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At least 1,351 records · Page 75

Using simulators to assess knowledge and behavior of “novice” operators of critical infrastructure under cyberattack events

—The transition from the traditional power grid to the smart grid improves reliability, performance, and management, while simultaneously increasing its susceptibility to cyberattacks. One of the biggest weaknesses in grid security is the human agent responsible for its maintenance and operations. As such, it is crucial to embed hands-on understanding of grid operations and security, especially for students in the Electrical and Computer Engineering (ECE) fields. This paper presents a case study where ECE students from Temple University used an interactive microgrid simulator, "Grid Game", a program developed by Idaho National Laboratory. This case study offers insights into the ECE students’ understanding of key engineering principles (microgrid stability, generation control system, generator inertia, energy storage, and grid security) gained by using the simulator program. Furthermore, the human behavior (strategies to prepare for and respond to cyberattacks, and cooperation and conflict in decision-making) of defenders/ECE students as they experience cyberattacks are also discussed. The paper then offers some limitations and possible suggestions for future research.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

On the Limits of EM Based Detection of Control Logic Injection Attacks In Noisy Environments

The difficulty in applying traditional security mechanisms in Industrial Control System (ICS) environments makes a large portion of these mission-critical assets vulnerable to cyber attacks. Therefore, there is a dire need for the development of novel security mechanisms specifically designed to protect such critical systems. Recently a lot of attention has been given to mechanisms that exploit the EM emanations of devices for defense purposes. Such practices may lead to the development of robust external and non-intrusive anomaly detection systems. Nevertheless, the majority of current work in the area neglects to consider the implications of real-life environments, particularly environmental noise. In this work, we explore the limits of EM-based anomaly detection towards identifying injection attacks in control logic software in noisy environments. Our study conducted upon both synthetically generated and real signals identified that indeed environmental noise might significantly degrade the accuracy of the anomaly detection process. Experiments done upon synthetic data indicated that assuming that signals are captured with high sampling rates, even minor code injections can be detected with above-90% accuracy in noisy environments where SNR is up to -2dB. This is true even if naive detection methods are considered. Moreover, experiments done using a real-life testbed attest that even single-instruction injections can be detected with near-perfect accuracy in relatively clean environments. Finally, noise-elimination techniques can drastically improve the reliability of the detection mechanism even in noisy environments.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Forced Power Systems Oscillations Due to Cyberattacks: Threats, Detection and Partial Mitigation

Forced oscillations in power systems can be caused by misconfigured controllers at generator stations. They can also be caused by cyberattacks against the exciters or governors. This paper explores the effects of forced oscillations from cyberattacks on generator excitation and governor systems and the effectiveness of a novel control system for a static var compensator in mitigating those oscillations to enhance transmission system resilience. A brief overview of oscillations, especially forced oscillations, within power systems is presented, along with an overview of cyberattacks on power systems. This paper also examines and implements FACTS devices to partially mitigate the forced oscillations created by cyberattacks by reducing the magnitude of the oscillations caused by the attack. The proposed approach is more effective against attacks targeting exciters.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

What Role Do Aggregators Play in Power System Security and Resilience?

Barriers to the participation of distributed energy resources (DERs) in wholesale electricity markets have limited the use of DERs for power system security and resilience. In September 2020, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved an order to reduce these barriers. FERC Order No. 2222 enables the participation of DER aggregators in wholesale electricity markets. DERs include renewable generation and technologies that support the integration of renewable generation by increasing grid flexibility and resilience. Requiring wholesale energy markets to allow DER aggregator participation provides a path for DERs to become competitive in these markets. As the contribution from aggregated DERs continues to increase, the aggregator's role in supporting grid security and resilience will become more critical. This paper reviews work that demonstrates how DER aggregators can provide resilience support through technical capabilities, operational strategies, and secure communication architectures. Socioeconomic influences and impacts of aggregators, including implications for social resilience, are presented. In surveying the current state-of-the-art across different but interconnected topics, we illustrate how aggregators can be power system participants that enhance grid security. There is no one-size-fits-all approach to enhancing resilience in a power grid that includes a growing cohort of DER aggregators, but there are many options for aggregators to contribute to a more resilient and secure power grid.

