SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Department of Defense”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 145 records · Page 8

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

DOE OSTI2021

Recommended Practices for Managing Induced Seismicity Risk Associated with Geologic Carbon Storage

The geologic storage of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) is one method to help reduce or eliminate atmospheric CO 2 emissions. The sequestered CO 2 is originally captured from the atmosphere or from a stationary industrial source and subsequently injected into a deep subsurface porous rock formation. To facilitate the successful deployment of field scale carbon storage projects, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is developing tools and protocols for defensible, science-based frameworks to quantify and mitigate risks associated with the long-term storage of CO 2 . This protocol specifically addresses the risk of induced seismicity due to injection in a geologic carbon storage (GCS) site. This integrated and risk-based protocol is a product of the U.S. DOE Fossil Energy’s National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP), a multi-year collaborative research effort of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL), and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). These recommended practices describe a set of 7 steps to evaluate, manage, communicate, and mitigate the risk of induced seismicity at GCS sites. The base methodology of the recommended practices follows a framework similar to the Protocol for Addressing Induced Seismicity Associated with Enhanced Geothermal Systems (Majer et al., 2012), developed for the Geothermal Technology Office of the U.S. DOE. These recommended practices present a framework to systematically assess the induced seismicity risk and quantify the associated uncertainties. These recommendations are based on current research and are sufficiently general to allow for modification and application to a variety of different types of sites. The substance of the recommended practices contained herein includes both technical and non-technical issues, and covers all operational stages of the GCS project lifecycle. They start at the preliminary risk assessment phase, continue through site assessment and characterization, include best practice communication and seismic monitoring plan methodologies, discuss the evaluation and mitigation of seismic hazard and risk, and closes with an exploration of operational management plans, which conclude when the induced seismicity risk abates back to background level. The focus of these recommendations is on actively managing the risks associated with induced seismicity by developing an actionable risk management plan that starts at the project proposal stage and continues through site closure through an iterative assessment and improvement process. The audience of this document is expected to include all interested stakeholders (e.g., operators, project developers, regulators, and the general public) and is expressly written to be accessible to this broad range of partners. This document is intended to disseminate knowledge gained through recent advances in the science of induced seismicity hazard and risk assessments, to provide updates based on recent experience gained by similar corollary injection-induced seismicity cases, and most importantly to establish a uniform framework to carry out a successful induced seismicity risk management plan for carbon storage projects in the future. These recommendations do not directly address any domestic or international regulations or standards. A complementary NRAP report makes recommendations for the assessment and management of environmental subsurface risks associated with unwanted fluid migration at GCS sites (Thomas et al., 2021) and should be referred to in order to address those additional GCS site risks.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2021

Recommended Practices for Managing Induced Seismicity Risk Associated with Geologic Carbon Storage

The geologic storage of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) is one method to help reduce or eliminate atmospheric CO 2 emissions. The sequestered CO 2 is originally captured from the atmosphere or from a stationary industrial source and subsequently injected into a deep subsurface porous rock formation. To facilitate the successful deployment of field scale carbon storage projects, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is developing tools and protocols for defensible, science-based frameworks to quantify and mitigate risks associated with the long-term storage of CO 2 . This protocol specifically addresses the risk of induced seismicity due to injection in a geologic carbon storage (GCS) site. This integrated and risk-based protocol is a product of the U.S. DOE Fossil Energy’s National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP), a multi-year collaborative research effort of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL), and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). These recommended practices describe a set of 7 steps to evaluate, manage, communicate, and mitigate the risk of induced seismicity at GCS sites. The base methodology of the recommended practices follows a framework similar to the $\textit{Protocol for Addressing Induced Seismicity Associated with Enhanced Geothermal Systems}$ (Majer et al., 2012), developed for the Geothermal Technology Office of the U.S. DOE. These recommended practices present a framework to systematically assess the induced seismicity risk and quantify the associated uncertainties. These recommendations are based on current research and are sufficiently general to allow for modification and application to a variety of different types of sites. The substance of the recommended practices contained herein includes both technical and non-technical issues, and covers all operational stages of the GCS project lifecycle. They start at the preliminary risk assessment phase, continue through site assessment and characterization, include best practice communication and seismic monitoring plan methodologies, discuss the evaluation and mitigation of seismic hazard and risk, and closes with an exploration of operational management plans, which conclude when the induced seismicity risk abates back to background level. The focus of these recommendations is on actively managing the risks associated with induced seismicity by developing an actionable risk management plan that starts at the project proposal stage and continues through site closure through an iterative assessment and improvement process. The audience of this document is expected to include all interested stakeholders (e.g., operators, project developers, regulators, and the general public) and is expressly written to be accessible to this broad range of partners. This document is intended to disseminate knowledge gained through recent advances in the science of induced seismicity hazard and risk assessments, to provide updates based on recent experience gained by similar corollary injection-induced seismicity cases, and most importantly to establish a uniform framework to carry out a successful induced seismicity risk management plan for carbon storage projects in the future. These recommendations do not directly address any domestic or international regulations or standards. A complementary NRAP report makes recommendations for the assessment and management of environmental subsurface risks associated with unwanted fluid migration at GCS sites (Thomas et al., 2021) and should be referred to in order to address those additional GCS site risks

