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At least 1,369 records · Page 76

Transforming Energy Through Computational Excellence: A View From NREL

At the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL)—a U.S. Department of Energy laboratory—computational science, high-performance computing, applied mathematics, advanced computer science, visualization, and data play a pivotal role in advancing energy abundance, affordability, security, and reliability. From fundamental scientifc discovery to systems engineering and analysis, NREL researchers tackle market-relevant challenges to develop solutions for an independent energy system that is reliable, resilient and secure. Collaborative partnerships with industry, government, and academia ensure that our research remains cutting edge, impactful, applicable, and aligned with real-world energy needs. This special issue of Computing in Science & Engineering highlights exemplary NREL projects where computational tools and methodologies drive discovery and accelerate innovation in scalable and integrated energy systems. The featured articles explore the role of computational modeling, high-performance computing, generative AI, and adaptive computing in advancing independent energy solutions, optimizing sustainability research, and enhancing decision-making for energy solutions using a broad mix of energy technologies. Here, these contributions demonstrate how NREL’s computational research bridges the gap between theoretical advancements and practical implementation, emphasizing interdisciplinary collaboration and a commitment to innovation, with a focus on translating computational excellence into real-world impact, thus accelerate progress toward national energy goals. By showcasing cutting-edge research at the intersection of computational science and energy systems, this issue aims to inspire and inform researchers, practitioners, and policymakers dedicated to shaping a more reliable energy future.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Autonomous System Inference, Trojan, and Adversarial Reprogramming Attack and Defense (Final)

In the world of ever-advancing technology, Autonomous Systems (AS) find extensive application, bolstering functionalities of critical infrastructures such as nuclear power plants. These systems, however, are increasingly becoming a target for nefarious activities, namely through inference attacks, trojan attacks, and adversarial reprogramming. This paper delves into a comprehensive exploration of machine learning (ML)-driven autonomous control systems within advanced nuclear reactor designs, revealing the vulnerabilities and proposing strategies for defense against potential cyber-attacks. Advanced cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure and the energy sector are becoming more common. With the invention of autonomous control systems (ACS) within advanced nuclear reactor designs, system designers, reactor operators, and regulators must consider cybersecurity during the design and operational phases. This article provides a cyber threat assessment of machine learning (ML)- based digital twinning (DT) technologies in the context of advanced reactor ACS. A cyber-physical testbed was created to emulate nuclear reactor digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) and act as a basis for the ACS. The ACS was designed as two plant-level DTs predicting reactor malfunctions and determining control actions and two component-level DTs responsible for classifying component states and forecasting component inputs and outputs (I/O). Two duplicate ACS designs– one using a traditional ML framework and one using an automated ML (AutoML) framework– were created and tested against cyber-attacks on training data, real-time process data, and ML model architectures to determine their respective qualitative cyber-risk in terms of likelihood and impact. Both frameworks showed similar cyber-resilience against training, real-time, and ML architecture attacks, proving that neither is inherently more secure. Recommended safeguard and security measures are posed to system designers, reactor operators, and regulators to maintain the cybersecurity of ML-based DT technologies such as ACS, prompting a holistic view of shared responsibility for maintaining cyber-secure ML-based systems. As global reliance on generation III reactors begins to be critically assessed, the evolution towards advanced reactor systems utilizing digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) becomes not merely preferable, but essential. The integration of semi and fully autonomous control systems (ACS), powered by digital I&C and machine learning (ML)-based digital twinning (DT) technologies, emerges as a potent strategy to mitigate operations and maintenance costs, thereby enhancing the economic feasibility of novel reactor designs. However, with a staggering 500% and 380% increase in cyber-attacks reported against the energy sector by the United States Department of Energy (DoE) and the European Union respectively, a surge in cyber vulnerabilities specifically targeting the nuclear industry has been 2 markedly observed. Notable incidents, such as the W32.Ramnit spyware infiltration at the Gundremmingen nuclear power plant in Germany and the Dtrack spyware intrusion at the Kudankulam nuclear power plant in India, while not directly compromising core industrial control systems (ICS), underscore a compelling necessity to fortify cybersecurity protocols in safeguarding reactor systems against increasingly adept digital adversaries. In light of this, our investigation extends beyond conventional cybersecurity parameters, diving into the intricate web of potential vulnerabilities woven into ML-based DTs and ACS in advanced reactor systems. A crafted cyber-physical testbed and preliminary ACS were devised to act as a mirror, reflecting potential configurations of advanced reactor control designs. Moreover, this study is intertwined with a scrutinization of ML models, developed either through conventional, manually tuned methodologies or via automated means through AutoML, probing into their cyber-risk profiles within operational technology (OT) environments. Expanding on this, two distinct ACS blueprints were forged – one navigating through the corridors of traditional ML and the other traversing the path of AutoML – in an effort to holistically encapsulate the considerations pivotal to ML-based DT control system design. Employing the SANS Institute Industrial Control System (ICS) Kill Chain and the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) framework, a structured analysis was conducted, launching three targeted attacks against the training dataset, real-time dataset, and ML models, therein dissecting the potential cyber-attack implications against both ML frameworks within an ACS milieu. It is essential to note that three distinct categories of attacks were conducted against both ACS configurations, each encompassing three distinct ML-based DTs, cumulating in a total of 18 varied attacks. This exploration extends into the realms of Autonomous System Inference, Trojan, and Adversarial Reprogramming Attack and Defense, unraveling vulnerabilities, and opportunities for fortified defenses against such intrusions, particularly where ML-driven technologies, and by extension, ACS, are deployed. Final recommendations, articulated through a lens of security, safeguard, and implementation considerations, are presented for both traditional and AutoML models, anchoring upon the existing knowledge landscape and ML-based DT modeling for ACS, and are offered as a beacon to guide the nuclear industry through the intricate cybersecurity challenges that lie ahead.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Concept of Operations for an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) for Upper E Airspace

