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Aluminum Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel Task 2: Oxide Layer Radiolytic Gas Generation Resolution Experiment Test Plan

This document presents the test plan for Task 2 of the Aluminum Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel Long Term Dry Storage Technical Issues Action Plan. This task’s overarching goal is the resolution of gas generation resulting from the radiolytic degradation of the oxide layers on aluminum. The uncertainty associated with the build-up of gaseous radiolytic products inside the ASNF storage canisters is one of the dominant technical challenges associated with long term dry storage of aluminum clad fuel. The objectives of the Task 2 test plan are to: 1. Understand how radiation chemistry inside the ASNF dry storage canister impacts extended dry storage performance. 2. Understand the radiation induced mechanisms governing the production of radiolytic gases and alteration of gas composition within a canister. 3. Correlate the observed changes in material properties of ASNF with the radiolytic degradation of aluminum oxide in fill environments of variable moisture and gas composition. 4. Compile a predictive kinetic modeling tool, to provide quantitative mechanistic insight into the in-cask radiation chemistry of ASNF. 5. Interface with the canister modeling activity of Task 3 to deliver degradation rates for package performance of both sealed and vented scenarios.

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Public Preferences Related to Radioactive Waste Management in the United States: Methodology and Response Reference Report for the 2016 Energy and Environment Survey.

This report presents the questions and responses to a nationwide survey taken June 2016 to track preferences of US residents concerning the environment, energy, and radioactive waste management. A focus of the 2016 survey is public perceptions on different options for managing spent nuclear fuel, including on-site storage, interim storage, deep boreholes, general purpose geologic repositories, and geologic repositories for only defense-related waste. Highlights of the survey results include the following: (1) public attention to the 2011 accident and subsequent cleanup at the Fukushima nuclear facility continues to influence the perceived balance of risk and benefit for nuclear energy; (2) the incident at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in 2014 could influence future public support for nuclear waste management; (3) public knowledge about US nuclear waste management policies has remined higher than seen prior to the Fukushima nuclear accident and submittal of the Yucca Mountain application; (6) support for a mined disposal facility is higher than for deep borehole disposal, building one more interim storage facilities, or continued on-site storage of spent nuclear fuel; (7) support for a repository that comingles commercial and defense related waste is higher than for a repository for only defense related waste; (8) the public’s level of trust accorded to the National Academies, university scientists, and local emergency responders is the highest and the level trust accorded to advocacy organizations, public utilities, and local/national press is the lowest; and (9) the public is willing to serve on citizens panels but, in general, will only modestly engage in issues related to radioactive waste management.

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Thermal Evaluations for Hypothetically Drain-Down Spent Fuel Storage Facility at SRS

The L-Area Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) underwater storage facility at Savannah River Site (SRS), referred to as L-Basin SNF facility, has an array of Vertical Tube Storage (VTS) racks and a group of High Flux Irradiation Reactor (HFIR) fuel cores. The underwater facility is integrally designed as a wet SNF storage system with a chemically-controlled water pool. The SNF storage racks are seismically qualified. The L-Basin pool holds about 3.4 million gallons of water with concrete wall thickness of about 5 ft and water depths of 17 ft to 30 ft. The facility has mainly two different elevation levels of 30 ft and 17 ft below the ground level. At the level 30 ft below the ground, a maximum of 110 racks of VTS and 5 racks of Dry Cave can be stored. At the level of 17 ft below the ground, 120 HFIR cores can be stored, considering that each rack contains two HFIR cores. In case of a hypothetical accident, all cooling water in the storage pool may be drained away, resulting in dry SNF storage condition. The primary objective of the work is to estimate the maximum fuel temperature in a conservative manner when the L-Basin facility is completely dry due to the hypothetical drain-down of the pool water. A three-dimensional Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) modeling approach was taken for the thermal evaluations of the water-drained SNF storage facility. The modeling calculations were performed, assuming that all of the storage racks in L-Basin are fully loaded with SNF assemblies containing decay heat sources. In the case of full loading, the L-Basin facility stores 14,600 SNF assemblies in VTS racks and 120 cores in HFIR racks. The thermal analysis results of the L-Basin model yielded maximum temperatures of VTS and HFIR fuel assemblies for different fuel loading scenarios and boundary conditions of the SNF storage racks.

