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At least 145 records · Page 8

Y-12 National Security Complex LEU-Mo Casting Update

The Y-12 National Security Complex participates in the Fuel Fabrication pillar of the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Material Minimization and Management (M3) Office of Conversion Pillar. Y-12's primary responsibility is to establish the fabrication process of low-enriched uranium- molybdenum (LEU-Mo) feedstock for United States High Performance Research Reactors. This update focuses on recent efforts to demonstrate consistency and repeatability in the LEU-Mo fabrication process for production environment.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Simulating Energy and Security Interactions in Semiconductor Manufacturing: Insights from the Intel Minifab Model

Semiconductor manufacturing is a highly complex. Fabrication plants must deal with re-entrant flows to support multiple types of wafers being produced simultaneously, each with their own deadlines and specifications. The manufacturing process itself depends upon the ability to control and programmatically adjust a variety of environmental conditions including temperature, humidity, and air quality. In addition, wafer fabrication consumes large amounts of electricity. Emerging technologies may help reduce the energy footprint of such facilities but can introduce cybersecurity risks. Therefore, this paper presents a modeling and simulation framework to quantify tradeoffs between operational measures of performance, energy consumption, and cybersecurity controls. We augment the Intel Minifab model, with the Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture (PERA) for cybersecurity as well as tool-level energy consumption data from a real-world semiconductor manufacturing testbed. In this manner, we intend to provide stakeholders with a systematic, data-driven approach to evaluate emerging risks within the manufacturing process.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Modernization at the Y-12 National Security Complex: A Case for Additional Experimental Benchmarks

Efforts are underway at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) to modernize the recovery, purification, and consolidation of un-irradiated, highly enriched uranium metal. Successful integration of advanced technology such as Electrorefining (ER) eliminates many of the intermediate chemistry systems and processes that are the current and historical basis of the nuclear fuel cycle at Y-12. The cost of operations, the inventory of hazardous chemicals, and the volume of waste are significantly reduced by ER. It also introduces unique material forms and compositions related to the chemistry of chloride salts for further consideration in safety analysis and engineering. The work herein briefly describes recent investigations of nuclear criticality for 235UO2Cl2 (uranyl chloride) and 6LiCl (lithium chloride) in aqueous solution. Of particular interest is the minimum critical mass of highly enriched uranium as a function of the molar ratio of 6Li to 235U. The work herein also briefly describes recent investigations of nuclear criticality for 235U metal reflected by salt mixtures of 6LiCl or 7LiCl (lithium chloride), KCl (potassium chloride), and 235UCl3 or 238UCl3 (uranium tri-chloride). Computational methods for analysis of nuclear criticality safety and published nuclear data are employed in the absence of directly relevant experimental criticality benchmarks.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Alternative D and D Planning Tool - 12466

On August 1, 2011, URS - CH2M Oak Ridge LLC (UCOR) began cleanup of the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP). UCOR's $2.2 billion contract has an initial five-year term and a four-year option period for completing the cleanup of ETTP and performing surveillance and maintenance and waste management operations at both the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the Y-12 National Security Complex. ETTP D and D work includes disposition of large, complex, contaminated, Manhattan Project-era facilities such as the K-25 and K-27 uranium enrichment facilities. At ETTP, UCOR views the D and D process as a 'Waste Factory' with waste production lines from the point-of-generation to the point-of-disposal. Safely transforming vertically-standing buildings into horizontally-lying waste in a disposal facility is the primary cleanup objective. Whereas a factory produces widgets, D and D produces waste-lots of waste. In support of the Waste Factory view, UCOR is developing a systems planning tool to help better plan how to effect cleanup by improving waste planning, uniting waste generator with waste dis-positioner, and represent the 'waste factory' in a computer model that allows the D and D and waste management teams to better understand available disposal paths, waste uncertainties and potential consequences, driving variables, and sensitivity to changes. Any model of reality represents a compromise. Part of the Waste Factory Model's value may be in providing standardization and relative direction for assisting decision making as opposed to absolute cost or schedule answers. From that relative direction, management can commission detailed planning and estimating. Also, the model's output credibility is tied directly to its input quality. That is why, as discussed above, the Waste Factory Model's key informational component will be the standardized waste streams (e.g., Structure/Debris disposed at EMWMF) and associated standardized unit costs. The model development process generally, and the development team's collaboration, specifically, is most important. Building-in this integrity up-front, transparently, will help ensure that the model outputs are known, understood, and credible (no mysterious 'black-box' components). The Waste Factory Model is envisioned to help improve understanding of a given project's waste implications; help reveal and suggest the important few variables out of the trivial many; reveal likely process bottlenecks, and help focus risk mitigation and assumption management efforts to better manage the projected total cost. In the long term, the UCOR team's goal is to incorporate an information feedback loop to help improve the accuracy of key model attributes, such as the standardized cost information. This way, by design, the model output should improve over time and thus help the model mature into both a credible scenario tool and a standardized project planning resource. The initial model capabilities may be narrow, but with time and effort it may prove to be a timely and cost-effective tool. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Remote Monitoring System Design Requirements for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Nevada National Security Site

