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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 145 records · Page 8
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

International Cybersecurity: Capabilities and Overview [Slides]

Innovations in clean energy technology are beginning to transform electric grids around the world. It is more important than ever to understand and improve the resiliency and security of the grid against natural and human disruptions as our energy systems become more distributed, intelligent, and interconnected. Through its advanced cybersecurity technical assistance portfolio, experts at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) work with international governments to support secure and resilient deployment of renewable energy assets and address grid interconnection challenges. Cybersecurity technical assistance is tailored to the needs of our international partners.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cybersecurity for Energy Systems: Foundational Concepts for Bangladesh Electric Utilities [Slides]

This slide deck was developed for a training for the Northern Electricity Supply Company (NESCO) in Rajshahi, Bangladesh. The topics include: understanding the cybersecurity landscape in power utilities, fundamentals of cybersecurity for power utilities, regulatory compliance and standards, and best practices and strategies. The concepts in this slide deck are relevant for electric utilities throughout Bangladesh.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Progress on the MARVEL Cybersecurity by Design Model-Based Systems Engineering Project

Formal model-based systems engineering (MBSE) combines a model, systems thinking, and systems engineering to visually depict the boundaries, context, and behavior of interconnected systems, facilitating effective design, development, and utilization of engineered systems throughout the systems engineering lifecycle. Although nuclear reactor vendors employ these tools to integrate functionality, performance, and safety, they are not yet addressing digital risk concerns introduced by use of operational technology, such as digital instrumentation and control systems. To accomplish this objective, the Microreactor Applications Research Validation and EvaLuation (MARVEL) microreactor was used as an MBSE case study. This real-world application provides a first-of-a-kind opportunity to demonstrate the benefits of integrating digital risk and cybersecurity into the MBSE design process of a nuclear reactor. This paper provides an update of the ongoing MARVEL Cyber MBSE project as it specifically relates to the integration of digital risk management and cybersecurity by design.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Challenges in cybersecurity: Lessons from biological defense systems

Defending against novel, repeated, or unpredictable attacks, while avoiding attacks on the ‘self’, are the central problems of both mammalian immune systems and computer systems. Both systems have been studied in great detail, but with little exchange of information across the different disciplines. Here, we present a conceptual framework for structured comparisons across the fields of biological immunity and cybersecurity, by framing the context of defense, considering different (combinations of) defensive strategies, and evaluating defensive performance. Throughout this paper, we pose open questions for further exploration. In this work we hope to spark the interdisciplinary discovery of general principles of optimal defense, which can be understood and applied in biological immunity, cybersecurity, and other defensive realms.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Assessing DER Network Cybersecurity Defences in a Power-Communication Co-Simulation Environment

Increasing penetrations of interoperable distributed energy resources (DER) in the electric power system are expanding the power system attack surface. Maloperation or malicious control of DER equipment can now cause substantial disturbances to grid operations. Fortunately, many options exist to defend and limit adversary impact on these newly-created DER communication networks, which typically traverse the public internet. However, implementing these security features will increase communication latency, thereby adversely impacting real-time DER grid support service effectiveness. In this work, a collection of software tools called SCEPTRE were used to create a co-simulation environment where SunSpec-compliant PV inverters were deployed as virtual machines and interconnected to simulated communication network equipment. Network segmentation, encryption, and moving target defence security features were deployed on the control network to evaluate their influence on cybersecurity metrics and power system performance. The results indicated that adding these security features did not impact DER-based grid control systems but improved the cybersecurity posture of the network when implemented appropriately.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

A Photovoltaic MPPT Charge Controller Real-Time Testbed for Cybersecurity Applications

The increasing deployment of distributed energy resources (DER) over the last decade is a great ally to combat climate change and strengthen the grid during increasingly common extreme weather events. However, DER systems, combined with the ongoing transition to a digital power grid, also pose substantial cybersecurity threats. One of the most common communication protocols used in DER integration is the Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3), which is known to have many security vulnerabilities. Thus, it is essential to investigate cyberattack behaviors and mitigation on power systems using DNP3. In this paper, we designed and implemented a cybersecurity testbed for a simulated photovoltaic (PV) maximum power point tracking (MPPT) charge controller. Our testbed uses an MPPT charge controller simulated on a Typhoon HIL602+ real-time simulator with a real DNP3 communication connection over TCP/IP, allowing for safe and efficient monitoring and manipulation of data traffic between the simulated hardware and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Roadmap for Wind Cybersecurity

The Roadmap for Wind Cybersecurity outlines the increasing challenges of cyber threats to the wind industry, its technologies, and control systems and presents a framework of activities and best practices that the wind industry can use to improve its cybersecurity.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Technical Guide for Implementing Cybersecurity Continuous Monitoring in the Nuclear Industry

A technical guide to assist the nuclear industry in implementing cybersecurity continuous monitoring program. The guide walks through the steps to develop a cybersecurity continuous monitoring program and provides details relative to the nuclear industry. It also includes a series of examples of optional metrics to be used, and technologies that can be useful when implementing a continuous monitoring program.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cybersecurity for Distributed Wind: What Integrators Need to Know

Few resources exist to address a growing need to secure distributed wind systems. Idaho National Laboratory recently published the Cybersecurity Guide for Distributed Wind, a richly detailed resource outlining a distributed wind system's possible architecture, relevant standards, risk management strategies, and key recommendations for stakeholders. This document highlights key actionable insights from the Guide that integrators can use to execute an effective cybersecurity strategy.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cybersecurity for Distributed Wind: What Manufacturers Need to Know