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Regulatory Perspective on Potential Fuel Reconfiguration and Its Implication to High Burnup Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation - 13042

The recent experiments conducted by Argonne National Laboratory on high burnup fuel cladding material property show that the ductile to brittle transition temperature of high burnup fuel cladding is dependent on: (1) cladding material, (2) irradiation conditions, and (3) drying-storage histories (stress at maximum temperature) [1]. The experiment results also show that the ductile to brittle temperature increases as the fuel burnup increases. These results indicate that the current knowledge in cladding material property is insufficient to determine the structural performance of the cladding of high burnup fuel after it has been stored in a dry cask storage system for some time. The uncertainties in material property and the elevated ductile to brittle transition temperature impose a challenge to the storage cask and transportation packaging designs because the cask designs may not be able to rely on the structural integrity of the fuel assembly for control of fissile material, radiation source, and decay heat source distributions. The fuel may reconfigure during further storage and/or the subsequent transportation conditions. In addition, the fraction of radioactive materials available for release from spent fuel under normal condition of storage and transport may also change. The spent fuel storage and/or transportation packaging vendors, spent fuel shippers, and the regulator may need to consider this possible fuel reconfiguration and its impact on the packages' ability to meet the safety requirements of Part 72 and Part 71 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is working with the scientists at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to assess the impact of fuel reconfiguration on the safety of the dry storage systems and transportation packages. The NRC Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation has formed a task force to work on the safety and regulatory concerns in relevance to high burnup fuel storage and transportation. This paper discusses the staff's preliminary considerations on the safety implication of fuel reconfiguration with respect to nuclear safety (subcriticality control), radiation shielding, containment, the performance of the thermal functions of the packages, and the retrievability of the contents from regulatory perspective. (authors)

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FY2018 Long-Term PCT of ILAW Glasses (Final Report, Rev. 0)

About 50 million gallons of high-level mixed waste is currently stored in underground tanks at The United States Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Hanford site in the State of Washington. The Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) will provide DOE’s Office of River Protection (ORP) with a means of treating this waste by vitrification for subsequent disposal. The tank waste will be separated into low- and high-activity waste fractions, which will then be vitrified respectively into Immobilized Low Activity Waste (ILAW) and Immobilized High Level Waste (IHLW) products. The objective of the work described in this report is to perform testing, data collection, and analyses for the ILAW glass product to assess potential environmental risks associated with long-term storage.

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Aging Hanford Nuclear Waste Using Carbon Dioxide to Evaluate Corrosion at Lower pH Limits - 18467

Samples of Hanford Nuclear Reservation (HNR) tank waste and simulated Hanford tank waste were exposed to carbon dioxide gas (CO{sub 2}) in the laboratory in order to decrease the pH of the solution. Sodium hydroxide is required to be added to some tanks according to waste handling specifications to keep tanks protected from pitting corrosion, but the maximum-allowed volume in some tanks is currently approaching capacity. Decreasing the pH of tank solutions using CO{sub 2} gas mimics the environmental exposure chemistry, does not add sodium, and allows for testing on solutions currently categorized as out-of-specification according to technical waste handling documents. Legacy alloy A537 Class 1 carbon steel was used to construct the AN tanks on the HNR and was utilized for this testing. The planned testing of three solutions included a simulant for feasibility and a waste solution from Tank 241-AN-102 (AN-102), taken in 2013, which was run in duplicate. The solutions were evaluated for corrosion potential using cyclic potentiodynamic polarization (CPP) scans to determine the propensity for stress corrosion cracking and pitting corrosion. Results in all solutions showed that pitting potential was low when the pH was above 11 and temperatures were below 40 deg. C. As solution pHs dipped into the 10- 10.5 range, there were mixed results. CPP scans were initially run at the higher temperature of 50 deg. C, accelerating corrosion rates. Solution pHs that did not indicate corrosion were further exposed to CO{sub 2}. Solutions with mixed or positive pitting results were rerun at 40 deg. C. The first failed run on the tank solution was seen when testing the duplicate sample at 50 deg. C and a pH of 13.01. When this solution was retested at 40 deg. C, the CPP scan did not show corrosion. A mixed corrosion result was obtained from a scan run at the final pH of 10 when tested at 50 deg. C. Upon completion of testing a visual inspection of the coupon did not show corrosion products on its surface. These results provide assurance that tanks containing slightly reduced pHs are still protected from pitting corrosion. Tank integrity assurance at a lower pH limit in Tank AN-102 could slow sodium addition and the rising volume of hazardous waste. Other benefits of reducing the pH specification would be reduced costs associated with retrieving and storing smaller volumes of hazardous waste, a reduced number of radiation exposure events (required for pH modification of tank waste), and a potential for a decreased volume required to be immobilized for long-term storage in a vitrified (glass) phase. (authors)

