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At least 1,423 records · Page 79

Characterization of Oxyhydroxides on a Dry-Stored Fuel Plate From L-Basin

This report describes the characterization of oxyhydroxide (oxide) films on a fuel plate that was previously irradiated in an RU-1 pool type reactor in Uruguay and subsequently stored in vented dry storage, first in Uruguay and most recently in L-Area on the Savannah River Site. Characterization of the as-received oxides includes the oxide morphology, thickness, structure, and chemical composition. The results from this work will, in a future report, be compared to characterizations of oxide films grown on alloys in the laboratory under prototypic conditions.

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Requalification of historical intermediate level waste (ILW) for the repository KONRAD on basis of non destructive assay (NDA) and re-evaluated nuclide vectors - 15289

The storage facility for ILW of the HDB contains a large number of historical waste products in 200-l drum geometry, which were produced in the 1970's to the 1990's. In the next years more ILW will be treated and stored at HDB, exceeding the storage capacity of the ILW store. All waste products produced at HDB are treated according to the acceptance criteria of the repository KONRAD and are planned to final storage in this repository. In order to qualify the waste materials for final storage in KONRAD and to remove parts of the inventory from the storage chambers this project was started. The main issues of the project, which will be accompanied by the regulator, are product control measures like gas chromatographic analyses of remotely sampled gas syringes and non destructive assay techniques like?-spectrometry and neutron-analytics. The product control is followed by declaration on the basis of re-evaluated nuclide vectors and a repackaging of the drums in licensed containers. The packaging concept includes a 400-l drum as qualified over-pack, because several of the historical drums cannot be qualified as IP-II or type A package. The annual space between the two drums is filled with quartz sand for stability and additional shielding. The drum set is afterwards inserted into a qualified UBA-container provided by GNS. In the case that the product control measures and the reassessment of the declarations result in a violation of the activity limits of the relevant acceptance criteria for KONRAD, the respective drum has to be physically re-qualified after correspondence with the surveillance authorities. This program will be applied to a fraction of approx. 400 canisters, which were selected on the basis of several quality aspects like dose rate below 100 mSv/h, nuclide inventory below 100 A2 according to paragraph 201 of TS-R-1 and well-known waste composition. In the future more waste products will be treated in the same way, if approved containers exist for the inventory. (authors)

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Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 121: Storage Tanks and Miscellaneous Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 121 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended February 2008) as Storage Tanks and Miscellaneous Sites. CAU 121 consists of the following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Area 12 of the Nevada Test Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada: (1) CAS 12-01-01, Aboveground Storage Tank; (2) CAS 12-01-02, Aboveground Storage Tank; and (3) CAS 12-22-26, Drums; 2 AST's. CAU 121 closure activities were conducted according to the FFACO and the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 121 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, 2007). Field work took place from February through September 2008. Samples were collected to determine the path forward to close each site. Closure activities were completed as defined in the plan based on sample analytical results and site conditions. No contaminants of concern (COCs) were present at CAS 12-01-01; therefore, no further action was chosen as the corrective action alternative. As a best management practice (BMP), the empty aboveground storage tank (AST) was removed and disposed as sanitary waste. At CAS 12-01-02, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) were present above the preliminary action level (PAL) in the soil beneath the AST that could possibly have originated from the AST contents. Therefore, PCBs were considered COCs, and the site was clean closed by excavating and disposing of soil containing PCBs. Approximately 5 cubic yards (yd{sup 3}) of soil were excavated and disposed as petroleum hydrocarbon PCB remediation waste, and approximately 13 yd3 of soil were excavated and disposed as PCB remediation waste. Cleanup samples were collected to confirm that the remaining soil did not contain PCBs above the PAL. Other compounds detected in the soil above PALs (i.e., total petroleum hydrocarbons [TPH] and semi-volatile organic compounds [SVOCs]) were determined to not likely have originated from the tank. Additional sample results showed that the compounds were likely present as a result of degraded asphalt around the adjacent, active water tank and not from the abandoned AST; therefore, they were not considered COCs. As a BMP, the empty AST was removed and disposed as sanitary waste. No COCs were present at CAS 12-22-26; therefore, no further action was chosen as the corrective action alternative. Although TPH was present at concentrations that exceeded the PAL, the volatile organic compound and SVOC hazardous constituents of TPH did not exceed the final action levels (FALs); therefore, TPH was not considered a COC. As a BMP, the empty AST was removed and disposed as sanitary waste. Closure activities generated sanitary waste, petroleum hydrocarbon PCB remediation waste, PCB remediation waste, and hazardous waste. Waste was appropriately managed and disposed. Waste that is currently staged on site is being appropriately managed and will be disposed under approved waste profiles in permitted landfills. Waste minimization activities included waste characterization sampling and segregation of waste streams.