aggregator↗

A Randomization-Based, Zero-Trust Cyberattack Detection Method for Hierarchical Systems

This paper demonstrates a novel randomization-based approach for verifying power system control signals with application to detecting cyberattacks. We consider fully connected hierarchical systems containing multiple local agents and a global "trust" agent. The global agent uses a time-varying randomized assignment scheme to identify corrupt network links based on principles of zero trust and majority rule. To evaluate the performance of this detection approach, we implement our algorithm in MATLAB and run it against nearly 43 million unique attack scenarios spanning a range of system sizes. For each scenario, the algorithm determines whether the identified corruptions satisfy a set of validity constraints reflecting network topology and uses that result to say whether the recovered state value for one or more local agents is malicious. We compare the algorithm's determination to the true state of the system to assess performance and find that classification accuracy converges to 100% as system size increases, suggesting that the validity constraints become more difficult to satisfy for larger systems. We further explore the scenarios that evade detection to understand practical implications for employing this detection approach.

cybersecurity↗

LINEBACKER: LINE-speed Bio-inspired Analysis and Characterization for Event Recognition

The cyber world is a complex domain, with digital systems mediating a wide spectrum of human and machine behaviors. While this is enabling a revolution in the way humans interact with each other and data, it also is exposing previously unreachable infrastructure to a worldwide set of actors. Existing solutions for intrusion detection and prevention that are signature-focused typically seek to detect anomalous and/or malicious activity for the sake of preventing or mitigating negative impacts. But a growing interest in behavior-based detection is driving new forms of analysis that move the emphasis from static indicators (e.g. rule-based alarms or tripwires) to behavioral indicators that accommodate a wider contextual perspective. Similar to cyber systems, biosystems have always existed in resource-constrained hostile environments where behaviors are tuned by context. So we look to biosystems as an inspiration for addressing behavior-based cyber challenges. In this paper, we introduce LINEBACKER, a behavior-model based approach to recognizing anomalous events in network traffic and present the design of this approach of bio-inspired and statistical models working in tandem to produce individualized alerting for a collection of systems. Preliminary results of these models operating on historic data are presented along with a plugin to support real-world cyber operations.

biosequence model↗

AZALIA: an A to Z Assessment of the Likelihood of Insider Attack

Recent surveys indicate that the ``financial impact and operating losses due to insider intrusions are increasing'' . Within the government, insider abuse by those with access to sensitive or classified material can be particularly damaging. Further, the detection of such abuse is becoming more difficult due to other influences, such as out-sourcing, social networking and mobile computing. This paper focuses on a key aspect of our enterprise-wide architecture: a risk assessment based on predictions of the likelihood that a specific user poses an increased risk of behaving in a manner that is inconsistent with the organization’s stated goals and interests. We present a high-level architectural description for an enterprise-level insider threat product and we describe psychosocial factors and associated data needs to recognize possible insider threats.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Real-Time Federated Cyber-Transmission-Distribution Testbed Architecture for the Resiliency Analysis

With the ongoing automation driven by the push toward the smart electric grid and the advancement in associated cyber infrastructure, the interaction between physical [electric transmission and distribution (T&D) systems], cyber (communication, automation, and control), and human (grid operators and decision-makers) is increasingly becoming more complex. This creates the requirement of analyzing the effect of the transmission system on the distribution system and vice versa with consideration of the additional complexity of the cyber infrastructure. Such an integrated testbed will also help with resiliency analysis, where resiliency refers to the ability of the system to continue serving energy to the critical loads even with limited extreme contingencies. Interaction of the physical power grid with the cyber layer can be effectively modeled using real-time (RT) simulator for developing and validating various operational and control algorithms. Testbeds using RT simulators with multiple capabilities have been developed at different institutions. Still, no single existing testbed can offer full scalability while simultaneously meeting high fidelity requirements for resiliency experimentation. Co-simulating federated testbed assets can provide a scalable experimentation platform that can be leveraged for verification and validation. In this article, an architecture is developed for federated cyber-physical testbed. A local federation with two real-time simulators is developed: real-time digital simulator (RTDS) and OPAL-RT have been interfaced using VILLAS framework for end-to-end testing. Also, a real-time linear predictor is developed and integrated here to address the communication latency impact on geographically allocated federated RT simulation. Finally, resiliency analysis tools are formulated and utilized for T&D systems. Finally as an illustrative use case, the resiliency of a T&D test system is simulated, and the results are analyzed. A 179-bus Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) transmission system is developed using OPAL-RT/ HYPERSIM, and a modified IEEE 13 node feeder system is modeled in RTDS/RSCAD and interfaced for resiliency analysis.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DISARM: Target Electronic Device Informed Mitigation of Software Runtime Side-Channel Vulnerabilities