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Preliminary Analysis of Advanced Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage, Transportation, and Disposal

Due to increased interest in advanced reactor deployment and their associated potential new fuel cycles, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) program has begun to evaluate the possible implications of long term management and final disposition of the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) generated. Safely managing and dispositioning this SNF, along with any other associated radioactive waste, is the primary focus of this initial preliminary assessment. This paper summarizes efforts to evaluate the characteristics and packaging options for three types of advanced reactor SNF forms: (1) tristructural isotropic (TRISO), (2) metallic, and (3) irradiated fuel salt presented in the report titled “Storage, Transportation, and Disposal of Advanced Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste”. TRISO and metallic SNF and their associated waste streams were emphasized because of the near-term anticipated demonstrations of X-energy’s Xe-100 and TerraPower and GE Hitachi’s Natrium advanced reactors. Preliminary information on spent fuel salts discharged from molten-salt reactors (MSRs) was also examined to provide a baseline for future efforts. All calculations and assumptions were based on publicly available information. This paper identifies several different reactors that produce either TRISO or metallic SNF as well as a few of the reactor and fuel characteristics used for the assessments. Based on these characteristics, calculations were performed to determine the applicability of packaging SNF into existing canister designs. The evaluations included geometric (e.g., dimension, volume) and mass/weight considerations, known operational approaches and loading procedures, physical and chemical considerations/conditions for storage environments, and as-loaded radiation, thermal, and criticality analyses to identify constraints on storage, transportation, and disposal. Gaps in publicly available data pertaining to reactor operation and/or fuel composition provide increased uncertainty in some evaluations. Additionally, uncertainty in packaging and SNF management operations provide additional uncertainty. However, preliminary conclusions can still be assessed through this work and are presented in this paper.

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Pressurizing Hagan and SAVY containers to 30-psig (air) to measure the release of analytical cerium oxide test powder

The need to pressure-test known nuclear material storage containers has been made apparent by the CSE (cognizant systems engineer) assigned to containers at TA-55. The main goal of the current study is to understand the behavior of the SAVY-4000 and Hagan containers during an internal pressurization (30 psig) event. The experiments incorporated a nominal mass of 100 g of CeO 2 (cerium oxide) powder to simulate MAR (material at risk) conditions. For the experimental results with mass losses of 0.0±0.1 g mass loss), using ASME error analysis, there is a total expanded uncertainty in a 95% confidence interval (±0.25 g) for the tested SAVY-4000 and Hagan containers. For purposes of conservatism, this has been rounded upward to yield a bounding value for the damage ratio DR = 0.003 = 0.3%.

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AREVA TN Universal Centralized Storage System - 15581

AREVA TN has developed a new used nuclear fuel storage product concept: NUHOMS{sup R} Universal Storage Facility (USF) to meet the needs and capabilities of centralized storage. This NUHOMS{sup R} USF is a horizontal system retaining the superior seismic stability, shielding performance, and ease of canister retrieval of the existing NUHOMS{sup R} system, while creating a single, simplified storage module that can store canisters of any sizes, including horizontal NUHOMS{sup R} canisters as well canisters from vertical storage systems or canisters developed for future direct geologic storage. The NUHOMS{sup R} USF has a reduced footprint and uses less material compared to existing NUHOMS{sup R} system. The canister handling process has been renovated to simplify the canister loading process. (authors)

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OVERVIEW OF ENHANCED HANFORD SINGLE-SHELL TANK (SST) INTEGRITY PROJECT - 12128

