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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2019

Gateway Modeling and Simulation Plan

This plan institutes direction across the Gateway Program and the Element Projects to ensure that Cross Program M&S are produced in a manner that (1) generate the artifacts required for NASA-STD-7009 compliance, (2) ensures interoperability of M&S exchanged and integrated across the program and, (3) drives integrated development efforts to provide cross-domain integrated simulation of the Gateway elements, space environment, and operational scenarios. This direction is flowed down via contractual enforcement to prime contractors and includes both the GMS requirements specified in this plan and the NASASTD- 7009 derived requirements necessary for compliance. Grounding principles for management of Gateway Models and Simulations (M&S) are derived from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report and the Diaz team report, “A Renewed Commitment to Excellence.” As an outcome of these reports, and in response to Action 4 of the Diaz team report, the NASA Standard for Models and Simulations, NASA-STD-7009 was developed. The standard establishes M&S requirements for development and use activities to ensure proper capture and communication of M&S pedigree and credibility information to Gateway program decision makers. Through the course of the Gateway program life cycle M&S will be heavily relied upon to conduct analysis, test products, support operations activities, enable informed decision making and ultimately to certify the Gateway with an acceptable level of risk to crew and mission. To reduce risk associated with M&S influenced decisions, this plan applies the NASA-STD-7009 requirements to produce the artifacts that support credibility assessments and ensure the information is communicated to program management.

NASA-STD-7009↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

TPSAS-NF1676L-13013-DND

Description, capabilities and utilization of the NASA Langley Aerothermodynamics Laboratory (LAL) are presented. The LAL consists of four hypersonic, blow-down-to-vacuum wind tunnels that collectively provide a range of Mach number from 6 to 10 (18 simulation), unit Reynolds number from 0.05 to 8 million per foot and, most importantly for blunt configurations, normal shock density ratio from 4 to 12. These wide ranges of hypersonic simulation parameters are due, in part, to the use of two different test gases (air and tetrafluoromethane, CF4), thereby making the facilities unique. The complex represents half of the conventional (as opposed to impulse) -type hypersonic wind tunnels operational in this country. LAL facilities are used to assess and optimize the hypersonic aerodynamic performance and aeroheating characteristics of aerospace vehicle concepts and to provide benchmark aerodynamic/aeroheating data for generating the flight aerodynamic databook and final design of the thermal protection system (TPS). Modifications and enhancements of LAL hardware components and instrumentation have been pursued to increase capability, reliability, and productivity in support of programmatic goals. The facilities are utilized to generate essentially all of the experimental hypersonic aerodynamic and aeroheating information for high-priority, fast-paced Agency programs and were a major contributor to the Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation, space shuttle Return-to-Flight program and Hypersonic Thermodynamic Infrared Measurements (HYTHIRM) project. The LAL has also contributed to the development of the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle, Ares launch system, Mars Science Laboratory, Genesis Sample Return Capsule and supported DOD programs including HIFiRE, X-37, Falcon HTV-2 and X-51A.

John R Micol↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Growing the NASA Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Workforce of Tomorrow

The NASA Safety Center (NSC) was established in2006 in response to Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) recommendations to strengthen NASA’s safety program. The NSC supports all NASA centers and facilities. The NSC fosters world-class Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) support for NASA programs and projects through professional development activities and the advancement of the following SMA technical disciplines: - Aviation Safety - Operational Safety - Quality Engineering - Reliability and Maintainability - SMA Technical Leadership - Software Assurance - System Safety The NSC’s Technical Excellence Office (TEO) is charged with encouraging technical excellence in NASA’s SMA community primarily through professional development products and services. TEO’s first initiative was the SMA Technical Excellence Program (STEP). STEP is a career-oriented, professional development roadmap for safety professionals, which is designed for the employee to learn specific knowledge and skills to improve performance in their current role.

