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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 1,423 records · Page 79
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2008

Navigation Ground Data System Engineering for the Cassini/Huygens Mission

The launch of the Cassini/Huygens mission on October 15, 1997, began a seven year journey across the solar system that culminated in the entry of the spacecraft into Saturnian orbit on June 30, 2004. Cassini/Huygens Spacecraft Navigation is the result of a complex interplay between several teams within the Cassini Project, performed on the Ground Data System. The work of Spacecraft Navigation involves rigorous requirements for accuracy and completeness carried out often under uncompromising critical time pressures. To support the Navigation function, a fault-tolerant, high-reliability/high-availability computational environment was necessary to support data processing. Configuration Management (CM) was integrated with fault tolerant design and security engineering, according to the cornerstone principles of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. Integrated with this approach are security benchmarks and validation to meet strict confidence levels. In addition, similar approaches to CM were applied in consideration of the staffing and training of the system administration team supporting this effort. As a result, the current configuration of this computational environment incorporates a secure, modular system, that provides for almost no downtime during tour operations.

Beswick, R. M.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Fire Analysis of the Thomas Fire in California Using NASA Data in a GIS

These maps are an analysis of the Thomas Fire that occurred in California during December 2017. Using a variety of NASA Earth science data from five National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) sources (including four Earth Observing System Data and Information System Distributed Active Archive Centers and NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System), as well as ancillary data from Ventura County, Santa Barbara County, and the Department of Homeland Security, this analysis sought to identify forest fire risk zones, create a fire occurrence density map, examine the vegetation and subsequent burn scar, capture the affected parcels, and capture the affected vegetation.

Bagwell, Ross↗
DOE OSTI2012

Resilient Control System Execution Agent (ReCoSEA)

In an increasingly networked world, critical infrastructure systems suffer from two types of vulnerability. The first is the traditionally recognized problem of monitoring the systems for faults and failures, recognizing and analyzing data, and responding with real understanding to the problems of the system. Increasingly complex systems create the opportunity for single points of failure to cascade when inaccurate assessment of system health increases response time or leads to faulty analysis of the problems involved. A second problem involves vulnerability to cyber intrusion, in which bad actors can mask system deterioration or present false data about system status. A resilient system will protect stability, efficiency, and security. To ensure these three states, the system must react to changing conditions within the system with coordination: no one component of the system can be allowed to react to problems without real consideration of the effects of that action on other components within the system. Systems with multi-agent design typically have three layers of action, a management layer, a coordination layer, and an execution layer. A resilient multi-agent system will emphasize functions of the execution layer, which has the responsibility of initiating actions, monitoring, analyzing, and controlling its own processes, while feeding information back to the higher levels of management and coordination. The design concept of a resilient control system execution agent (ReCoSEA) grows out of these underpinnings, and through the use of computational intelligence techniques, this paper suggests an associated design methodology.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2012

ORNL Automated-In-Motion Evaluation Environment (AIMVEE) User Training and Testing Materials - U.S. Copyright TXu 1-797-273

The AIMVEE/WIM system electronically retrieves deployment information, identifies vehicle automatically, and determines total weight, individual wheel weight, individual axle weights, axle spacing, and center-of-balance for any wheeled vehicle in motion. The AIMVEE/WIM system can also perform these functions statically for both wheel vehicles and cargo with information. The AIMVEE/WIM system incorporates digital images and applies cubing algorithms to determine length, width, height for cubic dimensions of both vehicle and cargo. Once all this information is stored, it electronically links to data collection and dissemination systems to provide actual weight and measurement information for planning, deployment, and in-transit visibility. The Static Scale Conversion (SSC) system is an unique enhancement to the AIMVEE/WIM system. It enables a SSC to weigh and measure vehicles and cargo dynamically (i.e., as they pass over the large scale and is included in the AIMVEE computer code base. The material copyrighted is the ORNL Automated-In-Motion Vehicle Evaluation Environment (AIMVEE)/Weigh-In-Motion User Training and Testing material. It includes instructional material in the set-up, operation and tear-down of the AIMVEE/WIM system. It also includes a final exam associated with the training.

