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Properties important to mixing and simulant recommendations for WTP full-scale vessel testing

Full Scale Vessel Testing (FSVT) is being planned by Bechtel National, Inc., to demonstrate the ability of the standard high solids vessel design (SHSVD) to meet mixing requirements over the range of fluid properties planned for processing in the Pretreatment Facility (PTF) of the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). Testing will use simulated waste rather than actual Hanford waste. Therefore, the use of suitable simulants is critical to achieving the goals of the test program. WTP personnel requested the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to assist with development of simulants for use in FSVT. Among the tasks assigned to SRNL was to develop a list of waste properties that are important to pulse-jet mixer (PJM) performance in WTP vessels with elevated concentrations of solids.

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West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2024

The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2024. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2024 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

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Hanford Tank Waste – What is in it? Where is it going?

The Waste Treatment Plant currently under construction for treatment of High Level Waste at the Hanford Site will process High Level Waste (HLW) to reduce the quantity of HLW material that must be immobilized. Recently, an extensive testing program was undertaken to characterize the composition of some of the major sources of HLW in the Hanford tank farm system. This effort has led to an increased understanding of the chemical form and the underlying dissolution chemistry for much of the waste.

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Impact of Fuel Failure on Criticality Safety of Used Nuclear Fuel

Commercial used nuclear fuel (UNF) in the United States is expected to remain in storage for considerably longer periods than originally intended (e.g., <40 years). Extended storage (ES) time and irradiation of nuclear fuel to high-burnup values (>45 GWd/t) may increase the potential for fuel failure during normal and accident conditions involving storage and transportation. Fuel failure, depending on the severity, can result in changes to the geometric configuration of the fuel, which has safety and regulatory implications. The likelihood and extent of fuel reconfiguration and its impact on the safety of the UNF is not well understood. The objective of this work is to assess and quantify the impact of fuel reconfiguration due to fuel failure on criticality safety of UNF in storage and transportation casks. This effort is primarily motivated by concerns related to the potential for fuel degradation during ES periods and transportation following ES. The criticality analyses consider representative UNF designs and cask systems and a range of fuel enrichments, burnups, and cooling times. The various failed-fuel configurations considered are designed to bound the anticipated effects of individual rod and general cladding failure, fuel rod deformation, loss of neutron absorber materials, degradation of canister internals, and gross assembly failure. The results quantify the potential impact on criticality safety associated with fuel reconfiguration and may be used to guide future research, design, and regulatory activities. Although it can be concluded that the criticality safety impacts of fuel reconfiguration during transportation subsequent to ES are manageable, the results indicate that certain configurations can result in a large increase in the effective neutron multiplication factor, k eff . Future work to inform decision making relative to which configurations are credible, and therefore need to be considered in a safety evaluation, is recommended.

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An Efficient Tool-Set for Modeling Containment Ventilation in Very Complex Facilities - 17215

The applicability of a multi-zone ventilation analysis program, CONTAM, to complex radioactive waste material handling or processing plants is evaluated. Validation results are based on simulations from three-dimensional multi-physics computational fluid dynamics. Insight into the application limits of CONTAM and conditions under which the use of higher fidelity tools are required are also discussed. (authors)

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Understanding Public Support for Transportation of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel - 19205

Commercially generated spent nuclear fuel (CSNF) in the US is currently stored in cooling pools and dry storage systems at or near nuclear power plants. These cooling pools and dry storage systems provide only a temporary solution, and as CSNF continues to accumulate an integrated program for transport and permanent disposal will need to be developed. Efforts to site the necessary facilities will require that we consider the transportation of spent fuel from reactor sites across the country to one or more centralized locations. This will likely generate interest and possible resistance among US residents who live along potential transportation routes. In this study, we use a recent survey of US adults to explore the nature of public support/opposition to CSNF transportation and the primary drivers of support/opposition such as risk perceptions. We also explore factors that may attenuate the effect of these drivers on support/opposition, such as public trust in agencies that are involved in CSNF management. (authors)

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Hanford Waste Physical and Rheological Properties: Data and Gaps

The Hanford Site in Washington State manages 177 underground storage tanks containing approximately 250,000 m3 of waste generated during past defense reprocessing and waste management operations. These tanks contain a mixture of sludge, saltcake and supernatant liquids. The insoluble sludge fraction of the waste consists of metal oxides and hydroxides and contains the bulk of many radionuclides such as the transuranic components and 90Sr. The saltcake, generated by extensive evaporation of aqueous solutions, consists primarily of dried sodium salts. The supernates consist of concentrated (5-15 M) aqueous solutions of sodium and potassium salts. The 177 storage tanks include 149 single-shell tanks (SSTs) and 28 double -hell tanks (DSTs). Ultimately the wastes need to be retrieved from the tanks for treatment and disposal. The SSTs contain minimal amounts of liquid wastes, and the Tank Operations Contractor is continuing a program of moving solid wastes from SSTs to interim storage in the DSTs. The Hanford DST system provides the staging location for waste feed delivery to the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of River Protection’s (ORP) Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). The WTP is being designed and constructed to pretreat and then vitrify a large portion of the wastes in Hanford’s 177 underground waste storage tanks.

