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NASA NTRS2015

Characteristics of a Well Clear Definition and Alerting Criteria for Encounters Between UAS and Manned Aircraft in Class E Airspace

Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) will be required to equip with a detect-and-avoid (DAA) system in order to satisfy the federal aviation regulations to remain well clear of other aircraft. For a DAA system to satisfy the requirement to stay well clear of other airborne traffic, a quantitative definition of well clear needs to be defined and evaluated. This study investigates the implications of UAS using proposed well clear definitions as a separation standard for conducting operations in the National Airspace System (NAS). The first analysis considers three well clear definitions and presents the relative state conditions of intruder aircraft as they encroach upon the well clear boundary. The second analysis focuses on the definition of the alerting criteria needed to inform the UAS operator of a potential loss of well clear. All analyses are conducted in a NAS-wide fast-time simulation environment using UAS aircraft models, proposed UAS missions, and historical air defense radar data to populate the background traffic operating under visual flight rules. The results presented in this study inform the safety case, requirements development, and the operational environment for DAA minimum operational performance standards.

Safety↗
NASA NTRS2015

Airspace Safety Threshold Study: NAS-Wide Encounter Rate Evaluation Using Historical Radar Data and ACES

Realization of the expected proliferation of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) operations in the National Airspace System (NAS) depends on the development and validation of performance standards for UAS Detect and Avoid (DAA) Systems. The RTCA Special Committee 228 (SC-228) is charged with leading the development of draft Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for UAS DAA Systems. NASA, as a participating member of RTCA SC-228 is committed to supporting the development and validation of draft requirements as well as the safety substantiation and end-to-end assessment of DAA system performance. With regard to the safety aspect being studied by the SC-228 DAA Safety sub-group, NASA has conducted a study using the ACES (Airspace Concept Evaluation System) simulation capability to determine: 1) the rate at which IFR aircraft encounter other IFR and VFR aircraft, and 2) the rate at which UAS aircraft encounter VFR aircraft as well as the corresponding encounter geometries. Five different separation thresholds were used (two for encounter and one each for well-clear, near mid-air collision, and closest point of approach). The results will be used by the SC-228 DAA Safety sub-group to inform decisions about the safety aspect of UAS DAA systems and future requirements development and validation efforts.

encounter geometry↗
NASA NTRS2019

Terminal Area Test Vector Development

This presentation provides an overview of work being done to develop test vectors for the terminal area, in coordination with RTCA Special Committee 228, an organization developing the Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Detect and Avoid (DAA) systems. The work leverages existing encounter data to develop a set of encounters to be used to define and refine both performance-based and functionally-based terminal area MOPS requirements. The encounter set would be used across various organizations supporting MOPS terminal area requirements development to provide some level of consistency in terms of terminal area assumptions. The work will investigate other potentially applicable data sets and make any similarly needed adjustments to arrive at a consolidated set of terminal area encounters.

terminal area↗
NASA NTRS2019

Detect-and-Avoid Alerting Performance for High-Speed UAS and Non-Cooperative Aircraft

This paper presents a set of experiments designed to assess the viability of using a smaller Detect and Avoid (DAA) volume for large Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) when they are trying to remain well clear of non-cooperative visual flight rules (VFR) aircraft, in compliance with Federal regulations. The current DAA volume was defined for both cooperative and non-cooperative VFR traffic by the work of RTCA (Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics) Special Committee 228 in 2017, in what is referred to in this paper as the Phase 1 standards. Subsequent work by the committee has been focused on enabling operations by smaller UAS that cannot carry the heavy radars required for the Phase 1 DAA Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS). The work discussed in this paper will explore whether a Phase 1 UAS using a Phase 1 radar can use the reduced non-cooperative DAA alerting volume being studied for smaller, slower Phase 2 UAS without significantly degrading system safety. The study uses UAS models and background traffic from previous Phase 1 and Phase 2 research to run an unmitigated simulation that will examine alerting performance using different DAA well clear definitions. The primary metrics are also tied to the alerting performance of the DAA system, and include average alerting times, probabilities of missed and late alerts, and the probability of a near mid-air collision given a loss of "well clear," as defined by the DAA system. Results are expected to help RTCA make the determination whether or not the DAA well clear definition for Phase 1 UAS can be reduced for non-cooperative VFR aircraft.