Safety and Mission Assurance↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Safety Culture at the World’s Premier Multi-User Spaceport

NASA’s Agency-wide Safety Culture is implemented at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) using a unique strategy due an unparalleled approach in making human spaceflight history. Kennedy Space Center, the world’s premier multi-user spaceport, enables U.S. government and commercial space access, while providing the world a resource to allow the exploration of and the ability to work in space. A consistently healthy safety culture at KSC is imperative for mission success: desired achievements, protection of space flight hardware, and ultimately, the preservation of human life requires the support of a healthy safety culture. Emphasis on the NASA Agency-wide development of Safety Culture began with the conception of the NASA Agency Safety Culture Working Group. After the devastating loss of life and mission of the Space Shuttle Colombia, a broken safety culture was identified as an organizational cause by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. Thus, the Agency Safety Culture Working Group was developed in 2009 to assess the status of the Agency’s Safety Culture, while addressing safety culture concerns at the NASA Center-level. A Five-factor model was developed to serve as the guiding principles for Safety Culture: 1) Reporting Culture, 2) Just Culture, 3) Flexible Culture, 4) Learning Culture, and 5) Engaged Culture. These five factors are included in the NASA Safety Culture logo, which was intentionally designed as a DNA double helix to prompt the permeation of safety into day-to-day work. KSC specifically implements the NASA Agency-wide Safety Culture principles in a tailored approach that is relevant to the diversity of work being performed. An emphasis is placed on the implementation to include safety at home, not exclusively at work. This emphasis is a KSC-specific element that has been intentionally added to promote a closed loop Safety Culture. To advertise the safety culture, various safety and health events are held throughout the calendar year, providing innovative speakers and engaging activities, while also promoting a wide range of curated safety initiatives. Development and continuous improvement of the KSC safety tracking database, allows for advanced tracking-to-closure, along with providing data sets used to identify areas of emphasis. Other safety initiatives rely solely on employee participation, such as the photo challenges; participants are encouraged to identify and capture themselves, coworkers, or family members participating in safe or healthy activities to share with others within the Center and at Agency levels. Fabrication of exclusive videos and graphics are utilized to advertise and inform employee of safety initiatives, upcoming safety events, and general dispersion of safety information. In addition, an anonymous Agency-wide Safety Culture Survey is advertised, administered, and analyzed at Kennedy Space Center, with the purpose of receiving basic feedback on Safety Culture perceptions to help prevent future incidents from occurring. Through these briefly identified means, and many other forms of employee engagement, Kennedy Space Center aims to maintain safety in the forefront, while creating an environment where everyone trusts that safety is a priority.

Larrin E. Moody↗
NASA NTRS2026

NASA Talks: Space Shuttle Columbia - Lessons Learned: Columbia Launch and Recovery

On February 25, 2026, this NASA Talk was held regarding the Space Shuttle Columbia (Columbia Launch & Recovery). Crew & Thermal System Division (EC) partnered with Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Engineering Directorate (EA) to bring this talk to Johnson Space Center (JSC) centering on what led up to and transpired after the Space Shuttle Columbia accident. Some recovered debris was on exhibit during the talk. Retired NASA Columbia Vehicle Manager Scott Thurston presented this talk. Mr. Thurston brings a wealth of knowledge from his mission experience. This talk was timely and a solemn reminder of the critical importance of diligence, safety, and excellence in our work. EA Director Julie Kramer White welcomed the 400+ center-wide in-person audience, and EC Division Chief Rubik Sheth introduced the speakers. This event was held in the JSC Teague Auditorium, recorded, and executed by the EC in-house STAR Productions team. This record includes an mp4 video presentation with a run time of 36 min. 20 sec.; in color; with sound.

NASA Talks↗
NASA NTRS2004

A Summary of the Space Shuttle Columbia Tragedy and the Use of LS Dyna in the Accident Investigation and Return to Flight Efforts

On February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia broke apart during reentry resulting in loss of 7 crewmembers and craft. For the next several months an extensive investigation of the accident ensued involving a nationwide team of experts from NASA, industry, and academia, spanning dozens of technical disciplines. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), a group of experts assembled to conduct an investigation independent of NASA concluded in August, 2003 that the cause of the loss of Columbia and its crew was a breach in the left wing leading edge Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) thermal protection system initiated by the impact of thermal insulating foam that had separated from the orbiters external fuel tank 81 seconds into the missions launch. During reentry, this breach allowed superheated air to penetrate behind the leading edge and erode the aluminum structure of left wing which ultimately led to the breakup of the orbiter. In order to gain a better understanding the foam impact on the orbiters RCC wing leading edge, a multi-center team of NASA and Boeing impact experts was formed to characterize the foam and RCC materials for impact analysis using LS Dyna. Dyna predictions were validated with sub-component and full scale tests. LS Dyna proved to be a valuable asset in supporting both the Columbia Accident Investigation and NASA s return to flight efforts. This paper summarizes Columbia Accident and the nearly seven month long investigation that followed. The use of LS-DYNA in this effort is highlighted. Contributions to the investigation and return to flight efforts of the multicenter team consisting of members from NASA Glenn, NASA Langley, and Boeing Philadelphia are introduced and covered in detail in papers to follow in these proceedings.

