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Activities related to development of an advanced composites stabilizer for the Boeing 737 commercial transport are reported. Activities include discussion of criteria and objectives, design loads, the fatigue spectrum definition to be used for all spectrum fatigue testing, fatigue analysis, manufacturing producibility studies, the ancillary test program, quality assurance, and manufacturing development.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.
A qualitative identification of the steps required to assure the incorporation of radiological system safety principles and objectives into all phases of a manned space base program are presented. Specific areas of emphasis include: (1) radiological program management, (2) nuclear system safety plan implementation, (3) impact on program, and (4) summary of the key operation and design guidelines and requirements. The plan clearly indicates the necessity of considering and implementing radiological system safety recommendations as early as possible in the development cycle to assure maximum safety and minimize the impact on design and mission plans.
Maintaining safe separation between aircraft remains one of the key aviation challenges as the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) emerges. The goals of the NextGen are to increase capacity and reduce flight delays to meet the aviation demand growth through the 2025 time frame while maintaining safety and efficiency. The envisioned NextGen is expected to enable high air traffic density, diverse fleet operations in the airspace, and a decrease in separation distance. All of these factors contribute to the potential for Loss of Separation (LOS) between aircraft. LOS is a precursor to a potential mid-air collision (MAC). The NASA Airspace Operations and Safety Program (AOSP) is committed to developing aircraft separation assurance concepts and technologies to mitigate LOS instances, therefore, preventing MAC. This paper focuses on the analysis of causal and contributing factors of LOS accidents and incidents leading to MAC occurrences. Mid-air collisions among large commercial aircraft are rare in the past decade, therefore, the LOS instances in this study are for general aviation using visual flight rules in the years 2000-2010. The study includes the investigation of causal paths leading to LOS, and the development of the Airborne Loss of Separation Analysis Model (ALOSAM) using Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) to capture the multi-dependent relations of causal factors. The ALOSAM is currently a qualitative model, although further development could lead to a quantitative model. ALOSAM could then be used to perform impact analysis of concepts and technologies in the AOSP portfolio on the reduction of LOS risk.
Telerobot systems are being developed to support a number of space mission applications. In low earth orbit, telerobots and teleoperated manipulators will be used in shuttle operations and space station construction/maintenance. Free flying telerobotic service vehicles will be used at low and geosynchronous orbital operations. Rovers and autonomous vehicles will be equipped with telerobotic devices in planetary exploration. In all of these systems, human operators will interact with the robot system at varied levels during the scheduled operations. The human operators may be in either orbital or ground-based control systems. To assure integrated system development and maximum utility across these systems, designers must be sensitive to the constraints and capabilities that the human brings to system operation and must be assisted in applying these human factors to system development. The simulation and analysis system is intended to serve the needs of system analysis/designers as an integrated workstation in support of telerobotic design.
With the retirement of the Space Shuttle looming, a series of new spacecraft is under development to assist in providing for the growing logistical needs of the International Space Station (ISS). Two of these vehicles are being built under a NASA initiative known as the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program. These visiting vehicles ; Space X s Dragon and Orbital Science Corporation s Cygnus , are to be domestically produced in the United States and designed to add to the capabilities of the Russian Progress and Soyuz workhorses, the European Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) and the Japanese H-2 Transfer Vehicle (HTV). Most of what is known about the COTS program has focused on the work of Orbital and SpaceX in designing, building, and testing their respective launch and cargo vehicles. However, there is also a team within the Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) at NASA s Johnson Space Center working with their operational counterparts in these companies to provide operational safety oversight and mission assurance via the development of operational scenarios and products needed for these missions. Ensuring that the operational aspect is addressed for the initial demonstration flights of these vehicles is the topic of this paper. Integrating Dragon and Cygnus into the ISS operational environment has posed a unique challenge to NASA and their partner companies. This is due in part to the short time span of the COTS program, as measured from initial contract award until first launch, as well as other factors that will be explored in the text. Operational scenarios and products developed for each COTS vehicle will be discussed based on the following categories: timelines, on-orbit checkout, ground documentation, crew procedures, software updates and training materials. Also addressed is an outline of the commonalities associated with the operations for each vehicle. It is the intent of the authors to provide their audience with a better understanding of the mission assurance that MOD brings to commercial ventures to the ISS
While there have been meetings on assurance of autonomy in other application areas, this meeting seeks to develop a roadmap for assurance of autonomy specifically for robotic space missions. Key characteristics that distinguish this application area include: the lack of detailed prior knowledge of the environments in which those missions are to operate; the challenges of mimicking deep space operating conditions for purposes of testing; the need to be highly assured of failsafe operation; limited and delayed (due to speed of light over solar system distances) communication; and the one/few-of-a-kind, must-work-the-first-time nature of most space missions.