UAS↗
NASA NTRS2019

Defining Well Clear Separation for Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operating with Noncooperative Aircraft

Detect-and-Avoid (DAA) systems are essential to the safe operations of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, and have the objectives of mitigating collisions with and remaining Well Clear of manned aircraft. This paper analyzes four candidate DAA Well Clear definitions for non-cooperative aircraft using mitigated performance metrics of DAA systems. These DAA Well Clear definitions were proposed in previous work based on their unmitigated collision risk and maneuver initiation range. In this work they are evaluated using safety and operational suitability metrics computed from a large number of representative encounters. Results suggest that although the four candidate DAA Well Clear definitions provide comparable safety, the alerting characteristics give preference for the DAA Well Clear definition without a temporal parameter.

Well Clear↗
NASA NTRS2019

Advancing the Standards for Unmanned Air System Communications, Navigation and Surveillance

Under NASA program NNA16BD84C, new architectures were identified and developed for supporting reliable and secure Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) needs for Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) operating in both controlled and uncontrolled airspace. An analysis of architectures for the two categories of airspace and an implementation technology readiness analysis were performed. These studies produced NASA reports that have been made available in the public domain and have been briefed in previous conferences. We now consider how the products of the study are influencing emerging directions in the aviation standards communities. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Communications Panel (CP), Working Group I (WG-I) is currently developing a communications network architecture known as the Aeronautical Telecommunications Network with Internet Protocol Services (ATN/IPS). The target use case for this service is secure and reliable Air Traffic Management (ATM) for manned aircraft operating in controlled airspace. However, the work is more and more also considering the emerging class of airspace users known as Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS), which refers to certain UAS classes. In addition, two Special Committees (SCs) in the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) are developing Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS) and Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for UAS. RTCA SC-223 is investigating an Internet Protocol Suite (IPS) and AeroMACS aviation data link for interoperable (INTEROP) UAS communications. Meanwhile, RTCA SC-228 is working to develop Detect And Avoid (DAA) equipment and a Command and Control (C2) Data Link MOPS establishing LBand and C-Band solutions. These RTCA Special Committees along with ICAO CP WG/I are therefore overlapping in terms of the Communication, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) alternatives they are seeking to provide for an integrated manned- and unmanned air traffic management service as well as remote pilot command and control. This paper presents UAS CNS architecture concepts developed under the NASA program that apply to all three of the aforementioned committees. It discusses the similarities and differences in the problem spaces under consideration in each committee, and considers the application of a common set of CNS alternatives that can be widely applied. As the works of these committees progress, it is clear that the overlap will need to be addressed to ensure a consistent and safe framework for worldwide aviation. In this study, we discuss similarities and differences in the various operational models and show how the CNS architectures developed under the NASA program apply.

Ponchak, Denise S.↗
NASA NTRS2020

Detect-and-Avoid: Flight Test 6 Scripted Encounters Data Analysis

The Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) in the National Airspace System (NAS) project conducted Flight Test 6 (FT6) in 2019. The ultimate goal of this flight test was to produce data to inform RTCA SC-228's Phase II Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Detect and Avoid (DAA) and Low Size, Weight, and Power Sensors. This report documents the analysis of scripted encounters' data. Scripted encounters own were analyzed and categorized based on the outcome of alert, maneuver guidance, and effectiveness of pilots' maneuver in resolving conflicts. Results indicate that UAS pilots' decisions as well as intruder maneuvers are leading factors that contribute to ineffective DAA maneuvers. Results also show that adding buffers to the DAA's suggested minimum turn angle improves effectiveness of the DAA maneuvers.

Wang, Wei-Ching↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Human-in-the-Loop Flight Simulation Experiment on Unmanned Aircraft Terminal Operations

A Detect and Avoid (DAA) System is a suite of sensors, tracker, and alerting and guidance algorithms that assist a remote pilot of an Unmanned Aircraft System in maintaining separation from airborne traffic by complying with current ‘see and avoid’ requirements. To date, work has focused on operations transiting to and from Class A or special use airspace. Current efforts are defining DAA system requirements for operations in and around terminal airspace. As a contribution to the current efforts, this paper presents results from a Human-in-the-Loop experiment comparing methods of changing from the transit-specific alerting and guidance criteria to the reduced terminal-specific alerting and guidance criteria.