Melis, Matthew↗
NASA NTRS2006

Characterization of Deposits on Glass Substrate as a Tool in Failure Analysis: The Orbiter Vehicle Columbia Case Study

In connection with the accident investigation of the space shuttle Columbia, an analysis methodology utilizing well established microscopic and spectroscopic techniques was implemented for evaluating the environment to which the exterior fused silica glass was exposed. Through the implementation of optical microscopy, scanning electron microscopy, energy dispersive spectroscopy, transmission electron microscopy, and electron diffraction, details emerged regarding the manner in which a charred metallic deposited layer formed on top of the exposed glass. Due to nature of the substrate and the materials deposited, the methodology proved to allow for a more detailed analysis of the vehicle breakup. By contrast, similar analytical methodologies on metallic substrates have proven to be challenging due to strong potential for error resulting from substrate contamination. This information proved to be valuable to not only those involved in investigating the break up of Columbia, but also provides a potential guide for investigating future high altitude and high energy accidents.

Olivas, J. D.↗
NASA NTRS1993

The x ray population in globular clusters and three crab-like SNR in the large Magellanic cloud

This document is to serve as the requisite Final Technical Report on grant NAG5-1557 which was awarded under the NASA ROSAT Guest Investigator Program to Columbia University. In response to the NASA Research Anouncement describing the first round of Guest Investigations to be carried out under the U.S.-German ROSAT Program (AO-1), the PI submitted several proposals, three of which were accepted in part: (1) the x-ray population of globular clusters; (2) three crab-like SNR in the Large Magellanic Cloud; and (3) x rays from nearby radio pulsars. The status of these three programs as of 31 May 1993, the termination date of the grant, is reported.

Helfand, David J.↗
NASA NTRS2004

InvestigationOrganizer: The Development and Testing of a Web-based Tool to Support Mishap Investigations

InvestigationOrganizer (IO) is a collaborative web-based system designed to support the conduct of mishap investigations. IO provides a common repository for a wide range of mishap related information, and allows investigators to make explicit, shared, and meaningful links between evidence, causal models, findings and recommendations. It integrates the functionality of a database, a common document repository, a semantic knowledge network, a rule-based inference engine, and causal modeling and visualization. Thus far, IO has been used to support four mishap investigations within NASA, ranging from a small property damage case to the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia. This paper describes how the functionality of IO supports mishap investigations and the lessons learned from the experience of supporting two of the NASA mishap investigations: the Columbia Accident Investigation and the CONTOUR Loss Investigation.

Carvalho, Robert F.↗
NASA NTRS1996

STS-78 Flight Day 13

On this thirteenth day of the STS-78 mission, the flight crew, Cmdr. Terence T. Henricks, Pilot Kevin R. Kregel, Payload Cmdr. Susan J. Helms, Mission Specialists Richard M. Linnehan, Charles E. Brady, Jr., and Payload Specialists Jean-Jacques Favier, Ph.D. and Robert B. Thirsk, M.D., begin another day of scientific investigations on board Columbia as the Life and Microgravity Spacelab mission continues its endurance record. The seven crew members continue supporting a variety of experiments investigating the effects of microgravity on the human body. Studies looking at muscle strength and energy expenditure and pulmonary function continue throughout the day, as well as the processing of advanced semiconductor materials and alloys in the Advanced Gradient Heating Facility. In an interview with the NBC News, Mission Commander Tom Henricks is shown discussing Columbia's flight and the varied experiments that are being conducted on board. Crew members are shown participating in tests that measure their performance.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2006

Shuttle Propulsion Overview to NATO

In the early morning on Saturday, February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia broke up during entry. After extensive investigation of the accident and recommendations made by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, President Bush gave the vision for space exploration for NASA, which include return the Space Shuttle to flight as soon as practical, complete assembly of the ISS by the end of the decade, initiate robotic missions to the moon no later than 2008, develop a new Crew Exploration Vehicle, conduct first robotic, then human missions to Mars and extend human exploration across the solar system.

