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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Workshop 2 – Prioritizing Digital Assurance Challenges, Session 2

The second session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort, held on November 10, 2025, focused on prioritizing digital assurance challenges at the intersection of data centers and the electric grid. Building on the foundational concepts introduced in Workshop 1, this session deepened the application of the Threat–Vulnerability–Consequence (TVC) framework and emphasized the urgency of addressing cybersecurity, supply chain integrity, and operational reliability. Participants explored the growing convergence of digital and physical systems, the expanding attack surface due to global supply chain dependencies, and the implications of AI-driven load behavior. Real-world incidents—including the Volt Typhoon campaign and vulnerabilities in Solarman and Deye platforms—were analyzed to illustrate the risks of unpatched systems, insecure APIs, and inadequate vendor oversight. Key themes included architecture and interface weaknesses, governance gaps, and human and procedural shortcomings. The workshop also examined the evolving regulatory landscape, highlighting new federal mandates around Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) compliance and large-load reliability standards. Through interactive exercises, stakeholders ranked and mapped digital assurance risks from their respective perspectives—utilities, operators, and vendors—laying the groundwork for mitigation strategies and shared accountability models to be developed in Workshop 3. Session 2 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cyber Threat Assessment of Solar PV Energy

This presentation discusses cyber threats to solar energy systems. Through a discussion of the cyber risk elements of threat, vulnerability, and consequence, we present examples of these risks in the solar industry. Then, we present 8 real-world events from the last 5 years that have affected the solar industry or solar companies.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Securing Grid Communications Infrastructure: Addressing Gaps Beyond NERC CIP Facility Perimeters

The North American electric grid relies on a complex communications infrastructure that extends beyond facility perimeters traditionally covered by NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standards. While CIP requirements have significantly strengthened cybersecurity within Electronic Security Perimeters, many operational communications—such as those between control centers, substations, and third-party networks—fall outside current regulatory scope. As grid modernization introduces new technologies and connectivity models, these external pathways present evolving security challenges. This brief explores the nature of these challenges, including emerging attack vectors and supply chain considerations, and highlights how ongoing grid transformation increases exposure to sophisticated threats. It outlines practical strategies and policy options to complement existing standards, such as expanding secure communications practices, enhancing supply chain transparency, and fostering collaboration among federal, state, and industry stakeholders. Near-term actions like encryption, authentication, and contractual safeguards can help reduce risk while longer-term frameworks are developed to ensure resilient and secure grid operations.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

Commercial integration of advanced nuclear energy with Artificial Intelligence (AI): Possible implications

The integration of advanced nuclear technologies (both fission and fusion) with artificial intelligence (AI) presents unprecedented national security challenges and opportunities. As fusion energy approaches commercial viability alongside advanced Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), their integration with AI and Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) systems could fundamentally transform the global energy and AI landscapes — two pillars of national security. This document briefly examines how AI could accelerate nuclear energy development and deployment while altering existing power structures, a lot could be done to deepen the discussions. Simultaneously, it observes how nuclear-powered AI may expedite advances toward AGI and beyond. These issues are deeply interconnected and thus need to be examined as a whole and more comprehensively than what’s being summarized here. For instance, AI-powered autonomous operation of nuclear facilities could reduce human error but introduce new cybersecurity vulnerabilities and uncertainties. Further investigation would also address how AI-enhanced nuclear technologies might complicate proliferation concerns through advanced fuel cycle management, nuclear materials production and safeguard. The strategic advantage gained by first entities achieving successful AI-nuclear integration could reshape global and national security framework. Timely analysis of these implications may be crucial for policymakers seeking to harness these technologies' benefits while effectively mitigating their potential risks.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗
DOE OSTI2024

BESSIE: Battery & Energy Storage Supply Chain Analysis, Mitigation Deployment, and Tools

Battery energy storage systems (BESS) and their associated power electronic interfaces are key components to delivering clean and more resilient energy, providing much-needed fast-ramping, emergency discharge, generation, and operations support to the electric grid. These services have grown to be invaluable over the past ten years and will soon be an irreplaceable element of energy delivery. The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) strives to address these challenges through a strategic approach to supply chain risk assessment and mitigation for BESS and related digital energy equipment through the BESSIE project under the Center for Securing Digital Energy Technology. Recognizing that decreasing dependence on a foreign supply chain will take significant time and investment, BESSIE’s focus is strategically addressing battery supply chain risks by pairing short-term steps to operate securely through today’s risks with long-term steps to shape the supply chain over the coming years.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2024

Lessons Learned for Responsible Use of Cloud in the Cirrus Project, Following the CrowdStrike Outage Event

