Fuels

This document outlines a strategic plan for a safety research program for accident tolerant fuels. Accident tolerant fuels (ATFs) are nuclear fuel materials and designs for existing and future light water reactors. This effort is under the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy’s Nuclear Technology Research and Development Advanced Fuels Campaign. The development of ATF is an industry lead initiative with fuel designs being championed by Westinghouse, Framatome, and General Electric. Industry goals for ATF deployment include implementing the first batch reloads of coated cladding and doped fuel designs into commercial reactors by 2023 and having the first batch reloads of more advanced designs into commercial reactors by 2026. Follow on goals include implementing the first full cores of coated cladding and doped fuel designs into commercial reactors by 2026 and implementing full cores of more advanced designs by 2030. The objectives of the national laboratory research programs within the Advanced Fuels Campaign related to ATF are: 1. Develop and maintain of unique nuclear testing infrastructure, which includes test reactors, hot cell PIE equipment, and unique out of pile separate effects testing facilities. 2. Respond directly to industry requests for support by partnering with the ATF vendors and executing experiments and/or analysis on their behalf. 3. Conduct independent scientific investigations into the performance of the different ATF concepts that are relevant to Industry designs. To achieve these objectives, the safety research program will execute transient irradiation experiments at the TREAT facility at Idaho National Laboratory with the aim of identifying the relevant transient fuel behaviors for each fuel design in order to establish appropriate fuel safety criteria and thresholds. Two test series are described in this plan, (1) an Integral Test Series, and (2) a Focused Effects Test Series. In fulfillment of the first objective for the safety research program, Integral Effects Tests will be developed and demonstrated using standard UO2 Zircaloy fuel designs in both the fresh and previously irradiated case. The Integral Test Series will consist of three campaigns to evaluate transient fuel performance in Reactivity Initiated Accidents, Loss of Coolant Accidents, and in generalized Power Cooling Mismatch scenarios. Development of these test programs also enables the safety research program to fulfill its second objective by making these three test programs available to each industry team. Initially, priority will be given in the integral test series to the coated cladding and doped fuel concepts as their deployment schedule is the most aggressive. To fulfill the third objective of the safety research program, a Focused Effects Test Series is also being developed which will examine specific transient fuel behaviors that are of general interest to all the ATF designs under development. These tests look at transient fuel behavior related to pellet cladding mechanical interaction, coated cladding swelling, rupture, and time at temperature behavior, non oxide fuel melting and mechanical interaction with Silicon Carbide cladding, UO2 and doped UO2 fuel fragmentation and transient fission gas release, and finally fuel coolant interaction. This document provides a general overview of the objectives of the safety research program as well as providing background into how programs like this have been used in the past to develop the criteria necessary for the safe operation of the present fuel designs. An overview of the materials and methods used for safety testing is presented. Finally the Integral and Focused Effects tests series are introduced and described. This document will be maintained as a “living” document with annual updates to reflect evolving requirements and needs.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Acceptable Knowledge Summary Report for REMOTE-HANDLED DEPLETED URANIUM INGOTS FROM MATERIALS AND FUELS COMPLEX

This Acceptable Knowledge (AK) Summary Report has been prepared for the Central Characterization Program (CCP) for remote-handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) waste generated and managed by the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC), formerly Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) and part of the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The waste described in this report, depleted uranium ingots (waste stream ID-MFC-DU-INGOT), was historically generated in Building 765, the Fuel Conditioning Facility (FCF), formerly, Hot Fuel Examination Facility (HFEF)-South. This AK Summary Report, along with the referenced supporting documents, provides a defensible and auditable record of AK for the designated waste stream, depleted uranium ingots, produced from the FCF electrorefining process. The references and AK source documents used to prepare this report are listed in Sections 8.0 and 9.0 respectively. The source documents cited throughout this report are identified by alphanumeric designations corresponding to a unique Source Document Tracking Number (e.g., AKA01, C001, CCE01, DR001, M001, P001, and U001).