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L-Basin Microbial Monitoring Program - Evaluation of 20 Years of Monitoring

The SRNL L-Basin corrosion surveillance and microbial monitoring programs provide early detection and characterization of corrosion attack to the fuel and storage system materials resulting from prolonged exposure to the L-Basin water environment and of changes to and impact of the diverse microbial population, respectively. The early detection of corrosion allows for adjustment of the water quality, engineering management, and fuel storage configurations to mitigate excessive corrosion attack. While microbial influenced corrosion in L-Basin has not been detected, tracking and understanding the effect of microbial populations on the stored fuel and basin water will aid in identifying remedial measures to mitigate any detrimental impact. This report reviews the microbial monitoring activities since initial characterizations in the mid-1990s.

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Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Annual Site Environmental Report for 2009

The purpose of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Annual Site Environmental Report for 2009 (ASER) is to provide information required by U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 231.1A, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting. Specifically, the ASER presents summary environmental data to: (1) characterize site environmental management performance; (2) summarize environmental occurrences and responses reported during the calendar year; (3) Confirm compliance with environmental standards and requirements; and (4) highlight the WIPP Environmental Management System (EMS) and significant environmental programs and accomplishments, including progress toward the DOE Environmental Sustainability Goals. The DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) and the management and operating contractor (MOC), Washington TRU Solutions LLC (WTS), maintain and preserve the environmental resources at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). DOE Order 231.1A; DOE Order 450.1A, Environmental Protection Program; and DOE Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, require that the affected environment at and near DOE facilities be monitored to ensure the safety and health of the public and workers, and preservation of the environment. This report was prepared in accordance with DOE Order 231.1A, which requires that DOE facilities submit an ASER to the DOE Headquarters Chief Health, Safety, and Security Officer. The WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (HWFP) Number NM4890139088-TSDF (treatment, storage, and disposal facility) further requires that the ASER be provided to the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED).

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Minimizing environmental risk through the use of evaporation - 15090

At the Hanford Site, work is being done to utilize a portable exhauster to reduce the remaining free liquid in the older underground storage tanks. Use of an exhauster allows the water in the free liquid to be evaporated reducing the possibility that mobile contaminants will leak into the soil and groundwater. Transferring the remaining liquid waste to newer tanks requires major infrastructure installation. Currently one set of tanks is undergoing the retrieval of solids and liquids. This retrieval requires substantial infrastructure in order to mobilize and pump the waste to newer tanks. Reducing the remaining liquid waste by pumping would require much of the same retrieval infrastructure and is cost prohibitive. The use of a portable exhauster will require minimal infrastructure and is much more efficient. Past results have demonstrated that this technology can be successfully used on various sizes of underground storage tanks. A portable exhauster is planned to be connected to the one tank believed to be leaking and will be used to evaporate the remaining free liquid, beginning in 2015. (authors)

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Estimation of Plutonium-240 Mass in Waste Tanks Using Ultra-Sensitive Detection of Radioactive Xenon Isotopes from Spontaneous Fission

This report details efforts to develop a technique which is able to detect and quantify the mass of 240 Pu in waste storage tanks and other enclosed spaces. If the isotopic ratios of the plutonium contained in the enclosed space is also known, then this technique is capable of estimating the total mass of the plutonium without physical sample retrieval and radiochemical analysis of hazardous material. Results utilizing this technique are reported for a Hanford Site waste tank (TX-118) and a well-characterized plutonium sample in a laboratory environment.