Few resources exist to address a growing need to secure distributed wind systems. Idaho National Laboratory recently published the Cybersecurity Guide for Distributed Wind, a richly detailed resource outlining a distributed wind system's possible architecture, relevant standards, risk management strategies, and key recommendations for stakeholders. This document highlights key actionable insights from the Guide that manufacturers can use to execute an effective cybersecurity strategy.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cybersecurity for Distributed Wind: What Operators Need to Know

Few resources exist to address a growing need to secure distributed wind systems. Idaho National Laboratory recently published the Cybersecurity Guide for Distributed Wind, a richly detailed resource outlining a distributed wind system's possible architecture, relevant standards, risk management strategies, and key recommendations for stakeholders. This document highlights key actionable insights from the Guide that operators can use to execute an effective cybersecurity strategy.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Towards a New Supply Chain Cybersecurity Risk Analysis Technique

Supply chain cyber-attacks, such as the SolarWinds Orion attack, are occurring with greater frequency. These attacks compromise a digital device before it is sent to customers, bypassing traditional security controls to remain persistent and undetected in operational environments. While supply chain attacks are prevalent, methods for analyzing the risk of these attacks are currently unavailable. This paper proposes new supply chain cyber-attack difficulty and risk metrics to evaluate the relative risk of an attack throughout the supply chain lifecycle. Difficulty metrics for each stakeholder in a digital device’s supply chain (e.g., hardware manufacturing, firmware development, software development, storage, and distribution entities) are calculated using scores from cybersecurity maturity questionnaires in a Bayesian Network leaky Noisy-MAX model. These difficulty metrics are then used to calculate an overall supply chain cyber-attack risk. Vulnerability and recoverability metrics are also proposed to evaluate the relative stakeholder influence in the attack risk. These proposed relative risk metrics enable continuous supply chain monitoring, provide decision-makers with information necessary for improved supplier selection, and help drive improvements in the cybersecurity posture of the stakeholders in their supply chain.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Business Continuity, Cybersecurity, and Backup Control Center: Standards, References, and Recommendations (White Paper)

This Whitepaper provides an overview and synopsis of relevant standards for Control Center, Cyber Security and Continuity of Operations for electric power utilities. It also provides suggestions and recommendations for the outline of a cybersecurity plan and a business continuity plan, and suggests training and certification opportunities for both cybersecurity and business continuity.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cybersecurity Anomaly Detection in SCADA-Assisted OT Networks Using Ensemble-Based State Prediction Model

The cybersecurity threats of power system gradually grow due to the increased sophisticated interactions between Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) networks. False data injection attack (FDIA) that aims to compromise the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) measurement and disturb the system operation is one of such cyber threats. Such attacks can potentially lead to significant operational issues at the control centers and substations, and hence, result in severe physical consequences. To avoid catastrophic failure across the power grid resulting from these attacks, it is essential to arm the OT network with real-time vulnerability assessment tools. To this end, this paper outlines various drawbacks of the Purdue architecture model to defend against cyberattacks in the OT network. Furthermore, a novel ensemble-based state prediction model is proposed to detect cybersecurity anomalies in SCADA assisted OT networks. The proposed model uses control center level generation and load forecasts, scheduled, and forced outages, power flow solutions, and the substation level historical data. The hypothesis of the proposed scheme relies on the fact that additional control center and substation data can hardly be accessed and compromised by attackers. One of the vital features of the proposed scheme is an hour-ahead prediction of the operational feasibility of the SCADA measurement range at the control center and substation in real time helps in detecting anomalies in measurements across both substation and the control center.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cybersecurity for Clean Energy Resources [Slides]

This presentation provides motivation for research in clean energy cybersecurity and highlights INL projects and capabilities to address clean energy cybersecurity needs. The projects are broken down by device level, plant level, utility level, regulation level, and implementation. This introduction to INL capabilities creates opportunity for further conversations around how cohort members can improve their own organizational security postures.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2024

Multilevel Cybersecurity for Photovoltaic Systems

The motivation behind this project is to protect critical infrastructure in electric power generation pertaining to solar photovoltaic (PV) systems. This growing renewable energy resource is becoming a more vital part of the nation’s energy portfolio, particularly since it has achieved grid-parity to existing generation methods in terms of cost. It is thus vital that steps be taken to ensure the cybersecurity of these assets. The project goal was to devise a multilevel cybersecurity solution to address PV security gaps at the inverter and system levels, and field test the solution under the supervision and review of a US-based solar inverter manufacturer and PV installer/operator. A two-level cyberattack defense approach was formulated whereby the first level, the solar inverter level, hardens individual devices and achieves a deeply cyber-secure inverter. The inverter level security involves a multi-layer defense-in-depth approach for securing the inverter while also providing data for the system level algorithms. The second level, the system level, addresses intrusion detection and restoration involving an ensemble of inverters and relevant systems.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2024

Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator: Cohort 2 - runZero Public Report

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) sponsors the Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator™ (CECA) to expedite the deployment of emerging security technologies that address the most urgent security concerns facing modern and future electric grids. CECA Cohort 2 assessed solutions focused on hidden risks due to incomplete system visibility and device security and configuration. Improving visibility can be achieved through operational technology (OT) asset identification solutions, including capabilities like automatic discovery, vulnerability reporting, and configuration monitoring. Solutions that monitor and identify assets in information technology (IT) networks in other domains are widely used; however, there is far less adoption of monitoring solutions for operational technology environments. Wider adoption may increase with increased confidence in the ability for these solutions to understand and respond to the specific requirements of OT environments. CECA Cohort 2 evaluated the active and passive asset discovery capabilities of market-ready solutions, documented and analyzed results, and identified gaps in functionality or capabilities. This report and describes how these results can help advance the adoption of these and similar solutions in the electric sector.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