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Quantitative Risk Analysis

The US energy sector is vulnerable to multiple hazards including both natural disasters and malicious attacks from an intelligent adversary. The question that utility owners, operators and regulators face is how to prioritize their investments to mitigate the risks from a hazard that can have the most impact on the asset of interest. In order to be able to understand their risk landscape and develop a prioritized mitigation strategy, they must quantify risk in a consistent way across all hazards their asset is facing. Without being able to quantitatively measure risk, it is not possible to defensibly prioritize security investments or evaluate trade-offs between security and functionality. Development of a methodology that will consistently measure and quantify risk across different hazards is needed.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Implementation Aspects of Smart Grids Cyber-Security Cross-Layered Framework for Critical Infrastructure Operation

Communication networks in power systems are a major part of the smart grid paradigm. It enables and facilitates the automation of power grid operation as well as self-healing in contingencies. Such dependencies on communication networks, though, create a roam for cyber-threats. An adversary can launch an attack on the communication network, which in turn reflects on power grid operation. Attacks could be in the form of false data injection into system measurements, flooding the communication channels with unnecessary data, or intercepting messages. Using machine learning-based processing on data gathered from communication networks and the power grid is a promising solution for detecting cyber threats. In this paper, a co-simulation of cyber-security for cross-layer strategy is presented. The advantage of such a framework is the augmentation of valuable data that enhances the detection as well as identification of anomalies in the operation of the power grid. The framework is implemented on the IEEE 118-bus system. The system is constructed in Mininet to simulate a communication network and obtain data for analysis. A distributed three controller software-defined networking (SDN) framework is proposed that utilizes the Open Network Operating System (ONOS) cluster. According to the findings of our suggested architecture, it outperforms a single SDN controller framework by a factor of more than ten times the throughput. This provides for a higher flow of data throughout the network while decreasing congestion caused by a single controller’s processing restrictions. Furthermore, our CECD-AS approach outperforms state-of-the-art physics and machine learning-based techniques in terms of attack classification. The performance of the framework is investigated under various types of communication attacks.

cross-layered↗

Resilient Observer Design for Cyber-Physical Systems with Data-Driven Measurement Pruning

Resilient observer design for Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) in the presence of adversarial false data injection attacks (FDIA) is an active area of research. The existing state-of-the-art algorithms tend to break down as more and more knowledge of the system is built into the attack model; also as the percentage of attacked nodes increases. From the view of optimization theory, the problem is often cast as a classical error correction problem for which a theoretical limit of has been established as the maximum percentage attacked nodes for which state recovery is guaranteed. Beyond this limit, the performance of -minimization based schemes, for instance, deteriorates rapidly. Similar performance degradation occurs for other types of resilient observers beyond certain percentages of attacked nodes. In order to increase the corresponding percentage of attacked nodes for which state recoveries can be guaranteed, researchers have begun to incorporate prior information into the underlying resilient observer design framework. For the most pragmatic cases, this prior information is often obtained through a data-driven machine learning process. Existing results have shown a strong positive correlation between the maximum attacked percentages that can be tolerated and the accuracy of the data-driven model. Motivated by these results, this chapter examines the case for pruning algorithms designed to improve the Positive Prediction Value (PPV) of the resulting prior information, given stochastic uncertainty characteristics of the underlying machine learning model. Theoretical quantification of the achievable improvement is given. Simulation results show that the pruning algorithm significantly increases the maximum correctable percentage of attacked nodes, even for machine learning model whose prediction power is comparable to the random flip of a coin.