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) worked with other sites within the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration weapons complex to develop design requirements for a Remote Monitoring System. System objectives include: • Continuous monitoring of packaging (containers) within a Facility's buildings to meet Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) inventory requirements. • Remotely access and receive monitoring data for tamper detection/alarm, tracking information, environmental conditions, equipment metadata (serial number, date of manufacturer, etc.), and assessment video feeds. • All data processing, storage/retrieval, and communications will be protected in a manner commensurate with its trust level and classification. • Remotely collected and processed data will be securely stored, backed up, and archived. • Current and historical data will accessible within and outside of a Building (location). • Automated creation of reports and data visualization. • Design features to facilitate the potential future integration with the Facility's physical security alarm and display system. The requirements may be used to develop an integrated conceptual design or may be used in a modular fashion to inform separate designs. The guiding principles in developing the system objectives include: • For MC&A needs, remotely perform the physical inventory and evidence collection of tamper for Security Category I and II packaged material within a facility and be capable of satisfying guidelines establish by DOE M 470.4-6, “Nuclear Material Control and Accountability.” • For personnel safety needs: o Meet/satisfy Nuclear Explosive Safety requirements. o Minimize the exposure of personnel to radiation to be as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) in accordance with NSTec Radiological Controls Manual (Ref TBD). • For DOE nuclear materials, Building environment shall be controlled to meet requirements for packaged nuclear materials specified in weapons laboratory literature.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Remote Monitoring System Design Requirements for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Nevada National Security Site

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) worked with other sites within the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration weapons complex to develop design requirements for a Remote Monitoring System. System objectives included: Continuous monitoring of packaging (containers) within a Facility's buildings to meet Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) inventory requirements. Remotely access and receive monitoring data for tamper detection/alarm, tracking information, environmental conditions, equipment metadata (serial number, date of manufacture, etc.), and assessment video feeds. All data processing, storage/retrieval, and communications will be protected in a manner commensurate with its trust level and classification. Remotely collected and processed data will be securely stored, backed up, and archived. Current and historical data will accessible within and outside of a Building (location). Automated creation of reports and data visualization. Design features to facilitate the potential future integration with the Facility's physical security alarm and display system. The requirements may be used to develop an integrated conceptual design or may be used in a modular fashion to inform separate designs. The guiding principles in developing the system objectives include: For MC&A needs, remotely perform the physical inventory and evidence collection of tamper for Security Category I and II packaged material within a facility and be capable of satisfying guidelines establish by DOE M 470.4-6, “Nuclear Material Control and Accountability.” For personnel safety needs: Meet/satisfy Nuclear Explosive Safety requirements. Minimize the exposure of personnel to radiation to be as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) in accordance with NSTec Radiological Controls Manual. For DOE nuclear materials, Building environment shall be controlled to meet requirements for packaged nuclear materials specified in weapons laboratory literature.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Implementing Safeguards-by-Design