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Command and Control of Utilities Systems

The utilities systems that encompass the Y-12 National Security Complex are an integral part of the entire campus, and are essential to maintaining critical mission focus for the site. Although the utilities systems each differ in function, the central production and distribution model creates a common thread on which each system is run. Several incidents in FY 2018 and FY 2019 documented a lack of overall systems control and highlighted the need to create a better command system that could maintain system availability and decrease possible impacts to the surrounding environment. An initial system was started in September of 2019 to better control mechanical utility distribution systems. The measurement of the system can be modeled against a standard command and control related incident. The corresponding work hours from a typical control-related incident were used as key component to this system model. System effectiveness is modeled against utility’s incidents that demonstrate a loss of command and control. The increased simulations of the model also document control can only be effectively contained within the stated time (3-5 years) by yielding more engineers to complete alignments, or drastically reducing the amount of time for alignments. The total control points of the model document a clear correlation between alignments, control points, and the amount of man-hours per incident. Current data shows that actual incident man-hours (1.88 manhours/ incident since initial system implementation) are near expected incident man-hours (1.81 manhours/ incident) with command and control for October 2021, which documents a 33.3% reduction in man-hours/incident since initial system implementation. A conclusion can be drawn that focus on increasing the amount of controlled points in the system can reduce incidents and the decrease the amount of non-value added work to employee’s day-to-day lives, while also achieving a culture that enhances and sustains utilities reliability.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Expediting Groundwater Sampling at Hanford and Making It Safer - 13158

The CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) manages the groundwater monitoring programs at the Department of Energy's 586-square-mile Hanford site in southeastern Washington state. These programs are regulated by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), and the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). The purpose of monitoring is to track existing groundwater contamination from past practices, as well as other potential contamination that might originate from RCRA treatment, storage, and disposal (TSD) facilities. An integral part of the groundwater-monitoring program involves taking samples of the groundwater and measuring the water levels in wells scattered across the site. Each year, more than 1,500 wells are accessed for a variety of reasons. Historically, the monitoring activities have been very 'people intensive'. Field personnel or 'samplers' have been issued pre-printed forms showing information about the well(s) for a particular sampling evolution. This information is taken from two official electronic databases: the Hanford Well Information System (HWIS) and the Hanford Environmental Information System (HEIS). The samplers traditionally used these hardcopy forms to document the groundwater samples and well water-levels. After recording the entries in the field, the samplers turned the forms in at the end of the day and other personnel posted the collected information. In Automating Groundwater Sampling at Hanford (HNF-38542-FP Revision 0, Presented at Waste Management 2009 Conference, March 1 - March 5, 2009, Phoenix, AZ), we described the methods, tools, and techniques that would be used in automating the activities associated with measuring water levels. The Field Logging and Electronic Data Gathering (FLEDG) application/database that automates collecting the water-level measurement data has now been implemented at Hanford. In addition to eliminating the need to print out documents, the system saves three-to-four man days each month for the field personnel taking the measurements and the scientists and administrators managing the data and the documentation. After the information has received technical review, FLEDG automatically updates the database for water-level measurements and loads the document management system with the completed sampling report. Due to safety considerations, access to wells is conditional. A spreadsheet with appropriate data not only lists the wells that are cleared for work, but also the safety personnel who must be present before work can start. This spreadsheet is used in planning daily activities. Daily plans are structured to ensure that the wells to be sampled are cleared for work and the appropriate safety personnel have been assigned and are present before the work starts. Historically, the spreadsheets have been prepared manually, and as a result, are potentially subject to human error. However, a companion database application has been developed to work with FLEDG - making the entire sampling process more efficient and safer for personnel. The Well Access List - Electronic, WAL-E, is a database that contains much the same information that was previously manually loaded into the spread sheet. In addition, WAL-E contains a managed work-flow application that shows the access requirements and allows for appropriate reviews of the compiled well. Various CHPRC organizations, including Industrial Hygiene, RADCON, and Well Maintenance and Sample Administration are able to enter and review the wells added or deleted from the WAL-E database. The FLEDG system then accesses this database information to identify appropriate support personnel and provide safety requirements to field personnel. In addition, WAL-E offers the assurance that wells have appropriate locks and are correctly labeled and electrically grounded as required, before well activities begin. This feature is an extremely important aspect of the FLEDG/WAL-E system because it adds another safety check to the work evolution and reduces the potential for unsafe conditions to exist that would lead to a stop-work situation. This paper will further describe the technical aspects of both electronic programs/databases and their successful application at Hanford. (authors)