A disruption in CrowdStrike’s Falcon cybersecurity platform on July 19th, 2024, caused worldwide chaos. This event highlights the imperative need for cloud security measures for networks that are critically reliant on cloud technology. This incident negatively impacted air travel, government networks, and critical infrastructure sectors such as hospitals and financial institutions. While no electric utilities had a physical impact, and few had an IT impact, there were issues created by loss of cloud services, and other interrelated industries. For utilities and energy distribution organizations, understanding and mitigating these risks is essential. The Cirrus tool offers a strategic solution engineered to weave cloud integration seamlessly into the fabric of operational management, thereby enhancing resilience and streamlining efficiency in the face of digital challenges.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2024

Battery Energy Storage Systems Report

Battery energy storage systems (BESS) are a critical component of grid reliability and resilience today, providing rapid response capabilities while enabling grid modernization and capacity expansion across the United States. As utilities, communities, and customers prepare to deploy significant BESS capacity over the next several years, the United States has an opportunity to build security into battery system design and deployments. This report provides a framework for assessing the current dominance of foreign-manufactured components in the supply chains for BESS, inverter-based resources, and transformers. It offers high-impact, actionable solutions to service partners, industry, and government to address supply chain risks for currently installed, in design, and future deployments.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Threat Landscape for BESS and IBR

The cyber risk landscape for BESS and IBR can be broken up by threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences for these systems. This presentation walks through the cyber risk landscape for BESS through the lens of consequence-informed awareness and mitigation for each risk factor. Threats with varying capabilities have been demonstrated in real-world events. Though threat actors can rarely be directly influenced by organizations, exposure of systems to adversaries can be limited (a known issue with IBR systems) to reduce likelihood of adversaries accessing systems with disruptive consequences. Common trends in disclosed IBR vulnerabilities include weak password generation or managements for various devices or services and web portal vulnerabilities that provide unauthorized access to data or capabilities or elevated user privileges. Understanding these common vulnerabilities and considering the consequences if these types of vulnerabilities were to occur can help mitigate risk. Consequences range from loss-of-view events that have no reliability impact to asset damage or grid stability impacts. Five case studies are briefly shared to highlight trends in real-world events affecting IBR.

14 - SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Reactor Safeguards & Security Program: Cybersecurity Scenarios

The use of digital control systems and automation in advanced nuclear power systems introduces different types of vulnerabilities compared to legacy (i.e. analog) control systems that cyber adversaries can exploit. These vulnerabilities pose a challenge to reactor operators and cyber operations staff due to the dynamic nature of the event in which a human response or a lack of response can potentially evolve into a worsening plant condition. Using the Department of Homeland Security Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) critical infrastructure exercise framework, this document presents several cyber security scenarios typical of digital control systems that could be used in advanced reactor designs. These scenarios can be used in tabletop exercises to evaluate cyber security posture or conduct training on different aspects of cyber security, including detection, threat hunting using indicators of compromise, evaluating incident response, risk mitigation, incident reporting, information sharing and recovery.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2026

ARIES Annual Report FY25

Advanced Research on Integrated Energy Systems (ARIES) at the National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR) is the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) test bed for energy system demonstration and de-risking. ARIES comprises the largest collection of physical and digital assets in the DOE laboratory complex, supporting flexible configuration across a broad range of energy scenarios. In Fiscal Year 2025, ARIES provided a platform for system-level research to anticipate and address future energy needs in energy security, system reliability, and technology deployment.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

Addressing Rising Energy Demand Through Innovation

The U.S. is facing a significant increase in energy demand, driven by AI advancements, the rapid expansion of data centers, manufacturing and industrial growth, and the electrification of transportation and buildings. Buildings alone account for approximately 75% of U.S. electricity consumption and 40% of total energy use. To address these challenges, NLR leverages its state-of-the-art research facilities, advanced energy modeling, hardware-in-the-loop emulation, and real-world demonstrations to provide data-driven insights that de-risk emerging energy solutions, increase efficiency and demand flexibility, optimize grid controls, and identify vulnerabilities to enhance energy security. This presentation will highlight our research ecosystem and its role in supporting a more reliable, affordable, and adaptive energy infrastructure in the face of accelerating demand.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2026

Smart Inverters, Dumb Risk: Taking Control of IBR Security in the Digital Age

This presentation addresses the security challenges posed by Inverter-Based Resources (IBRs) in the modern energy landscape. The presentation highlights the vulnerabilities and risks associated with IBRs, including the potential for cyber-attacks, the impact of insecure defaults, and the systemic risks posed by supply chain dependencies. Key topics covered include: 1) The increasing digital transformation in energy systems and the associated security risks. 2) Specific vulnerabilities in IBRs, including weak passwords, hardcoded credentials, and insecure web application interfaces. 3) The implications of persistent connectivity and the strategic risks posed by foreign-manufactured components. 4) The role of regulatory frameworks, such as NERC CIP, in addressing these challenges and the limitations of current oversight. 5) Practical solutions for mitigating risks, including secure design practices, vendor risk assessments, and the importance of strong passwords and role-based access control. The presentation underscores the necessity of a comprehensive, system-of-systems approach to securing IBRs, emphasizing the need for collaboration across various stakeholders, including operators, developers, and regulators, to ensure the resilience and security of the energy grid.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

