Preliminary Analysis of Facility Design for Pyro-processing Safeguardability
The deployment of advanced nuclear energy systems can assure sustainable energy use worldwide. For some of these systems, nuclear fuel will be fabricated in remotely-handled facilities in which batch-type processing will occur in heavily-shielded hot cells. Because special nuclear material is in both different physical and chemical form than that of the contemporary fuel cycle, new challenges have arisen in terms of safeguards, safety, and security, integrated with facility design; i.e., safeguardability. There is a need to develop models that can quantitatively assess safeguardability from a design-driven perspective. Previously, the first build of a material throughput model was established using discrete event simulation (DES) for the fuel fabrication process. Results showed that the DES model potentially can detect diversion attempts. This paper continues the study by further developing the the model. We test the use of the probability of the false alarm; i.e., the Type I error, as a metric for safeguardability assessment. Initiating events leading to a false alarm arise from aspects of safeguards, safety, and security. Different conceptual facility designs could exhibit different frequencies for the Type I error, and this could provide a measure of the safeguardability of each design. A quantitative assessment for safeguardable facility designs has not been developed in this manner. Much of the research into safeguardability has been qualitative. Engineering design approaches for a safeguardable facility are now needed. As there are not accepted metrics for safeguardability assessment, our motivation is to develop this design facet of safeguardability further.