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Transuranic Waste Processing Center (TWPC) Legacy Tank RH-TRU Sludge Processing and Compliance Strategy - 13255

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) needs to safely and efficiently treat its 'legacy' transuranic (TRU) waste and mixed low-level waste (LLW) from past research and defense activities at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) so that the waste is prepared for safe and secure disposal. The TWPC operates an Environmental Management (EM) waste processing facility on the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR). The TWPC is classified as a Hazard Category 2, non-reactor nuclear facility. This facility receives, treats, and packages low-level waste and TRU waste stored at various facilities on the ORR for eventual off-site disposal at various DOE sites and commercial facilities. The Remote Handled TRU Waste Sludge held in the Melton Valley Storage Tanks (MVSTs) was produced as a result of the collection, treatment, and storage of liquid radioactive waste originating from the ORNL radiochemical processing and radioisotope production programs. The MVSTs contain most of the associated waste from the Gunite and Associated Tanks (GAAT) in the ORNL's Tank Farms in Bethel Valley and the sludge (SL) and associated waste from the Old Hydro-fracture Facility tanks and other Federal Facility Agreement (FFA) tanks. The SL Processing Facility Build-outs (SL-PFB) Project is integral to the EM cleanup mission at ORNL and is being accelerated by DOE to meet updated regulatory commitments in the Site Treatment Plan. To meet these commitments a Baseline (BL) Change Proposal (BCP) is being submitted to provide continued spending authority as the project re-initiation extends across fiscal year 2012 (FY2012) into fiscal year 2013. Future waste from the ORNL Building 3019 U-233 Disposition project, in the form of U-233 dissolved in nitric acid and water, down-blended with depleted uranyl nitrate solution is also expected to be transferred to the 7856 MVST Annex Facility (formally the Capacity Increase Project (CIP) Tanks) for co-processing with the SL. The SL-PFB project will construct and install the necessary integrated systems to process the accumulated MVST Facilities SL inventory at the TWPC thus enabling safe and effective disposal of the waste. This BCP does not include work to support current MVST Facility Surveillance and Maintenance programs or the ORNL Building 3019 U-233 Disposition project, since they are not currently part of the TWPC prime contract. The purpose of the environmental compliance strategy is to identify the environmental permits and other required regulatory documents necessary for the construction and operation of the SL- PFB at the TWPC, Oak Ridge, TN. The permits and other regulatory documents identified are necessary to comply with the environmental laws and regulations of DOE Orders, and other requirements documented in the SL-PFB, Safety Design Strategy (SDS), SL-A-AD-002, R0 draft, and the Systems, Function and Requirements Document (SFRD), SL-X-AD-002, R1 draft. This compliance strategy is considered a 'living strategy' and it is anticipated that it will be revised as design progresses and more detail is known. The design basis on which this environmental permitting and compliance strategy is based is the Wastren Advantage, Inc., (WAI), TWPC, SL-PFB (WAI-BL-B.01.06) baseline. (authors)

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Low-Level Waste Regulation: Putting Principles Into Practice - 13297 - The Richard S. Hodes, M.D., Honor Lecture Award

In carrying out its mission to ensure the safe use of radioactive materials for beneficial civilian purposes while protecting people and the environment, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) adheres to its Principles of Good Regulation. The Principles-Independence, Openness, Efficiency, Clarity, and Reliability-apply to the agency as a whole in its decision-making and to the individual conduct of NRC employees. This paper describes the application of the Principles in a real-life staff activity, a guidance document used in the NRC's low-level radioactive waste (LLW) program, the Concentration Averaging and Encapsulation Branch Technical Position (CA BTP). The staff's process to revise the document, as well as the final content of the document, were influenced by following the Principles. For example, consistent with the Openness Principle, the staff conducted a number of outreach activities and received many comments on three drafts of the document. Stakeholder comments affected the final staff positions in some cases. The revised CA BTP, once implemented, is expected to improve management and disposal of LLW in the United States. Its positions have an improved nexus to health and safety; are more performance-based than previously, thus providing licensees with options for how they achieve the required outcome of protecting an inadvertent human intruder into a disposal facility; and provide for disposal of more sealed radioactive sources, which are a potential threat to national security. (author)