To improve the understanding of the single-shell tanks integrity, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, the USDOE Hanford Site tank contractor, developed an enhanced Single-Shell Tank (SST) Integrity Project in 2009. An expert panel on SST integrity, consisting of various subject matters experts in industry and academia, was created to provide recommendations supporting the development of the project. This panel developed 33 recommendations in four main areas of interest: structural integrity, liner degradation, leak integrity and prevention, and mitigation of contamination migration, Seventeen of these recommendations were used to develop the basis for the M-45-10-1 Change Package for the Hanford Federal Agreement and Compliance Order, which is also known as the Tri-Party Agreement. The change package identified two phases of work for SST integrity. The initial phase has been focused on efforts to envelope the integrity of the tanks. The initial phase was divided into two primary areas of investigation: structural integrity and leak integrity. If necessary based on the outcome from the initial work, a second phase would be focused on further definition of the integrity of the concrete and liners. Combined these two phases are designed to support the formal integrity assessment of the Hanford SSTs in 2018 by Independent Qualified Registered Engineer. The work to further define the DOE's understanding of the structural integrity SSTs involves preparing a modern Analysis of Record using a finite element analysis program. Structural analyses of the SSTs have been conducted since 1957, but these analyses used analog calculation, less rigorous models, or focused on individual structures. As such, an integrated understanding of all of the SSTs has not been developed to modern expectations. In support of this effort, other milestones will address the visual inspection of the tank concrete and the collection of concrete core samples from the tanks for analysis of current mechanics properties. The work on the liner leak integrity has examined the leaks from 23 tanks with liner failures. Individual leak assessments are being developed for each tank to identify the leak cause and location. Also a common cause study is being performed to take the data from individual tanks to look for trends in the failure. Supporting this work is an assessment of the leak rate from tanks at both Hanford and the Savannah River Site and a new method to locate leak sites in tank liner using ionic conductivity. A separate activity is being conducted to examine the propensity for corrosion in select single shell tanks with aggressive waste layers. The work for these two main efforts will provide the basis for the phase two planning. If the margins identified aren't sufficient to ensure the integrity through the life of the mission, phase two would focus on activities to further enhance the understanding of tank integrity. Also coincident with any phase-two work would be the integrity analysis for the tanks, which would be complete in 2018. With delays in the completion of waste treatment facilities at Hanford, greater reliance on safe, continued storage of waste in the single shell tanks is increased in importance. The goal of integrity assessment would provide basis to continue SST activities till the end of the treatment mission.

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Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Annual Site Environmental Report for 2007

The purpose of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Annual Site Environmental Report for 2007 (ASER) is to provide information required by U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 231.1A, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting. Specifically, the ASER presents summary environmental data that (1) characterize site environmental management performance; (2) summarize environmental occurrences and responses reported during the calendar year; (3) confirm compliance with environmental standards and requirements; (4) highlight significant facility programs and efforts; and (5) describe how compliance and environmental improvement is accomplished through the WIPP Environmental Management System (EMS). The DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) and the management and operating contractor (MOC), Washington TRU Solutions LLC (WTS), maintain and preserve the environmental resources at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). DOE Order 231.1A; DOE Order 450.1, Environmental Protection Program; and DOE Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, require that the affected environment at and near DOE facilities be monitored to ensure the safety and health of the public and preservation of the environment. This report was prepared in accordance with DOE Order 231.1A, which requires that DOE facilities submit an ASER to the DOE Headquarters Chief Health, Safety, and Security Officer. The WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (HWFP) (NM4890139088-TSDF [treatment, storage, and disposal facility]) further requires that the ASER be provided to the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED).

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Disposal Systems Evaluation Framework DSEF User Manual (V.3.0)