Software assurance is the planned and systematic set of activities that ensures that software processes and products conform to requirements, standards, and procedures. Examples of such activities are the following: code inspections, unit tests, design reviews, performance analyses, construction of traceability matrices, etc. In practice, software development projects have only limited resources (e.g., schedule, budget, and availability of personnel) to cover the entire development effort, of which assurance is but a part. Projects must therefore select judiciously from among the possible assurance activities. At its heart, this can be viewed as an optimization problem; namely, to determine the allocation of limited resources (time, money, and personnel) to minimize risk or, alternatively, to minimize the resources needed to reduce risk to an acceptable level. The end result of the work reported here is a means to optimize quality-assurance processes used in developing software. This is achieved by combining two prior programs in an innovative manner
Software assurance is the planned and systematic set of activities that ensures that software processes and products conform to requirements, standards, and procedures. Examples of such activities are the following: code inspections, unit tests, design reviews, performance analyses, construction of traceability matrices, etc. In practice, software development projects have only limited resources (e.g., schedule, budget, and availability of personnel) to cover the entire development effort, of which assurance is but a part. Projects must therefore select judiciously from among the possible assurance activities. At its heart, this can be viewed as an optimization problem; namely, to determine the allocation of limited resources (time, money, and personnel) to minimize risk or, alternatively, to minimize the resources needed to reduce risk to an acceptable level. The end result of the work reported here is a means to optimize quality-assurance processes used in developing software.
The continued goal of the ARC SQA project in the Advanced Reactor Technologies program of DOE is to resolve the QA gaps for the ARC software that limit, or prevent, commercialization of the software for industry users. This project started in earnest in fiscal year 2023 which saw the entire code system moved from a SVN repository to a GitLab repository and an associated software quality assurance plan (SQAP) developed and ratified. Most of the QA gaps in the ARC software were identified in collaboration with industry partners and work begin in fiscal year 2023 and continued in 2024. The primary documentation that is missing includes user manuals, user guides, software verification reports, and code coverage assessments. The SUMMAR manual was completed this fiscal year and work was started on creating manuals for SE2ANL, SE2RCT, and DASSH. Software verification work was carried out for DIF3D and REBUS in a previous program and the current fiscal year saw the completion of software verification reports for GAMSOR, GAMSRC, VARPOW, EvaluateFlux, and SUMMAR. The goal for the next fiscal year is to complete the PERSENT software verification work and begin planning the software verification work for DASSH, SE2ANL, and SE2RCT. The code coverage reports for DIF3D and MC2-3 were completed in the previous fiscal year and the goal is to generate code coverage reports for REBUS, GAMSOR, PERSENT, and DASSH in the coming fiscal year. A considerable amount of effort was spent in the current fiscal year working on the continuous integration capability for automated regression testing in GitLab. The first version of the testing was created in the previous fiscal year and applied to DIF3D and its utility programs. That testing was extended this year to cover GAMSOR, REBUS, and PERSENT. To accomplish this, the first version of the new testing methodology had to be updated to make a single output checking methodology viable for all of the ARC software. This will result in a single document to detail the automated regression testing methodology and minor documents to detail the tolerance settings that have been applied to the output for each ARC code. The previous methodology put into place with SVN would have required a separate document for each ARC code to detail the output checking methodology and the tolerance settings for the output from each code. Because some of our industry partners are providing funds to add new capabilities to the ARC software to meet their needs, all of which must be reviewed and approved by the SQA program funded by this project, a summary of that development work is detailed in this report. Overall progress on resolving the QA gaps has been good this year with the most impactful improvement for our industry partners in capability being the creation of a threaded version of DIF3D-VARIANT that allows the DIF3D, REBUS, and GAMSOR run times to be reduced by a factor of 4-6. The most impactful QA gap that was resolved was the software verification of GAMSRC and VARPOW.