Resilient Observer, Cyber-physical Systems, Data-D↗

Autonomous Tools for Attack Surface Reduction

The electric power grid is a complex critical infrastructure that forms the lifeline of modern society, and its secure and reliable operation is of paramount importance to national security and economic well being. However, recent findings documented in authoritative sources indicate the threat of cyber-based attacks growing in numbers and sophistication. However, securing the grid against stealthy cyber attacks is a challenging task due to legacy nature of the infrastructure coupled with dynamic nature of threat landscape and ever growing sophistication of the adversaries. Additionally, the grid’s attack surface continues to grow with the increased dependence on digital communications and control that now extends to each consumer through smart meters and distributed energy resources. Unfortunately, this expansive surface increases the grid’s vulnerability and further exposes critical control systems in both substations and control centers. To respond to this emerging need, we had successfully assembled an interdisciplinary team with academic- industry partnership to successfully conduct research, development, evaluation, demonstration, and commercialization of attack surface reduction tools, whose goal is to significantly reduce the cyber attack surface in the North American power grid. Our proposed project was a synergistic collaborative effort leveraging the synergistic expertise of the team members across power systems, cyber security and CPS security, testbeds, field deployments and demonstration, and successful commercialization. The team consisted of leading experts from two major universities – Iowa State University, Washington State University – complemented by reputed researchers from two DOE national laboratories – Pacific Northwest National Lab, and Argonne National Lab, one major utility vendor GE Global Research, and one utility partner – Cedar Falls Utilities (CFU). The team members have proven track record of successful academic-industry collaboration in interdisciplinary R&D projects, and bring onboard some of the best state-of-the-art testbed resources, industry-grade SCADA/EMS/DMS environment for experimentation and field demonstration.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

A comparison of approximate reasoning results using information uncertainty

An Approximate Reasoning (AR) model is a useful alternative to a probabilistic model when there is a need to draw conclusions from information that is qualitative. For certain systems, much of the information available is elicited from subject matter experts (SME). One such example is the risk of attack on a particular facility by a pernicious adversary. In this example there are several avenues of attack, i.e. scenarios, and AR can be used to model the risk of attack associated with each scenario. The qualitative information available and provided by the SME is comprised of linguistic values which are well suited for an AR model but meager for other modeling approaches. AR models can produce many competing results. Associated with each competing AR result is a vector of linguistic values and a respective degree of membership in each value. A suitable means to compare and segregate AR results would be an invaluable tool to analysts and decisions makers. A viable method would be to quantify the information uncertainty present in each AR result then use the measured quantity comparatively. One issue of concern for measuring the infornlation uncertainty involved with fuzzy uncertainty is that previously proposed approaches focus on the information uncertainty involved within the entire fuzzy set. This paper proposes extending measures of information uncertainty to AR results, which involve only one degree of membership for each fuzzy set included in the AR result. An approach to quantify the information uncertainty in the AR result is presented.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Autonomous Tools for Attack Surface Reduction (Final Report)

The electric power grid is a complex critical infrastructure that forms the lifeline of modern society, and its secure and reliable operation is of paramount importance to national security and economic wellbeing. However, recent findings documented in authoritative sources indicate the threat of cyber-based attacks growing in numbers and sophistication. However, securing the grid against stealthy cyberattacks is a challenging task due to legacy nature of the infrastructure coupled with dynamic nature of threat landscape and ever-growing sophistication of the adversaries. Additionally, the grid’s attack surface continues to grow with the increased dependence on digital communications and control that now extends to each consumer through smart meters and distributed energy resources. Unfortunately, this expansive surface increases the grid’s vulnerability and further exposes critical control systems in both substations and control centers. To respond to this emerging need, we had successfully assembled an interdisciplinary team with academic- industry partnership to successfully conduct research, development, evaluation, demonstration, and commercialization of attack surface reduction tools, whose goal was to significantly reduce the cyber attack surface in the North American power grid. Our proposed project was a synergistic collaborative effort leveraging the synergistic expertise of the team members across power systems, cyber security and CPS security, testbeds, field deployments and demonstration, and successful commercialization. The following are the specific tasks that have been successfully completed two phases (2016-2020). Phase I: Task 1: Developed and implemented a robust Project Management and Data Management Plan, coupled with a well thought out Risk Mitigation Plan. Task 2.1: Developed a comprehensive framework that continually assesses and autonomously reduces the attack surface for the power grid control environment spanning across substations, control center and the SCADA network to significantly reduce the risks of cyber attacks. Task 2.2: Developed attack surface analysis techniques, metrics, and tools that assess the attack surface at multiple levels including the control center, substations, and the SCADA network. Task 2.3: Developed attack surface reduction techniques and tools that dynamically reduce attack surface and hence increase attacker’s cost without interfering in the critical functions of the system. Task 2.4: Prototyped, implemented, and quantitatively evaluated/validated the techniques and tools on a realistic industrial CPS security testbed environment by leveraging the unique resources of the team. Task 3: Developed Commercialization plan to transition the developed tools into power system industry stakeholders for a broader adoption by leveraging the expertise of our industrial members. Phase II: Task 4: Successfully completed field demonstration, verification, and evaluation of the effectiveness of the attack surface analysis and reduction techniques on a realistic utility testbed environment. This also involved the development of realistic scenarios, sound metrics, data sets, evaluation criteria, and documentation. Technology integration & Field demonstration: The project had significantly advanced the state-of-the-art research and practice in improving the cybersecurity of our nation’s power grid infrastructure against cyber threats. In particular, the proposed, designed, and deployed attack surface analysis and reduction algorithms and tools have contributed to significantly reducing the exposure and risk of the devices, substations, and the integrated SCADA/EMS/ DMS grid environment to cyber threat. Strong demonstration and evaluation techniques have verified the feasibility of the developed techniques on realistic cyber-physical testbeds and utility partner's real grid environment, and collaborative research and evaluation of attack surface reduction techniques (for wide-are monitoring and control) within a vendor (GE) EMS platform. The Attack Host Analyzer (AHA) tool that was developed through this project was made available through GitHub.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Using Machine Learning in Adversarial Environments