The Disposal Systems Evaluation Framework (DSEF) has been developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to formalize and facilitate the development and documentation of repository conceptual design options for a range of waste forms, geologic environments, repository design concepts, and repository operating modes. DSEF is one component of the Engineered Barrier System (EBS) family of work packages at several national laboratories led by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), in support of the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, specifically of the Used Fuel Disposition (UFD) Campaign within the Office of Used Nuclear Fuel Disposition Research and Development (NE-53). DSEF is a knowledge management system that allows the user to intelligently access and draw data from a case library of hundreds of completed thermal analyses (currently 721 cases in the library), and draw input from databases of material properties and repository development cost data (currently the data in these databases are drawn from more than 100 references). The core functionality of DSEF is provided by a Microsoft Office Excel 2010 workbook with macros and form controls that create a structured environment and walk the user through the steps of creating the input data required to perform disposal system evaluations internally and by interfacing with external programs. The user can choose to work with built-in data from the case library of previous analysis cases, from the material property databases, or can define their own input descriptions and data. DSEF uses the Excel worksheet protection (implemented on a sheet by sheet basis) to prevent inadvertent over-writing of formulas with data. When worksheet protection is enabled, the user can see all underlying formulas, and enter data in unprotected cells (the unprotected cells generally correspond to the yellow highlighted cells). Worksheet protection also prevents restructuring the files (adding or deleting rows or columns) and changing the formatting, as well as preventing access to the Visual Basic Editor to prevent modification of the macros. If the user needs to modify the worksheet structure, formulas, or macros, they can contact LLNL to get the password to unprotect the worksheets. However, care should be taken in making any modifications, since the macros and formulas are dependent in some cases on the current structure, range names, and macro subroutines DSEF is set up to retrieve the results of external thermal analysis program runs, summarize them graphically, and provide a template for adding the new results to the Case Library. The Case Library worksheet in DSEF is set up to create a Case Library data record for each new analysis case, at the top of the list of prior cases. Therefore, a separate DSEF file (with unique name) should be saved for each run that is to be archived. Users should submit a copy of their DSEF files to LLNL so that their results can be added to the overall Case Library and made available to other laboratories and stakeholders. LLNL will maintain the DSEF Case Library and make the most current files available on the SNL SharePoint site. The Revision History sheet documents the file evolution. One of the key objectives of DSEF is to allow the user to compare the results of thermal analyses to the thermal constraints of the design components. These comparisons can then be used to consider design, layout, and operating mode modifications to find combinations that can meet the thermal constraints for a given combination of waste form, geologic medium, surface storage time, and system concept of operation.

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Key differentiators influencing the choice of robust shielded containers

The NDA's Upstream Optioneering project has examined the potential implications of using an alternative type of waste package and its influence on the waste management lifecycle across the NDA estate. Robust Shielded Containers (RSCs) are radioactive waste packages that provide integral radiological shielding, reducing the need for remote handling. The robustness of the container could remove the need to immobilise waste by cement encapsulation. RSCs are routinely used to package ILW for interim storage in Germany and have fairly recently been considered for use in the UK because RSCs have the potential to simplify the waste management lifecycle and enable risk and hazard reduction. In particular, the current baseline (included in Magnox Limited lifetime plans) follows the strategy set out in the Magnox Operating Decommissioning Programme (MODP), in which Type II MOSAIK and Type VI Ductile Cast Iron Containers (DCICs) are used to package (in non-encapsulated form) most Magnox ILW arising prior to 2050. By considering representative types of Intermediate Level Waste (ILW) and exploring potential packaging options for these wastes, this paper identifies the factors that could differentiate between cases in which RSCs would, or would not, be an appropriate option. The potential role of RSCs across the waste management lifecycle is examined, from retrieval of waste through to emplacement at a Geological Disposal Facility (GDF), including consideration of other potential uses of RSCs, such as temporary storage of raw wastes for which appropriate treatment and conditioning measures have yet to be developed. (authors)

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Initial Site-Specific De-Inventory Report for Maine Yankee

This report has been developed to satisfy solicitation number 6400014223 under subcontract number 4000146712 issued by UT-Battelle, LLC, managing contractor of Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to AREVA Federal Services (AFS). The purpose of this report is to assist the United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) in laying the groundwork for implementing an integrated waste management system. This includes preparing for future large-scale transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF), High-Level Radioactive Waste (HLW), and Greater Than Class C (GTCC) Low Level Radioactive Waste (LLW). This report addresses the tasks, equipment, and interfaces necessary for the complete de-inventory of the Maine Yankee (MY) independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) site located in the mid-coast region of Maine approximately 25 miles south of Augusta, ME and 45 miles northeast of Portland, ME. As such, this report is intended to provide information useful for planning options within the integrated waste management system.

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The criticality safety program of the Swedish nuclear fuel and waste management Co (SKB)

SKB is co-owned by the owners of the Swedish nuclear power plants (NPP) and is responsible for the back-end of all Swedish spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste from the Swedish nuclear program. The responsibility starts from when the fuel leaves the NPP and ends at the planned final repository. That means that SKB has the responsible for the safety at the intermediate pool storage (Clab), the encapsulation plant (Clink), the Spent Fuel Repository and the transportation between these sites. In March 2011 SKB applied to the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) for a permit to build a final repository for spent fuel and an encapsulation plant (Clink). The application contained a criticality safety analysis for the canisters to be used in Clink and the copper canister to be used in the final repository. In 2012 SSM requested several complements to the criticality safety analysis in the application and about the same time they also required Clab to modernise the Safety Analysis Report. Our owners (the NPPs) had also requested SKB to take care of higher enrichments and higher burnup fuel. A prerequisite to meet this was extended Burnable Absorber credit (peak reactivity) and Burn-up credit. Up to this stage SKB had relied heavily on consultants to do criticality safety analysis and had no specific criticality safety program or methodology. However it was now evident to SKB that we needed to take an overall view on the criticality safety area and not only lift the quality of the actual criticality analysis but also to handle organisational and competence issues. (authors)