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Control Decision and Control Development of Hanford Tank Farms First Two ISA-84 Safety Instrumented Systems - 17370

Hanford's 242-A Evaporator has had the mission of reducing waste volume in the Hanford Tank Farms since the late 1970's. Until 2014, the Documented Safety Analysis for the 242-A facility considered protection and controls of the collocated worker (workers outside the facility) and the public. In 2010, Tank Farms Nuclear Safety engineers initiated a significant revision of the Documented Safety Analysis to implement DOE-STD-3009, Change Notice 3, which requires the protection of the facility worker in addition to the collocated worker and public. Through the use of an extensive process hazards analysis performed on the facility, it was concluded that it was essential to control conditions in the primary evaporation vessel (C-A-1) such that flammable gasses could not build up to the Lower Flammability Limit, and that another control was necessary to ensure that the C-A-1 vessel could not overflow. Early control decision meetings held during the development of the Documented Safety Analysis revision yielded no simple solution to the protection of workers from a flammable gas deflagration. Controls selected for the waste overflow accident were all mitigative in nature (i.e. the detection of a waste overflow after it already happened). Engineering could not replace the mitigative controls with preventive controls without attempting to credit some of the existing facility interlocks associated with the C-A-1 vessel operations. Software and hard-wired interlocks had been used at the facility to prevent overheating of the waste and overfilling of the C-A-1 vessel. These interlocks were considered useful to the prevention of the flammable gas deflagration and vessel overfilling accidents, but lacked the pedigree and reliability necessary to credit the interlocks as safety significant. It was at this stage of the Documented Safety Analysis control decision and control development that engineering became aware of the DOE's acceptance of the ISA-84 instrumented system standard. It became apparent that the ideal solution was not to attempt to credit existing interlock systems, but to develop a new system of 'safety interlocks' to the ISA-84 standard. A meeting was held with upper management of both engineering and operations to propose the use of safety instrumented systems at the 242-A facility. URS Corporation (now AECOM), who had recently supported the Savanah River site in developing ISA-84 controls, was consulted to support the development of two new instrumented systems for the 242-A facility. In addition to the use of the newly adopted ISA-84 standard, the failure modes and effect analysis process was implemented in a very effective manner to support the development of the new safety instrumented systems. Through a brand new methodology, and through a very dedicated and hard-working engineering, projects, and operations team, the new controls were designed, built, tested, and commissioned. At this time, five successful waste reduction campaigns have been performed at the facility with the new safety instrumented systems. During these waste processing campaigns, trips and spurious trips of the SIS have occurred - all of which acted properly. (authors)

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U.S. department of energy safety design strategy review and approval beyond critical decision 3 for the high-level waste facility - 15525

The Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) in Hanford, Washington, is the nation's largest environmental remediation construction project. In 2012, at the WTP's High-Level Waste (HLW) Facility, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of River Protection (ORP) restricted construction work at the Hazard Category 2 nuclear facility because of unresolved technical issues associated with the facility and of misalignment of the design and nuclear safety basis. By 2013, as additional issues were discovered, ORP limited HLW design and procurement activities. Addressing the technical issues and the misalignment of the design basis with the Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis (PDSA) is a priority for ORP. A proposal was developed to use the concept of a safety design strategy (SDS), as documented in DOE-STD-1189-2008, Integration of Safety into the Design Process, as a planning mechanism to support facility design and PDSA alignment. The standard provides the processes to develop an SDS that will ensure safety is integrated into design early in the project, by the start of preliminary design. Ultimately, as design progresses, an SDS is intended to support development of the project's PDSA. However, in this unique case, the HLW Facility design and construction phase has progressed beyond Critical Decision 3 and DOE-STD-1189-2008 was issued in 2008; 6 years after ORP approved the first WTP PDSA. In July 2013, ORP and the contractor recognized that the unresolved technical issues and design - safety basis misalignment should be addressed through a renewed look at nuclear safety requirements, and agreed that developing an SDS tailored to the criteria in DOE-STD-1189-2008 provided the best path forward to better integrate design and safety. Development of the SDS for the HLW Facility was one of many goals ORP established in a plan that describes how ORP will determine whether, and under what conditions, the contractor should be authorized to proceed with production engineering, procurement, and construction activities for the HLW Facility. Over the next several months, the contractor developed the draft SDS, identifying design basis accidents and control strategies for those accidents. ORP monitored progress and, when appropriate, provided recommendations. In April 2014, the contractor provided a draft SDS to ORP for initial review by an independent DOE Review Team. The Review Team was comprised of representatives from nuclear safety, criticality safety, engineering, fire protection, the Office of Environmental Management, the Assistant Manager WTP, and the DOE Chief of Nuclear Safety. A unique draft document review and interactive review process, facilitated through work sessions and continuous communication with the contractor, culminated in the development of 147 technical comments on topics varying from SDS implementation to hydrogen deflagration in vessels. Comment resolution sought to improve project clarity, delineation of control strategies, and, holistically, facilitate integration of safety into design in the SDS, as it will guide the restart of the HLW Facility production engineering and limited procurement and construction activities. All comments were resolved in support of a contractor submission of the final SDS to ORP at the end of June 2014. Successful resolution of these comments was achieved by continuing the real-time response and incorporation interaction with the contractor to ensure that mutual objectives were satisfied. The response times were facilitated through telephone, E-mail, and a shared file server accessible to contractor and DOE reviewers across the DOE complex. As a measure of success of this process, the Safety Basis Approval Authority (ORP Manager) and the WTP Federal Project Director approved the SDS on August 1, 2014, with no conditions of approval. DOE and the contractor recognized that it would be difficult to implement the SDS without changes to the existing contractor's engineering and nuclear safety processes. Accordingly, the contractor developed or revised a significant number of engineering and nuclear safety plans and procedures to implement the SDS into the design process. Over the coming year, the contractor will conduct a gap analysis between the SDS and the presently approved PDSA to incorporate the design basis accidents and preferred control strategies developed from the SDS into the PDSA. In addition, ORP will conduct an assessment of the contractor's implementation of the SDS into the design process at the appropriate stage of implementation, within 6 to 12 months of approval. Although the SDS was developed late in the HLW project timeline, the document will facilitate alignment of design and the safety basis, and is a key step in the return to full production engineering for the HLW Facility. (authors)

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Basis of Knowledge for Oxidizing Chemicals in TRU Waste - 18654

A new Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) document for implementing new requirements in the WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) titled Basis of Knowledge for Evaluating Oxidizing Chemicals in the TRU waste was issued in July, 2017 and has now been implemented on several waste streams. The February 14, 2014, airborne radiation release in Room 7 of the WIPP underground disposal unit 7 was caused by an exothermic chemical reaction of nitrate oxidizing chemicals and organic materials in a single 55-gallon container. That event exposed hazards not previously evaluated in the WIPP safety basis. A new WIPP Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), Revision 5b, was developed that addressed potential hazards related to the airborne radiation release and evaluated and addressed new fire hazard scenarios. The revised hazards analysis within the DSA specifically included potential chemical exothermic reactions in waste containers and propagating fires. Compliance with WAC was credited as initial conditions to the hazards analysis, and Chapter 18 was added making the WIPP WAC compliance program a safety management program within the DSA. The WIPP DSA, Revision 5b, Chapter 18, and the WIPP WAC require the use of this document when performing the enhanced acceptable knowledge (AK) process on transuranic (TRU) waste determined to contain oxidizing chemicals. The WIPP WAC was revised to address the conditions and requirements of DSA Revision 5b. The use of this Basis of Knowledge (BoK) by WIPP Certified Programs is specified in the WIPP WAC, Appendix H, Enhanced Acceptable Knowledge. This document establishes criteria that must be used by the WIPP Certified Programs to evaluate TRU waste containing one or more oxidizing chemicals to determine acceptability at the WIPP as-is and to identify when additional evaluation or treatment is required. This BoK also includes options and requirements to be used by TRU waste sites when further evaluation, testing, and/or treatment are required. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) will review requests, plans, and technical justifications and provide written decisions prior to implementation by the TRU waste sites. (authors)

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Challenges in Long-Term Records Preservation and Access - 19549