A Computational Review of Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms for the Smart Grid

Smart grid technologies have rapidly become one of the largest and most comprehensive sources of data for the modern utility. For the most part, data streams are seen as an essential tool that enable utilities to carry their day-to-day business operations, but they also create the need for efficient and secure data management strategies. In the context of the smart grid, ensuring data privacy is becoming an increasing concern due to a combination of factors that range from shifts in operational paradigms and rapid technology evolution to changes in legislation. Furthermore, researchers have highlighted the risks associated with improperly protected energy records. For example, energy consumption data from homes could be used to infer the behaviors and habits of home occupants through activity recognition or user profiling (Fan, 2017), which may lead to unfair service pricing, targeted advertising, or other personal security violations. Similarly, Electric Vehicles’ (EVs) charging metadata could be used to reveal private information about the owner such as their payment methods, preferred charging stations, and other locational and timing information that could be used to reconstruct the vehicle owner’s behaviors. The privacy of user data, even when used for statistical analysis or machine learning training processes, also needs to be carefully considered, as an individual’s private traits may still be vulnerable if their inclusion/exclusion greatly impacts the result or could be linked to a public dataset through cross-reference. The breach of user privacy also has severe impacts for organizations that store, transmit, or work on the data in the form of diminishing the public’s trust in them while potentially incurring legal consequences (e.g., fines and suspensions under the European Union General Data Protection Regulation, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, etc.). Because of these risks, several privacy-preserving mechanisms are available to help organizations comply with privacy legislations and prevent the unauthorized and malicious use of user data. In light of these concerns, this report focuses on performing a computational review of privacy-preserving mechanisms that have received a significant amount of interest in literature. It specifically focuses on 1) homomorphic encryption, 2) zero-knowledge proofs, 3) differential privacy, and 4) federated learning. It is worth noting that although many of the methods presented in this document rely on cryptographic primitives, their intent is not to provide perfect secrecy, but rather to enable users to maintain privacy, and thus they shall not be compared or equated to other constructs that are aimed to address cybersecurity constructs.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Enhancing Cloud Cybersecurity: Prescriptive Controls for Operational Technology

This whitepaper provides strategic insights and recommendations into security cloud-based solutions for electric utilities, encompassing operational technology (OT), virtual power plants (VPP), distributed energy resources (DERs), applications, networks, and data storage as they transition to and leverage cloud infrastructure through managed service providers (MSPs) and cloud service providers (CSPs). Principles derived from established frameworks serve as a foundation for best practices across cybersecurity projects and remove the constraints of settling on a single framework. For organizations that prefer not to integrate a specific framework altogether, elements of the proposed approach could be adopted or tailored to best fit defined requirements and expected functionalities. The Cirrus assessment, a utility cloud feasibility tool, and the roadmap it provides serve as a precursor to this paper, which seeks to be a valuable resource for defining next steps following cloud technology integration feasibility appraisal. With its comprehensive approach to adoption, the Cirrus framework offers strategic guidance on responsibly preparing for or deploying a utility cloud solution. The previously published whitepaper, “Use Case-Informed Framework for Utility Cloud Migration,” details the guiding strategy, research, and deployment of cloud solutions within electric and interconnected grid systems. Before implementing the controls suggested in this document, it is recommended that stakeholders complete Cirrus's cloud integration assessment and pair the results with their unique cybersecurity controls to form a comprehensive cloud-based utility cybersecurity plan. The Cirrus outcome will consider a series of future architectures for the grid before and after the energy transition and evaluate the arguments for and against cloud applications for each electric and interconnected grid layer. This document is a companion to the original whitepaper, "Use Case-Informed Framework for Utility Cloud Migration" to further identify and recommend security controls based on Cirrus’s cloud integration assessment output. The following whitepaper outlines the cybersecurity controls that secure cloud-service models pertinent to the electric sector using the predefined categories identify, protect, detect, and respond and recover. The objective is to outline prescriptive security controls based on the type of architecture and data stored in the cloud. The focus includes dissecting the shared responsibility model and elucidating what on-premises Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service (SaaS) entail. A pivotal consideration in this context is allocating responsibility for foundational cybersecurity aspects—having used Cirrus for the cloud integration assessment. The ensuing controls detailed herein also represent a checklist of controls necessary for a secure cloud transition, equipping utilities with the knowledge to navigate this digital transformation with confidence and strategic foresight in a safe and responsible manner.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cyber-Informed Engineering Briefing for ABET

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) is an emerging method to integrate cybersecurity considerations into the conception, design, development, and operation of any physical system, energy or otherwise, to mitigate or even eliminate avenues for cyber-enabled attacks.?CIE concepts use design decisions and engineering controls to prioritize defense against the worst possible consequences of cyberattacks facing critical infrastructure systems and asset owners. These slides offer a deep dive into Cyber-Informed Engineering for engineering educators.