Cyber defense is an asymmetric battle today. We need to understand better what options are available for providing defenders with possible advantages. Our project combines machine learning, optimization, and game theory to obscure our defensive posture from the information the adversaries are able to observe. The main conceptual contribution of this research is to separate the problem of prediction, for which machine learning is used, and the problem of computing optimal operational decisions based on such predictions, coupled with a model of adversarial response. This research includes modeling of the attacker and defender, formulation of useful optimization models for studying adversarial interactions, and user studies to measure the impact of the modeling approaches in realistic settings.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Employing a Hardware-in-the-Loop Approach to Realize a Fully Homomorphic Controller for a Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor

This paper addresses the cybersecurity challenges of advanced nuclear reactors by integrating fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) into their control systems, enabling encrypted processing of control signals without compromising functionality. Advanced nuclear reactors, including Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and microreactors, aim to achieve autonomous and remote operations, reducing costs and enhancing competitiveness. However, these advancements expand the attack surface for cyberattacks, particularly in autonomous and remote operation scenarios. Cyberattacks can exploit vulnerabilities to manipulate physical processes, causing shutdowns, asset damage, or public harm. Such attacks begin with passive reconnaissance, where adversaries intercept communications or observe behaviors to gather information, which is then leveraged to execute cyber-physical attacks by injecting malicious commands. Nuclear power must adopt cybersecurity protection measures to secure the integrity and availability of their digital control systems. This paper demonstrates the application of FHE to secure operations by enabling encrypted processing of sensitive signals and parameters -- ensuring privacy without exposing data. FHE supports secure mathematical operations on encrypted data without requiring decryption. Using a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) approach, this paper implements an FHE-integrated controller on a BeagleBone Black (BBB) controlling a simulation of the Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor (SmAHTR). By doing so, the encrypted controller protects the integrity of critical set points and control signals during transmission and processing. Thus, FHE-integrated controllers enhance secure operations of advanced nuclear reactors while maintaining functionality.

control systems↗

Cooperative Systems in Presence of Cyber-Attacks: A Unified Framework for Resilient Control and Attack Identification

Here, this paper considers a cooperative control problem in presence of unknown attacks. The attacker aims at destabilizing the consensus dynamics by intercepting the system’s communication network and corrupting its local state feedback. We first revisit the virtual network based resilient control proposed in our previous work and provide a new interpretation and insights into its implementation. Based on these insights, a novel distributed algorithm is presented to detect and identify the compromised communication links. It is shown that it is not possible for the adversary to launch a harmful and stealthy attack by only manipulating the physical states being exchanged via the network. In addition, a new virtual network is proposed which makes it more difficult for the adversary to launch a stealthy attack even though it is also able to manipulate information being exchanged via the virtual network. A numerical example demonstrates that the proposed control framework achieves simultaneously resilient operation and real-time attack identification.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Mathematical approaches to secure in-vehicle networks