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Mini-Canister Radiolysis Testing of ASNF Materials and Surrogates

An experimental irradiation campaign to investigate radiolysis behavior of ASNF was conducted using in situ gas monitoring of small, sealed stainless-steel vessels (mini-canisters) containing aluminum samples with adherent (oxy)hydroxide films under helium backfill. The samples were irradiated with gamma radiation from a Co-60 irradiator. The samples tested included aluminum plate assemblies with lab-grown (oxy)hydroxides as surrogates for fuel as well as an end cropping from an actual ASNF assembly retrieved from long-term wet storage. These experiments enabled investigation of the impacts of various fuel drying approaches on the radiolytic generation rate and measurement of the H 2 yield associated with a reactor exposed sample with reactor-formed (oxy)hydroxide. The resulting data can be incorporated into model development for ASNF in dry storage. This report presents the cumulative results from four surrogate assemblies tested after application of different preparation (drying) conditions as well as the ASNF cropping; some post-irradiation testing was included. The mini-canister results are compared to data from related experimental campaigns that also tested the impact of drying conditions using samples irradiated in glass ampoules and discusses implications of the combined data

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Cathodic Protection Modeling for Hanford Underground Double-Shell Tank Farms

Hanford stores millions of gallons of radioactive and chemically hazardous waste from the production of weapon materials in tank farms consisting of underground carbon-steel storage tanks surrounded by reinforced concrete. Six of these Hanford tank farms use double-shell storage tanks (DSTs). The DST farms were constructed from 1968 to 1986 with a planned 40–50 year design life, so some are already operating beyond their initial life expectancy. Ultrasonic testing (UT) has indicated significant thinning on the bottom of the secondary (outer) liner of these tanks, believed to arise from groundwater intrusion driving concrete side corrosion. There is no direct access to the steel/concrete interface between the tank and the concrete pad, making it difficult to apply a chemical-based mitigation strategy or to conduct repairs, but cathodic protection (CP) is a possible method to inhibit further concrete-side corrosion. Hanford already uses CP to protect below grade steel piping within the tank farms and connected to the tanks, but this system was not designed to protect the tank bottoms. CP design must account for the structures surrounding the DSTs, including the steel reinforcing bars (rebar) within the concrete pad and vault, various process lines, and the existing CP system. In this study, finite element analysis (FEA) modeling was carried out to simulate CP protection of 1) a single tank and CP anode to develop options for modeling the rebar and to compare to a simpler circuit model and 2) the entire Hanford AN tank farm as a representative example consisting of seven tanks, associated piping, and both existing and new CP anodes. Both circuit and FEA models predict that significant protective current could be delivered to the bottoms of the tanks with the addition of tank-protection anodes below the depth of the tanks. Simulations with only the existing pipe-protection anodes active confirmed that only a very small current to the tank bottoms is predicted under present conditions. Multiple simplified representations of the dome and wall rebar were tested to reduce the computational complexity of the tank-farm simulations, resulting in modeling the rebar as edge elements with a prescribed effective circumference that matches the real rebar surface area. The geometry of the rebar is also simplified into horizontal hoops around the tank walls and radial rebar over the dome with increased effective circumference to retain the target surface area. This simplification was found to greatly reduce the complexity and solution time of the models without large changes in current distributions, especially to the tank bottom. A range of values were tested for model parameters such as soil and concrete resistivities and polarization resistance to investigate their impact on the current and electric potential distributions. Depending on the parameters used, FEA simulations predict some risk of overprotection, particularly on the piping system; since overprotection can also lead to surface damage associated with hydrogen gas generation at the interface (e.g. hydrogen embrittlement or damage to coatings), this needs to be considered when refining the design of the new CP system. Comparison between the FEA models and the circuit model representation demonstrated that the circuit model could not match the predicted FEA current distribution, even when using the exact same surface areas. This discrepancy appeared to be at least partly attributable to the impact of the relative positions of the tank components and anodes to each other and to the ground surface. The FEA model accounts for the relative positions since it solves the governing equations in three dimensions, but the circuit model cannot account for the positioning. In particular, the circuit model underpredicts the current to the tank bottom and overpredicts the current to the dome compared to FEA for the baseline geometry. The FEA models omitted the electrically isolated rebar in the bottom concrete slab. However, a circuit based stray current model estimated that only 2.1% of the total current through the slab would stray into the rebar, corresponding to ~0.21 A for a target current density of 2 mA/ft2 to the tank bottom. The estimated corrosion driven by this amount of stray current is predicted to yield a lifetime of >400 years for the minimum rebar diameter, assuming an acceptable cross-section area loss of 10%.