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2024

Sigma Division Capability Strategy

Sigma Division maintains a unique manufacturing science capability at Los Alamos National Laboratory that has made substantial contributions to weapons component process development for more than 70 years. This mission requires the ability to handle a range of radiological and hazardous materials, work with a variety of metallic and non-metallic components, and process materials systems with elements spanning hydrogen to uranium. Today, Sigma serves as a national resource for uranium research and development, provides hardware for experimental campaigns, supports production by demonstrating modern fabrication technologies, and conducts manufacturing science research primarily for customers across the nuclear weapons complex, including the Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, and Office of Defense Programs.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2023

Women as a Force Multiplier for Bringing Nuclear Forensic Capabilities to the International Stage

In 2009, the US Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program initiated a new nuclear forensics outreach effort under its Confidence Building Measures Program. Little did they know that the timing could not have been better. This article focuses on the early years (2009–2015) of the NNSA’s international nuclear forensics outreach, specifically the efforts and experiences of the women who helped establish this program, building it from a fledgling, bilateral effort into an enduring technical capacity provider engaging with dozens of countries and multilateral organizations. At the onset of the program, nuclear forensics was an emerging priority within the US Government and receiving increased focus from international organizations through high-level diplomatic efforts such as the Nuclear Security Summit and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Additionally, working-level initiatives were gaining traction through the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group. Over the next 6 years, a small team comprising a uniquely large number of women NNSA federal, contract, and national laboratory staff served as key leaders engaging with the international community to strengthen global technical nuclear forensics capacity and best practices. The program continues today under the Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Program as Investigation Support. The experiences shared here detail a unique time period when the new technical discipline of nuclear forensics was beginning to mature and gain international traction. The authors have made every effort to remember history correctly and be as inclusive as possible. A wealth of training, guidance, and exercise documentation was developed in the 2009–2015 time frame, much of which still serves as the foundation for today’s even more extensive program and community of dedicated technical and diplomatic practitioners.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2020

Safeguards by Design Projects (FY2020 Final Report)

This University Engagement project challenged engineering students at universities, that do not have Bachelor degrees in nuclear engineering but do have research reactors and some nuclear engineering coursework, to incorporate Safeguards by Design concepts into their Senior Capstone Design Project. This University Engagement project was part of the U. S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Office of International Nuclear Safeguards, Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, Human Capital Development: University Engagement Program. This program exposed university students with Mechanical Engineering majors and Nuclear Engineering minors to the concepts of international nuclear safeguards. FY20, three teams at the University of Rhode Island and one team at the University of Texas - Austin participated in researching, designing, building, and testing projects to support international nuclear safeguards measurements or verification. The projects involved engaging in activities at the university’s research reactors. All the projects engaged students with prototyping a design and/or tool for application at the Universities’ reactor. At the end of the course, most of the students expressed the experience was a positive and they learned more about international nuclear safeguards and applying requirements than they had previously encountered. This school year the projects were further complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Both universities cancelled in class room classes, and limited direct student/professor interactions. Furthermore, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) greatly restricted travel, therefore making it impossible to visit the students at the end of the semester for the review of their design projects. The final design and review meeting for the projects happened via the internet. Additionally, while the teams planned to build prototypes this did not happen since there was a social distancing ban on students meeting in person.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Summary Report for the NEPA Impact Analysis. Revision 1