Modern vehicles rely on numerous small computers called electronic control units (ECUs) that continually communicate life-critical messages, e.g., wheel speeds and steering angle, through a few controller area networks (CANs). Originally designed as a closed network for the life of the vehicle, CAN protocol developed bereft of security features (e.g., authentication or encryption). For emission testing, updates, and other diagnostics, vehicle CANs are now physically accessible, but this comes with vulnerability to cyber attack. Mandatory on-board diagnostic ports (OBD-II) provide adversaries with direct access to the vehicle. Remote attacks, e.g., via Bluetooth or cellular connections, are possible but require deep expertise. In short, the critical networks for vehicle functionality are exposed to remote and local cyber attacks with little to no built-in defenses. Most notably, the infamous 2015 research of Miller and Valasek exhibited a remote takeover of a Jeep’s brakes resulting in a massive recall and ample media coverage.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Real-World Cyber Security Demonstration for Networked Electric Drives

In this article, we present the design and implementation of a cyber-physical security testbed for networked electric drive systems, aimed at conducting real-world security demonstrations. To our knowledge, this is one of the first security testbeds for networked electric drives, seamlessly integrating the domains of power electronics and computer science, and cybersecurity. By doing so, the testbed offers a comprehensive platform to explore and understand the intricate and often complex interactions between cyber and physical systems. The core of our testbed consists of four electric machine drives, meticulously configured to emulate small-scale but realistic information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) networks. This setup both provides a controlled environment for simulating a wide array of cyber-attacks, and mirrors potential real-world attack scenarios with a high degree of fidelity. The testbed serves as an invaluable resource for the study of cyber-physical security, offering a practical and dynamic platform for testing and validating cybersecurity measures in the context of networked electric drive systems. As a concrete example of the testbed's capabilities, we have developed and implemented a Python-based script designed to execute step-stone attacks over a wireless local area network (WLAN). This script leverages a sequence of target IP addresses, simulating a real-world attack vector that could be exploited by adversaries. To counteract such threats, we demonstrate the efficacy of our developed cyber-attack detection algorithms, which are integral to our testbed's security framework. Furthermore, the testbed incorporates a real-time visualization system using InfluxDB and Grafana, providing a dynamic and interactive representation of networked electric drives and their associated security monitoring mechanisms. This visualization component not only enhances the testbed's usability but also offers insightful, real-time data for researchers and practitioners, thereby facilitating a deeper understanding of cyber-physical security dynamics in networked electric drive systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

BioSecure Digital Twin: Manufacturing Innovation and Cybersecurity Resilience

U.S. national security, prosperity, economy, and well-being require secure, flexible, and resilient Biopharmaceutical Manufacturing. The COVID-19 pandemic reaffirmed that the biomedical production value-chain is vulnerable to disruption and has been under attack from sophisticated nation-state adversaries. Current cyber defenses are inadequate, and the integrity of critical production systems and processes are inherently vulnerable to cyber-attacks, human error, and supply chain disruptions. The following chapter explores how a BioSecure Digital Twin will improve U.S. manufacturing resilience and preparedness to respond to these hazards by significantly improving monitoring, integrity, security, and agility of our manufacturing infrastructure and systems. The BioSecure Digital Twin combines a scalable manufacturing framework with a robust platform for monitoring and control to increase U.S. biopharma manufacturing resilience. Then, the chapter discusses some of the inherent vulnerabilities and challenges at the nexus of health and advanced manufacturing. Next, the chapter highlights that as the Pandemic evolves, we need agility and resilience to overcome significant obstacles. This section highlights an innovative application of Cyber Informed Engineering to developing and deploying a BioSecure Digital Twin to improve the resilience and security of the biopharma industrial supply chain and production processes. Finally, the chapter concludes with a process framework to complement the Digital Twin platform, called the Biopharma (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) OODA Loop Framework (BOLF), a four-step approach to decision-making outputs from the Digital Twin. The BOLF will help end users leverage twin technology by distilling the available information, focusing the data on context, and rapidly making the best decision while remaining cognizant of changes that can be made as more data becomes available.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Active Detection for Exposing Intelligent Attacks in Control Systems