Automated-in-Motion Evaluation Environment (AIMVEE↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber Resilient Design and Controls for Energy Systems

As the grid of today is evolving into a highly distributed and autonomous cyber-physical system with higher penetration of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) and autonomous controls that are dependent on the cyber infrastructure, there are novel and increasing challenges to cyber-resilient operation of the grid. While the traditional mechanisms take a "bolt on" approach to cybersecurity and resiliency, this talk presents two novel technologies developed at NREL that "bake in" security and resilience into the design and control of the grid. An Adaptive Resilience Metrics framework is a novel mechanism for system owners and operators to understand the impact of cyber and physical system design and topology on the resilient operation, while also helping determine optimal policies in response to adverse cyber events. Along with that a zero-knowledge proof-based technique helps incorporate security into the controls layer by focusing on computational integrity rather than data integrity. By leveraging design and control properties unique to Operational Technology systems these technologies will not only help enhance cyber-resilience for the grid of today, but a highly distributed and autonomous grid of tomorrow.

cyber resilience↗
DOE OSTI2025

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Workshop 2 – Prioritizing Digital Assurance Challenges, Session 2

The second session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort, held on November 10, 2025, focused on prioritizing digital assurance challenges at the intersection of data centers and the electric grid. Building on the foundational concepts introduced in Workshop 1, this session deepened the application of the Threat–Vulnerability–Consequence (TVC) framework and emphasized the urgency of addressing cybersecurity, supply chain integrity, and operational reliability. Participants explored the growing convergence of digital and physical systems, the expanding attack surface due to global supply chain dependencies, and the implications of AI-driven load behavior. Real-world incidents—including the Volt Typhoon campaign and vulnerabilities in Solarman and Deye platforms—were analyzed to illustrate the risks of unpatched systems, insecure APIs, and inadequate vendor oversight. Key themes included architecture and interface weaknesses, governance gaps, and human and procedural shortcomings. The workshop also examined the evolving regulatory landscape, highlighting new federal mandates around Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) compliance and large-load reliability standards. Through interactive exercises, stakeholders ranked and mapped digital assurance risks from their respective perspectives—utilities, operators, and vendors—laying the groundwork for mitigation strategies and shared accountability models to be developed in Workshop 3. Session 2 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2016

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 413: Clean Slate II Plutonium Dispersion (TTR) Tonopah Test Range, Nevada (Rev. 1)

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 413 is located on the Tonopah Test Range, which is approximately 130 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada, and approximately 40 miles southeast of Tonopah, Nevada. The CAU 413 site consists of the release of radionuclides to the surface and shallow subsurface from the conduct of the Clean Slate II (CSII) storage–transportation test conducted on May 31, 1963. CAU 413 includes one corrective action site (CAS), TA-23-02CS (Pu Contaminated Soil). The known releases at CAU 413 are the result of the atmospheric deposition of contamination from the 1963 CSII test. The CSII test was a non-nuclear detonation of a nuclear device located inside a reinforced concrete bunker covered with 2 feet of soil. This test dispersed radionuclides, primarily plutonium, on the ground surface. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 413 will be evaluated based on information collected from a corrective action investigation (CAI). The investigation is based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on June 17, 2015, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; the U.S. Air Force; and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 413. The CAI will include radiological surveys, geophysical surveys, collection and analyses of soil samples, and assessment of investigation results. The collection of soil samples will be accomplished using both probabilistic and judgmental sampling approaches. To facilitate site investigation and the evaluation of DQO decisions, the releases at CAU 413 have been divided into seven study groups.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2016

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 414: Clean Slate III Plutonium Dispersion (TTR) Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision 1