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), located in southeastern New Mexico, has been developed by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for the geologic (deep underground) disposal of defense-related transuranic (TRU) waste. Containment of TRU waste at the WIPP facility is derived from standards set forth in Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 191. The DOE assesses compliance with the containment standards according to the Certification Criteria in Title 40 CFR Part 194 by means of Performance Assessment (PA) calculations performed by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). WIPP PA calculations estimate the probability of radionuclide releases from the repository to the accessible environment for a regulatory period of 10,000 years after facility closure. The DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) has initiated a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) action for a proposal to excavate and use additional transuranic (TRU) waste disposal panels at the WIPP facility. This report documents an analysis undertaken as part of an effort to evaluate the potential environmental consequences of the proposed action. Although not explicitly required for a NEPA analysis, evaluations of a dose indicator to hypothetical members of the public after final facility closure are presented in this report. The analysis is carried out in two stages: first, Performance Assessment (PA) calculations quantify the potential releases to the accessible environment over a 10,000-year post-closure period. Second, dose was evaluated for three hypothetical exposure pathways using the conservative radionuclide concentrations assumed to be released to the accessible environment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2021

Safeguards by Design Projects (Final Report FY2021)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Safeguards by Design Projects (Final Report-FY-22)

This University Engagement project challenged engineering students at universities, that do not have Bachelor degree programs in nuclear engineering but do have research reactors and some nuclear engineering coursework, to incorporate Safeguards by Design concepts into their Senior Capstone Design Project. This University Engagement project was part of the U. S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Office of International Nuclear Safeguards, Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), Human Capital Development (HCD): University Engagement Program. This program exposed university students with Mechanical Engineering majors and Nuclear Engineering minors to the concepts of international nuclear safeguards. In FY22, three teams at the University of Rhode Island and two teams at the University of Texas - Austin participated in researching, designing, building, and testing projects to support international nuclear safeguards measurements or verification. The projects involved engaging in activities at the university’s research reactors. All the projects engaged students with prototyping a design and/or tool for application at the Universities’ reactor. At the end of the course, most of the students expressed the experience was positive and they learned more about international nuclear safeguards and applying requirements than they had previously encountered. This school year the projects were further complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Both universities had limited in classes on campus, still relying on Zoom classes, and limited direct student/professor interactions. Furthermore, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) greatly restricted travel, therefore making it impossible to visit the students at the end of the semester for the review of their design projects. The final design and review meeting for the projects happened via meetings over the internet. Additionally, the teams did build and test some prototypes but could only do so in a limited capacity.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2023

Safeguards by Design Table Top Exercises Final Report (FY 2023)

This University Engagement project challenged engineering students at universities, that do not have bachelor’s degree programs in nuclear engineering but do have research reactors and some nuclear engineering coursework, to develop capacity in Safeguards by Design concepts through the application of Tabletop Exercises. This University Engagement project was part of the U. S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Office of International Nuclear Safeguards, Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), Human Capital Development (HCD): University Engagement Program. This program exposed university students with Mechanical Engineering majors and Nuclear Engineering minors to the concepts of international nuclear safeguards. In FY22, three teams at the University of Rhode Island and two teams at the University of Texas Austin participated in researching, designing, building, and testing projects to support international nuclear safeguards measurements or verification. The projects involved engaging in activities at the university’s research reactors. All the projects engaged students with prototyping a design and/or tool for application at the Universities’ reactor. However, for FY23, the direction of the HCD project had changed to implementing a Tabletop Exercise in Safeguards by Design (SBD). A Tabletop Exercise was not executed during FY23, but relationships with both Universities was maintained and how to integrate the exercise into the curriculum of both programs was determined.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Development of a Neutron List Mode Collar (LMCL) and a List Mode Response Matrix Analysis Concept

This report was prepared for the Safeguards Program of the US Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D). The report presents the development of the neutron nondestructive assay system, the List Mode Collar (LMCL) for the project OR16-List Mode for Collar-PD1La “List Mode Response Matrix for Advanced Correlated Neutron Analysis for Nuclear Safeguards.” The new list mode electronics developed under this project, and a spatial analysis concept called the List Mode Response Matrix are also described in this report. Analysis algorithms based on classification methods are published in a separate report. This research addresses the need to expand the capabilities of current nondestructive assay systems used for nuclear safeguards applications and considers the sustainability of safeguards technologies by the development of a “retrofit” concept using electronics based on modern standards. Furthermore, employing list mode data acquisition enabled the development of a spatial analysis concept and empirical measurement of a spatial response not previously used for safeguards neutron counting applications or measured in a traditional neutron collar detector and, therefore, provides new capability.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Accelerated Beta Radiation Aging of Interlayer Titanium Nitride in Gallium Nitride Contacts