The US Department of Energy Office of Legacy Management (LM) mission includes preserving records and information about the nation's Cold War-era weapons projects and making that information available for years to come. As LM assumes responsibility for each project, records documenting operations and cleanup activities are absorbed into a central recordkeeping system. Each record category is governed by a federal retention requirement. Routine administrative records are kept just a few years, while the most important records have 'permanent' retention requirements and are transferred to the National Archives typically within 25 years of creation. It is relatively easy for LM to meet retention requirements for these routine and permanent records. LM's big preservation challenge is with records with tremendously long retention requirements. Records with 75-year retention requirements are common, and a small subset of LM records pertaining to waste disposal requires 150-year retention periods. LM must consider the best format for maintaining each of its records collections. Should physical records be boxed up for long-term storage, or should they be digitized? Each option has associated benefits, costs, and risks. Keeping records in paper format avoids digitizing expense and preserves the original media, but the paper must be maintained in a certified storage facility. A vermin infestation or sprinkler malfunction at a certified facility may be rare but could easily destroy records. Keeping the paper and making reference or backup electronic copies reduces the risk of loss but requires diligence and resources to keep the physical records and electronic versions synchronized. This becomes an overwhelming task in a database with millions of records. Entirely replacing paper records with digitized versions as electronic records introduces the risk that records could be lost due to a cybersecurity incident or made inaccessible by evolving technology. LM's early electronic records management efforts were limited to documents saved to PDF format. More recently, LM has embraced the benefits of maintaining records in native formats. (A spreadsheet includes formulas and other details lost when converted to a PDF file.) But whether the file is saved as a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet or PDF document, how do we ensure the file is readable in 75 or 150 years when these records meet their retention requirement? We have no way of knowing for sure from our 2019 vantage point-no more than we would expect to get good technology advice from someone 150 years ago. We cannot predict the technological future, but we can make sure our current electronic records environment is healthy and future ready. This includes making sure the electronic recordkeeping system is built on a modern platform and ensuring that each record in the system is saved in a current format. Quality standards are critical for electronic records to be future ready. Implementing quality involves an organization-wide approach to having consistently formatted file names and complete and descriptive metadata. Quality PDF documents are scanned to settings that ensure characters are machine-readable (with optical character recognition, or OCR). LM is currently replacing its electronic recordkeeping system and simultaneously modernizing its organizational approach to data management; it is replacing a traditional electronic records repository with a system that also manages records stored anywhere across the computer network. This new records management approach will require new thinking in how LM manages a dramatically increased volume of information across the network while not losing focus on its responsibility for long-term records preservation and access. (author)

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Examples of Use of SINBAD Database for Nuclear Data and Code Validation

Benchmark experiments can serve several purposes and the availability of suitable experimental data is fundamental to ensure that modelling tools meet the requirements of nuclear industry and licensing needs. Essentially, they are used for: - validation of nuclear cross-section data, - validation of nuclear codes and models used, - qualification and training of users through benchmarking and code comparison exercises. The Shielding Integral Benchmark Archive and Database (SINBAD) project was started in the early 1990's at the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency Data Bank (NEA DB) and the Radiation Safety Information Computational Center (RSICC) as a collection of quality experiments for validating and benchmarking computer codes and data for radiation transport and shielding applications. Currently, the SINBAD database comprises over 100 benchmark compilations and evaluations of relevance to: - reactor shielding, pressure vessel dosimetry (48); - fusion blanket neutronics (31); - accelerator shielding (23). In order to facilitate their use, the data are organized in the standardized format structure. The index and the master document (called abstract) use the Hyper Text Markup Language (HTML) format with links to text files, figures, Portable Document Format (pdf) documents and computer code inputs. The format allows easy access and forward/backward navigation among the data and has proved to be suitable, general enough and above all easy (and low-cost) to maintain. In addition to the characterization of the radiation source, description of the shielding set-up, the instrumentation and the relevant detector measurements, most sets in SINBAD contain also the deterministic or Monte Carlo radiation transport computer model used for the interpretation of the experiment and, where available, results from uncertainty analysis. The set of primary documents used for the benchmark compilation and evaluation are provided in computer readable form. The database is intended for different types of users, including nuclear data evaluators, computer code developers, experiment designers and university students. SINBAD is available from the NEA Data Bank and RSICC (see https://www.oecdnea.org/science/wprs/shielding/sinbad/). Up to now several hundreds of SINBAD packages were distributed from the NEA DB and RSICC. Since 2011 the maintenance and further development of the database is coordinated in the scope of the OECD NEA Nuclear Science Committee (NSC) Working Party on Scientific Issues of Reactor Systems (WPRS) Expert Group on Radiation Transport and Shielding (EGRTS). A key objective of the group is to identify, evaluate and preserve experimental data on shielding benchmarks. The Expert Group maintains close links with the International Reactor Physics Experiment Evaluation (IRPhE) and International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation (ICSBEP) projects, as well as in co-ordination with the JEFF and EFF NEA Data Bank projects and with the SATIF community of accelerator shielding specialists. In the last years, much effort was devoted to the quality review of the available benchmark information.