Program runtime/timing attacks exploit variations in a program’s execution times to extract sensitive information from the program (e.g. encryption keys, sensitive variable data, intellectual property). State-of-the-art solutions to runtime side-channel attacks attempt to balance the execution time of the sensitive code for different control flow paths to eliminate the timing leakage. However, during the mitigation process, most techniques do not consider the underlying hardware/device on which the target program is supposed to run on. This can lead to over-fixing (unnecessary extra operations), under-fixing (not solving the imbalance properly), and even failures. Here, we propose DISARM, a joint hardware-software methodology (unlike any existing solution) for mitigating runtime side-channel vulnerabilities that utilizes timing values from real embedded devices to generate targeted software fixes. We implement DISARM to support C/C++/Java source codes and validate it across 22 standard benchmarks. DISARM outperforms state-of-the-art solutions such as PENDULUM and DifFuzzaR in terms of execution time overhead, code size overhead, and correctness on five different embedded/edge devices.

Timing/runtime side-channel↗

Self-Supervised and Interpretable Anomaly Detection Using Network Transformers

Machine learning and deep neural networks (DNNs) have been proposed as a tool to identify anomalies in computer network communications. However, due the obfuscated nature of off-the-shelf machine learning models, their output often does not provide enough information to isolate the source of the anomaly to take corrective measures. In this article, we introduce the network transformer (NeT), a DNN model for anomaly detection that incorporates the graph structure of the communication network in order to improve interpretability. Further, the presented approach has the following advantages: first, enhanced interpretability by incorporating the graph structure of computer networks; second, provides a hierarchical set of features that enables analysis at different levels of granularity; second, self-supervised training that does not require labeled data. The NeT model was evaluated on a set of anomalous scenarios executed in a real industrial control system. The presented approach successfully identified the anomalies, the devices affected, and the specific connections causing the anomalies, providing a data-driven hierarchical approach to analyze the behavior of a cyber network.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Distribution System Behind-the-Meter DERs: Estimation, Uncertainty Quantification, and Control

This paper summarizes the three-year technical activities of the IEEE Task Force (TF) on behind-the-meter (BTM) distributed energy resources (DERs): estimation, uncertainty quantification, and control. The potential grid services from BTM DERs are discussed in detail. The paper also reviews the state-of-the-art for BTM DERs visibility, uncertainty quantification, and, optimization and control. Furthermore, different aspects of the market structures associated with BTM DERs are covered, including emerging market and business models. Finally, needs and recommendations are provided for additional areas such as system protection, computing capabilities, algorithm development, market structure design, cyberinfrastructure and security, and hardware and software developments.

behind-the-meter↗

Robust Restoration From Cyber-Physical Attacks in Active Distribution Grids With Grid-Edge IBRs

The inverter-based resources (IBRs) have enabled the integration of renewable energy at the grid edge with enhanced control capabilities to support the reliable operation of power grids. Different control frameworks, such as hierarchical or distributed architecture, have been proposed with the expansion of cyber networks for real-time monitoring and control. This evolution of critical infrastructure into cyber-physical systems also brings more vulnerabilities for the broadened attack surfaces, and significantly increases the possibility of physical system failures or outages caused by cyberattacks. Among tremendous efforts in the defense-in-depth approach, it remains challenging to provide prompt detection and accurate location of attack entry points or paths. Therefore, the prevailing restoration framework may struggle to fully consider the cyber-physical interdependence, successfully isolate the compromised cyber and physical components, and safely recover the systems without the potential risks leading to secondary outages. This paper is motivated to develop a cyber-physical restoration framework for distribution grids to recover from cyber attacks by harnessing grid-edge IBRs. The framework is first built on the operational guidelines of IBRs considering the compromised cyber layer. Then, an ambiguity set is established to represent the uncertainty of attack scenarios and their possibility levels. Next, a distributionally robust optimization model is developed to provide the optimal load restoration strategy across all scenarios. The effectiveness of the proposed model is demonstrated through various use cases on the modified IEEE 13-node and 123-node test systems. Finally, simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness and advancement of developed post-attack restoration strategies.