Research conducted under the Laboratory Directed Research and Development Program at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, a multiprogram national laboratory operated by Battelle for the U.S. Department of Energy. An NNSS author co-authored this paper, and portions of this work were supported by the Mission Support and Test Services, LLC, under Contract No. DE-NA0003624 with the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, NA-10 USDOE NA Office of Defense Programs (NA-10). PNNL-SA-163618 Currently, there is no good way to determine the influence of radiation on the aging of betavoltaic electrical contacts. This work tested a method to accelerate the aging of the contacts inside a betavoltaic by enhancing energy deposition within the interfacial region of interest. An electrical contact of gold-titanium on gallium nitride was aged by exposure to tritium betas and electrons in a beamline. The interface stoichiometry was compared to the electrical performance of the contact. The method to age the betavoltaic component could help predict the lifetime performance of the internal electrical contacts and provide assurance of deployment reliability.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2025

Genomic factors limiting the diversity of Saccharomycotina plant pathogens

We compared the genomes of 12 plant-pathogenic Saccharomycotina strains to 360 plant-associated strains to identify features unique to the phytopathogens. Characterization of the oxylipin synthesis genes, a compound believed to be involved in Eremothecium pathogenicity, did not reveal any differences in gene presence within or between the plant-pathogenic and plant-associated strains. A reverse-ecological approach, however, revealed that plant pathogens lack several metabolic enzymes known to assist other phytopathogens in overcoming plant defenses.

phytopathogen↗

DOE OSTI2023

A Cybersecurity Testbed for Smart Buildings

Smart buildings are equipped with a plethora of cyber-physical systems, such as Internet of Things (IoT) devices and building automation systems. These devices, especially in commercial buildings, use legacy communications and hardware that were not designed with cybersecurity in mind. With increasing cyber threats in recent years, smart buildings have become an increasing target for attacks, but not enough published data are available from these incidents to study or replicate the scenarios to defend buildings. As part of the U.S. Department of Energy-funded project focusing on developing the Building Intelligence with Layered Defense Using Security-Constrained Optimization and Security Risk Detection (BUILD-SOS) platform, we developed a cybersecurity test bed for smart buildings. This test bed includes a building simulation tool, virtual devices, emulated operational technology networks, and remote hardware-in-the-loop. Using this test bed, we performed different cyberattacks on the smart building model and collected both physical building data, to understand the impacts on the building, and network data, to aid in separating mechanical faults from cyberattacks during the detection. This test bed is a significant tool in protecting smart buildings from cyberattacks because it can aid in both cybersecurity analysis and the evaluation of other cyberattack detection tools by testing the tools in a secure environment without impacting the building operations.

cyber-physical systems↗

DOE OSTI2024

A Cybersecurity Testbed for Smart Buildings

Smart buildings are equipped with a plethora of cyber-physical systems, such as Internet of Things (IoT) devices and building automation systems. These devices, especially in commercial buildings, use legacy communications and hardware that were not designed with cybersecurity in mind. With increasing cyber threats in recent years, smart buildings have become an increasing target for attacks, but not enough published data are available from these incidents to study or replicate the scenarios to defend buildings. As part of the U.S. Department of Energy-funded project focusing on developing the Building Intelligence with Layered Defense Using Security-Constrained Optimization and Security Risk Detection (BUILD-SOS) platform, we developed a cybersecurity test bed for smart buildings. This test bed includes a building simulation tool, virtual devices, emulated operational technology networks, and remote hardware-in-the-loop. Using this test bed, we performed different cyberattacks on the smart building model and collected both physical building data, to understand the impacts on the building, and network data, to aid in separating mechanical faults from cyberattacks during the detection. This test bed is a significant tool in protecting smart buildings from cyberattacks because they can aid in both cybersecurity analysis and the evaluation of cyberattack detection tools by testing the tools in a secure environment without impacting the building operations.