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Microbial Biofilm Growth on Irradiated, Spent Nuclear Fuel Cladding

A fundamental criticism regarding the potential for microbial influenced corrosion in spent nuclear fuel cladding or storage containers concerns whether the required microorganisms can, in fact, survive radiation fields inherent in these materials. This study was performed to unequivocally answer this critique by addressing the potential for biofilm formation, the precursor to microbial-influenced corrosion, in radiation fields representative of spent nuclear fuel storage environments. This study involved the formation of a microbial biofilm on irradiated spent nuclear fuel cladding within a hot cell environment. This was accomplished by introducing 22 species of bacteria, in nutrient-rich media, to test vessels containing irradiated cladding sections and that was then surrounded by radioactive source material. The overall dose rate exceeded 2 Gy/h gamma/beta radiation with the total dose received by some of the bacteria reaching 5 × 103 Gy. This study provides evidence for the formation of biofilms on spent-fuel materials, and the implication of microbial influenced corrosion in the storage and permanent deposition of spent nuclear fuel in repository environments.

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Decommissioning Status and Preliminary Engineering Planning for Chinshan NPP in Taiwan - 19114

The Chinshan Nuclear Power Plant, which consists of two BWR units and was owned by Taiwan Power Company (TPC), has an electrical output of 636 MWe for each unit. Unit No. 1 and Unit No. 2 were licensed till December 2018 and July 2019, respectively. According to regulations of decommissioning in Taiwan, decontamination and dismantling of a NPP should be completed within 25 years. Therefore, TPC had started compiling the decommissioning plans (DP, 17 chapters) with INER, national engineering companies and international consultants since 2012. The DP of Chinshan NPP has been approved by the regulator, Atomic Energy Council (AEC), in the end of June, 2017. There are 17 chapters in the decommissioning plans, which deal with all aspects of safety-related considerations during the decommissioning period, such as spent fuel management, waste management, personnel/workers planning, schedules/working items, environmental management and monitoring. Those items are discussed in detail in this paper in accordance with the approved DP. The implementation of decommissioning will be started while the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is still under approval by EPA, which is expected to be completed in the end of 2018 or the mid of 2019. Once the decommissioning be started, all dismantling, decontamination, management teams, and preparation would be kicked off simultaneously in a very short period of time. In this paper, the planning assumptions, strategies from INER and TPC, management of radioactive waste, conversion of Turbine Building and detailed description of turbine-generator set are discussed. For the Turbine Building dismantling, inventories of equipment, cutting technology determination, storage logistics, container options and radwaste treatment and reduction would be important factors to be evaluated in the beginning. Afterwards, WBS (work breakdown structure) would be determined and be the basis for working bids, construction of a new storage warehouse, an incinerator and a super high pressure compactor. This preliminary engineering planning would be applied in the decommissioning of Chinshan NPP for the first time and be duplicated in Kuosheng NPP and Maanshan NPP in Taiwan as well. (authors)

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Long-term Prediction of Spent Fuel Storage Canisters - Issues and Approaches - 18112

The considerations involved in aging management of stainless steel canisters used in dry cask storage of spent fuel are discussed in this paper in a probabilistic framework. The two important modes of degradation in the long-term performance of the casks are localized corrosion and stress corrosion cracking initiating from the external surface. These degradation modes are determined by the evolution of the electrochemical behavior and the strain rate of the stainless steel. Laboratory data suggest that Type 304L/316L stainless steels should suffer from localized corrosion and SCC under salt deposits. However, field inspection of the canisters has not indicated extensive pitting or stress corrosion cracking. This discrepancy can be understood in terms of the joint probabilities of various factors that must come together to cause these failure modes. A Bayesian network approach is suggested as the framework for modeling the probability of failure of canisters and long-term management of aging. The gaps in knowledge to conduct a Bayesian network analysis are discussed. (authors)

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