The National Airspace System undergoes continuous change including in the Upper Class E airspace involving increasingly complex operations and a widening diversity of vehicles. To secure a safe future system, the National Academies recommended an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) that is extensible to Upper E. Current Air Traffic Management is not cost-effective to scale for future Upper E operations and diversity of vehicles so the Federal Aviation Administration developed an Upper E Traffic Management ConOps to safely integrate the diverse operations and vehicles having different performance characteristics and flight missions without disrupting current operations including space launch and reentry, suborbital flights, supersonic and hypersonic flights, slow moving or stationary unmanned balloons, and long endurance fixed wing vehicles that are slow, stationary, or high speed. IASMS integrates state-of-the-art predictive modeling with reactive and proactive analytics to detect hazards and mitigate risk precursors for Upper E operators. IASMS identifies emergent safety risks exposed by transformation of the NAS with new and increasingly complex operations. Safety intelligence will also expand the data available and offer insight to new approaches for implementing safety improvements to mitigate risk with more seamless “in-time” integration across the policy, risk management, safety assurance, and promotion pillars of SMS.

K Ellis↗

Motivation and Design of the OCPP Security Service

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is conducting in-depth research aimed at exploring how zero trust security principles can be effectively applied to electric vehicle charging infrastructure. This investigation seeks to enhance the resilience and reliability of these systems against cyber threats, ensuring secure and uninterrupted access to charging services for electric vehicle users and electric supply. Zero trust is a security concept centered on the belief that system operators should not automatically trust users or systems based on their location, whether inside or outside the organization, but instead must verify everything trying to connect to their systems before granting access. A key aspect of the project is to demonstrate and validate zero trust approaches targeted to electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure. It has been observed that both open-source and commercial solutions often overlook the specific protocols employed in managing EV charging stations and proceeded with a general, protocol-agnostic approach. While these strategies effectively block non-authorized routes to the charging infrastructure, they do not tackle the situations where attackers may exploit legitimate access channels, such as the inattentive operator model posited by the Idaho National Laboratory. To address this gap, this paper proposes and discusses a new security service targeted to the Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP), which is the de facto protocol for the management of charging stations and serves a critical role in the broader adoption of electric vehicles. The design and architecture of the proposed OCPP security service are discussed in detail, outlining how it aims to safeguard charging station management system (CSMS) functions. The service is particularly important in scenarios where the charging station operator (CSO), responsible for the maintenance and operation of charging stations, and the charging network provider (CNP), which manages the charging network's accessibility and billing, are separate entities. This distinction is crucial because CSOs and CNPs often have different priorities, objectives, and operational responsibilities, which may not always align perfectly. For instance, a CSO might prioritize uptime and customer satisfaction, while a CNP might focus on maximizing revenue and network utilization. Such misalignment can create security vulnerabilities, as each entity might implement different policies and standards, potentially leaving gaps in the overall security posture.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