Lightfoot, Robert↗
NASA NTRS2004

Foam on Tile Impact Modeling for the STS-107 Investigation

Following the breakup of the Space Shuttle Columbia during reentry a NASA/Contractor investigation team was formed to examine the probable damage inflicted on Orbiter Thermal Protection System elements by impact of External Tank insulating foam projectiles. The authors formed a working subgroup within the larger team to apply the Smooth Particle Hydrodynamics code SPHC to the damage estimation problem. Numerical models of the Orbiter's tiles and of the Tank's foam were constructed and used as inputs into the code. Material properties needed to properly model the tiles and foam were obtained from other working subgroups who performed tests on these items for this purpose. Two- and three-dimensional models of the tiles were constructed, including the glass outer layer, the main body of LI-900 insulation, the densified lower layer of LI-900, the Nomex felt mounting layer, and the Aluminum 2024 vehicle skin. A model for the BX-250 foam including porous compression, elastic rebound, and surface erosion was developed. Code results for the tile damage and foam behavior were extensively validated through comparison with Southwest Research Institute foam-on-tile impact experiments carried out in 1999. These tests involved small projectiles striking individual tiles and small tile arrays. Following code and model validation we simulated impacts of larger foam projectiles on the examples of tile systems used on the Orbiter. Results for impacts on the main landing gear door are presented in this paper, including effects of impacts at several angles, and of rapidly rotating projectiles. General results suggest that foam impacts on tiles at about 500 mph could cause appreciable damage if the impact angle is greater than about 20 degrees. Some variations of the foam properties, such as increased brittleness or increased density could increase damage in some cases. Rotation up to 17 rps failed to increase the damage for the two cases considered. This does not rule out other cases in which the rotational energy might lead to an increase in tile damage, but suggests that in most cases rotation will not be an important factor.

Stellingwerf, R. F.↗
DOE OSTI2023

Informed Multi‐Scale Approach Applied to the British Columbia Fires of Late Summer 2017

Abstract Pyrocumulonimbus (PyroCb) clouds have a complex origin dependent on fire dynamics and meteorological conditions. When a pyrocumulonimbus cloud develops and is maintained over a period of time, it can inject significant aerosol into the troposphere and lower stratosphere, resulting in a longer‐term (months to years) occurrence of aerosol in the stratosphere. In this work, we investigate the British Columbia wildfires on 12–13 August 2017 using a multi‐scale simulation framework. We use the output of a physics‐based wildfire model (FIRETEC) with parameterized energy, particle, and gas emissions to drive the upper atmospheric aerosol mass injection within a regional cloud resolving model (HIGRAD). We demonstrate that vertical motions produced by latent heat release of the condensation of ice and cloud particles within the PyroCbs induce another 5 km of lifting of the simulated aerosol plume. Primary black carbon and organic aerosols (OAs) alone may not be enough to explain the observed aerosol burden, thus we show that secondary OA produced via condensation of gases by the fires, ash, and possibly dust can enhance lofted aerosol mass. A simulation with all emission mechanisms active, driven by the observed fuel load and environmental conditions, reasonably reproduces an aerosol profile inferred from observational data.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
NASA NTRS1998

High-Temperature Deformation of Dry Diabase with Application to Tectonics on Venus

We have performed an experimental study to quantify the high-temperature creep behavior of natural diabase rocks under dry deformation conditions. Samples of both Maryland diabase and Columbia diabase were investigated to measure the effects of temperature, oxygen fugacity, and plagioclase-to-pyroxene ratio on creep strength. Flow laws determined for creep of these diabases were characterized by an activation energy of Q = 485 +/- 30 kJ/mol and a stress exponent of n = 4.7 +/- 0.6, indicative of deformation dominated by dislocation creep processes. Although n and Q are the same for the two rocks within experimental error, the Maryland diabase, which has the lower plagioclase content, is significantly stronger than the Columbia diabase. Thus the modal abundance of the various minerals plays an important role in defining rock strength. Within the s ample-to-sample variation, no clear influence of oxygen fugacity on creep strength could be discerned for either rock. The dry creep strengths of both rocks are significantly greater than values previously measured on diabase under "as-received" or wet conditions. Application of these results to the present conditions in the lithosphere on Venus predicts a high viscosity crust with strong dynamic coupling between mantle convection and crustal deformation, consistent with measurements of topography and gravity for that planet.