Executive Summary Excerpt Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) is an approach to the design and construction of nuclear facilities whereby safeguards are designed-in from the very beginning. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards (MC&A), physical security, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge, and this report focuses on that aspect of SBD. The present report continues the work begun in 2008 and focuses specifically on the design process, or project management and coordination - the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of activities of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project, in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, as well as describing the documents created and how they are used. Designing and constructing a nuclear facility is an extremely complex undertaking. The stakeholders in an actual project are many – owner, operator, State regulators, nuclear facility primary contractor, subcontractors (e.g. instrument suppliers), architect engineers, project management team, safeguards, safety and security experts, in addition to the IAEA and its team. The purpose of the present report is to provide a common basis for discussions amongst stakeholders to collaboratively develop a SBD approach that will be both practically useful and mutually beneficial. The principal conclusions from the present study are: • In the short term, the successful implementation of SBD is principally a project management problem. • Life-cycle cost analysis can be a useful tool in safeguards design. • An important obstacle to straight forward application of life-cycle cost analysis is that there is no single organization responsible for the entire life-cycle cost of the facility. • The Safeguards Effectiveness Report (SGER) is proposed as a focus for the safeguards design activities, and is intended to be a living document that contains increasing safeguards relevant scope and content as the facility design emerges. Further work is required in a number of areas. The authors note that other studies supported by NGSI are addressing the development of requirements and performance criteria, as well as contributing to the design toolkit through the development of technology, methodology, and safeguards guidelines for designers. With respect to further development of the SBD design process, the authors recommend: • In the short term, conduct a workshop with interested industry representatives, to ensure that their perspectives and needs are factored into further development. • In the short term, provide NGSI SBD project documents to IAEA, and support them in the conduct of an ‘SBD Workshop II.” • In the medium term, continue to support the SBD demonstration work started with the Next Generation Nuclear Plant project. • In the longer term, conduct further studies to examine the integration of SBD into projects with concurrent consideration of physical security and safety.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

System Engineering on the Use for Ares I,V - the Simpler, the Better

The Ares I and Ares V Vehicles will utilize the J-2X rocket engine developed for NASA by the Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne Company. The J-2X is an improved higher power version of the original J-2 engine used during the Apollo program. With higher power and updated requirements for safety and performance, the J-2X becomes a new engine using state-of-the-art design methodology, materials and manufacturing processes. The implementation of Systems Engineering (SE) principles enables the rapid J-2X development program to remain aligned with the ARES I and V vehicle programs, Meeting the aggressive development schedule is a challenge. Coordinating the best expertise thai NASA and PWR have to offer requires effectively utilizing resources at multiple sites. This presents formidable communication challenges. SE allows honest and open discussions of issues and problems. This simple idea is often overlooked in large and complex SE programs. Regular and effective meetings linking SE objectives to component designs are used to voice differences of opinions with customer and contractor in attendance so that the best mutual decisions can be made on the shortest possible schedule. Regular technical interchange meetings on secure program wide computer networks and CM processes are effective,in the "Controlled Change" process that exemplifies good SE. Good communication is a key effective SE implementation. The System of Systems approach is the vision of the Orion program which facilitates the establishment of dynamic SE processes at all levels including the engine. SE enables requirements evolution by facilitating organizational and process agility. Flow down and distribution of requirements is controlled by Allocation Reports which breakdown numerical design objectives (weight, reliability, etc.) into quanta goals for each component area. Linked databases of design and verification requirements helps eliminate redundancy and potential mistakes inherent m separated systems. Another tool, the Architecture Design Description, is being used to control J-2X system architecture and effectively communicate configuration changes to those involved in the design process. But the proof is in successful program accomplishment. The SE is the methodology being used to meet the challenge of completing J-2X engine certification 2 years ahead of any engine program ever developed at PWR. The Ares I SE system of systems has delivered according to expectations thus far. All major design reviews (SRR. PDR, CDR) have been successfully conducted to satisfy overall program objectives using SE as the basis for accomplishment. The paper describes SE tools and techniques utilized to achieve this success.

Kelly, William↗

2022 Small Turbine Certification Awardee: NPS Solutions

Inverters convert the direct current power generated by wind turbines into the alternating current needed to serve local loads and feed onto the electricity grid. Although distributed wind systems typically supply electricity for homes and businesses near the turbines, these systems can also provide clean power to strengthen grid resilience. Certification to UL 1741 SA ensures that inverters will enable distributed wind turbines to provide grid support services and stay online when the grid experiences stability issues. Small companies often find the electrical listing process too complex and expensive to undertake on their own, so few distributed wind turbine inverters are certified to this standard. A U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Competitiveness Improvement Project (CIP) award is helping NPS Solutions (NPS) secure this critical certification for the inverter in its 100-kilowatt NPS 100C wind turbine, which is optimized for on-site generation at farms, businesses, schools, hospitals, and remote locations.