PURE Biomanufacturing: Secure, Pandemic-Adaptive Biomanufacturing

Biopharmaceutical production systems and processes are vulnerable to cyberattacks from sophisticated adversaries. Consequently, it is imperative to start building biopharmaceutical manufacturing systems that offer verifiable formalism and transform the current state of security across all production stages.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

[The Engineering and Technical Services Directorate at the Glenn Research Center]

My name is James Moon and I am a senior at Tennessee State University where my major is Aeronautical and Industrial Technology with a concentration in industrial electronics. I am currently serving my internship in the Engineering and Technical Services Directorate at the Glenn Research Center (GRC). The Engineering and Technical Service Directorate provides the services and infrastructure for the Glenn Research Center to take research concepts to reality. They provide a full range of integrated services including engineering, advanced prototyping and testing, facility management, and information technology for NASA, industry, and academia. Engineering and Technical Services contains the core knowledge in Information Technology (IT). This includes data systems and analysis, inter and intranet based systems design and data security. Including the design and development of embedded real-time s o h a r e applications for flight and supporting ground systems, Engineering and Technical Services provide a wide range of IT services and products specific to the Glenn Research Center research and engineering community. In the 7000 Directorate I work directly in the 7611 organization. This organization is known as the Aviation Environments Technical Branch. My mentor is Vincent Satterwhite who is also the Branch Chief of the Aviation Environments Technical Branch. In this branch, I serve as the Assistant program manager of the Engineering Technology Program. The Engineering Technology Program (ETP) is one of three components of the High School L.E.R.C.I.P. This is an Agency-sponsored, eight-week research-based apprenticeship program designed to attract traditionally underrepresented high school students that demonstrate an aptitude for and interest in mathematics, science, engineering, and technology.

Moon, James↗

Secure voice for mobile satellite applications

The initial system studies are described which were performed at JPL on secure voice for mobile satellite applications. Some options are examined for adapting existing Secure Telephone Unit III (STU-III) secure telephone equipment for use over a digital mobile satellite link, as well as for the evolution of a dedicated secure voice mobile earth terminal (MET). The work has included some lab and field testing of prototype equipment. The work is part of an ongoing study at JPL for the National Communications System (NCS) on the use of mobile satellites for emergency communications. The purpose of the overall task is to identify and enable the technologies which will allow the NCS to use mobile satellite services for its National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) communications needs. Various other government agencies will also contribute to a mobile satellite user base, and for some of these, secure communications will be an essential feature.

Vaisnys, Arvydas↗

Cyber-Physical Attack-Resilient Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection, and Control for the Power Grid

Cyber security and resiliency of Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC) applications is critically important to ensure secure, reliable, and economic operation of the bulk power system. WAMPAC relies heavily on the security of measurements and control commands transmitted over wide-area communication networks for real-time operational, protection, and control functions. Also, the current “N-1 security criteria” for grid operation is inadequate to address malicious cyber events and therefore it is important to fundamentally redesign WAMPAC and to enhance Energy Management System (EMS) applications to make them attack-resilient. In this paper, we propose an end-to-end defense-in-depth architecture for attack-resilient WAMPAC that addresses resilience at both the infrastructure layer and the application layers. Also, we propose an attack-resilient cyber-physical security framework that encompasses the entire security life cycle including risk assessment, attack prevention, attack detection, attack mitigation, and attack resilience. The overarching objective of this paper is to provide a broad scope that comprehensively describes most of the major research issues and potential solutions in the context of cyber-physical security of WAMPAC for the power grid.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Towards improving software security by using simulation to inform requirements and conceptual design

We illustrate the use of modeling and simulation early in the system life-cycle to improve security and reduce costs. The models that we develop for this illustration are inspired by problems in reliability analysis and supervisory control, for which similar models are used to quantify failure probabilities and rates. In the context of security, we propose that models of this general type can be used to understand trades between risk and cost while writing system requirements and during conceptual design, and thereby significantly reduce the need for expensive security corrections after a system enters operation

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Ethanol Distribution, Dispensing, and Use: Analysis of a Portion of the Biomass-to-Biofuels Supply Chain Using System Dynamics