d'Entremont, Anna [Savannah River National Laborat↗

Development of a Robust Reference Electrode in Aggressive Chemical and Radiation Environments in the Hanford Waste Tanks

The Hanford site stores more than 200 million liters of radioactive and chemically hazardous wastes from the production of weapons materials. The wastes are stored in 177 underground carbon-steel storage tanks, separated between 149 single shell tanks (SSTs) and 28 double shell tanks (DSTs). The DSTs provide critical retrieval and interim storage before the waste is vitrified in the Waste Treatment and Isolation Plant (WTP). The tanks will need to remain in-service far beyond the initial 40-year design life, and effective corrosion control practices must remain in force to extend the tanks’ lifespans. This effort includes direct measurements of corrosion rate (e.g., ultrasonic measurements and corrosion coupons) and electrochemical processes (e.g., linear polarization measurements and open circuit potential measurements). The Hanford site began monitoring the corrosion potential in select DSTs in 2008. Of the 45 reference electrodes that have been installed, 29 have failed and 6 others provided unreliable results. DOE-EM is supporting a 3-year program to develop a chemical and radiation resistant reference electrode for application in the Hanford tanks. The first year of the program focused on understanding the failure mechanism for the reference electrodes and identification of candidate construction materials that would mitigate degradation of the electrodes in the waste environment. During the second year of the program, the objectives were to: 1) test candidate materials under simulated waste conditions, 2) design components that will extend the service life of the electrode, 3) fabricate materials for prototype reference electrodes, and 4) assemble prototype reference electrodes for accelerated testing. The reference electrode is constructed of four principal parts: 1) junction, 2) casing, 3) inner chamber backfill materials, and 4) the sensing wire. Principally, improvements of the junction, casing, and inner chamber backfill materials are being pursued. The junction material at the interface between the waste and the inner chamber of the reference electrode was identified as a critical component in the failure of the reference electrodes. Nine candidate replacement junction materials were tested under simulated waste conditions to evaluate permeation rate. These materials included a variety of polymeric and ceramic materials, some of which were 3-D printed. Thus far, porous polyvinylidene fluoride materials have performed satisfactorily and are being considered for prototype development. The commercial electrode casing materials in general have performed well. Additionally, 3-D printing of chemically and mechanically stable materials is being investigated as a means for further improvement in fabrication consistency. SRNL has also investigated altering the reference electrode design to extend the service life. The new design of the interior of the reference electrode casing creates a longer, more tortuous path between the junction material and the electrode sensing wire. A finite element model was used to optimize the design without adversely impacting the circuit resistance of the electrode during the measurements, thus preserving the measurement accuracy while enhancing the service life. The inner chamber back fill materials are also critical to the performance of the reference electrode. Materials that are resistant to intruding tank waste and provide a conductive path to the sensing wire were investigated. Gel and powder materials that are interspersed with a conductive chloride bearing material were tested for their influence on diffusion and electrode resistance. All the investigated materials and components will be assembled, with collaboration from commercial vendors, to fabricate the initial prototypes. Accelerated testing of the prototypes will be initiated in Year 2 of the program and will be completed in Year 3. A recommendation on the materials of construction and the design of the new robust reference electrode will be presented to the Hanford tank farm facility.

Sykes, Kiana [Savannah River National Laboratory (↗

Low and intermediate level radioactive waste processing in plasma reactor

Methods of low and intermediate level radioactive waste processing comprise: cementation, bituminization, curing in polymer matrices, combustion and pyrolysis. All these methods are limited in their application in the field of chemical, morphological, and aggregate composition of material to be processed. The thermal plasma method is one of the universal methods of RAW processing. The use of electric-arc plasma with mean temperatures 2000 - 8000 K can effectively carry out the destruction of organic compounds into atoms and ions with very high speeds and high degree of conversion. Destruction of complex substances without oxygen leads to a decrease of the volume of exhaust gases and dimension of gas cleaning system. This paper presents the plasma reactor for thermal processing of low and intermediate level radioactive waste of mixed morphology. The equipment realizes plasma-pyrolytic conversion of wastes and results in a conditioned product in a single stage. As a result, the volume of conditioned waste is significantly reduced (more than 10 times). Waste is converted into an environmentally friendly form that suits long-term storage. The leaching rate of macro-components from the vitrified compound is less than 1.10{sup -7} g/(cm{sup 2}.day). (authors)