CIP↗

Revisiting Current Paradigms: Subject Matter Expert Views on High Consequence Facility Security Assessments

Security assessments support decision-makers' ability to evaluate current capabilities of high consequence facilities (HCF) to respond to possible attacks. However, increasing complexity of today's operational environment requires a critical review of traditional approaches to ensure that implemented assessments are providing relevant and timely insights into security of HCFs. Using interviews and focus groups with diverse subject matter experts (SMEs), this study evaluated the current state of security assessments and identified opportunities to achieve a more "ideal" state. The SME-based data underscored the value of a systems approach for understanding the impacts of changing operational designs and contexts (as well as cultural influences) on security to address methodological shortcomings of traditional assessment processes. These findings can be used to inform the development of new approaches to HCF security assessments that are able to more accurately reflect changing operational environments and effectively mitigate concerns arising from new adversary capabilities.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Private sector involvement in civil space remote sensing. Volume 1: Report

A survey of private sector developers, users, and interpreters of Earth resources data was conducted in an effort to encourage private investment and participation in remote sensing systems. Results indicate positive interest in participation beyond the current hardware contracting level, however, there is a substantial gap between current market levels and system costs. Issues identified include the selection process for an operating entity, the public/private interface, data collection and access policies, price and profit regulation in a subsidized system, international participation, and the responsibility for research and development. It was agreed that the cost, complexity, and security implications of integrated systems need not be an absolute bar to their private operation.

Source record↗

Los Alamos National Security, LLC Request for Information on how industry may partner with the Laboratory on KIVA software.

KIVA is a family of Fortran-based computational fluid dynamics software developed by LANL. The software predicts complex fuel and air flows as well as ignition, combustion, and pollutant-formation processes in engines. The KIVA models have been used to understand combustion chemistry processes, such as auto-ignition of fuels, and to optimize diesel engines for high efficiency and low emissions. Fuel economy is heavily dependent upon engine efficiency, which in turn depends to a large degree on how fuel is burned within the cylinders of the engine. Higher in-cylinder pressures and temperatures lead to increased fuel economy, but they also create more difficulty in controlling the combustion process. Poorly controlled and incomplete combustion can cause higher levels of emissions and lower engine efficiencies.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Transuranic (TRU) Waste Repackaging at the Nevada Test Site

This paper describes the activities required to modify a facility and the process of characterizing, repackaging, and preparing for shipment the Nevada Test Site’s (NTS) legacy transuranic (TRU) waste in 58 oversize boxes (OSB). The waste, generated at other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sites and shipped to the NTS between 1974 and 1990, requires size-reduction for off-site shipment and disposal. The waste processing approach was tailored to reduce the volume of TRU waste by employing decontamination and non-destructive assay. As a result, the low-level waste (LLW) generated by this process was packaged, with minimal size reduction, in large sea-land containers for disposal at the NTS Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC). The remaining TRU waste was repackaged and sent to the Idaho National Laboratory Consolidation Site for additional characterization in preparation for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The DOE National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office and the NTS Management and Operating (M&O) contractor, NSTec, successfully partnered to modify and upgrade an existing facility, the Visual Examination and Repackaging Building (VERB). The VERB modifications, including a new ventilation system and modified containment structure, required an approved Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis prior to project procurement and construction. Upgrade of the VERB from a radiological facility to a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility required new rigor in the design and construction areas and was executed on an aggressive schedule. The facility Documented Safety Analysis required that OSBs be vented prior to introduction into the VERB. Box venting was safely completed after developing and implementing two types of custom venting systems for the heavy gauge box construction. A remotely operated punching process was used on boxes with wall thickness of up to 3.05 mm (0.120 in) to insert aluminum bronze filters and sample ports to prevent sparking during penetration. A remotely operated cold-drilling process with self-drilling, self-tapping titanium coated spark-resistant filters was used for boxes with wall thickness of up to 6.35 mm (0.25 in). The box headspace was sampled for the presence of flammable gases. To further accelerate the project schedule, an innovative treatment process was used. Several of the OSBs were re-assayed and determined to be mixed low-level waste (MLLW) which allowed treatment, followed by disposal in the Mixed Waste Disposal Unit at the NTS Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC). The MLLW boxes were certified using real-time radiography and overpacked into custom-built polyethylene-lined macroencapsulation containers. The polyethylene-lined lid was welded to the poly-lined box using automatically controlled resistance heating through embedded wiring in the lid. The work was performed under the existing Documented Safety Analysis since plastic welding is accomplished at low temperature and does not introduce the risks of other macroencapsulation processes, such as welding stainless steel containers. The macroencapsulation process for MLLW not only accelerated the schedule by reducing the number of boxes requiring size reduction, but it also resulted in significantly improved safety with as low as reasonable achievable levels of exposure to workers plus reduced cost by eliminating the need to perform repackaging in the VERB.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Sequential Detection of Fission Processes for Harbor Defense