Devin Patrick Jack↗
NASA NTRS2020

Integration Test and Evaluation (IT&E) Flight Test Series 6 Live Virtual Constructive - Distributed Environment (LVC-DE) Test Report

The goals of the Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) (also UAS-NAS) Project are to reduce the barriers for UAS access and its integration into the NAS. The UAS-NAS project and industry stakeholders conducted a series of flight tests integrating technologies from the Modeling & Simulation (M&S), Human Systems Integration (HSI), and Communication and Control (C2), and Integration, Test & Evaluation (IT&E) research areas. The last of the flight test series, Flight Test Series 6 (FT6) was conducted in late 2019 and focused on evaluating the interaction of the airborne non-cooperative surveillance system and the Detect and Avoid (DAA) technology. The DAA system generated conflict alert and guidance for pilots using a Research Ground Control System (RGCS) to avoid intruder aircraft. The conflict alerting and guidance information was presented on the RGCS’s display using symbology developed by the human factors team. The objective of FT6 was to investigate the interoperability of Low Size, Weight, and Power (Low SWaP) sensors with the DAA alerting, guidance, and display requirements. To support this goal, the distributed test environments (DTE) were developed at Ames Research Center (ARC) and Armstrong Flight Research Center (AFRC) and securely linked over a Virtual Private Network (VPN). These environments took advantage of existing Live Virtual Constructive (LVC) technologies to support research observation at both Centers with the insertion of live UAS and manned intruder aircraft into a simulated NAS environment with Air Traffic Control (ATC) and constructive manned aircraft. The experiment was distributed between AFRC flight operations and research facilities and the Distributed Simulation Research Laboratory (DSRL) and Software Development Laboratory (SDL) in building N243 at ARC. The Air Traffic Controller and pseudo pilots operated from the DSRL and SDL, respectively, using the Multi-Aircraft Control System (MACS). The test subject and researchers operated from the Research Ground Control Station (RGCS) at AFRC using the Vigilant Spirit Control Station (VSCS) and associated DAA software and displays. Flight Operation for the unmanned aircraft (UA) and manned intruder traffic was conducted at AFRC. Virtual traffic was managed by ARC. Voice distribution was accomplished using a combination of disparate communication systems at ARC and AFRC. The purpose of this document is to record the development, design, and execution of activities in support of the FT6 efforts from the perspective of the ARC IT&E team. Furthermore, the Armstrong IT&E team has published a thorough FT6 Test Report, with emphasis on flight test support, facilities and vehicle development; this report complements the Armstrong report. Analysis of collected FT6 data will be conducted and reported by the M&S and HSI teams and will be published in separate reports.

UAS-NAS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Impact of Airborne Radar Uncertainties on Detect-and-Avoid Systems’ Performance

Impact of sensor uncertainty on Detect-and-Avoid (DAA) systems’ performance is investigated. Key metrics analyzed are the loss of DAA well clear ratio, the near-mid-air-collision risk ratio, the alert ratio, and the number of maneuvers per loss of DAA well clear. Sensitivity of these metrics to the magnitude of sensor uncertainty, pilots’ selection of maneuver, and surveillance range is investigated. Benefits of a dynamic buffer around the DAA well clear separation boundary, computed based on track accuracies, are also analyzed. These metrics are computed from open- and closed-loop simulations of a large number of representative encounters between an unmanned aircraft system and a manned aircraft. Results show that sensor uncertainty degrades safety metrics considerably but has only a minor effect on the number of maneuvers per loss of DAA well clear. The number of maneuvers, nonetheless, can be reduced by a 5◦ buffer away from the edge of the range of conflict-resulting heading in pilots’ selection of maneuver.

UAS↗
NASA NTRS2020

UAS Pilot Assessments of Display and Alerting for the Airborne Collision Avoidance System XU

Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) must comply with specific standards to operate in the National Airspace System (NAS). Among the requirements are the detect and avoid (DAA) capabilities, which include display, alerting, and guidance specifications. Previous studies have queried pilots for their subjective feedback on these display elements on earlier systems; the present study sought pilot evaluations with an initial iteration of the unmanned variant of a Next Generation Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS XU). Sixteen participants piloted simulated aircraft with both standalone and integrated DAA displays. Their opinions were gathered using post-block and post-simulation questionnaires as well as guided debriefs. The data showed pilots had better understanding and comfort with the system when using an integrated display. Pilots also rated ACAS Xu alerting and guidance as generally acceptable and effective. Implications for further development of ACAS XU and DAA displays are discussed.