In this paper, we consider approaches for detecting integrity attacks carried out by intelligent and resourceful adversaries in control systems. Passive detection techniques are often incorporated to identify malicious behavior. Here, the defender utilizes finely-tuned algorithms to process information and make a binary decision, whether the system is healthy or under attack. We demonstrate that passive detection can be ineffective against adversaries with model knowledge and access to a set of input/output channels. We then propose active detection as a tool to detect attacks. In active detection, the defender leverages degrees of freedom he has in the system to detect the adversary. Specifically, the defender will introduce a physical secret kept hidden from the adversary, which can be utilized to authenticate the dynamics. In this regard, we carefully review two approaches for active detection: physical watermarking at the control input, and a moving target approach for generating system dynamics. We examine practical considerations for implementing these technologies and discuss future research directions.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Multifractal Characterization of Distribution Synchrophasors for Cybersecurity Defense of Smart Grids

“Source ID Mix” spoofing emerged as a new type of cyber-attack on Distribution Synchrophasors (DS) where adversaries have the capability to swap the source information of DS without changing the measurement values. Accurate detection of such a highly-deceptive attack is a challenging task especially when the spoofing attack happens on short fragments of DS recorded within a relatively small geographical scale. Herein this letter proposes an effective approach to detect this cyber-attack by realizing the multifractal characteristics of DS measurements. First, the multifractal cross-correlation of DS measured at multiple intra-state locations is revealed. Then the derived correlation is integrated with weighted two-dimensional multifractal surface interpolation to reconstruct quasi high-resolution signals. Finally, informative location-specific signatures are extracted from the high-resolution DS and they are integrated with advanced machine learning techniques for source authentication. Experiments using the real-life DS are performed to verify the proposed method.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014

The Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Thyssenkrupp Steel Mill cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. In December 2014, the German Government’s Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) released a report detailing a cyber attack on a German steel mill that occurred earlier that year, though exact dates and details of the attack were not revealed. While the report did not specify the name of the company, multiple sources identified the victim as one of Europe’s largest steel manufacturers, Thyssenkrupp AG. Further, Thyssenkrupp announced on 16 May of that year that Europe’s largest blast furnace, “Schwelgern 2,” located at its facility in Duisburg, Germany, would be offline for several weeks for repairs and upgrades, suggesting Schwelgern 2 was likely the target of the attack. The attack began in early 2014, when adversaries infiltrated the victim steel mill’s Information Technology (IT) network via a spearphishing campaign, then worked their way into the Operational Technology (OT) environment, where they executed software that caused denial of service, denial of control, and eventually a loss of control. This led to the blast furnace shutting down without proper safety procedures, resulting in catastrophic physical damage. No lives were lost in the incident, but ThyssenKrupp suffered $4 million in damage to the blast furnace and an additional $6 million in lost revenue. The adversaries required specialized knowledge and expertise in steel production, which enabled them to compromise a variety of internal systems and components across both IT and OT networks. The attack also demonstrated detailed knowledge of the industrial control systems (ICS) and production processes being used. This combination resulted in one of the earliest known publicly reported cybersecurity incidents resulting in physical damage to ICS equipment. Researchers and analysts identified 19 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 20 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 454 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fifteen of the identified techniques used during the Thyssenkrupp cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 369 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 316 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 120 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Dragonstone Strategy – State of Cybersecurity in the Oil & Natural Gas Sector