This is a software-specific quality assurance plan (SQAP) for the X-Ray ToolKit (XTK) software that aligns with Sandia policy IT008, the SSQAP policy SS-R89727, and requirements related to DOE O 414.1D, Quality Assurance for software development.
The continued goal of the ARC SQA project in the Advanced Reactor Technologies program of DOE is to resolve the QA gaps for the ARC software that limit, or prevent, commercialization of the software for industry users. This project started in earnest in fiscal year 2023 which saw the entire code system moved from a SVN repository to a GitLab repository and an associated software quality assurance plan (SQAP) developed and ratified. Most of the QA gaps in the ARC software were identified in collaboration with industry partners and work begin in fiscal year 2023 and continued through 2024 and 2025. The continuous integration testing was extended to RCT, DASSH, and SE2ANL. Minor changes were required to the original continuous integration methodology to make this happen. When full confidence in the methodology is complete, a report will be created to detail the automated regression testing methodology and minor reports will be created to detail the tolerance settings that have been applied to the output for each ARC code. The primary documentation that is missing includes user manuals, user guides, software verification reports, and code coverage assessments. The DASSH, SE2ANL, and SE2RCT manuals were completed this fiscal year. A review of the SE2ANL software identified that it is unrealistic to include updated correlations or different geometry models and it was scheduled for deprecation in favor of DASSH. The SE2ANL manual is essential for SE2RCT as they are similar but quite different in purpose. The only piece of software missing a manual consistent with the source code is NUBOW-3D which is a focus of the coming year. The code coverage report for DIF3D was updated and code coverage reports were created for REBUS, RCT, PERSENT, GAMSRC, and DASSH. Minor coverage issues were identified for all of these pieces of software which did not prevent the work done to transition them to the OneAPI compiler. Because SE2ANL was scheduled for deprecation, it was not transitioned, but it was successfully tested with the OneAPI compiler. This leaves SE2RCT and NUBOW-3D as the only pieces of software not transitioned to OneAPI and further work is required to get SE2RCT to work properly. The SE2RCT software transition will begin early next year while the NUBOW-3D software requires a manual before it can begin. Software verification work has been completed for DIF3D, REBUS, GAMSOR, GAMSRC, VARPOW, EvaluateFlux, and SUMMAR. The PERSENT software verification work was completed this year which was somewhat delayed because of unexpected bugs in the software. The PERSENT manual was updated to detail some of the issues and discuss the bowing reactivity worth feature added in the previous fiscal year. The RCT, DASSH, SE2RCT, and NUBOW-3D software are the only maintained pieces of software without verification reports. The software verification work for DASSH will be a focus in the upcoming fiscal year and it is hoped that some of the test cases created can serve as verification tests for SE2RCT. The NUBOW-3D work will begin when the manual and requirements report are completed. Only minor industry partner software development funds were provided this year. The DASSH software was updated to handle general axial geometry for each assembly and the NUBOW-3D software was updated to incorporate a new input format and better output. Overall progress on resolving the QA gaps has been good this year.
The continued goal of the ARC SQA project in the Advanced Reactor Technologies program of DOE is to resolve the QA gaps for the ARC software that limit, or prevent, commercialization of the software for industry users. This project started in earnest in fiscal year 2023 which saw the entire code system moved from a SVN repository to a GitLab repository and an associated software quality assurance plan (SQAP) developed and ratified. Most of the QA gaps in the ARC software were identified in collaboration with industry partners and work begin in fiscal year 2023 and continued through 2024 and 2025. The continuous integration testing was extended to RCT, DASSH, and SE2ANL. Minor changes were required to the original continuous integration methodology to make this happen. When full confidence in the methodology is complete, a report will be created to detail the automated regression testing methodology and minor reports will be created to detail the tolerance settings that have been applied to the output for each ARC code. The primary documentation that is missing includes user manuals, user guides, software verification reports, and code coverage assessments. The DASSH, SE2ANL, and SE2RCT manuals were completed this fiscal year. A review of the SE2ANL software identified that it is unrealistic to include updated correlations or different geometry models and it was scheduled for deprecation in favor of DASSH. The SE2ANL manual is essential for SE2RCT as they are similar but quite different in purpose. The only piece of software missing a manual consistent with the source code is NUBOW-3D which is a focus of the coming year. The code coverage report for DIF3D was updated and code coverage reports were created for REBUS, RCT, PERSENT, GAMSRC, and DASSH. Minor coverage issues were identified for all