The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 targets use of 36 billion gallons of biofuels per year by 2022. Achieving this may require substantial changes to current transportation fuel systems for distribution, dispensing, and use in vehicles. The U.S. Department of Energy and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory designed a system dynamics approach to help focus government action by determining what supply chain changes would have the greatest potential to accelerate biofuels deployment. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory developed the Biomass Scenario Model, a system dynamics model which represents the primary system effects and dependencies in the biomass-to-biofuels supply chain. The model provides a framework for developing scenarios and conducting biofuels policy analysis. This paper focuses on the downstream portion of the supply chain-represented in the distribution logistics, dispensing station, and fuel utilization, and vehicle modules of the Biomass Scenario Model. This model initially focused on ethanol, but has since been expanded to include other biofuels. Some portions of this system are represented dynamically with major interactions and feedbacks, especially those related to a dispensing station owner's decision whether to offer ethanol fuel and a consumer's choice whether to purchase that fuel. Other portions of the system are modeled with little or no dynamics; the vehicle choices of consumers are represented as discrete scenarios. This paper explores conditions needed to sustain an ethanol fuel market and identifies implications of these findings for program and policy goals. A large, economically sustainable ethanol fuel market (or other biofuel market) requires low end-user fuel price relative to gasoline and sufficient producer payment, which are difficult to achieve simultaneously. Other requirements (different for ethanol vs. other biofuel markets) include the need for infrastructure for distribution and dispensing and widespread use of high ethanol blends in flexible-fuel vehicles.

02 PETROLEUM↗

Combating the Insider Cyber Threat

This article represents a collaboration between PNNL, CERT/CMU, and AFRL that describes needs and related efforts by these institutions to develop technologies and approaches to counter cyber threats by insiders to informatin systems. The main focus of this article is on the need for effective training on insider threat to raise staff awareness and encourage organizations to adopt a more effective approach to identifying potential risks and take proactive steps to mitigate them.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Smart Grid - Transforming Power System Operations

Abstract—Electric power systems are entering a new realm of operations. Large amounts of variable generation tax our ability to reliably operate the system. Couple this with a greater reliance on the electricity network to serve consumer demand that is likely to rise significantly even as we drive for greater efficiency. Trade-offs between energy and environmental needs will be constantly negotiated, while a reliable supply of electricity needs even greater assurance in a world where threats of disruption have risen. Smart grid capabilities are being proposed to help address the challenges confronting system operations. This paper reviews the impact of smart grid functionality on transforming power system operations. It explores models for distributed energy resources (DER – generation, storage, and load) that are appearing on the system. It reviews the evolving nature of electricity markets to deal with this complexity and a change of emphasis on signals from these markets to affect power system control. Smart grid capabilities will also impact reliable operations, while cyber security issues must be addressed as a culture change that influences all system design, implementation, and maintenance. Lastly, the paper explores significant questions for further research and the need for a simulation environment that supports such investigation and informs deployments to mitigate operational issues as they arise.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Final report and documentation for the security enabled programmable switch for protection of distributed internetworked computers LDRD.

An increasing number of corporate security policies make it desirable to push security closer to the desktop. It is not practical or feasible to place security and monitoring software on all computing devices (e.g. printers, personal digital assistants, copy machines, legacy hardware). We have begun to prototype a hardware and software architecture that will enforce security policies by pushing security functions closer to the end user, whether in the office or home, without interfering with users' desktop environments. We are developing a specialized programmable Ethernet network switch to achieve this. Embodied in this device is the ability to detect and mitigate network attacks that would otherwise disable or compromise the end user's computing nodes. We call this device a 'Secure Programmable Switch' (SPS). The SPS is designed with the ability to be securely reprogrammed in real time to counter rapidly evolving threats such as fast moving worms, etc. This ability to remotely update the functionality of the SPS protection device is cryptographically protected from subversion. With this concept, the user cannot turn off or fail to update virus scanning and personal firewall filtering in the SPS device as he/she could if implemented on the end host. The SPS concept also provides protection to simple/dumb devices such as printers, scanners, legacy hardware, etc. This report also describes the development of a cryptographically protected processor and its internal architecture in which the SPS device is implemented. This processor executes code correctly even if an adversary holds the processor. The processor guarantees both the integrity and the confidentiality of the code: the adversary cannot determine the sequence of instructions, nor can the adversary change the instruction sequence in a goal-oriented way.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Smart Grid Integrity Attacks: Characterizations and Countermeasures