The oil & natural gas (ONG) system touches every corner of the nation and increased communications & control capabilities have not only allowed for greater efficiency of system operation, but have also created a massive target for adversaries to launch cyber-attacks. Like any other heavy industrial process, the ONG system relies on a complex system of information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) devices. The current state of cyber-preparedness across the ONG industry varies from organization to organization. Among the most common challenges that ONG companies face are remote locations, longlived field assets, and lacking capabilities to find and track malware on their systems. ONG companies tend to be concerned with lack of cyber-awareness from employees, risk stemming from remote access for operations & maintenance, and software vulnerabilities within third-party equipment. Various industry and government organizations are performing research and development activities to address some of these challenges, but in many cases industry stakeholders are not aware of solutions that already exist. It is clear that a need exists for a coherent, comprehensive, multi-layered strategy for assuring the security and resilience of the nation's pipeline infrastructure against cyber threats. For a variety of reasons, the general consensus from stakeholders interviewed by LLNL is that the state of cyber-security within the electric grid is currently outpacing its ONG cousin. Existing strategies for the resilience and cyber-security of the electric grid can and should be leveraged to provide immediate benefits to the ONG system. In LLNL’s view, there are two key factors currently limiting the development of necessary cyber-practices within the ONG industry: The sheer number of differing regulatory bodies and trade groups offering both standards and best-practice recommendations for ONG cyber-security makes it difficult to create a comprehensive, directed, and coherent strategy that is applicable to all players within the ONG industry. The ONG industry is unaware of potentially useful technologies that have been developed for ensuring cyber-security of other infrastructure systems, such as the electric grid. Leveraging these technologies—and the science and engineering behind them—can provide some low-hanging fruit that can greatly improve cyber-security in the ONG industry without significant investments in terms of time and money. In the months following this report, LLNL will continue to perform outreach to key oil & gas industry stakeholders in a continual effort to identify the most pressing cyber-resilience issues in the industry. This outreach will be supplemented with LLNL’s threat intelligence capabilities to begin painting a clearer picture of the overall threat landscape faced by this sector. This assessment will be threat-informed and while the strategy itself will not be classified we will leverage intelligence analysis and adversary capabilities to identify gaps in current cybersecurity practices for oil & gas pipeline systems. Recommended efforts will be compiled into a cyber-resilience roadmap for the oil & gas pipeline sector, in which LLNL will highlight priority activities to immediately improve the state of cyber-resilience in the industry.

02 PETROLEUM↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer2 and Wiper Malware Targeting Ukrainian Energy Provider 2022

The Industroyer2 and Wiper Malware Targeting Ukrainian Energy Provider 2022 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Industroyer2 cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. An adversary attempted to cause a blackout in Ukraine in April 2022 by using the Industroyer2 malware against a regional Ukrainian energy provider. The adversary targeted eight high-voltage electrical substations and utilized the malware in tandem with disk wipers for Windows, Linux, and Solaris operating systems in an attempt to make response and recovery efforts more difficult. The adversary reused a piece of the original Industroyer malware designed to open circuit breakers and de-energize target substations. The adversary gained initial access to the victim’s enterprise network through unknown means in February 2022 and was able to perform reconnaissance, pivot to the operations network, and reside in the system for at least 51 days. This gave the adversary a detailed understanding of the environment and allowed them to customize the Industroyer2 malware to the victim’s operations network. However, defenders detected and stopped the attack before the adversary could achieve their intended impact. Had the Industroyer2 attack been successful, it could have caused a blackout for more than two million people during the early stages of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Researchers and analysts identified 22 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 31 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 297 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-three of the identified techniques used during the Industroyer2 cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 224 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 122 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 51 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Framework for Identifying Cybersecurity Risks in Manufacturing

Increasing connectivity, use of digital computation, and off-site data storage provide potential for dramatic improvements in manufacturing productivity, quality, and cost. However, there are also risks associated with the increased volume and pervasiveness of data that are generated and potentially accessible to competitors or adversaries. Enterprises have experienced cyber attacks that exfiltrate confidential and/or proprietary data, alter information to cause an unexpected or unwanted effect, and destroy capital assets. Manufacturers need tools to incorporate these risks into their existing risk management processes. This article establishes a framework that considers the data flows within a manufacturing enterprise and throughout its supply chain. The framework provides several mechanisms for identifying generic and manufacturing-specific vulnerabilities and is illustrated with details pertinent to an automotive manufacturer. Finally, in addition to providing manufacturers with insights into their potential data risks, this framework addresses an outcome identified by the NIST Cybersecurity Framework.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