UAS↗
NASA NTRS2020

UAS Integration in the NAS Project: Overview of Flight Test Series 6

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration in the National Airspace System (UAS-NAS) Project has conducted a series of flight test campaigns intended to support the reduction of barriers that prevent unmanned aircraft from flying without the required waivers from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The 2019 Flight Test Series 6 (FT6) campaign furthered this path and supported three test configurations: 1) Radar Characterization, 2) Scripted Encounters and 3) Full Mission. Radar Characterization assessed the performance of Honeywell’s low size, weight, and power (low SWaP) radar system; Scripted Encounters investigated the timing of Detect and Avoid (DAA) alerting thresholds using a Department of Defense (DoD) Group 3 unmanned aircraft system (UAS) equipped with low SWaP sensors and three different live intruder aircraft flown at varying encounter geometries; and Full Mission validated human-in-the-loop simulations by collecting pilot performance data from a ground control station while controlling a live unmanned aircraft on a mission in both virtual and live air traffic controlled airspace. The subject pilot observed a research display that presented DAA advisories to maintain separation from live and virtual aircraft. The test was conducted over a twenty-week period within the R-2508 special use airspace located near Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB), CA. Over 240 encounters were flown during the test series and FT6 proved to be invaluable for the purposes of planning, managing, and executing this type of integrated flight test in both live and virtual environments. Data collected from FT6 was provided to the RTCA Special Committee 228 (SC-228) to help inform the Phase 2 Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS). FT6 was the final test series for the UAS-NAS project that began in 2012. This paper provides an overview of FT6 and its success can be directly attributed to the diligent work of the men and women who supported this effort.

UAS in the NAS↗
NASA NTRS2020

Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration in the National Airspace System Project: Phase 2 Abstracts - FY2017 to FY2020

There is an increasing need to fly Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the National Airspace System (NAS) to perform missions of vital importance to national security and defense, emergency management, science, and to enable commercial applications. However, routine access by UAS into the NAS remains unrealized. The UAS community needs routine access to the global airspace for all classes of UAS. Based upon that need, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) Integrated Aviation Systems Program (IASP) UAS Integration in the NAS Project identified the following goal: To Provide research findings, utilizing simulation and flight tests, to support the development and validation of Detect and Avoid (DAA) and Command and Control (C2) technologies necessary for integrating UAS into the NAS. Because this is such a broad reaching challenge facing the UAS community, the UAS-NAS Project recognizes the importance of working together with others in Industry and Other Government Agencies to overcome the technical, operational, and public perception barriers.

Jamie Marie Turner↗
NASA NTRS2021

GA-ASI Final Report and Program Wrap-up for NASA System Integration and Operationalization (SIO)

The NASA SIO demonstration flight of April 3, 2020 represents a successful culmination of 18 months of coordinated effort between GA-ASI, NASA, the FAA, Collins Aerospace, and Honeywell Aerospace to operate a Medium Altitude, Long Endurance (MALE) Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) safely in the National Airspace System (NAS) using industry leading prototype technologies. The GA-ASI team consisted of technical experts, program managers, engineers, mechanics, flight technicians, flight crews, and numerous other subject matter experts. This final report describes the most significant and potentially impactful aspects of the planning, integration, test, and flight aspects of this effort. GA-ASI successfully integrated the key technologies needed for UAS to fly in the NAS onto our prototype SkyGuardian UAS, which was designed to meet the most stringent airworthiness standards applicable to an aircraft of its size category. A proven Detect and Avoid (DAA) system, developed by GA-ASI and utilizing Honeywell Aerospace technology was integrated onto SkyGuardian for the first time, along with datalink radios from Collins Aerospace that meet the new civil standard for Control and Non-Payload Communication (CNPC) links. GA-ASI also obtained approvals from the FAA and FCC to operate the reconfigured UAS. The SIO demonstration flight represented a commercial aerial surveying operation conducted at medium altitude (>10,000ft above mean sea level). The aircraft’s onboard sensors were used to capture photographic, infrared and radar imagery of public and commercial infrastructure and land, and to subsequently produce the types of data products that would provide business value to potential customers. These survey services would supplement or replace services currently provided by manned airplanes and helicopters, small drones or satellites. A “virtual” mission was also planned, to show what additional survey data could have been captured during the flight if additional sensors had been installed on the aircraft’s external hardpoints. This revision of the final report focuses on information of value to the wider UAS community, and avoids propriety data to facilitate broad dissemination. It also includes a description of GA-ASI’s engagement with the FAA following the SIO flight, which led to the award of an updated Special Airworthiness Certificate in the Experimental Category (SAC-EC) and a Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA) allowing operation of the SkyGuardian UAS using its DAA system to satisfy right-of-way rules, instead of a chase plane. The associated operational limitations are described to illustrate the further steps that would be needed to remove those limitations for unhindered commercial operations.