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 414 is located on the Tonopah Test Range, which is approximately 130 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada, and approximately 40 miles southeast of Tonopah, Nevada. The CAU 414 site consists of the release of radionuclides to the surface and shallow subsurface from the conduct of the Clean Slate III (CSIII) storage–transportation test conducted on June 9, 1963. CAU 414 includes one corrective action site (CAS), TA-23-03CS (Pu Contaminated Soil). The known releases at CAU 414 are the result of the atmospheric dispersal of contamination from the 1963 CSIII test. The CSIII test was a nonnuclear detonation of a nuclear device located inside a reinforced concrete bunker covered with 8 feet of soil. This test dispersed radionuclides, primarily uranium and plutonium, on the ground surface. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 414 will be evaluated based on information collected from a corrective action investigation (CAI). The investigation is based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on June 7, 2016, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; the U.S. Air Force; and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective action alternatives for CAU 414.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

WISP: Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies (Final Technical Report)

The complex interdependencies of cyber systems (sensors and communications), physical grids and associated electricity market operations make protecting electric power grids a significant challenge. The energy sector is constantly under new, targeted, advanced and dangerous cyber-attacks that have the potential to result in the loss of human life. These threats are further exacerbated by our need to modernize the grid. One focus of cyber security research in smart grids is the securing of the SCADA system through advanced intrusion detection systems (IDS) and bad data detection algorithms in state estimation. These methods either require full knowledge of the system topology and parameters or fail to understand the physical behaviors under attack. WISP (Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies) is designed to provide additional protection to the power grid using only publicly available data. In particular, WISP exploits the spatio-temporal nature of the real time locational marginal prices (LMPs), in conjunction with other information such as bids, weather, outages and load data to analyze anomalous power pricing behaviors and then correlate those observations to localize regions of interest and identify potential cyber events. WISP is non-intrusive as the tool is deployed as a service in the Cloud or on premise and provides reliable information to system operators for enhanced situational awareness, without impeding energy delivery functions. The WISP technology comprises three modules: the data-driven anomaly detection core, the vulnerability and risk analysis and the root cause analysis. The data-driven anomaly detection core performs the tasks of feature selection, anomaly detection and attack region localization. The vulnerability and risk analysis module provides system level information of the vulnerable variables and times, assisting the operators in selecting monitoring and protection nodes. The root cause analysis module takes the detection results and identifies potential operational conditions that contribute to the detected anomalies. In Phase I, we have demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of WISP. We developed a realistic electricity market simulator capable of generating normal and attack market data under various operational conditions. We developed a series of cyber-attack detection and analysis algorithms and evaluated them under multiple data sources. Finally, we integrated all modules into an end-to-end software, providing functions for data management, data analytics and visualization. Specifically, we have achieved: (i) real-time data acceptance from external utility interfaces with >99% acceptance rate; (ii) high performance anomaly detection algorithms with >98% detection accuracy and <0.1% false alarm rate; and (iii) ultra-low computing delay <50 milliseconds. Additionally, our team developed algorithms to identify the vulnerable variables in electricity market operations and root cause analysis functions to identify major contributors to the price spikes. These ancillary modules are necessary when deploying WISP in real world industry environment. In Phase II, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of WISP software on realistic largescale power systems. We performed red team testing for the Phase I WISP software and identified software vulnerabilities and implemented corresponding mitigation solutions. We adapted the electricity market simulator for the Texas synthetic 2000-bus system and generated datasets for the false data injection attacks. We created database and visualization interfaces for the Texas system and the ISO New England system. We performed software optimization in terms of operation efficiency, computing speed and detection accuracy. Finally, we tested the software on the Texas system and the ISO New England system and evaluated the detection performance. Overall, we achieved above 89% detection rate, below 3% false alarm rate and below 37 seconds of end-to-end detection delay.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRS2016

Secure Mass Measurements From Transit Timing: 10 Kepler Exoplanets Between 3 and 8M⊕ with Diverse Densities and Incident Fluxes