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Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2011 Summary

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) directs the management and operation of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). NNSA/NSO prepares the Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) to provide the public an understanding of the environmental monitoring and compliance activities that are conducted on the NNSS to protect the public and the environment from radiation hazards and from nonradiological impacts. The NNSSER is a comprehensive report of environmental activities performed at the NNSS and offsite facilities over the previous calendar year. It is prepared annually to meet the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the information needs of NNSA/NSO stakeholders. This summary provides an abbreviated and more readable version of the NNSSER. It does not contain detailed descriptions or presentations of monitoring designs, data collection methods, data tables, the NNSS environment, or all environmental program activities performed throughout the year. The NNSS is currently the nation's unique site for ongoing national security-related missions and high-risk operations. The NNSS is located about 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas. The approximately 1,360-square-mile site is one of the largest restricted access areas in the United States. It is surrounded by federal installations with strictly controlled access, as well as by lands that are open to public entry.

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Simulating Regional Groundwater Flow in the Vicinity of the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada - 16104

The Death Valley Regional Groundwater Flow System (DVRFS) occupies an area of about 70,000 km{sup 2} in south-central Nevada and southeastern California. Interest in this system stems from the need to (1) understand the groundwater flow paths and travel times associated with potential migration of radioactive material from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) where underground nuclear testing was conducted from 1956 to 1992; (2) characterize the groundwater system in the vicinity of the proposed high-level radioactive waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nev.; and (3) address a variety of potential effects from NNSS activities on users down gradient from the NNSS and Yucca Mountain. A single groundwater flow model of the DVRFS has been developed that integrates data and results of two previous regional-scale models and supports Department of Energy (DOE) programs at the NNSS. The numerical model was constrained by organizing hydrogeologic data and interpretations in three-dimensional (3D) geographic information systems and constructing a digital three-dimensional (3D) hydrogeologic framework model (HFM) to represent 27 hydrogeologic units (HGUs) and major structures in the DVRFS region. The 3D hydrogeologic data sets were discretized to 1,500 meters (m) grid cell resolution for input arrays required for the model. The DVRFS was simulated using the USGS 3D groundwater-flow modeling code MODFLOW-2000. Two examples showing how the DVRFS regional model is used by the DOE as part of waste management activities at the NNSS: (1) use of the regional model to provide the boundary conditions for site-scale models, and (2) use of the regional model to assess changes in hydraulic gradient and flow paths in the regional flow system resulting from changes in pumping in various areas of interest. (authors)

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Materials Science of High-Level Nuclear Waste Immobilization

With the increasing demand for the development of more nuclear power comes the responsibility to address the technical challenges of immobilizing high-level nuclear wastes in stable solid forms for interim storage or disposition in geologic repositories. The immobilization of high-level nuclear wastes has been an active area of research and development for over 50 years. Borosilicate glasses and complex ceramic composites have been developed to meet many technical challenges and current needs, although regulatory issues, which vary widely from country to country, have yet to be resolved. Cooperative international programs to develop advanced proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies to close the nuclear fuel cycle and increase the efficiency of nuclear energy production might create new separation waste streams that could demand new concepts and materials for nuclear waste immobilization. This article reviews the current state-of-the-art understanding regarding the materials science of glasses and ceramics for the immobilization of high-level nuclear waste and excess nuclear materials and discusses approaches to address new waste streams.

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ANNUAL RADIOACTIVE WASTE TANK INSPECTION PROGRAM- 2007

Aqueous radioactive wastes from Savannah River Site (SRS) separations and vitrification processes are contained in large underground carbon steel tanks. The 2007 inspection program revealed that the structural integrity and waste confinement capability of the Savannah River Site waste tanks were maintained. A very small amount of material had seeped from Tank 12 from a previously identified leaksite. The material observed had dried on the tank wall and did not reach the annulus floor. A total of 5945 photographs were made and 1221 visual and video inspections were performed during 2007. Additionally, ultrasonic testing was performed on four Waste Tanks (15, 36, 37 and 38) in accordance with approved inspection plans that met the requirements of WSRC-TR-2002- 00061, Revision 2 'In-Service Inspection Program for High Level Waste Tanks'. The Ultrasonic Testing (UT) In-Service Inspections (ISI) are documented in a separate report that is prepared by the ISI programmatic Level III UT Analyst. Tanks 15, 36, 37 and 38 are documented in 'Tank Inspection NDE Results for Fiscal Year 2007'; WSRC-TR-2007-00064.