Cybersecurity↗

Self-Healing Attack-Resilient PMU Network for Power System Operation

In this paper, we propose a self-healing phasor measurement unit (PMU) network that exploits the features of dynamic and programmable configuration in a software-defined networking infrastructure to achieve resiliency against cyber-attacks. After a cyber-attack, the configuration of network switches is changed to isolate the compromised PMUs/phasor data concentrators to prevent further propagation of the attack; meanwhile, the disconnected yet uncompromised PMUs will be reconnected to the network to "self-heal" and thus restore the observability of the power system. Specifically, we formulate an integer linear programming model to minimize the overhead of the self-healing process (e.g., the recovery latency), while considering the constraints of power system observability, hardware resources, and network topology. We also propose a heuristic algorithm to decrease the computational complexity. Case studies of a PMU network based on the IEEE 30-bus and 118-bus systems are used to validate the effectiveness of the self-healing mechanism.

Cybersecurity↗

Toward a Cyber Resilient and Secure Microgrid Using Software-Defined Networking

To build a resilient and secure microgrid in the face of growing cyber-attacks and cyber-mistakes, we present a software-defined networking (SDN)-based communication network architecture for microgrid operations. We leverage the global visibility, direct networking controllability, and programmability offered by SDN to investigate multiple security applications, including self-healing communication network management, real-time and uncertainty-aware communication network verification, and specification-based intrusion detection. We also expand a novel cyber-physical testing and evaluation platform that combines a power distribution system simulator (for microgrid energy services) and an SDN emulator with a distributed control environment (for microgrid communications). Experimental results demonstrate that the SDN-based communication architecture and applications can significantly enhance the resilience and security of microgrid operations against the realization of various cyber threats.

critical infrastructure protection↗

Detection and Characterization of Intrusions to Network Parameter Data in Electric Power Systems

Combating cyberattacks is an emerging challenge in maintaining the reliable and economic operation of electric power systems. Possible cyberattacks include intrusions to the parameter data at a control center. In this class of attacks, algorithms at the control center are correctly executed, but the attacker's modification of the associated parameter data yields improper results. This paper proposes an algorithm for detecting and characterizing cyberattacks to network parameter data, with specific application to optimal power flow problems. The proposed algorithm evaluates whether historical operating point data are consistent with the network parameters. Inconsistencies indicating potential cyberattacks are characterized using historical operational data (power injections and voltage phasors) along with network parameter data. Simulated test cases illustrate the proposed algorithm's detection and characterization capabilities.

cybersecurity↗

Small-Signal Angle Stability-Oriented False Data Injection Cyber-Attacks on Power Systems

The small-signal angle stability (SSAS) of a power system is determined by the property of operation points. The widely applied false data injection (FDI) cyber-attack, however, is able to stealthily mislead the optimal power flow (OPF) and thus compromise operation points, leading to damages to the SSAS margin. Here, to provide insights for cyber defenders, this paper proposes and investigates a stealthy SSAS-oriented FDI cyber-attack focusing on two attacking purposes, i.e., the SSAS margin and operation cost, with higher priority on the former one. First, this paper establishes a novel bi-level model with an implicit SSAS constraint based on a structure preserving model to compromise operation points. Then, for the SSAS interarea mode in a typical two-area system, this paper formulates closed-form expressions of how the SSAS margin and operation cost behave with respect to stealthy injections. By comparison, for the SSAS local mode in general power systems, this paper proposes a moving target cyber-attack-based hierarchical solution algorithm. Simulation results on a two-area system, a Kundur 11 bus system, and a modified IEEE 14 bus system demonstrate the significant damaging effects of the proposed SSAS-oriented FDI cyber-attack and the conflict between the two attacking purposes.

Benders decomposition↗