We infer dynamical masses in eight multiplanet systems using transit times measured from Keplerʼs complete dataset, including short-cadence data where available. Of the 18 dynamical masses that we infer, 10 pass multiple tests for robustness. These are in systems Kepler-26 (KOI-250), Kepler-29 (KOI-738), Kepler-60 (KOI-2086), Kepler-105 (KOI-115), and Kepler-307 (KOI-1576). Kepler -105 c has a radius of 1.3R⊕ and a density consistent with an Earth-like composition. Strong transit timing variation (TTV) signals were detected from additional planets, but their inferred masses were sensitive to outliers or consistent solutions could not be found with independently measured transit times, including planets orbiting Kepler-49 (KOI-248), Kepler-57 (KOI-1270), Kepler-105 (KOI-115), and Kepler-177 (KOI-523). Nonetheless, strong upper limits on the mass of Kepler-177 cimply an extremely low density of 0.1 g cm−3. In most cases, individual orbital eccentricities were poorly constrained owing to degeneracies in TTV inversion. For five planet pairs in our sample, strong secular interactions imply a moderate to high likelihood of apsidal alignment over a wide range of possible eccentricities. We also find solutions for the three planets known to orbit Kepler-60 in a Laplace-like resonance chain. However, nonlibrating solutions also match the transit timing data. For six systems, we calculate more precise stellar parameters than previously known, enabling useful constraints on planetary densities where we have secure mass measurements. Placing these exoplanets on the mass–radius diagram, we find that a wide range of densities is observed among sub-Neptune-mass planets and that the range in observed densities is anticorrelated with incident flux.

Stars individual↗
DOE OSTI2023

AI-ENABLED MONITORING OPTIONS TOWARDS SECURE MICROREACTOR DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONS

Global nuclear energy deployment scenarios suggest favorable economics for smaller, more versatile, and self-contained reactor technologies. Recognizing their key features as integrated, autonomous and either semi-remotely operated or fully remotely operated systems, microreactors are expected to be deployed in large numbers servicing off/micro-grids, many in geographically remote locations. Integrated nature of these systems as well as ease of their transportation as complete units, simplified installation and relocation/decommissioning challenge traditional continuity-of-knowledge practices used for conventional light water reactors where refueling is done onsite at designated times only replacing portions of their cores and only after their full commissioning for operations including completion of their containment building with security and safeguards measures in place. This effort is exploring AI (artificial intelligence)-enabled monitoring options that would be design agnostic and would assure secure unit deployment and operations. The principle is to maintain situational awareness via real-time evaluations of simultaneous and remotely transmitted monitoring data capturing key safeguards attributes including such characteristics as temperature, radiation, vibrational signals (inter alia), and others. The key principle is to provide reliable and resilient security options while maintaining simplified and economical deployment. The paper will review feasible options for AI-enabled solutions for such evaluations.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2018

Assembled genomic and tissue-specific transcriptomic data resources for two genetically distinct lines of Cowpea (Vigna unguiculata (L.) Walp)

Cowpea (Vigna unguiculata (L.) Walp) is an important legume crop for food security in areas of low-input and smallholder farming throughout Africa and Asia. Genetic improvements are required to increase yield and resilience to biotic and abiotic stress and to enhance cowpea crop performance. An integrated cowpea genomic and gene expression data resource has the potential to greatly accelerate breeding and the delivery of novel genetic traits for cowpea. Extensive genomic resources for cowpea have been absent from the public domain; however, a recent early release reference genome for IT97K-499-35 (Vigna unguiculata v1.0, NSF, UCR, USAID, DOE-JGI, http://phytozome.jgi.doe.gov/) has now been established in a collaboration between the Joint Genome Institute (JGI) and University California (UC) Riverside. Here we release supporting genomic and transcriptomic data for IT97K-499-35 and a second transformable cowpea variety, IT86D-1010. The transcriptome resource includes six tissue-specific datasets for each variety, with particular emphasis on reproductive tissues that extend and support the V. unguiculata v1.0 reference. Annotations have been included in our resource to allow direct mapping to the v1.0 cowpea reference. Access to this resource provided here is supported by raw and assembled data downloads.