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CESIUM REMOVAL FROM TANKS 241-AN-103 & 241-SX-105 & 241-AZ-101 & 241AZ-102 COMPOSITE FOR TESTING IN BENCH SCALE STEAM REFORMER

This report documents the preparation of three actual Hanford tank waste samples for shipment to the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). Two of the samples were dissolved saltcakes from tank 241-AN-103 (hereafter AN-103) and tank 241-SX-105 (hereafter SX-105); one sample was a supernate composite from tanks 241-AZ-101 and 241-AZ-102 (hereafter AZ-101/102). The preparation of the samples was executed following the test plans LAB-PLAN-10-00006, Test Plan for the Preparation of Samples from Hanford Tanks 241-SX-105, 241-AN-103, 241-AN-107, and LAB-PLN-l0-00014, Test Plan for the Preparation of a Composite Sample from Hanford Tanks 241-AZ-101 and 241-AZ-102 for Steam Reformer Testing at the Savannah River National Laboratory. All procedural steps were recorded in laboratory notebook HNF-N-274 3. Sample breakdown diagrams for AN-103 and SX-105 are presented in Appendix A. The tank samples were prepared in support of a series of treatability studies of the Fluidized Bed Steam Reforming (FBSR) process using a Bench-Scale Reformer (BSR) at SRNL. Tests with simulants have shown that the FBSR mineralized waste form is comparable to low-activity waste glass with respect to environmental durability (WSRC-STI-2008-00268, Mineralization of Radioactive Wastes by Fluidized Bed Steam Reforming (FBSR): Comparisons to Vitreous Waste Forms and Pertinent Durability Testing). However, a rigorous assessment requires long-term performance data from FBSR product formed from actual Hanford tank waste. Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) has initiated a Waste Form Qualification Program (WP-5.2.1-2010-001, Fluidized Bed Steam Reformer Low-level Waste Form Qualification) to gather the data required to demonstrate that an adequate FBSR mineralized waste form can be produced. The documentation of the selection process of the three tank samples has been separately reported in RPP-48824, Sample Selection Process for Bench-Scale Steam Reforming Treatability Studies Using Hanford Waste Samples.

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CHANGING THE SAFETY CULTURE IN HANFORD TANK FARMS

In 2000 the Hanford Tank Farms had one of the worst safety records in the Department of Energy Complex. By the end of FY08 the safety performance of the workforce had turned completely around, resulting in one of the best safety records in the DOE complex for operations of its kind. This paper describes the variety of programs and changes that were put in place to accomplish such a dramatic turn-around. The U.S. Department of Energy's 586-square-mile Hanford Site in Washington State was established during World War II as part of the Manhattan Project to develop nuclear materials to end the war. For the next several decades it continued to produce plutonium for the nation's defense, leaving behind vast quantities of radioactive and chemical waste. Much of this waste, 53,000,000 gallons, remains stored in 149 aging single-shell tanks and 28 newer double-shell tanks. One of the primary objectives at Hanford is to safely manage this waste until it can be prepared for disposal, but this has not always been easy. These giant underground tanks, many of which date back to the beginning of the Manhattan Project, range in size from 55,000 gallons up to 1.1 million gallons, and are buried beneath 10 feet of soil near the center of the site. Up to 67 of the older single-shell tanks have leaked as much as one million gallons into the surrounding soil. Liquids from the single-shell tanks were removed by 2003 but solids remain in the form of saltcake, sludges and a hardened heel at the bottom of some tanks. The Department of Energy's Office of River Protection was established to safely manage this waste until it could be prepared for disposal. For most of the last seven years the focus has been on safely retrieving waste from the 149 aging single-shell and moving it to the newer double-shell tanks. Removing waste from the tanks is a difficult and complex task. The tanks were made to put waste in, not take it out. Because of the toxic nature of the waste, both chemically as well as radiologically, all retrieval operations must be performed using remote-controlled equipment which has to be installed in each tank, then removed when retrieval is completed. This process involves a variety of potentially hazardous construction activities including crane and rigging, excavation, electrical and piping work. It also requires strong attention to safety to avoid injuries to personnel and contamination of the environment.

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SFWST Disposal Research R&D 5-Year Plan - FY2021 Update.