alfalfa↗

DOE OSTI2021

Report on Next-Gen AI for Proliferation Detection Workshop: Domain-Aware Methods

The emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) in the modern world has impacted nearly every application imaginable. This includes nuclear proliferation detection, which offers the potential to improve existing capabilities as well as create new ones. Proliferation detection seeks to detect and characterize attempts by state and non-state actors to acquire nuclear weapons or associated technology, materials, or knowledge. Such a mission is vitally important for global stability and security but is notoriously difficult. By leveraging advances in AI, exciting opportunities exist to enhance the proliferation detection regime. The Data Science and AI portfolio within the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D) seeks to leverage the capabilities of the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) national laboratories and other partners to develop AI systems that can accomplish otherwise impossible tasks in support of proliferation detection. As part of its efforts, the portfolio has created a series of workshops on Next-Gen AI for Proliferation Detection to help define the requirements for suitable AI systems, share successful research and best practices, and foster connection and understanding between the relevant parties including researchers and end-users. Each workshop in the series focuses on a specific and critical aspect of AI to enable it to accomplish proliferation detection objectives. The first workshop focused on explainability techniques; the second workshop and the topic of this report, covers methods for incorporating domain awareness into AI. The Next-Gen AI for Proliferation Detection Workshop: Domain-Aware Methods took place virtually over two days in February 2021 and included four keynote presentations, 22 technical presentations, and a concluding panel. The presentations, discussions, and workshop findings are summarized in this report.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2022

Design Guidelines for Deployable Wind Turbines for Defense and Disaster Response Missions

Access to on-site electrical energy is critical to ensuring a successful military or humanitarian response to conflicts and disasters. These missions typically rely on access to liquid fuel that could be vulnerable to disruption or attack during transport. Generating power on location with wind technology can reduce this risk and enhance mission reach by diversifying energy sources. Common characteristics of these missions are short planning and execution time horizons and a global scope of potential locations. Compared to conventional wind turbine applications, defense and disaster response applications place a premium on rapid shipping and installation, short-duration operation (days to months), and quick teardown upon mission completion. These design drivers depart from features found in conventional distributed wind turbines, thus necessitating unique design guidance. The supporting information for this guidance comes from available relevant references, technical analyses, and input from industry and military stakeholders. This poster serves as a summary of project publications which presents the best currently available design guidance for deployable wind turbines to facilitate the effective development and acquisition of technology solutions to support mission success. This Defense and Disaster Deployable Turbine Project (D3T) is a multi-laboratory effort led by Sandia National Laboratories and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Wind Energy Technologies Office.

deployable wind↗

DOE OSTI2024

Plant Disease Detection Technology Assessment

Visual inspections by US Customs and Border Protection agriculture specialists have identified approximately 20,000 regulated, quarantined pests each year in agricultural products entering the United States. Most of these pests identified in the Agriculture Quarantine and Inspection (AQI) program are insects. Many pathogens are difficult to detect in agricultural products, particularly in early stages of infection. New technologies can help to detect plant pathogens and the diseases that they cause. This technology assessment was performed for the US Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T) through the Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense (FAV-D) program to identify emerging technologies that could address this hard problem. These emerging technologies differ in their diagnostic sensitivities and specificities, as well as in their measurement time and training requirements. New instruments that detect volatile organic compounds characteristic of plant disease or pathogens could provide a less invasive inspection method. Dogs, which can successfully detect many concealed agricultural products, have also been trained to detect some plant pests and pathogens. Simple immunological tests offer sensitive and specific detection of many pathogens at the point of use. Advanced imaging methods that use AI to sort fruits and vegetables and recognize anomalies at high speeds could be used in cooperation with exporters to improve food quality and reduce pests. Advances in nucleic acid–based detection methods that have become gold standards for confirmatory diagnostics are now making those methods available for faster, point-of-use detection. These new methods should be developed in the context of AQI operational requirements, which apply risk-based sampling protocols to protect agriculture and facilitate commerce and passenger transit.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2025

NCERC 2024 Highlights

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is entrusted with ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile while advancing programs aimed at reducing global nuclear proliferation. These critical mission objectives are achieved through the expertise of a highly skilled team of professionals. The operations at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) play a vital role in developing and enhancing knowledge and expertise in advanced nuclear technologies. NCERC supports a wide range of mission areas, including nuclear criticality safety, nuclear emergency response, and nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards, and arms control. It also provides support to the Department of Homeland Security, advances stockpile stewardship science, and delivers scientific expertise to other government agencies, such as NASA and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. NCERC conducts experiments utilizing diverse nuclear materials, from small neutron-emitting sources for testing radiation detection equipment to larger quantities of uranium and plutonium for criticality experiments. A cornerstone of NCERC's mission portfolio includes the operation of four critical mass assembly machines—Planet, Comet, Flattop, and Godiva-IV—which are instrumental in advancing nuclear science and ensuring the nation’s nuclear security objectives.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