42 - ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

ARCADE Analysis Methods & Validation Pathway

The Advanced Reactor Cyber Analysis and Development Environment (ARCADE) provides an automated analysis system which supports risk-informed performance based (RIPB) evaluations of nuclear control systems. Every possible cyber threat which could lead to consequence is identified by simulating the unsafe control action sequences which transform digital harm into physical harm. Eliminating the simulation of complex digital cyber attack chains cuts out unnecessary computational overhead and focuses directly on the physics of cyber-physical attacks. This focus enables designers to make informed decisions which can entirely eliminate categories of cyber threats against advanced reactors through the physical nature of the plant design. This narrowing of cyber threat against nuclear power plants through the physics of the system is intended to make any remaining threat management and cost efficient. This is the goal of the Tiered Cyber Analysis (TCA) outlined in NRC Draft Regulation Guide (RG) 5.96, which provides a RIPB cybersecurity approach for new reactors. ARCADE has been custom developed to meet the demands of the rigorous analysis required in Tier 1 of the TCA, which forms the foundation of the TCA process. Currently, ARCADE is still under development, but has made significant leaps in capability. A pilot analysis on the opensource Asherah simulator was performed which demonstrated key functionality goals. The next stage of ARCADE development involves improvements to the applications which support the analysis system, and enabling the analysis system to utilize the full suite of unsafe control action simulations. Since the analysis method’s core functions are complete, validation of the analysis method will be started concurrent to the next development stages. The automated analysis ARCADE will provide can radically change the cybersecurity design process for advanced reactors, reducing the cost of security implementation while enhancing cyber resilience. The pathway for ARCADE’s development to this goal has become much clearer. The majority of technical hurdles have been cleared, and the remaining development needs have been solidified. ARCADE is now capable of assisting the advanced reactor design process and directly support advanced reactor industry RIPB practices.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Robust Restoration From Cyber-Physical Attacks in Active Distribution Grids With Grid-Edge IBRs

The inverter-based resources (IBRs) have enabled the integration of renewable energy at the grid edge with enhanced control capabilities to support the reliable operation of power grids. Different control frameworks, such as hierarchical or distributed architecture, have been proposed with the expansion of cyber networks for real-time monitoring and control. This evolution of critical infrastructure into cyber-physical systems also brings more vulnerabilities for the broadened attack surfaces, and significantly increases the possibility of physical system failures or outages caused by cyberattacks. Among tremendous efforts in the defense-in-depth approach, it remains challenging to provide prompt detection and accurate location of attack entry points or paths. Therefore, the prevailing restoration framework may struggle to fully consider the cyber-physical interdependence, successfully isolate the compromised cyber and physical components, and safely recover the systems without the potential risks leading to secondary outages. This paper is motivated to develop a cyber-physical restoration framework for distribution grids to recover from cyber attacks by harnessing grid-edge IBRs. The framework is first built on the operational guidelines of IBRs considering the compromised cyber layer. Then, an ambiguity set is established to represent the uncertainty of attack scenarios and their possibility levels. Next, a distributionally robust optimization model is developed to provide the optimal load restoration strategy across all scenarios. The effectiveness of the proposed model is demonstrated through various use cases on the modified IEEE 13-node and 123-node test systems. Finally, simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness and advancement of developed post-attack restoration strategies.

Cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2025

Encrypted Control Using Modified Learning With Errors-based Schemes

Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) require reliable, safe, and secure control of critical infrastructure, combining computational and networking capabilities, which heighten the risk of cyber attacks. These attacks can disrupt the physical process, causing unforeseen consequences. One solution is the use of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) to protect the control loop, allowing for secure computations and communications without compromising signal and control system privacy. The challenge with FHE, however, is its requirement for inputs to be integers. This paper introduces a modified Learning With Errors (LWE) FHE approach that encodes control system dynamics and signals into integers. Our proposed scheme leverages a generalized LWE encoding function and modifies the Gentry-Sahai-Waters (GSW) gadget decomposition tool to encrypt the control system. Using the modified LWE scheme, we formalize a fully encrypted control system, supported by simulated results.

42 - ENGINEERING↗