42 ENGINEERING↗

MSR Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection White Paper

This document represents the status of Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) characteristics for the Molten Salt Reactor designs selected by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) Molten Salt Reactor (MSR) provisional System Steering Committee (pSSC) as representatives of three broad classes of MSRs. The three classes of MSRs are: (1) Liquid-fueled with integrated salt processing, (2) Liquid-fueled without integrated salt processing, (3) Solid-fueled with salt coolant. The intent is to generate preliminary information about the PR&PP merits of the MSR Reactor Technology and to provide insights for optimizing their PR&PP performance for the benefit of MSR system designers. It updates the MSR analysis published in the 2011 report “Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection of the Six Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems”, prepared Jointly by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) and the System Steering Committees of the Generation IV International Forum, taking into account the evolution of both the systems and the GIF R&D activities since its publication. The document, prepared jointly by the GIF PRPPWG and the GIF MSR pSSC, follows the high-level paradigm of the GIF Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Evaluation Methodology to investigate the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection features of the GIF MSR representative designs. For PR, the document analyses and discusses the proliferation resistance aspects in terms of robustness against State-based threats associated with diversion of materials, misuse of facilities, breakout scenarios, and production in clandestine facilities. Similarly, for physical protection, the document discusses the robustness against theft of material and sabotage by non-State actors.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

RH-TRU Waste Streams: HFDA Crucibles Create New Complex Waste Stream

This project focuses on the removal of the Hot Fuel Dissolution Apparatus (HFDA) crucibles from the Hot Fuel Examination Facility’s (HFEF) hot cells to create space for upcoming projects. The project team has created a crucible and pyro-salt non-debris waste stream that can be disposed of at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Chemical Compatibility Examinations (CCEs) must be performed on candidate waste by reviewing the types of chemicals used in the experiments, information found in INL Process Knowledge Summary Reports (PKSRs), and Environmental Protection Agency guides on chemical compatibility. The CCEs identify which chemicals can be safely combined to ensure adverse reactions do not occur in the waste packages. The CCEs are then used to update the PKSR, Basis of Knowledge, and Acceptable Knowledge documents and demonstrate compliance with the WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria. Once documents are finalized, they are reviewed and approved by the WIPP Central Characterization Project (CCP) to ensure proper waste stream characterization. After the documents are approved, the crucibles can be packaged and shipped to the Idaho Nuclear Technical and Engineering Center for storage awaiting certification. CCP will certify the waste using the approved documents and a series of confirmatory testing before being shipped and disposed in WIPP’s deep geological repository. Currently, the CCE is in progress and the PKSRs are being updated.

Basis of Knowledge↗

Enhancing multilingual latent semantic analysis with term alignment information.

Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) is based on the Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) of a term-by-document matrix for identifying relationships among terms and documents from co-occurrence patterns. Among the multiple ways of computing the SVD of a rectangular matrix X, one approach is to compute the eigenvalue decomposition (EVD) of a square 2 x 2 composite matrix consisting of four blocks with X and XT in the off-diagonal blocks and zero matrices in the diagonal blocks. We point out that significant value can be added to LSA by filling in some of the values in the diagonal blocks (corresponding to explicit term-to-term or document-to-document associations) and computing a term-by-concept matrix from the EVD. For the case of multilingual LSA, we incorporate information on cross-language term alignments of the same sort used in Statistical Machine Translation (SMT). Since all elements of the proposed EVD-based approach can rely entirely on lexical statistics, hardly any price is paid for the improved empirical results. In particular, the approach, like LSA or SMT, can still be generalized to virtually any language(s); computation of the EVD takes similar resources to that of the SVD since all the blocks are sparse; and the results of EVD are just as economical as those of SVD.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