Real power injections at loads and generators, and real power flows on selected lines in a transmission network are monitored, transmitted over a SCADA network to the system operator, and used in state estimation algorithms to make dispatch, re-balance and other energy management system [EMS] decisions. Coordinated cyber attacks of power meter readings can be arranged to be undetectable by any bad data detection algorithm. These unobservable attacks present a serious threat to grid operations. Of particular interest are sparse attacks that involve the compromise of a modest number of meter readings. An efficient algorithm to find all unobservable attacks [under standard DC load flow approximations] involving the compromise of exactly two power injection meters and an arbitrary number of power meters on lines is presented. This requires O(n2m) flops for a power system with n buses and m line meters. If all lines are metered, there exist canonical forms that characterize all 3, 4, and 5-sparse unobservable attacks. These can be quickly detected in power systems using standard graph algorithms. Known secure phase measurement units [PMUs] can be used as countermeasures against an arbitrary collection of cyber attacks. Finding the minimum number of necessary PMUs is NP-hard. It is shown that p + 1 PMUs at carefully chosen buses are sufficient to neutralize a collection of p cyber attacks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Economic Incentives for Cybersecurity: Using Economics to Design Technologies Ready for Deployment

Cybersecurity practice lags behind cyber technology achievements. Solutions designed to address many problems may and do exist but frequently cannot be broadly deployed due to economic constraints. Whereas security economics focuses on the cost/benefit analysis and supply/demand, we believe that more sophisticated theoretical approaches, such as economic modeling, rarely utilized, would derive greater societal benefits. Unfortunately, today technologists pursuing interesting and elegant solutions have little knowledge of the feasibility for broad deployment of their results and cannot anticipate the influences of other technologies, existing infrastructure, and technology evolution, nor bring the solutions lifecycle into the equation. Additionally, potentially viable solutions are not adopted because the risk perceptions by potential providers and users far outweighs the economic incentives to support introduction/adoption of new best practices and technologies that are not well enough defined. In some cases, there is no alignment with redominant and future business models as well as regulatory and policy requirements. This paper provides an overview of the economics of security, reviewing work that helped to define economic models for the Internet economy from the 1990s. We bring forward examples of potential use of theoretical economics in defining metrics for emerging technology areas, positioning infrastructure investment, and building real-time response capability as part of software development. These diverse examples help us understand the gaps in current research. Filling these gaps will be instrumental for defining viable economic incentives, economic policies, regulations as well as early-stage technology development approaches, that can speed up commercialization and deployment of new technologies in cybersecurity.

Cyber Security↗

Introduction: Cybersecurity and Software Assurance Minitrack

Modern society is dependent on software systems of remarkable scope and complexity. Yet methods for assuring their security and functionality have not kept pace. The result is persistent compromises and failures despite best efforts. Cybersecurity methods must work together for situational awareness, attack prevention and detection, threat attribution, minimization of consequences, and attack recovery. Because defective software cannot be secure, assurance technologies must play a central role in cybersecurity approaches. There is increasing recognition of the need for rigorous methods for cybersecurity and software assurance. The goal of this minitrack is to develop science foundations, technologies, and practices that can improve the security and dependability of complex systems.

Burns, Luanne↗

Disruption of Commercial Solar Inverter System by TLS Proxy Man-in-the-Middle Attack

Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a cryptographic protocol that encrypts communication data, providing end-to-end communication encryption and authentication. Currently, TLS is widely adopted for securing communication between servers and end devices, including solar inverter systems. Therefore, users/operators can securely access the solar inverters through a web user interface (WebUI) application programmable interface (API) on a PC or server over TLS-enabled Wi-Fi or Ethernet. However, the security of the TLS-based network becomes compromised if it is breached by a TLS proxy man-in-the-middle (MITM) exploit. This report explores potential vulnerabilities in a commercial solar inverter system that leverages a TLS proxy MITM and discusses the impacts through assume-breached penetration testing. Furthermore, the paper explores recommended mitigation methods against the TLS proxy MITM exploit in solar inverters.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Modularization of Small Modular Reactor Facilities: Physical Protection Recommendations

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. In consideration of the economic viability of small modular reactor (SMR) facilities, many designers and utilities are considering a modular approach to the construction and operation of these facilities. This modular approach considers building and operating a first unit; once the first reactor is in operation, construction will begin on a second reactor. This process would allow the vendor or utility to ensure production of energy and financial income while the second reactor is under construction. This project evaluates the feasibility of modular construction in terms of physical protection and identifies several recommendations for vendors and utilities considering this approach. To conduct this evaluation, a hypothetical three-unit SMR facility was developed, a physical protection system (PPS) was considered for the design, and a hypothetical design basis threat (DBT) was used to evaluate this PPS. Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined, with adversary team sizes ranging from 4-to-8 to determine security system effectiveness. The results of this work will influence PPS designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic SMRs. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) complex can impact the design and completion of security-by-design (SeBD) for SMRs considering modular construction. The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all SMR designs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