Mackwell, S. J.↗
DOE OSTI2022

Local-thermal-gradient and large-scale-circulation impacts on turbine-height wind speed forecasting over the Columbia River Basin

Abstract. We investigate the sensitivity of turbine-height wind speed forecast to initial condition (IC) uncertainties over the Columbia River Gorge (CRG) and Columbia River Basin (CRB) for two typical weather phenomena, i.e., local-thermal-gradient-induced marine air intrusion and a cold frontal passage. Four types of turbine-height wind forecast anomalies and their associated IC uncertainties related to local thermal gradients and large-scale circulations are identified using the self-organizing map (SOM) technique. The four SOM types are categorized into two patterns, each accounting for half of the ensemble members. The first pattern corresponds to IC uncertainties that alter the wind forecast through a modulating weather system, which produces the strongest wind anomalies in the CRG and CRB. In the second pattern, the moderate uncertainties in local thermal gradient and large-scale circulation jointly contribute to wind forecast anomaly. We analyze the cross section of wind and temperature anomalies through the gorge to explore the evolution of vertical features of each SOM type. The turbine-height wind anomalies induced by large-scale IC uncertainties are more concentrated near the front. In contrast, turbine-height wind anomalies induced by the local IC thermal uncertainties are found above the surface thermal anomalies. Moreover, the wind forecast accuracy in the CRG and CRB is limited by IC uncertainties in a few specific regions, e.g., the 2 m temperature within the basin and large-scale circulation over the northeast Pacific around 140∘ W.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
NASA NTRS2006

Near-Miss Evaluation Bias as an Obstacle to Organizational Learning: Lessons from NASA

After the Shuttle Columbia catastrophe, the investigation board (CAIB) stated that NASA needs to develop a "learning culture", meaning a capability to learn from past failures by understanding the technical and organizational causes of these mistakes (CAIB report, 2003). While many organizations learn from obvious failures, we argue that it is harder for organizations to learn from near-miss events (i.e., situations where a failure does not occur but nearly did), because these near-misses are processed as successes. For the shuttle program, prior debris problems could have caused a similar failure as on the Columbia mission except that the large pieces missed the highly sensitive portions of the orbiter. This acceptance of foam debris was adopted as a normal occurrence by the shuttle program managers similar to the problems at the time of the Challenger Disaster (detailed in Vaughan, 1996). We extend that work to show that an outcome bias influences people's evaluation of project managers, such that managers of failed missions were perceived more poorly than managers who made the same decisions but whose mission ended in either success or a near-miss. The similarity of ratings between the near-miss and success condition imply that even when a problem occurs that is clearly linked to prior managerial decisions, if the project is not harmed because of good luck, that manager is not held accountable for faculty decision making and neither the individual manager nor the organization learn from the experience potentially increasing the likelihood of a failure in the future.

Dillon, Robin L.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Synchrotron Catalysis Consortium (SCC) at NSLS-II: Dedicated Beamline Facilities for In Situ and Operando Characterization of Catalysts

The Synchrotron Catalysis Consortium (SCC) was funded and established in September 2005 at the National Synchrotron Light Source (NSLS) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL). For more than a decade, the SCC was the first of its kind in the United States, with a mission to promote the utilization of synchrotron techniques for cutting-edge catalysis research under in-situ conditions. The consortium consists of three Principal Investigators (Jingguang Chen, Columbia University, Anatoly Frenkel, Stony Brook University/BNL, and Jose Rodriguez, BNL) and scientific staff member Nebojsa Marinkovic. The initial team also included Radoslav Adzic, BNL, and collaborators from academic, national, and industrial laboratories. During the first decade of its operations at three NSLS beamlines (X18A, X18B, and X19A) until the closing of NSLS on September 30, 2014, the primary goal of the SCC team was to provide assistance and to develop new sciences/techniques to the catalysis community...This report outlines a brief history, specifications, techniques, and training and outreach for the facility.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
NASA NTRS1993

ROSAT: X ray survey of compact groups

This is the final technical report on grant NAG5-1954, which was awarded under the NASA ROSAT Guest Investigator Program to Columbia University. This grant was awarded for a number of projects on two rather different topics: (1) an x-ray survey of compact groups of galaxies; and (2) the fate of gas in merging galaxies. Progress made in these projects is presented.

Vangorkom, Jacqueline↗