Flight demonstration↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

SIRIUS: Simulation Infrastructure for Research on Interoperating Unmanned Systems

This paper presents the Simulation Infrastructure for Research on Interoperating Unmanned Systems (SIRIUS), a research framework for simulation and analysis of future conceptual Urban Air Mobility (UAM) operations. SIRIUS is being developed under the auspices of the NASA Air Traffic Management eXploration project, UAM subproject (ATM-X UAM). SIRIUS provides an intuitive, highly configurable graphical user interface to design complex traffic scenarios and airspace configurations representative of conceptual UAM operations. Aircraft simulated with SIRIUS can be equipped with flight-tested capabilities for detect and avoid (DAA), geofencing, distributed merging and spacing, path conformance, and path planning while executing time-constrained, 4D trajectories generated by a UAM ground operations system. Central to the design of the SIRIUS simulation framework is the capability to evaluate the integration and interoperability of ground-based separation services (e.g., strategic separation) with extended DAA functionality (e.g., path monitoring, separation provision, merging and spacing, etc.) The simulation environment also supports modelling of wind, navigation, and sensor uncertainties, as well as communication delays. SIRIUS enables distributed simulation of large-scale scenarios. An interactive graphical analysis capability helps isolate, visualize, and compare relevant vehicle state data and widely used measures of performance metrics across multiple scenarios.

Andrew Peters↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Effects of Unmanned Aircraft Voice Communication Delay on En Route Air Traffic Management Operations

The present study investigated the effects of remotely piloted unmanned aircraft (UA) voice communication delay on air traffic management operations with different background sector traffic-volume levels. Three one-way UA voice delay lengths of 400, 900, and 2,000 milliseconds (ms) were tested, representing the currently estimated transmission delays for terrestrial, satellite communication (SATCOM), and long SATCOM Command and Control Link System, respectively. All delay values exceeded 390 ms, the FAA’s current requirement for the maximum communication latency in the National Airspace System. Eight retired en route air traffic controllers (ATCs) and eight remote pilots (RPs) participated in a human-inthe-loop simulation study, where a simulated UA flight transitioned through an Oakland en route low-altitude sector to a local non-towered airport. The results showed that, when the 2,000-ms voice delay was present, radio transmission step-ons and detect-and-avoid (DAA) alert level elevations increased. In addition, ATC workload, ATC acceptability for the UA, and RP acceptability for the DAA were negatively affected only when the UA had a 2,000-ms voice delay under the high traffic-volume condition, but not in the other conditions.

remotely piloted unmanned aircraft, voice delay, s↗
NASA NTRS2022

Effects of Unmanned Aircraft Voice Communication Delay on En Route Air Traffic Management Operations

The present study investigated the effects of remotely piloted unmanned aircraft (UA) voice communication delay on air traffic management operations with different background sector traffic-volume levels. Three one-way UA voice delay lengths of 400, 900, and 2,000 milliseconds (ms) were tested, representing the currently estimated transmission delays for terrestrial, satellite communication (SATCOM), and long SATCOM Command and Control Link System, respectively. All delay values exceeded 390 ms, the FAA’s current requirement for the maximum communication latency in the National Airspace System. Eight retired en route air traffic controllers (ATCs) and eight remote pilots (RPs) participated in a human-in-the-loop simulation study, where a simulated UA flight transitioned through an Oakland en route low-altitude sector to a local non-towered airport. The results showed that, when the 2,000-ms voice delay was present, radio transmission step-ons and detect-and-avoid (DAA) alert level elevations increased. In addition, ATC workload, ATC acceptability for the UA, and RP acceptability for the DAA were negatively affected only when the UA had a 2,000-ms voice delay under the high traffic-volume condition, but not in the other conditions.

remotely piloted unmanned aircraft, voice delay, s↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Assured Vehicle Automation 1 Sim - Results Outbrief

In early 2022, the Human Autonomy Teaming Lab (NASA Ames Research Center) conducted a manned, human-in-the-loop (HITL) simulation. This part-task HITL began the lab’s Hazard Perception and Avoidance (HPA) technical work under NASA’s Advanced Air Mobility (AAM), Automated Flight and Contingency Management (AFCM) Sub-Project. The results of that sim guided the objectives of the current study, which were to examine pilots’ use of the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) rotorcraft variant (Xr) v2 in multiple phases of flight with two separate Xr Modes, fully leverage Xr v2 features (e.g., use radar altimeter data to inform low altitude Resolution Advisory [RA] behavior, utilize the ability to designate “terminal-area intruders,” and display airspeed-based Detect and Avoid [DAA] guidance), emulate a “Traffic Advisory” (TA), and present Xr in a higher-fidelity environment. Therefore, this study was conducted in the Vertical Motion Simulator, and the variables included Phase of Flight (En-route, Hover, and Approach) as well as ACAS Xr Mode (TA/RA and DAA). The data collected included response times, losses of well clear, and maneuver sizes and durations as well as subjective ratings like acceptability and usability. Additional details and future anticipations are also discussed.

air taxis↗