Spriggs, Andrew↗
DOE OSTI2012

Pre-Shot Simulations of Near-Field and Far-Field Ground Motion for the Source Physics Experiment (SPE) Explosions at the Climax Stock, Nevada National Security Site: SPE3

The Source Physics Experiment (SPE) is designed to improve ground motion prediction capabilities for underground nuclear testing through the development of new physics-based models together with validation via new chemical explosion data. The SPE shots consist of different size and depth chemical explosions in a granite borehole at the Climax Stock on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The third shot in the series (SPE3) will be the same size (1000 kg TNT equivalent) and depth (45 m canister centroid) as the previous shot (SPE2). The main purpose of the SPE3 is to investigate the effects of the damage zone caused by the SPE2 chemical explosion on the SPE3 explosion, keeping all other parameters (e.g. size, depth, explosive type) the same. This SPE3 pre-shot report addresses progress made in simulation of the expected wavefield in the both the near- and the far-field. In this report we consider the far-field to be where seismic wave motion can be characterized by elastic or visco-elastic approximations, in contrast to the near-field where other, often non-linear effects, play a major role. The current simulations build on previous work from the SPE1 and SPE2 shots. The simulations are intended to highlight differences between SPE2 and SPE3 using a variety to approximations intended to mimic the expected effect of the damage zone. The simplest physics of damage zone effects suggest changes in the source region material properties (density, velocity), and in the yield strength (coupling) of the rock, should both impact the far-field signal. We can illustrate this in a simplistic way for P-waves in Figure A using the empirical Mueller-Muphy (1971) far-field explosion model (MM). First if the SPE2 explosion-induced damage reduces velocities and densities without affecting the yield strength or coupling, then by energy conservation the amplitudes for SPE 3 would increase as shown in the top of Figure A. Similarly if the explosion induced damage increased density (say by compacting pore space) the amplitude would decrease. This impedance effect, where the product of the density, wave-velocity, and ground-velocity squared is conserved, is well known. The second and harder effect to quantify, are changes in the energy coupling or yield strength. In the simple MM model this is represented by the coupling factor between cavity radius and yield. If we assume the granite was slightly weakened by SPE2 such that the cavity radius increases slightly then the overall amplitudes of SPE3 decrease relative to SPE2 as shown in the bottom of Figure A. In reality both effects, may exist due to the damage zone, and furthermore we know they are interrelated in complex ways. For S-waves we expect even more complex effects due to motion on joints and faults. For this reason we are developing physics-based near field simulation models coupled to far-field propagation codes to predict the overall effects of changes in the source emplacement region on observed signals. Near-field simulations have been performed using the Eulerian code (GEODYN). An ensemble model, calibrated to match records from past large-scale nuclear events is used. Both 2D axisymmetric (no faults) and fully three-dimensional GEODYN calculations (with /without faults) were conducted in which the damage zones sustained by SPE2 are retained as the initial condition for the SPE3 calculations. The results indicate that the waveform peak amplitudes are slightly decayed since the ensemble model includes no softening mechanism. The pulse widths are reduced, indicating the energy is dissipated more by the damage zone as expected. The dominant motions calculated in all the scenarios are spherically symmetric and non-spherical components are small as seen for the SPE2 calculations. The arrival time of the SPE3 waveform at the boreholes is shorter than SPE2 due to compaction during the previous explosion. As shown in the SPE 1 and 2 observations shear waves are generated, indicating the potential contributions from the induced motion on distributed joints. The effects of joints are evaluated using the Lagrangian hydrocode (GEODYN-L), which was benchmarked against the GEODYN calculations for the ensemble model. A new granite model calibrated for samples from the SPE site is used. The new model includes effects of poroelasticity and water saturation and may be scaled allowing application to both small and large scales. Parametric tests were performed to evaluate the effect of joints within the granite and the results demonstrate that in situ joints introduce anisotropy and significant tangential motions.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

A comparison of machine learning methods to classify radioactive elements using prompt-gamma-ray neutron activation data