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Cs absorption capacity and selectivity of crystalline and amorphous Hf and Zr phosphates

Removal of radioactive Cs from sodium-rich solutions is a technical challenge that goes back to post World War II nuclear waste storage and treatment; and interest in this topic was reinvigorated by the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant disaster, 10 years ago. Since the 1960's there has been considerable focus on layered Zr phosphates as robust inorganic sorbents for separation of radionuclides such as Cs. Here we present synthesis and characterization, and direct comparison of Cs sorption capacity and selectivity of four related materials: 1) crystalline α-Zr phosphate and α-Hf phosphate, and 2) amorphous analogues of these. Powder X-ray diffraction, thermogravimetry, solid-state 31P magic angle spinning nuclear magnetic resonance (MAS-NMR) spectroscopy, and compositional analysis (inductively coupled plasma optical emission spectroscopy and mass spectroscopy, ICP OES and ICP MS) provided formulae; respectively M(HPO4)2∙1H2O and M(HPO4)2∙4H2O (M = Hf, Zr) for crystalline and amorphous analogues. Maximum Cs loading, competitive Cs-Na selectivity and maximum Cs-Na loading followed by the above characterizations plus 133Cs MAS-NMR spectroscopy revealed that amorphous analogues are considerably better Cs-sorbents (based on maximum Cs-loading and selectivity over Na) than the well-studied crystalline Zr-analogue. Additionally, crystalline α-Hf phosphate is better Cs-sorbent than crystalline α-Zr phosphate. All these studies consistently show that Hf phosphate is less crystallize than Zr phosphate, when obtained under similar or identical synthesis conditions. We attribute this to lower solubility of Hf phosphate compared to Zr phosphate, preventing ‘defect healing’ during the synthesis process.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

The united kingdom's changing requirements for spent fuel storage

The UK is adopting an open fuel cycle, and is necessarily moving to a regime of long term storage of spent fuel, followed by geological disposal once a geological disposal facility (GDF) is available. The earliest GDF receipt date for legacy spent fuel is assumed to be 2075. The UK is set to embark on a programme of new nuclear build to maintain a nuclear energy contribution of 16 GW. Additionally, the UK are considering a significant expansion of nuclear energy in order to meet carbon reduction targets and it is plausible to foresee a scenario where up to 75 GW from nuclear power production could be deployed in the UK by the mid 21. century. Such an expansion, could lead to spent fuel storage and its disposal being a dominant issue for the UK Government, the utilities and the public. If the UK were to transition a closed fuel cycle, then spent fuel storage should become less onerous depending on the timescales. The UK has demonstrated a preference for wet storage of spent fuel on an interim basis. The UK has adopted an approach of centralised storage, but a 16 GW new build programme and any significant expansion of this may push the UK towards distributed spent fuel storage at a number of reactors station sites across the UK.

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Maintenance of Maywood Laboratory Operations Support During Contractor Transition and Replacement of the Project Databases - 16329