In the planning for FY2020 in the U.S. DOE NE-81 Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Campaign, the DOE requested development of a plan for activities in the Disposal Research (DR) Research and Development (R&D) over a five (5)-year period, and DOE requested periodic updates to this plan. The DR R&D 5-year plan was provided to the DOE based on the FY2020 priorities and program structure (Sassani et al., 2020) and represents a strategic guide to the work within the DR R&D technical areas (i.e., the Control Accounts), focusing on the highest priority technical thrusts. This FY2021 report is the first update to the DR R&D 5-year plan for the SFWST Campaign DR R&D activities. This 5-year plan will be a living document and is planned to be updated periodically to provide review of accomplishments and for prioritization changes based on aspects including mission progress, external technical work, and changes in SFWST Campaign objectives and/or funding levels (i.e., Program Direction). The updates to this 5-year plan will address the DR R&D that has been completed (accomplishments) and the additional knowledge gaps to be investigated, with any updates to the DR R&D priorities for the next stages of activities.

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Overview of SAVY-4000 Lifetime Extension Activities in Fiscal Year 2024

This report provides an overview of activities engaged in during the 2024 fiscal year in support of the SAVY-4000 (hereafter “SAVY”) lifetime extension. As the final full year prior to the submittal of the technical basis, efforts were made to assess the current understanding regarding SAVY degradation in service as well as any knowledge that provided a more substantive view of the challenges that SAVYs face in storage. Close coordination with the stakeholders (i.e. LANL program office) ensured alignment with expectations regarding timelines for the remainder of the activities supporting the technical basis document for the lifetime extension request.

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U.S. Department of Energy Office of Legacy Management's Tribal Interactions - 12513

Effective government-to-government interactions with tribal nations and maintaining stakeholder relations with members of tribes are increasingly important to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM). As of October 2011, LM was responsible for long-term surveillance and maintenance of 87 sites and facilities in the continental U.S. and Puerto Rico, including some sites on tribal lands. The sites on tribal lands can affect natural resources that are managed or used by tribes, or the sites can potentially affect areas of cultural significance to tribal nations in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Tribes are separate sovereign governments recognized in the U.S. Constitution and are significant stakeholders for LM sites. The tribes are individual nations with diverse histories, cultures, customs, religions, and laws. LM has regular communication with the affected tribes to inform members of issues, to allow the tribe to participate in decision making, to provide technical reviews, and to ensure tribal concerns are addressed. Four LM sites are in the Navajo Nation. Three of those sites contain uranium mill tailings disposal cells regulated under long-term surveillance and maintenance programs that require monitoring and annual inspections. The fourth site was remediated but still has a groundwater plume that LM is responsible for. DOE and LM have worked with the Navajo Nation for almost 30 years on technical issues and to ensure tribal concerns are addressed. (authors)

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Indoor Dust Remedial Investigation Sampling at the Colonie FUSRAP Site - 15578

The Colonie Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) Site is located in the Town of Colonie, Albany County, New York. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is currently addressing environmental contamination associated with the Site. The area surrounding the Site consists of residential and commercial properties, known as vicinity properties. Cleanup activities have been completed on many of these VPs under the FUSRAP to address depleted uranium contamination. Soil remediation activities have been substantially completed at the Colonie FUSRAP Site and its VPs under the FUSRAP. Recent studies performed by an independent party and under FUSRAP identified uranium within indoor dust in residencies and businesses in the immediate vicinity of the Site. The studies were limited to non-living areas such as basement window sills, garages, and attics. This paper discusses the indoor dust Remedial Investigation (RI) for the VPs at the Colonie FUSRAP Site. The indoor dust sample media presented many technical challenges regarding sampling design, data reduction, and data interpretation. In addition, because the RI is focused on numerous resident-owned, rental, and commercial properties, challenges where presented regarding right-of-entry to sample and concerns were raised regarding confidentiality of the results. In response to this, a community outreach communication and education program is being developed to mitigate property-owner concerns. The paper also identifies specific action levels used to determine future actions. Ultimately, property-specific risk assessments, performed at properties exceeding the action levels, will be used to determine whether a response action is appropriate under FUSRAP. (authors)

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The EMC: Development of a New Equipment for Recovering Old Nuclear Wastes From Fontenay-aux-Roses CEA Center - 18017 - 18471

The discharge of nuclear wastes from the Fontenay-aux-Roses CEA center, to conform with storage facilities, is a key issue of the cleaning and dismantling program, both for old nuclear wastes - produced during the R and D nuclear activities period-, and for the current wastes from the dismantling activities. In order to address this double issue, a new equipment, specific to mid-radiant and highly-radiant (MI/HI) solid wastes, is being designed by CEA. The Measurement and Conditioning Equipment, (EMC) aims at radiological characterization of wastes and their conditioning so that they respect the acceptance criteria of the storage facilities. The EMC is currently being studied and should be operated in 2020. (authors)

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