of these pieces of software which did not prevent the work done to transition them to the OneAPI compiler. Because SE2ANL was scheduled for deprecation, it was not transitioned, but it was successfully tested with the OneAPI compiler. This leaves SE2RCT and NUBOW-3D as the only pieces of software not transitioned to OneAPI and further work is required to get SE2RCT to work properly. The SE2RCT software transition will begin early next year while the NUBOW-3D software requires a manual before it can begin. Software verification work has been completed for DIF3D, REBUS, GAMSOR, GAMSRC, VARPOW, EvaluateFlux, and SUMMAR. The PERSENT software verification work was completed this year which was somewhat delayed because of unexpected bugs in the software. The PERSENT manual was updated to detail some of the issues and discuss the bowing reactivity worth feature added in the previous fiscal year. The RCT, DASSH, SE2RCT, and NUBOW-3D software are the only maintained pieces of software without verification reports. The software verification work for DASSH will be a focus in the upcoming fiscal year and it is hoped that some of the test cases created can serve as verification tests for SE2RCT. The NUBOW-3D work will begin when the manual and requirements report are completed. Only minor industry partner software development funds were provided this year. The DASSH software was updated to handle general axial geometry for each assembly and the NUBOW-3D software was updated to incorporate a new input format and better output. Overall progress on resolving the QA gaps has been good this year.
The situation of American aeronautics in the year 1929 is examined. In that year manufacturers all over the U.S. were bringing out new aircraft models to capture an assured market. Earlier developments in aviation in the U.S. after World War I are also considered along with the conditions of American aeronautics in the 1930s. Attention is given to the introduction of the Barling NB-3 with its all-metal construction, efforts of NACA to collect and disseminate in a uniform notation aerodynamic characteristics of airfoils from laboratories around the world, and the invention of the variable-density wind tunnel.
Clipping of narrow extrema and distortion of smooth profiles is a well known problem associated with so-called high resolution nonoscillatory convection schemes. A strategy is presented for accurately simulating highly convective flows containing discontinuities such as density fronts or shock waves, without distorting smooth profiles or clipping narrow local extrema. The convection algorithm is based on non-artificially diffusive third-order upwinding in smooth regions, with automatic adaptive stencil expansion to (in principle, arbitrarily) higher order upwinding locally, in regions of rapidly changing gradients. This is highly cost effective because the wider stencil is used only where needed-in isolated narrow regions. A recently developed universal limiter assures sharp monotonic resolution of discontinuities without introducing artificial diffusion or numerical compression. An adaptive discriminator is constructed to distinguish between spurious overshoots and physical peaks; this automatically relaxes the limiter near local turning points, thereby avoiding loss of resolution in narrow extrema. Examples are given for one-dimensional pure convection of scalar profiles at constant velocity.
A strategy is presented for accurately simulating highly convective flows containing discontinuities such as density fronts or shock waves, without distorting smooth profiles or clipping narrow local extrema. The convection algorithm is based on non-artificially-diffusive third-order upwinding in smooth regions, with automatic adaptive stencil expansion to (in principle, arbitrarily) higher order upwinding locally, in regions of rapidly changing gradients. This is highly cost-effective because the wider stencil is used only where needed - in isolated narrow regions. A recently developed universal limiter assures sharp monotonic resolution of discontinuities without introducing artificial diffusion or numerical compression. An adaptive discriminator is constructed to distinguish between spurious overshoots and physical peaks; this automatically relaxes the limiter near local turning points, thereby avoiding loss of resolution in narrow extrema. Examples are given for one-dimensional pure convection of scalar profiles at constant velocity.
The helpful hints herein describe, from a system perspective, the functional flow of hardware and software. The flow will begin at the experiment development stage and continue through build-up, test, verification, delivery, launch and deintegration of the experiment. An effort will be made to identify those interfaces and transfer functions of processing that can be improved upon in the new world of 'Faster, Better, and Cheaper.' The documentation necessary to ensure configuration and processing requirements satisfaction will also be discussed. Hints and suggestions for improvements to enhance each phase of the flow will be derived from extensive experience and documented lessons learned. Charts will be utilized to define the functional flow and a list of 'lessons learned' will be addressed to show applicability. In conclusion, specific improvements for several areas of hardware processing, procedure development and quality assurance, that are generic to all Small Payloads, will be identified.