In December 2013, Cabrera Services (Cabrera) executed transition of the FUSRAP Maywood Superfund Site remediation project operations, including an on-site accredited environmental lab, from a large business that had established technology infrastructure in place for over a decade which required updating to support the expected remediation scope and client needs. As of November 2015, Cabrera has shipped over 116,000 yd{sup 3} of contaminated soil to disposal facilities. During the transition, the USACE FUSRAP Maywood Laboratory (UFML) continued to support project operations, providing the expected timely and reliable results and maintaining their New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection certification for all parameters of concern, while having to cope with new challenges and additional tasks having the potential to disrupt the laboratory's ability to support project operations. This case study examines the challenges with maintaining a certified radiochemistry laboratory and an aggressive remediation schedule during a period of prime contractor transition which included a complete IT infrastructure overhaul, and conversion of the existing Microsoft Access laboratory database and project Electronic Data Management System (EDMS) to a customized commercial solution. Challenges: I. Procurement of a new database subcontractor and working closely with them to achieve the following: a. Migration of all environmental (including radiological, chemical, and quality control), health and safety, and spatial data as well as reports, queries, and analytical instrument software processes from a MS Access data management system to a SQL server system; and b. Verification that the functionality and data integrity of the databases remained intact. II. The onsite laboratory was changed over to a new onsite network and the following tasks were completed with little or no interruption to site operations by January 10, 2014: i. Installation of new instrument personal computers (PCs) and making them fully operational; ii. Configuration of the lab domain and server to host the LIMS (replaced all servers/domain/workstations with Windows 7 and Server 2012 machines). iii. Networking of the laboratory building into the rest of the project site via fiber optic cabling across the site. iv. Upgrade of the wide area network (WAN) data connection to high-speed Fiber Optic service; v. Upgrade of the telephones into voice over internet protocol (VOIP) phones. vi. Splitting of the database into front ends and a centralized back-end hosted on the new server to allow simultaneous access for fixes and improvements. III. Phone service interruption; phone systems were operational by January 10, 2014. Additional Tasks: I. Revision of the USACE FUSRAP Maywood Laboratory (UFML) Quality Systems Manual Rev. 1 Submitted 01/16/14; II. Writing of the Uniform Federal Policy Quality Assurance Project Plan Rev. 1 (UFP-QAPP) submitted 1/21/14. This document replaced the prior project data quality plan, the Chemical Data Quality Management Plan. III. Support of USACE communications to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) on lab management and personnel transition to Cabrera. This work was important since it ensured a smooth transition and shows how critical project records infrastructure such as databases, can be upgraded with minimal interruption of project support. Such work may provide benefit to other similar projects, especially long term projects where database infrastructure upgrades may be beneficial in terms of improved efficiencies in data recording and transfer, and improved security in data storage. (authors)

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A study of transfer of UNF from non-disposable canisters - 15388

A study was performed by AREVA and URS for the Department of Energy (DOE) [1] to establish optimal methods for the opening of dry storage canisters (DSC) and the subsequent repackaging of used nuclear fuel (UNF) from the DSCs into generic standard transportation, aging, and disposal canisters (STADs) in wet or dry environments at reactor, consolidated storage, or repository sites. Eight dry and wet cutting technologies were evaluated: (1) skiving; (2) milling; (3) arc gouging/plasma torch; (4) cutting wheel; (5) diamond cable cutting; (6) laser cutting; (7) sawing; and (8) electrical discharge machining. The evaluated UNF repackaging technologies options included: (1) wet transfer in a pool; (2) dry transfer in a dry transfer system (DTS); (3) dry transfer in a fixed hot cell (FHC); (4) dry transfer in a mobile hot cell (MHC), and (5) a hybrid approach utilizing wet transfer in a pool and dry transfer in a FHC. A systems engineering evaluation was utilized for ranking the eight viable cutting options and the five different repackaging approaches for each of the sites. The systems engineering evaluation took into account six criteria (i.e., life cycle costs, worker dose, operational efficiency, technical maturity, ease of licensing, and waste generation) and performed a qualitative pairwise ranking of their relative importance to one another. Then quantitative or qualitative factors associated with each criterion (e.g., cost in millions of dollars, relative ease of licensing, etc.) for each option at each location (reactor, consolidated storage facility [CSF], repository) were developed based on historical experience, existing design studies, current 'state-of-the art', and/or engineering judgment. Using this input, the systems engineering evaluation identified dry skiving as the preferred cutting technology, with the wheel cutting technology in either a dry or wet environment identified as a promising technology that, with some RD and D, could mature to a better option (depending also on the disposition of the used DSC). For a reactor and a CSF/repository site, the systems engineering evaluation ranked the repackaging option using the skiving dry cutting technique and wet transfer of UNF in a pool as the highest option. However for a CSF and a repository site, the team recommended the hybrid option using the skiving dry cutting technique and both dry and wet transfer of UNF in a pool and FHC as a potentially better option (providing specific benefits such as higher throughput and more flexibility in operation). (authors)

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Results of Modeling and Simulation Support to Specia Nuclear Material Handling Facility Operations - 16053

Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS) is the sole designer and provider of nuclear powered aircraft carriers and one of only two companies in the United States to build nuclear powered submarines. As part of the upkeep of aircraft carriers, the ships return to NNS once in their lifetime for a complex overhaul and to be refueled. In support of overhaul operations NNS maintains a state of the art Special Nuclear Material (SNM) handling facility. Due to the complex nature of the operations that occur within this facility, during the design and initial operation of the building NNS developed a facility simulation model to provide decision support during the project planning and operational phases. This tool allows users to experiment with process times, process order, equipment utilization, personnel utilization and spatial utilization. By capturing the planned operations, time distributions for operations, equipment sizes and uses and personnel requirements, the tool accurately reflects the planned use of the facility. This realism allows the user to experiment with any aspect of the facility, in a controlled and cost effective space, and determine how changes or potential delays may impact overall facility operations. Thus the model allows for rapid exploration of multiple scenarios to determine likely outcomes, allowing a user to identify risks well ahead of their realization and explore mitigation strategies in a controlled space, to determine the ideal path forward. The tool was successful during the initial operation of the facility in helping to identify and mitigate risks related to the complex operations occurring during SNM handling. The tool is now in use to support planning for the next series of operations that will occur within the facility. The initial operations the model supported occurred during the deactivation of the USS Enterprise, and future operation will focus on the overhaul of Nimitz class aircraft carriers. The NNS planning team is currently using the tool to assess potential risks and challenges that are identified as potentially impacting the schedule and timelines for these overhaul processes. In addition, the NNS development team is working to add new operational steps to the model, capturing work that is occurring near the facility, but which directly impacts the facilities operational abilities. In conjuncture with the engineering planning division, the NNS development team has run over 20 complex scenarios through the tool. The team has provided output from these scenarios to both NNS personnel and government representatives. To date the model has successfully supported the identification of several feasible paths to incorporate new processes, dictated by the work to support a overhaul vs a deactivation. The model also provides a spatial arrangement component that allows users to experiment with different equipment placement within the facility. Due to the fidelity of the model, arranging equipment with the spatial component allows a user to set up the facility in an experimental layout and run the processes inside the facility to determine if the layout will be feasible, or if it would impact operational capabilities. Additionally, the spatial component allows for visual collaboration between stakeholders to ensure all operational personnel are aware of the current and planned layout, and that they do not locate equipment or work stations in locations that would interfere with facility operations. The spatial component, in combination with the simulation component, has resulted in several documented improvements in process. These include: the identification of additional equipment which could be stored outside the facility, without impacting operations, to increase space; confirmation of the ideal placement of a large water tank; and identification of several risks related to planned equipment storage area, allowing the team to develop new plans and avoid realizing the risk. (authors)

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Environmental cleanup of the East Tennessee Technology Park - Year three - A status report - 15522