VALIDATION OF ANALYTICAL METHODS AND INSTRUMENTATION FOR BERYLLIUM MEASUREMENT: REVIEW AND SUMMARY OF AVAILABLE GUIDES, PROCEDURES, AND PROTOCOLS

This document proposes to provide a listing of available sources which can be used to validate analytical methods and/or instrumentation for beryllium determination. A literature review was conducted of available standard methods and publications used for method validation and/or quality control. A comprehensive listing of the articles, papers, and books reviewed is given in Appendix 1. Available validation documents and guides are listed in the appendix; each has a brief description of application and use. In the referenced sources, there are varying approaches to validation and varying descriptions of validation at different stages in method development. This discussion focuses on validation and verification of fully developed methods and instrumentation that have been offered up for use or approval by other laboratories or official consensus bodies such as ASTM International, the International Standards Organization (ISO) and the Association of Official Analytical Chemists (AOAC). This review was conducted as part of a collaborative effort to investigate and improve the state of validation for measuring beryllium in the workplace and the environment. Documents and publications from the United States and Europe are included. Unless otherwise specified, all documents were published in English.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

NFPA's Hydrogen Technologies Code Project

This article discusses the development of National Fire Protection Association 2 (NFPA), a comprehensive hydrogen safety code. It analyses the contents of this document with particular attention focused on new requirements for setting hydrogen storage systems. These new requirements use computational fluid dynamic modeling and risk assessment procedures to develop requirements that are based on both technical analyses and defined risk criteria. The intent is to develop requirements based on procedures that can be replicated based on the information provided in the code document. This code will require documentation of the modeling inputs and risk criteria and analyses in the supporting information. This article also includes a description of the codes and standards that address hydrogen technologies in general.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Human health and wellbeing in environmental impact assessment in New South Wales, Australia: Auditing health impacts within environmental assessments of major projects

Internationally the inclusion of health within environmental impact assessment (EIA) has been shown to be limited. While Australian EIA documentation has not been studied empirically to date, deficiencies in practice have been documented. This research developed an audit tool to undertake a qualitative descriptive analysis of 22 Major Project EAs in New South Wales, Australia. Results showed that health and wellbeing impacts were not considered explicitly. They were, however, included indirectly in the identification of traditional public health exposures associated with the physical environment and to a lesser extent the inclusion of social and economic impacts. However, no health data was used to inform any of the assessments, there was no reference to causal pathways between exposures or determinants and physical or mental health effects, and there was no inclusion of the differential distribution of exposures or health impacts on different populations. The results add conceptually and practically to the long standing integration debate, showing that health is in a position to add value to the EIA process as an explicit part of standard environmental, social and economic considerations. However, to overcome the consistently documented barriers to integrating health in EIA, capacity must be developed amongst EIA professionals, led by the health sector, to progress health related knowledge and tools.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

The paradox of strategic environmental assessment

Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) is a tool that can facilitate sustainable development and improve decision-making by introducing environmental concern early in planning processes. However, various international studies conclude that current planning practice is not taking full advantage of the tool, and we therefore define the paradox of SEA as the methodological ambiguity of non-strategic SEA. This article explores causality through at three-step case study on aggregates extraction planning in Denmark, which consists of a document analysis; a questionnaire survey and follow-up communication with key planners. Though the environmental reports on one hand largely lack strategic considerations, practitioners express an inherent will for strategy and reveal that their SEAs in fact have been an integrated part of the planning process. Institutional context is found to be the most significant barrier for a strategy and this suggests that non-strategic planning setups can prove more important than non-strategic planning in SEA practice. Planners may try to execute strategy within the confinements of SEA-restricted planning contexts; however, such efforts can be overlooked if evaluated by a narrow criterion for strategy formation. Consequently, the paradox may also spark from challenged documentation. These findings contribute to the common understanding of SEA quality; however, further research is needed on how to communicate and influence the strategic options which arguably remain inside non-strategic planning realities. - Highlights: • International studies conclude that SEAs are not strategic. = The paradox of SEA. • Even on the highest managerial level, some contexts do not leave room for strategy. • Non-strategic SEA can derive from challenged documentation. • Descriptive and emergent strategy formation can, in practice, be deemed non-strategic.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