The detection of illicit radiological materials is critical to establishing a robust second line of defence in nuclear security. Neutron-capture prompt-gamma activation analysis (PGAA) can be used to detect multiple radioactive materials across the entire Periodic Table. However, long detection times and a high rate of false positives pose a significant hindrance in the deployment of PGAA-based systems to identify the presence of illicit substances in nuclear forensics. In the present work, six different machine-learning algorithms were developed to classify radioactive elements based on the PGAA energy spectra. The model performance was evaluated using standard classification metrics and trend curves with an emphasis on comparing the effectiveness of algorithms that are best suited for classifying imbalanced datasets. We analyse the classification performance based on Precision, Recall, F1-score, Specificity, Confusion matrix, ROC-AUC curves, and Geometric Mean Score (GMS) measures. The tree-based algorithms (Decision Trees, Random Forest and AdaBoost) have consistently outperformed Support Vector Machine and K-Nearest Neighbours. Based on the results presented, AdaBoost is the preferred classifier to analyse data containing PGAA spectral information due to the high recall and minimal false negatives reported in the minority class.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

AMS / BARC Joint Survey Addendum Technical Report

This report details the data analysis results from data collected during the September-October 2019 joint survey series between the Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Aerial Measuring System (AMS) asset, and the Government of India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). This joint survey series took place at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), areas of public land in Southern Nevada, and at the DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) Large Area Calibration Pads (LACP) at the Grand Junction Regional Airport in Grand Junction, CO. The data detailed in this report were gathered at the LACP. More details regarding the setup of these surveys and personnel involvement can be found in the AMS / BARC Joint Survey Summary Report. The data from the LACP collected by AMS are consistent with past data collection campaigns at the LACP. The AMS Bell 412 (B412) helicopter, equipped with both the standard AMS thallium-doped sodium iodide (NaI(Tl)) 2"x4"x16" 12-detector system and a subset of the BARC Aerial Gamma Spectroscopy System (AGSS) consisting of two independent 3"x3"cylindrical NaI(Tl) detectors, measured each of the five calibration pads for a minimum of 10 minutes. After the helicopter measurements, a pressurized ion chamber (PIC) was used to directly measure radiation exposure rates on each of the pads for a period 5 minutes. The geophysical calibration procedure published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Erdi-Krausz et al. 2003) was used to determine the spectral stripping sensitivity matrix for naturally occurring radiological material (NORM). The sensitivity matrix is consistent with the AMS long term average. Additionally, the PIC data was used to calibrate the AMS system for exposure rate. The results of the exposure rate analysis are also consistent with AMS long-term averages.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2025

DICER: A new instrument at LANSCE to constrain neutron capture rates on radionuclides

With very few exceptions, direct measurements of neutron capture rates on radionuclides have not been possible. A number of indirect methods have been pursued such as the surrogate method, the γ-ray strength function method, the Oslo method and the β-Oslo method. Substantial effort has been devoted to quantify the usually large systematic errors that accompany the results from these techniques. A new instrument has been developed at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) to provide more accurate data on several radionuclides relevant to nuclear criticality safety, radiochemical diagnostics, astrophysics, nuclear forensics and nuclear security, by measuring the transmission of neutrons through radioactive samples and studying resonance properties. The Device for Indirect Capture on Radionuclides (DICER) and associated radionuclide production at the Isotope Production Facility (IPF), both at LANSCE, as well radioactive sample fabrication, have been under development the last few years. A description of the new apparatus, data on a few mid-weight stable isotopes and efforts on radionuclide measurements will be presented.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2011

Fuzzy Logic Based Anomaly Detection for Embedded Network Security Cyber Sensor

Resiliency and security in critical infrastructure control systems in the modern world of cyber terrorism constitute a relevant concern. Developing a network security system specifically tailored to the requirements of such critical assets is of a primary importance. This paper proposes a novel learning algorithm for anomaly based network security cyber sensor together with its hardware implementation. The presented learning algorithm constructs a fuzzy logic rule based model of normal network behavior. Individual fuzzy rules are extracted directly from the stream of incoming packets using an online clustering algorithm. This learning algorithm was specifically developed to comply with the constrained computational requirements of low-cost embedded network security cyber sensors. The performance of the system was evaluated on a set of network data recorded from an experimental test-bed mimicking the environment of a critical infrastructure control system.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