On August 1, 2011, URS - CH2M Oak Ridge LLC (UCOR) began its five-year, $1.4 billion cleanup of the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP), the former Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, located on the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Oak Ridge Reservation (Reservation) in Tennessee. Under the contract, the base period scope of work to be completed by 2016 includes demolition of both the K-25 and K-31 gaseous diffusion buildings and all demolition waste dispositioned, initiation of demolition on the remaining K-27 gaseous diffusion building, safe storage of transuranic (TRU) waste for eventual transfer to the Transuranic Waste Processing Center, previously designated -No-Path-To-Disposition Waste- dispositioned to the extent possible, and completion of design and engineering of a mercury treatment system to be installed at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12). UCOR will have also managed DOE Oak Ridge Office of Environmental Management (OREM)-owned facilities at ETTP, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), and Y-12 in a safe and cost-effective manner. Since assuming responsibilities as the ETTP and Oak Ridge Reservation cleanup contractor, UCOR has completed its life-cycle Performance Measurement Baseline; received its Earned Value Management System (EVMS) certification; completed the deactivation and demolition (D and D) of the 44-acre K-25 gaseous diffusion building; removed and disposed of a contaminated underground storage tank (Tank W-1A) at ORNL; dispositioned mercury-contaminated storage tanks at Y-12; completed closure of the Toxic Substances Control Act Incinerator; disposed of more than 158,000 cubic yards of cleanup waste while managing the on-site Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF); and conducted operations, surveillance, and maintenance activities at 180 DOE EM facilities at ETTP, ORNL, and Y-12 in a safe and cost-effective manner. In 2014, UCOR completed the removal and disposal of all of the K-25 demolition debris; completed the removal of asbestos-laden transite siding on the K-31 gaseous diffusion building and began demolition of that 17-acre building; advanced the characterization and deactivation of the K-27 gaseous diffusion building, readying the building for the start of demolition in 2015; advanced the design and engineering of a Mercury Treatment Facility to be located at Y-12; continued the cost-effective and safe disposition of all cleanup wastes; and readied ETTP for Voluntary Protection Program Star Status Assessment in 2015. Project performance as of December 31, 2014, continued to be excellent: - Cost Performance Index - 1.12 - Schedule Performance Index - 1.02 At the same time, since safety is the foundation of all cleanup work, UCOR's safety record goes hand-in-hand with its excellent project performance. Through calendar year 2014, UCOR's recordable injury rate was 1.04 occurrences per 200,000 work hours, and the lost workday case rate was 0.52. This performance continues to be due, in large part, to the people and processes URS and CH2M HILL, the parent companies of UCOR, brought to the project. Key enablers included: - Selected and deployed experienced staff in key leadership positions throughout the organization, continually re-energizing the organization with new leaders - Implemented previously successful safety programs and initiatives from other DOE sites, such as DOE's Voluntary Protection Program - Brought fresh thinking and innovation to tackling tough project issues, such as the deactivation of the Technetium-99-contaminated areas of K-27, applying lessons learned from the D and D of K-25; and implementing a -waste factory- approach to cleanup - Maintained continuing alignment between UCOR's contract with DOE and its Performance Measurement Baseline - rapidly addressing contract changes when they arose - Maintained a readiness both from a process as well as experienced personnel perspective to support DOE OREM in performing other significant Oak Ridge Reservation cleanup activities. (authors)

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Test for Reconditioning RA Waste with Simulated Bitumen and Concrete in a 1,2 MW Plasma Test Facility - 20092

The operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants, the non nuclear fuel cycle, etc generate low-level radioactive waste which, along with the historical radioactive waste from past nuclear activities, needs to be treated and stored, awaiting final disposal. Plasma technology offers a very effective way of treating this waste with a high volume reduction factor (VRF), free from organics, liquids and moisture, and meets without a doubt the acceptance criteria for safe storage and disposal. By means of a plasma beam of approximately 5000 deg. C, the inorganic materials are melted into a glassy slag, containing most of the radioactive isotopes while the organic material is gasified, oxidized and purified in an off-gas cleaning system. First the paper describes the new full-scale Plasma Melting Facility (PMF) at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant in Bulgaria which was taken in nuclear operation In May 2018. The plant has a capacity of 250 tons per year and the maximum contact dose rates of the incoming waste is 2 mSv/h. Different mixtures of radioactive waste packed in 200 l drums were successfully treated resulting in a glassy slag free from liquids and organic material with an important volume reduction factor (VRF). The Project was co-financed through a grant by Kozloduy International Decommissioning fund (KIDSF) administrated by the EBRD through Bulgarian national funding. Plasma is a suitable technology for treatment of problematic waste or even reconditioning waste so Belgoprocess was contracted to do plasma tests with simulated conditioned waste types. One can do tests on a laboratory scale on smaller samples and torch capacities of e.g. 50 kW but Belgoprocess wanted to do more realistic and reliable tests. So Belgoprocess contracted Phoenix Solutions Co who has a full-scope test facility equipped with a 1200 kW plasma torch for full-scope treatment of simulated conditioned waste. For a first confidential contract simulated 200 l (55 gallon) bitumen drums were treated. The drums contained different pucks of compacted waste such as rags, used filters, granulates, etc. The pucks were stacked in the 200 l drums and subsequently embedded with bitumen. A total of 6 drums were treated in the plasma facility. For a second contract simulated homogeneous 200 l (55 gallon) concrete drums with on the one hand concentrates and on the other hand spent resins were selected. A total of 6 drums with concrete and spent resins were treated and melted in the plasma testing facility. The paper describe the test facility, volume reduction factor (VRF) of different waste streams and most important parameters. (authors)

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