With the large increase in terrorist activities throughout the world, the timely and accurate detection of special nuclear material (SNM) has become an extremely high priority for many countries concerned with national security. The detection of radionuclide contraband based on their γ-ray emissions has been attacked vigorously with some interesting and feasible results; however, the fission process of SNM has not received as much attention due to its inherent complexity and required predictive nature. In this paper, on-line, sequential Bayesian detection and estimation (parameter) techniques to rapidly and reliably detect unknown fissioning sources with high statistical confidence are developed.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

A roadmap to understanding and anticipating microbial gene transfer in soil communities

Engineered microbes are being programmed using synthetic DNA for applications in soil to overcome global challenges related to climate change, energy, food security, and pollution. However, we cannot yet predict gene transfer processes in soil to assess the frequency of unintentional transfer of engineered DNA to environmental microbes when applying synthetic biology technologies at scale. This challenge exists because of the complex and heterogeneous characteristics of soils, which contribute to the fitness and transport of cells and the exchange of genetic material within communities. Here, we describe knowledge gaps about gene transfer across soil microbiomes. Here, we propose strategies to improve our understanding of gene transfer across soil communities, highlight the need to benchmark the performance of biocontainment measures in situ, and discuss responsibly engaging community stakeholders. We highlight opportunities to address knowledge gaps, such as creating a set of soil standards for studying gene transfer across diverse soil types and measuring gene transfer host range across microbiomes using emerging technologies. By comparing gene transfer rates, host range, and persistence of engineered microbes across different soils, we posit that community-scale, environment-specific models can be built that anticipate biotechnology risks. Such studies will enable the design of safer biotechnologies that allow us to realize the benefits of synthetic biology and mitigate risks associated with the release of such technologies.

bioccontainment↗

LEU-Mo Casting Update

The Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) participates in the Fuel Fabrication Pillar of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) Office of Material Minimization and Management (M3) Office of Conversion Pillar. Y-12’s primary responsibility is to establish the fabrication process for the low-enriched uranium-molybdenum (U-10Mo) feedstock.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Development of PNNL’s Plutonium Metallography Capability

The goal of this project was to develop plutonium metallography capabilities and establish workflows for characterization at PNNL’s Radiological Processing Facility (RPL). Developing and expanding on this capability opens more opportunities for PNNL to better support science through collaborations with other labs, plants, and sites withing the Department of Energy Complex and through programs within the National Nuclear Security Administration. This project established metallography equipment in an air glovebox, polishing protocols, as well as radiological and facility controls and procedures so that gram quantities of plutonium metal could be analyzed on multiple characterization tools. Data was collected and analyzed on two different delta phase plutonium - Gallium samples and a calciothermically reduced alpha plutonium metal using a combination of optical and electron microscopy, powder X-ray diffraction, and atom probe tomography. This report highlights the metallography capabilities, some preliminary data collections, and plans at PNNL to support plutonium material science.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Crediting a Soluble Neutron Absorber at Y-12 under ANSI/ANS-8.14-2004

The Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) is performing work to modernize the recovery, purification, and consolidation of un-irradiated, highly enriched uranium metal. The development of advanced technology such as Electrorefining (ER) eliminates many of the intermediate chemistry systems and processes that are the current and historical basis of uranium processing at Y-12. The ER system processes impure broken uranium metal pieces into a high-purity uranium metal disk. The overall system consists of an ER cell, salt vaporization furnace (SVF), and uranium consolidation furnace (UCF).

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